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ABSTRACT 
In the context of the profound transformative developments in Eastern Europe since 1989. this 
study examines the political conception and evolution of 'shock therapy' in Poland. As the 
region's pioneer of neo-liberal engineering, Poland embarked on its post-communist reforms 
with a singular determination to eliminate hyperinflation and transfer the bulk of its state 
enterprises into private hands. Emboldened by a unique window of opportunity in the second-
half of 1989 and driven by a philosophical attraction to Anglo-Saxon-style capitalism. Finance 
Minister Leszek Balcerowicz's actions epitomised the 'transition' perspective. Emphasising 
political imperatives in moments of accelerated change, conventional models, and a technocratic 
agenda, the 'transition' school chose Poland as its exemplary pupil. The 'adaptation' perspective. 
by contrast, defended by social democrats such as Ryszard Bugaj, recognised the constraints 
Polish reformers faced in departing from central planning, notably in their efforts to rid state 
firms of their self-managed status. Stressing the legacies of the past, indigenous structures, and 
a negotiated framework, the 'adaptation' school eschews sharp historical demarcations and 
uniform blueprints. 
Focusing on the endogenous aspects of the Polish transformation. this research 
demonstrates the need for a multifaceted evolutionary approach in which the 'transition' 
perspective offers insights on the foundations of 'shock therapy' while the 'adaptation' 
perspective underscores the significance of the self-management inheritance: the former, it is 
argued, helps explain the success of macroeconomic stabilisation while the latter reveals the 
impediments to large-scale privatisation. Four political variants of Polish neo-liberalism are 
presented in the context of a well-defined policy regime which became entrenched during the 
1990-1991 years. The spurious 'shock therapy versus gradualism' debate is then explored in 
order to illustrate the importance of initial conditions - the Hungarian route being of particular 
relevance. Finally, the views of the standard bearers of both schools, Jeffrey Sachs and John 
Gray, are discussed, if only to emphasise the need for clarity and specificity in the reform 
debates. 
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POLAND 
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PSL - Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peasant Party) 
PZPR - Polska Zjednoczona Partie Robotnicza (Polish United Workers' Party) 
ROAD - Ruch Obywatelski-Akcja Demokratyczna (Citizens' Movement-Democratic Action) 
SD - Stronnictwo Demokratycne (Democratic Party) 
SdRP - Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Social Democratic Party of the Polish 
Republic) 
SLD - Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance) 
UD - Unia Demokratyczna (Democratic Union) 
UP - Unia Pracy (Labour Union) 
UW - Unia Wolnosci (Freedom Union) 
WAK - Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka (Catholic Electoral Action) 
ZChN - Zjednoczenie Chrzescijatisko-Narodowe (Christian National Union) 
ZSL - Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe (United Peasant Party) 
HUNGARY 
FIDESz - Fiatal Demokratak SZQvetsege (Alliance of Young Democrats) 
FKgP - Ftiggetlen Kisgazada Part (Independent Smallholders' Party) 
KDNP - Kereszteny Demokratak Nepi Partja (Christian Democratic People's Party) 
MDF - Magyar Demokratikus Forum (Hungarian Democratic Forum) 
MSzP - Magyar Szocialista Part (Hungarian Socialist Party) 
MSzMP - Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) 
SzDSz - Szabad Demokratak SZQvetsege (Alliance of Free Democrats) 
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TO KASIA AND BARTEK 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Often the feeling prevails that everything is falling apart. In a way this is true. The 
former centralist, bureaucratic and dysfunctional system cannot be self-supporting and 
is collapsing. The new system, in all its aspects, is being born, prepared, thought through. 
But it is not yet up and working. - Vaclav Havel l 
The demands placed on students of post-communism are extraordinary. Part of the difficulty in 
assessing the impact of Eastern Europe's transitions is the lack of an historical precedent. The 
tentative conclusions drawn from the Southern European and Latin American regime changes 
in the 1970s and 1980s are subject to 'conceptual stretching,2 if applied to the geographically vast 
and culturally distinct region stretching from the Elbe to Vladivostok. Whilst the earlier cases 
involved a shift from authoritarianism to democracy. coupled with the liberalisation of economic 
management, their geopolitical ramifications were relatively limited. The revolutions of 1989, 
on the other hand, were considerably more far-reaching. The emergence of radical reformers in 
the former Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s provided the catalyst for 
un imagined developments which, to this day, have profound implications for the state of global 
affairs. The collapse of communism was, for the most part, greeted with relief throughout the 
Western hemisphere as the forty-year long Cold War seemed, finally, to have been brought to a 
close. Nowhere was the euphoria of the moment more poignantly expressed than in the Central 
European capitals of Warsaw, Prague and Budapest whose citizens witnessed an almost magical 
domino effect following the formation of the first non-communist cabinet in Poland in August 
1989. 
The annus mirabilis confronts the observer with a multitude of questions ranging from 
the precise reasons for communism's collapse, the condition of 'post-communism' itself, and the 
role of the West in facilitating (or hindering) the rehabilitation of weak and dispirited societies. 
Although analysts envisaged various forms of power-sharing arrangements between discredited 
party-states and insurgent opposition movements, the momentum of change was clearly 
underestimated. In retrospect, this is perhaps understandable. The focus of reform during the 
waning years of Soviet hegemony centred on economic issues: the authorities hoped in vain they 
could buy social peace with the lifting of a restriction here and the availability of another good 
there. The desire for capitalist institutions - and their perceived consequences, notably improved 
living standards - was a motivating force compelling governments to renounce their ideological 
aims and integrate their economies more closely with the West's. Yet even in countries such a~ 
Hungary and Poland, where the decentralisation of decision-making progressed the furthest, the 
economics of reform were inextricably linked to aspects of political legitimation. 
For what sets the post-communist states apart from the rest of the 'third wave'.' 
democratisations is the confluence of two historical processes as the basis for the transformation: 
the search for accountable political systems and the introduction of a market economy. This 
dual-track nature of the transition (the magnitude, variety and complexity of which challenges 
the appropriateness of the term as well as other social scientific methodology used to analyse its 
progression) is unprecedented in scope and thus requires careful appraisal and judicious 
treatment. Whilst familiar themes emerge when discussing the intricacies of East European 
reform, issues ranging from macroeconomic stabilisation to interest representation, even 
globalisation, it is important not to lose sight of the unique character of the changes and the 
constraints this imposes on our understanding of these developments. For as Claus Offe notes, 
"the upheaval is a revolution without a model and a theory. Its most conspicuous characteristic 
is the lack of any elaborated theoretical assumptions and normative arguments addressing the 
questions who is to carry out which actions under which circumstances and with what aims; 
which dilemmas are to be expected [along the way]; how the new synthesis of the post-
[communist] order ought to be constituted; and what meaning should be assigned to the notion 
of 'progress'."~ 
The daunting challenges facing the bankrupt economies of the East - similar in nature, 
though by no means identical across the region - command the attention of wide sections of the 
academic and policy-making communities. The interdisciplinary approach that is called for if 
the purpose of research is to uncover the multitude of factors influencing the trajectory of 
systemic change is not helped, in my view, by the indiscriminate and technically-oriented 
analyses that permeate the 'economics of transition' literature. As we begin the task of 
disaggregating the post-communist reform process - across the region and within individual 
countries - a fruitful area of investigation concerns the political and historical dimensions to 
economic change. In the case of the former, it is in the initial stages of transfonnation, 
particularly in those states where the drive for a radical break with the past is the most 
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pronounced, where the predominance of political forces is manifest. Quite often. these 
overshadow structural factors which, with hindsight, caution against grand designs or 'quick-fix' 
solutions. The decisions taken during these months, hurried and visionary yet audacious and 
resolute, determine the priorities of the first stages of transition and thus need to be a~sessed. 
Historical conditions are equally significant in determining the viability and/or suitability of 
economic reform programmes. In countries such as Hungary, for instance, where the "cathartic 
day one of 'shock therapy",5 never occurred, continuities in policy are much more apparent. Yet 
it is in those states which chose the radical path, like Poland in late 1989, where the need for 
historical analyses is all the more justified in view of the difficulties in departing from 'real 
socialism' . 
THE NATURE OF POST-COMMUNIST REFORM 
A cursory examination of the predicament faced by the ex-communist states reveals the 
magnitude of the task in effecting the transition to market democracy. The political opportunities 
present at the time of the collapse of the old order need to be placed in the context of the legacy 
of communism; an inheritance bedevilled by a host of structural and societal constraints. 
Questions relating to the uniqueness of these developments, commonly referred to as the 
'difference debate,6 in which the relevance of 'transitological' approaches to East European area 
studies is disputed, as well as their enduring presence in the construction of the new system are 
the subject of intense controversy. Whether one believes the imperatives of economic and 
politicalliberalisation can (and should) override the influence of historical factors, or whether 
one attaches greater significance to institutional or behavioural continuities, there is little doubt 
that the former Soviet bloc countries confront unparalleled challenges. While there are 
qualitative differences in the country-specific paths of extrication from communism7, basic 
similarities in their socioeconomic, political and cultural attributes distinguish the East European 
transitions from their Southern European and Latin American counterparts. 
Just as the Mediterranean states were spared the threat of economic collapse when 
dictatorships gave way to parliamentary systems, the Latin American countries could rely on the 
experience of long-standing (if at times misguided) development strategies to mitigate the 
adjustment when military juntas stepped down in favour of popularly elected governments. This 
emphasis on political objectives, on the one hand. and a pre-existing affinity for capitalist 
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institutions, on the other, aside from its implications regarding the sequencing of reform. 
distinguishes the earlier transitions from the post-communist reforms. "The key question. then. 
is whether [these] differences constitute variations on a common process - that is transitions from 
dictatorship to democracy - or altogether different processes - that is, democratisation versus 
what could be termed 'post-communism' ."8 Observers who claim these differences are ones of 
degree take the first position, while those who perceive them as differences in kind take the 
second. 
The simultaneous attempt to introduce democracy and a market economy tends to favour 
the second perspective. Fraught with a number of internal contradictions, the tensions, at least 
in the short term, between the political and economic processes of liberalisation raise new 
questions in the familiar debate concerning the type of political regime best suited to the interests 
of economic reform. Can the fledgling post-communist democracies manage the pressures of 
financial stabilisation? Under what political conditions is economic reform most likely to 
succeed? The impressive growth rates of a number of East Asian states beginning in the 1980s, 
in particular Taiwan and Singapore, to say nothing of China's distinctive reform path. suggest 
that perhaps (quasi-)authoritarian governments may be better equipped at coping with the rigours 
of adjustment - notably in those countries where radical macroeconomic stabilisation is required. 
Even Chile's experience with market reform under the guidance of General Augusto Pinochet 
is listed as a possible role model for Eastern Europe.9 Leaving aside the fact that empirical 
evidence to support these claims 10 is, at best, controversial, and that it is invariably the states 
comprising the former Soviet Union (as opposed to the more western-oriented Central European 
countries) that, rightly or wrongly, are the target of these suppositions, one need only reflect on 
the underlying motivations of Eastern Europe's revolutions to understand why such arguments 
can be dismissed (a prominent Polish dissident once stated that "if forced to choose between 
General laruzelski and General Pinochet, [he] would pick Marlene Dietrich""). 
Since the sequencing of capitalism first, democracy second was not a viable option, the 
question becomes how to manage the plurality of changes occurring at the same time in various 
spheres; the temporalities of which are seldom harmonious: "The pain inflicted by the economic 
transition [contributes to] political instability which in tum impedes the creation of the legal and 
institutional infrastructure for privatisation and slows the flow of foreign investment - in the end 
[prolonging] the recession and [adding] to further political polarisation."':! Ralf Dahrendorf has 
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described these difficulties as the 'dilemma of the three clocks' .13 He refers to the 'hour of the 
lawyer' in establishing the constitutional and political framework which may take several 
months; the 'hour of the economist' in building the rudiments of a market economy in five to six 
years; and, finally, the 'hour of the citizen' in regenerating the social impulses of civil society 
which, inevitably, will take generations. 
The 'Hour of the Lawyer' 
The development of liberal democratic institutions in Eastern Europe - prior to the establishment 
of capitalism and a bourgeoisie - rests on the assumption that values of compromise. bargaining 
and tolerance will underpin the functioning of the new order. The ability to reconcile competing 
interests, settle territorial or ethnic disputes and redefine the boundaries of the state are all 
dependent upon society'S willingness to accept the new 'rules of the game' and pursue its 
demands in a peaceful and rational manner. Yet the majority of ex-communist states, with the 
possible exception of the former Czechoslovakia, lack the historical precedents for multi-party 
democracy. The regimes in existence before the imposition of communism were, at best, 
unstable parliamentary systems and, at worst, authoritarian governments. Moreover, the true 
legacy of 'real socialism' lay in its (rather successful) attempt to extend its rule over all areas of 
public life, thereby suppressing interests and restraining identities. The atomisation of the 
citizenry, "a kind of desertification ,,14 in the words of George Schopflin, meant that as the newly 
liberated states emerged from forty years of communism, a deep sense of confusion and 
uncertainty permeated the body politic. In response to the overwhelming support for 'market 
democracy' , intellectuals in the opposition took on the difficult mission of articulating political 
and economic liberalism in the absence of social interests to act on behalf of the reforms. 15 This 
was perhaps best illustrated by the words of Poland's first post-communist Minister of Industry 
at his confirmation hearings prior to entering government: "I represent subjects that do not yet 
exist[!]"16 
The success of this enterprise depended on what David Ost rightly viewed as essential: 
namely whether "there are [socioeconomic] interests out there - real, particular. independent 
societal interests waiting for a chance to articulate their views and to use the state to implement 
their views."17 As the new elites soon realised, the formation of political parties with clearly-
defined constituencies (a~ opposed to general movements with disparate members) proved highly 
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troublesome. Quite often, 'politics' consisted of highly personalised appeals emphasising 
traditional concerns centred around nationalism or morality. The absence of genuine interests 
to support, let alone identify with, market refonn - with the possible exception of the fonner 
nomenklatura, the group least deserving to 'capitalise' on the changes - presented liberal elites 
with huge political dilemmas in legitimating their agendas. As the state (once again) became the 
substitute for societyl8, at least in the initial stages of the transition, and political struggles were 
waged around symbols as opposed to material interests, the search for populist, at times 
irredentist, solutions to the pain of economic restructuring threatened the basis of democracy. 
The 'Hour of the Economist' 
The state's role in establishing the rudiments of the market is equally, if not more, visible. 
Soviet-style central planning, even when accounting for its varying pervasiveness throughout the 
region, was profoundly defective. The 'fusion principle' 19 described by BartJomiej Kaminski in 
which the party-state succeeded in eliminating autonomous sources of economic activity (and 
innovation) by controlling all spheres of public life resulted in highly centralised. overly 
bureaucratised and massively industrialised economic structures. Plagued by low productivity 
and technological obsolescence, and "mired in environmental [and ecological] nightmares that 
pose still uncharted threats to public health":!(), the East European economies suffered from a host 
of endemic ills, including shortages. high levels of debt, and near-total state ownership. Even 
when ideological claims of self-sufficiency were dropped in favour of greater reliance on market 
mechanisms and closer integration with the West's economies (Hungary leading the way with 
the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism in 1968), administrative tinkering merely 
accentuated the discrepancies between half-hearted measures and deep-seated flaws in central 
planning. 
Aside from differences in the macroeconomic situation and the degree of autonomy 
accorded to state enterprises, all the post-communist states were characterised by heavily 
distorted economic systems in 1989. The 'initial conditions'. according to the late Michael 
Bruno, necessitated a radical approach irrespective of refonn strategy: "The chief novelty of the 
East European experience is the revolutionary change required in the institutional infrastructure. 
the financial system. the fiscal structure, social safety nets, the establishment of property rights. 
and the mass privatisation efforts. The circumstances dictated a much more comprehensive 
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approach than [ever adopted before).,,:!1 
The Bretton Woods institutions - the International Monetary Fund (lMF) primarily 
responsible for issuing quick disbursements of financial aid to countries with severe 
macroeconomic disequilibria and the World Bank generally in charge of long-tenn development 
matters, such as the privatisation and restructuring of state industry - were immediately called 
upon in 1989 to provide the post-communist countries with technical and financial assistance. 
The (in)famous 'Wa~hington Consensus' prescriptions, a tenn coined by John Williamson when 
describing the neo-liberal agenda embraced by a number of Latin American states in the mid-
1980s (he later commented that he should have christened his list 'universal convergence' as the 
'Consensus' extended far beyond Washington):!:!. placed fiscal and monetary discipline. currency 
convertibility, price and trade liberalisation and the privatisation of state enterprises at the top of 
the policy agenda. Yet while the perceived credibility of the reform effort may have depended 
on the level of commitment to the above measures, its theoretical or philosophical basis could 
not substitute for the practical dilemmas and uncertainties in applying neo-liberal frameworks 
to state-dominated economies. Whether the preference was for spontaneous or state-driven 
privatisation, open or semi-protected trading regimes, 'shock therapy' or 'gradualism', the 
strategy of reform could not disguise the unprecedented character of the changes~ many of which, 
ironically, required the active involvement of the state. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the sphere of ownership transfonnation. 
Countries such as Poland and the former Yugoslavia which were once considered to be in the 
vanguard of socialist refonn as a result of strong autonomy accorded to state finns emerged from 
communism with ill-defined property rights. "While the state enterprises [were) presumably 
owned by the state, the various components of ownership - including the rights to use property, 
to benefit from financial returns, and to dispose of the property - [were] in fact jointly held, in 
a shifting and imprecise way, among managers, workers and the state,,:!3 (this was not the case 
in Hungary or the former Czechoslovakia where strong managerial control and a centralised 
ownership structure respectively helped clarify property rights in 1989). In these circumstances, 
it was not enough for the state to simply transfer nominal ownership into private hands. It had 
firstly to clarify property rights by reasserting ownership claims over 'its' enterprises. These 
actions, ostensibly carried out in the name of economic liberalism. inevitably entailed a degree 
of reccntralisation on the part of the state. This so-called 'sin of constructivism '24, in the words 
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of Jerzy Szacki, is equally apparent in other areas of the economic transfonnation where the state 
has to intervene on a grand scale to set in place the institutions of capitalism. 
The 'Hour of the Citizen' 
The difficulties in developing a modem civil society that will embrace. let alone understand. the 
logic of market democracy constitute by far the greatest challenge for the post-communist elites. 
In contrast to the alleged "resurrection of civil society,,25 that a number of 'transitologists' 
believed could be traced to the overwhelming support for radical change in 1989, Eastern Europe 
was faced with a poorly organised, state-dependent and deeply confused citizenry. "Rather than 
strong states confronting strong societies", noted David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt. "the more 
typical cases of change were moments in which weak states faced weak societies. ,,:!(, Although 
civil society, in its attempt to create spheres of social and individual autonomy, was often 
successful in challenging the communist party-state (particularly in Poland where the rise of the 
Solidarity movement, together with the strong influence of the Catholic Church, strengthened the 
notion of a 'Self-Governing Republic'), its existence depended on, or at least was facilitated by, 
the presence of a common foe. Once this power disappeared, the presumed 'resilience' of civil 
society was no longer apparent. Many of the former assets of the democratic opposition -
collectivist aspirations stressing religious, social (notably egalitarian) and moral aims - became 
liabilities in the post-communist context. The 'anti-politics,27 of the 1970s "proved to be 
inadequate schooling for the practice of democracy as the 'art of the possible'. What we have 
witnessed instead is the fragmentation and polarisation of political life in which confrontation 
takes precedence over compromise and leaves the electorate confused or alienated."':!!! A new 
structuring of interests based on a redefinition as opposed to a resurrection of civil society is 
arguably the most pressing yet time-consuming task facing the new liberal elites. 
The 'dilemma of the three clocks' has profound implications for the viability and 
sustainability of post-communist refonn. In the 'rush to capitalism', however, these matters were 
set aside as economic priorities took centre stage. At lightning speed, proposals for all-
encompassing institutional change were drawn up in which democracy, market economics and 
civil society were perceived in contradiction-free terms. A "capitalism by design (or capitalism 
without the active promoters of their class interests),,29 emerged based almost exclusively on 
blueprints prepared by western financial institutions. In those countries with severe 
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macroeconomic imbalances, such as Poland, speed became paramount. "Discontinuity with 
everything inherited from the 'planned economy' acquired value in its own right" and "a certain 
radicalisation on the part of the system [designers] took place."lQ A chart prepared by the World 
Bank (see Appendix 1) in 1989 dubbed "the prototype reform process for a representative East 
European country,,31 underscored the indiscriminate nature of these programmes. 
Differences in countries' initial conditions, their respective political and social structures. 
or their ethnic composition were generally absent from reform debates. A tabula rasa approach 
in which the irrelevance of history was probably the most conspicuous element resulted in 
standardised programmes in which success (or failure) was judged against the yardstick of the 
blueprint. Those who questioned the merits of 'designer capitalism' . or who simply objected to 
the manner in which it was being presented, were branded 'gradualist' renegades. When the 
early results of reform revealed unfulfilled expectations. these 'renegades' became more vocal 
in their critiques. A dichotomous conception of the transition emerged in the expanding 
literature on post-communism. The arguments - sometimes spurious. often perceptive - were 
drawn along lines which appeared diametrically opposed and were maintained with equal 
vehemence. "Approving one of the options more or less implied rejection of - and by - the 
others. This led to an extreme splintering of the [academic and policy communities] into small 
tribal entities whose representatives were hardly on speaking terms."·~2 
TWO SCHOOLS: TRANSITION VERSUS ADAPTATION 
The absence of conceptual or theoretical models to analyse post-communism has generated 
intense controversy over the precise nature of these developments. Many observers question the 
applicability of standard instruments of social science used to formulate hypotheses on the earlier 
transitions. The so-called 'travelling problem ·33 discussed by Giovanni Sartori - the application 
or. more precisely. the extension of a conceptual model to encompass additional cases - was 
given a new lease of life in 1989. Whether "the trick", in Sartori's words. merely "resides in 
making the unlike look alike,,·l4 (the 'conceptual stretching' argument) or. alternatively. whether 
there are legitimate and justifiable reasons for adapting old frameworks to suit new contexts (the 
'conceptual travelling' position), "the challenge of achieving the virtue of 'travelling' without 
committing the vice of 'stretching,,,:l5 is considerable. On the surface. the basic objectives of the 
post-communist countries parallel the aims of the earlier transitions. While the starting positions 
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are considerably more inauspicious and the role of external factors (both in bringing down 
communism as well as reforming it) is much more apparent, the East European cases can. 
according to some, be viewed as a sub-category of a more generic phenomenon of transition from 
authoritarian rule; in other words "a sub-species of the same genus. "36 The authors most 
commonly associated with this view, and those most willing to engage in 'conceptual travelling' 
throughout the East, take their cues from the seminal works on Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule37 edited by Philippe Schmitter and his colleagues in 1986. Credited with pioneering the 
proto-science of 'transitology' , Schmitter and his associates are key figures in the familiar debate 
between comparativists and area specialists. 
The 'Transition' Perspective 
In their four-volume work dealing with the Southern European and Latin American regime 
changes, Schmitter and his associates argue that the rea~ons for launching democratic transitions 
are to be found predominantly in the domestic situations of the respective countries. specifically 
in the strategic decisions of key actors. Alluding to the metaphor of a multi-layered chess game 
involving not two but several players, all competing in a highly fluid and unpredictable 
environment where one move can have profound consequences for the next. the authors pay 
tribute to the participant(s) who is able to secure hislher/their imprint on the new rules of the 
game. Equipped with a decidedly Machiavellian understanding of regime change ('the wily 
Florentine' is, lest we forget, the patron saint of 'transitology'), the authors refer to "the high 
degree of indeterminacy embedded in situations where unexpected events (jortuna), insufficient 
information, hurried and audacious choices, confusion about motives and interests, pla~ticity and 
even indefinition of political identities, as well as the talents of specific individuals (virtu), are 
frequently decisive in determining outcomes. ,,38 
In contrast to structural forces, or the pre-conditions which help determine whether some 
authoritarian states democratise and others do not, 'transitologists' focus their attention on the 
strategic actions of elites in the founding moments separating the collapse of the old regime from 
the arrival of the new. Central to this perspective is the element of choice (as opposed to 
constraint). Building on the work of Dankwart Rustow in the 1 970S39, Schmitter and his 
colleagues, while not denying the importance of structurallhistorical conditions, do not perceive 
a direct link between structural factors and political outcomes. Instead they believe contingency 
10 
is the key element in the shift from authoritarianism to democracy. Giuseppe Oi Palma. a fellow 
'transitologist', concurs with them by claiming that transitions are more a product of political 
craft than structural forces which, in any event, according to him, become "temporarily 
suspended [in the formative stages]" and "cease to function as tried constraints:'''o This 
voluntarist, politically-driven view offers a counterweight to previous analyses of regime change 
which searched for the pre-conditions of democracy. 
In a determined effort to extend his approach to Eastern Europe, Schmitter, this time in 
collaboration with Terry Lynn Kar141 , urges former Sovietologists to reconcile themselves to the 
inevitable by incorporating the post-communist region into the body of comparative analysis. 
Stating that "all these cases of regime change - regardless of their geopolitical location or cultural 
context - should be regarded as parts of a common process of diffusion and causal interaction· ... 2, 
Schmitter and Karl believe the gains of 'travelling' far outweigh the risks of 'stretching'. While 
they admit that the parametric conditions favouring the 'tentative conclusions' of 1986 were 
based largely on political factors as well as the absence of powerful external forces, they again 
refuse to acknowledge a clear link between the structural legacies of 'real socialism' and the 
crucial decisions taken in the initial stages of transformation. In their view, the revolutions of 
1989 were also characterised by great uncertainty, unforeseen contingencies and a considerable 
degree of choice in the mode of transition: "Actors believe they are engaged in a 'war of 
movement' where dramatic options are available and the outcome depends crucially on their 
choices. They find it difficult to specify ex ante which classes, sectors, institutions or groups will 
support their efforts - indeed most of these collectivities are likely to be divided or hesitant about 
what to do. "·B 
Schmitter and Karl list several distinguishing characteristics of the East European 
countries which complicate the task of comparative analysis, yet they believe 'transitologists' 
should "stick to their initial operating assumptions."~ It is his criticism of former Sovietologists 
and other area specialists for stressing the 'uniqueness' of post-communist developments that 
allies Schmitter(ism) with those who, in principle, see no fundamental reason why neo-liberal 
economic models cannot be applied in Eastern Europe. One should stress, however. that 
Schmitter (as well as other 'transitologists' for that matter) are not associated with, nor do they 
advocate, any particular economic model for the region. One who does is Jeffrey Sachs. 
Professor of International Trade at Harvard University and renowned advisor to several of the 
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radical reformers in Eastern Europe. An expert on Third World debt. Sachs assisted the Boli\"ian 
government in the mid-1980s to stamp out hyperinflation45 and then went on to playa key role 
in the design of the Polish and Russian transition programmes in 1989 and 1992 respectively. 
A firm believer in the global validity of neo-liberal economics, Sachs is credited with 
supplying much of the intellectual rationale for 'shock therapy': the policy regime commonly 
a~sociated with the unconditional and much-publicised embrace of the 'Washington Consensus' 
prescriptions. The public launch of his vision for the post-communist transition was provided 
in a contribution to The Economist in January 1990 provocatively entitled 'What is to be 
Done?,46 (even Sachs himself, in a subsequent work, admitted that "it may seem reckless to ask 
the same question,,47 as that posed in 1902). Writing "in the style of a Lenin of decollectivisation 
against all the assorted Menshevisms of half-measures .. 48, Sachs provided the baptism for a new 
discipline entitled 'the economics of transition' - a rapidly expanding field which now boasts its 
own journal under the same name49• The article itself was an authoritative, albeit controversial, 
piece which argued emphatically against any 'third way' between plan and market. The 'three 
zatsias' - stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation - were presented as a 'seamless web' of 
reforms all strongly interrelated and dependent on one another. As a policy advisor, Sachs, as 
he later confessed in his Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures at the London School of 
Economics50, perceived the problem of reform to be political rather than social or economic. For 
this reason, and doubtless for others, he pioneered his own 'strategy of transition' (a sub-category 
of the 'economics of transition ') and placed speed, together with comprehensiveness, at the top 
of the post-communist agenda; "You don't try to cross a chasm in two jumps"SI, Sachs repeatedly 
claimed. 
Joined by other prominent 'shock therapists' such as Sweden's Anders Aslund52 , Sachs 
spoke in Schmitter-friendly terms when he argued that "there are powerful arguments for moving 
[ahead] rapidly. Fragile governments facing economic crises are best able to carry out strong 
measures [early on]. For this reason, Machiavelli's famous advice is that a government should 
bring all the bad news forward. "5J In so doing, he directly associated the strategy, tactics and 
design of 'shock therapy' with the existence of a window of opportunity in the formative stages 
of regime change. This is not to say that Sachs's 'Leninism of the market' is fugacious - indeed 
he goes to great lengths to prove it is not in his treatise entitled . Understanding 'Shock 
Therapy .. 54 - but rather that its inner logic. at least politically speaking, is limited to (possihly 
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dependent on) a unique opening at the start of the transition. However circumscribed or one-
dimensional his advice may appear to be, there is little doubt that it exerted a strong influence 
on the politics of initiating economic reform, notably in those states with severe macroeconomic 
imbalances. If speed is the primary concern of the radical school, then faith "in technocrats' 
knowledge of how to construct successful economic institutions .. 5) is its motto. 'Shock 
therapists' are guided by a clear vision of the reform blueprint they seek to implement and are 
willing to base their policies on conventional models. While differences in the sequencing - the 
ordering of priorities between the 'three zatsias' - of transition programmes may occur, variations 
from the ideal model will be kept to a bare minimum. The exemplary reformer, therefore. is the 
one who is able to recognise, and capitalise on, the window of opportunity, side-step vested 
interests, and remain true to the original design. 
The notion that choice as opposed to constraint deserves greater attention (at least in the 
early stages of regime change), the willingness to place the post-communist countries in 
conceptual categories reserved for previous democratisations, and the political underpinnings of 
'shock therapy' as a programme for radical economic engineering constitute the core of a 
framework for transition. This school of thought, clearly in the ascendant at the outset of the 
changes, derived its legitimacy from the political language and economic aspirations expressed 
in 1989. "The very currency of the discourse of [East European reforms] encouraged 
expectations of an orderly convergence on a Western moder'56 of market democracy. Driven by 
strong theoretical and philosophical beliefs, emboldened by political (and hopefully financial) 
encouragement from Western governments, and convinced that objective realities precluded the 
availability of 'alternatives' ("lingering ideas of worker self-management or public ownership,,57 
according to Sachs), the transition was perceived as an end in itself. Defined in terms of its 
intended purpose and aiming "unstintingly at the end-state,,5S, the transition perspective proved 
attractive if only because of the perceived coherency and consistency of its goals; more easily 
discernable than in any 'gradualist' reform strategy. Yet as Laszlo Csaba rightly observed in his 
book entitled The Capitalist Revolution ill Eastenl Europe, while "the term 'transition' suggests 
a single trajectory between two defined points, it is not [at all] clear where the beginning [or 
where the end lies]. and how we in fact measure 'progress' .,,59 The notion of a linear movement 
from A to Z is disputed on the grounds that the 'A' and the 'Z' (to say nothing of what lies in 
between) differ from country to country - some dispense with alphabets all together. 
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The' Adaptation' Perspective60 
In their attempts to apply, possibly transplant, western social scientific concepts and practices to 
the post-communist region, 'transitologists' face resistance from various quarters. Schmitter's 
focus on contingency, some say, "risks descending into excessive voluntarism"!> I if it fails to 
address factors which shape actors' political preferences in the first place - and how these 
preferences change over time. For those who believe the 'differences' of the East European 
states are ones in kind and not degree, the merits of 'transitology' are questioned. Valerie Bunce, 
for instance, in a spirited and rapid rejoinder to Schmitter and Karl's piece disputes the very 
terms of the debate between 'comparativists' and 'area specialists' and is somewhat offended by 
'transitologists" attempts to frame the argument in such a manner. According to Bunce, the 
debate is one of comparative methodology per se: "Are we comparing apples with apples, apples 
with oranges (which are at least a variety of fruit) or apples with, say, kangaroos? [ '1,,62 
From this perspective, area specialists are hardly taking refuge in empiricism, as 
Schmitter and Karl suggest, when they caution against assimilating the post-communist states 
into the body of comparative analysis. Rather they are pointing to the unique structural - as 
opposed to purely national or cultural - attributes of the region which render comparative 
judgements problematic. While it is true that a majority of those who object to 'transitology' are 
area specialists of one kind or another (an issue Schmitter and Karl stress repeatedly), pitting 
comparativists against area specialists does little to address the complexities of post-communist 
reform and, if anything, inflames the debates, notably those pertaining to the advice offered by 
the comparativists of all comparativists: the 'shock therapists'. Bunce provides a good 
illustration of this with the following remark: Schmitter and Karl's "arrogance parallels the 
attitude some western economists have taken. Just as they have advocated 'designer capitalism', 
so Schmitter and Karl and other 'transitologists' seem to be advocating 'designer democracy' -
if not 'designer social science'. ,,63 
Clearly the notion of 'uniqueness', whether on national or cultural grounds or else with 
regard to structural or historical conditions, is a contentious issue. While a number of analysts 
stress the first set of issuesb4, the second category is particularly relevant to an 'institutionalist' 
perspective of post-communist reform. The argument here is that the 'three zatsia~' hardly 
operate in a vacuum and thus need to be seen as part of an elaborate process of redefining (a~ 
opposed to replacing) institutions in the construction of the new system. One of the key 
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criticisms of the 'institutionalist' school is that 'shock therapists'. in their drive to impose 
textbook models of market economies, perceived a systemic vacuum in 1989 - the absence of 
new social forces capable of providing direction to the refonns - ali tantamount to an institutional 
one. 
In this respect, all that was needed was strategic and technical advice on the mechanics 
of implementing refonn; in other words'getting the prices right' was what mattered. Yet it soon 
became clear that choosing the 'right policies' or picking the 'right refonn team' was not enough. 
Unexpected continuities in policy meant that, far from an institutional vacuum, deep-seated 
structural and historical legacies conflicted with the tabula rasa approach. Douglass North, 
winner of the 1993 Nobel Prize, raised the profile of development economics at a time when 
Eastern Europe was embarking on far-reaching changes. North's ground-breaking work entitled 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance65 placed economic history at the 
centre of the reform debates. His main premise was that it was a mistake to concentrate 
exclusively on policies themselves; what mattered was an understanding of the environment in 
which these policies could - or could not - function. Customs, habits and other infonnal rules 
and norms built up over generations were ali important as fonnal ones. Stressing that institutions 
and history needed to be integrated more into conventional economics, North argued that path 
dependence could provide valuable insights on the prospects for institutional change. Much 
more than a simple acknowledgement that 'history matters', path dependence is a useful 
conceptual tool which enables us to better understand how specific decisions or institutional 
choices in the past structure, possibly foreclose, options at a later point in time. 
The implications of North's findings for East European developments are considerable. 
While it is only recently that the 'institutionalist' position has commanded the attention of the 
policy-making community66, two American academics, David Stark and Peter Murrell, have 
repeatedly argued for a path dependent approach. Stark applies a distinctly tabula nOll rasa 
framework to post-communist privatisation regimes. In a well-researched article entitled 'Path 
Dependence and Privatisation Strategies in East Central Europe'67 (his conclusions seem equally, 
if not more, valid for the former Soviet states). he criticises 'shock therapists' - practitioners of 
the "science of the not yet,,68 in his words - for devising uniform privatisation blueprints which 
do not take into account the indigenous enterprise structures of the countries concerned: for 
instance a highly decentralised one in the fonner Yugoslavia versus a centralised one in the 
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former East Germany_ Taking the cases of four separate privatisation paths. Stark notes how 
countries' distinct institutional legacies strongly influenced the politics and economics of 
ownership transformation. According to him, "the true strength of the concept of path 
dependence is its analytic power in explaining outcomes where strategic actors are deliberately 
searching for departures from long-established routines and attempting to restructure the rules 
of the game. ,,69 
Murrell is equally critical of the 'shock therapy' design for both its constructivist nature 
and its abuse of history. In a series of articles contrasting the 'radical' approach with the 
preferred 'evolutionary' path, he attempts to debunk the myth that rapid. state-driven 
privatisation is a precondition for effective reform. Central to his understanding of institutional 
change is the view that socioeconomic mechanisms are information-processing devices and not. 
as the 'radical' school suggests, resource allocating ones.70 Rather than attempting to destroy the 
old state sector steeped in the attitudes, values and routines of the pa~t, post-communist reformers 
would be better advised, according to Murrell, to place their faith in (and channel their resources 
to) the new private sector: "The first step [must be] to expose the existing institutions to 
challenge by the new. This can only be accomplished by encouraging the na~cent private sector. 
Such encouragement is so vital that it must be [the key] element in all aspects of policy as well 
as define policy towards the old state sector.'m The 'dual-track' approach advocated by Murrell -
slowly phasing out the old state sector while privileging the private sphere - is in fact similar to 
that recommended by the alleged Hungarian 'shock therapist' Janos Kornai. Whilst it is true that 
Kornai advocated 'surgical stabilisation' in his 1990 book entitled The Road to a Free Economy, 
he also warned of the dangers in tearing down the state sector in one fell swoop: "The process 
of passing state property into private hands should in no way lead to the brutal dismantling of 
huge, indivisible units."n Instead, Kornai favoured an organic or spontaneous privatisation 
regime in which the private sector, and not the state bureaucracy, would be responsible for 
selecting which state assets should be privatised. 
A more fundamental critique of the 'transition' school is provided by John Gray. formerly 
at Oxford and now Professor of European Thought at the London School of Economics, in a 
paper entitled 'Post-Communist Societies in Transition: A Social Market Perspective' .7
1 
Gray's 
argument is that Western, in particular Anglo-Saxon. exemplars of market institutions have little 
relevance to the post-communist countries (with the possible exception of the Czech Republic). 
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while some of the East Asian brands of capitalism at least recognise the importance of social 
harmony and government intervention; both central, in his view, to the Ea~t European 
transformations. Gray's analysis supplements the structural attacks on neo-Iiberalism with 
legitimate cultural and national reservations (notably with regard to Russia, the target of his 
analysis) which contrast markedly with the triumphalist declarations of the 'the end of history' 
made by Francis Fukuyama74 and others in 1989. "To expect [post-communist Europe] to 
converge smoothly and peacefully on any Western model is", according to Gray, ., to betray an 
ignorance of history that is staggering; yet such expectations are the basis of all Western policy 
to date, and are reinforced by the history-blind perspective of neo-liberal theory ... 75 
In a stimulating and thought-provoking manner, Gray personifies the second school of 
post-communist reform which places the accent on adaptation in its open-ended and indigenous 
forms. Emphasising the diverse institutional legacies of the post-communist landscape and 
concerned with the structural or cultural dimensions of development, 'adaptationists' are found 
in a variety of disciplines ranging from social anthropology to economic history. Instead of 
seeing windows of opportunity or hypothesised end-states, 'adaptationists' stress path 
dependence as a means of understanding the constraints faced by the new elites in departing from 
communism. Their creed is best described by Stark: we "do not preclude the possibility of 
changes that are far-reaching and dramatic. But [we differ fundamentally] from those all too 
prevalent approaches [in 1989] that argued that economic development required a rapid, radical. 
extensive (even exhaustive) replacement of institutions, habits, and routines by an entirely new 
set of institutions and mentalities."76 A 'stark' contrast, then, with the prescriptions advanced 
by the 'shock therapists'. 
POLAND AS A CASE STUDY 
A country which, in my view, acts as a useful frame of reference for both schools is Poland, the 
first East European nation to commit itself to radical economic reform. Always a 'weak link'77 
in the state socialist world as a result of a history of fierce resistance against foreign oppression, 
Poland's brand of communism, perhaps more than any, epitomised the discrepancies between 
the ideological roots of central planning and its practice under successive administrations. The 
rise of the Solidarity movement in 1980-81 as an independent trade union, a national organisation 
opposing Soviet domination, and a powerful force for the democratisation of society78 presented 
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the greatest challenge to the communist system and yet, paradoxically, frustrated the plans of the 
country's post-communist elites (see below). With strong support from the Catholic Church and 
an enduring 'Solidarity Ethos' that helped the movement preserve its unity whilst underground 
in the 1980s, Solidarity compelled the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) to negotiate the 
terms of a power-sharing arrangement in early 1989. 
The Round Table talks led to the first (semi-)free elections in Eastern Europe since the 
Second World War and, against all odds, resulted in the victory of the Solidarity forces on 4 June 
1989. The swift passage from a social democratic, evolutionary transformation to an IMF-
sponsored radical transition in the space of three to four months is one of the defining features 
of the Polish case. The conception of 'shock therapy' derived as much from the symbolic 
legitimacy accorded to the new liberal elites as it did from the necessity of extinguishing a 
hyperinflationary bonfire in autumn 1989. The Balcerowicz Plan, named after the country's first 
post-communist Finance Minister, emerged as the quintessential East European reform package 
long sought by the western financial institutions. The political and philosophical factors behind 
its launch proved as controversial as the effects of its implementation. 
The choice of Poland as a case study stems from a consensus that the Balcerowicz Plan 
was designed to effect a rapid transition to an Anglo-Saxon-style market economy - particularly 
in the sphere of corporate governance. According to one observer, "Poland represents a clear and 
deliberate attempt at neo-liberal economic, social and political engineering on a grand scale and 
[should] therefore be taken as a key test-case for the adequacy of neo-liberal recipes."79 Another 
claims that "Poland was the first country to change, and it became the testing ground for the 'big 
bang' approach that Sachs advocated."gO The 1990-1991 years under the guidance of 
Balcerowicz in the governments of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki provide a 
recognisable and, for the most part, consistent policy framework in which to assess the neo-
liberal project. Formally introduced on I January 1990, the Plan spearheaded radical reform in 
the region and, rightly or wrongly, provided the basis for cross-country comparisons. The 
comprehensiveness of the programme - its key provisions were virtually indistinguishable from 
the 'Wa'ihington Consensus' prescriptions and included sharp fiscal and monetary controls, the 
sudden removal of (most) restrictions on domestic prices and foreign trade, and the privatisation 
of state enterprises - was without precedent. 
The circumstances which facilitated its launch relate to the peculiar, if not paradoxical. 
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role played by the Solidarity movement in the latter-half of 1989. Deeply suspicious of the 
intentions of the communists in enticing the opposition into an unpropitious power-sharing 
arrangement (the PZPR ensured itself and its allies of 65% of the seats in the parliament and wa" 
able to preserve this 'contract' until October 1991), Solidarity - at the time consisting of a trade 
union in Gdansk and a parliamentary/intellectual elite in Warsaw. with its popular Chairman 
Lech Walysa gravitating between the two - gave its blessing not so much to a specific programme 
of reform but rather to its representatives' political authority in implementing it. Whether or not 
one accepts that 'shock therapy' was chosenfaute de mieux, its genesis lies in a Schmitteresque 
atmosphere in autumn 1989 which granted Polish policy-makers a unique window of opportunity 
to carry out their plans. This exceptional environment has been described as a period of 
'extraordinary politics'; a term coined and repeatedly used by its greatest beneficiary, Leszek 
Balcerowicz. 
Balcerowicz elaborates on this expression in a number of his western publications written 
following his exit from Polish politics in late 1991. His book entitled Socialism, Capitalism. 
Transformation 81 is a compilation of all his articles written for western journals. Two clear 
themes emerge from his work: the economic justification for proceeding with a radical approach 
(the book's strong comparative content offers insights on other countries' reform strategies) and 
the compelling case for initiating 'shock therapy' in a period of 'extraordinary politics'. 
Balcerowicz defines this period as one in which a clear discontinuity in a country's history 
occurs. In terms similar to those used by Schmitter, he describes a stage in which "new political 
structures, including parties and interests groups are fluid. The old elite is discredited and there 
is a stronger-than-normal tendency amongst the new elites and the population at large to think 
and act in terms of the common good. This period calls (and creates favourable conditions) for 
the emergence of technopols,,82: technocrats in positions of political responsibility. The 
ephemeral and 'non-renewable ,83 character of this period encourages the technopol to act quickly 
and establish his authority. In a second contribution. this time in Polish entitled 800 Days: 
COlltrolled Shock (800 Dni: Szok KOlltrolowany)84, Balcerowicz presents a virtual month-by-
month summary of his efforts to sustain his Plan in the face of strong political and economic 
resistance. Particularly intriguing is his candid account of his self-management (as opposed to 
neo-liberal) objectives during the 1980-81 years of Polish reform. That the 'Balcerowicz Group' 
began its reform career advising Solidarity's self-management wing known as the 'Network' is. 
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to say the least, ironic in view of its post-communist efforts to suppress, ideally eliminate. its 
influence. 
David Ost, a specialist on Poland's politics whose book Solidarity and the Politics of 
Anti-Politict5 traces the evolution of the opposition movement throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
builds on this theme by explaining why the Balcerowicz Plan did not encounter as much 
resistance on the part of the Solidarity union as it did from its self-management wing - the more 
enduring legacy of the 1980-81 era. In a paper entitled 'Class and the Organisation of Anger in 
Post-Communist Poland', Ost notes how "Poland entered the post-communist era with labour 
in a very strong position. This was due not so much to the status of Solidarity - in many ways 
that status actually helped weaken the labour movement since the authority of the union wal\ tied 
up with the success of market reform. Rather it resulted from the institutional position of the 
workers' councils [in the state enterprises),,86 (see below). Ost focuses on the dilemmas inherent 
in the Janus-like role played by the Solidarity movement - a union attempting to defend workers' 
interests and an umbrella organisation providing tacit support for market reform. In a separate 
paper entitled 'Shaping a New Politics in Poland: Interests and Politics in Post-Communist 
Europe,87, he analyses the weak political foundations of the Balcerowicz Plan which, in his view, 
stemmed from the artificial support which gave birth to it in the first place. The Solidarity 
union's biggest mistake, according to Ost (as well as other Polish social democrats), was not to 
insist on a corporatist-style pact institutional ising a role for labour. Given the hyperinflationary 
climate in late 1989, coupled with Ost's own admission that the union's political stature helped 
bolster the 'shock therapists', it is difficult to see how this could have been achieved. Instead. 
the union was encouraged by its own Chairman to support the Balcerowicz Plan while remaining 
unclear on its own identity and confused about its (class) interests.88 
A recognised authority on these matters is the Polish sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis. Her 
1984 book entitled Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution89 presented a critical account of the 
worker-intelligentsia relationship at the heart of the Solidarity movement (the author herself was 
one of the seven advisors to the union at the time of the Gdansk Accords in August 1980). The 
second installment of her complex social commentary on Polish and East European 
developments appears in a book entitled The Dynamics o/the Breakthrough ill Eastenl Ellrope.90 
Staniszkis offers a detailed, if at times disjointed, account of the Solidarity movement's new-
found role in the post-communist environment. She claims the absence of social forces to act 
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on behalf of the reforms in late 1989 required a 'revolution from above' which turned out to be 
too 'discrete' for many in the Solidarity camp. In the ensuing months. 'post-Solidarity' politics 
was characterised by various 'estates' competing over symbols or 'ethoses' instead of clear-cut 
socioeconomic interests. The so-called 'acceleration' drive undertaken by Wal~sa and his 
supporters in spring 1990 in response to perceived delays in political and institutional changes 
stemmed from what Staniszkis believed to be the Balcerowicz Plan' s inability to effect swift 
changes in property rights.91 
It is the privatisation process in Poland which presents the greatest insights into the 
applicability of the neo-liberal design. For unlike the Czechoslovak or Hungarian enterprise 
structures, Polish state firms emerged from communism with considerable autonomy and 
confused ownership rights which complicated plans for privatisation. One of the leading 
authorities on these matters is the Gdansk-based research team on enterprise behaviour under the 
direction of the late Janusz D~browski. In order to appreciate the difficulties faced by the neo-
liberals one must return to the passage of two crucial pieces of legislation on 25 September 1981: 
the Law on State Enterprises and the Law on Self-Management. Together, these bills granted 
increased operational and financial autonomy to state firms. The self-management bodies known 
as the workers' councils - invariably under Solidarity control - were endowed with considerable 
legal powers broadly resembling those held by a board of directors in a western commercial 
enterprise; these included the right to "fire managers, veto managerial appointments made by 
Ministries, and control the investment and contract decisions [of] enterprises. ,,92 
Although both laws were suspended following the declaration of Martial Law in 
December 1981, they remained on the statute books up until 1989. Indeed it came as a surprise 
to Poland's post-communist reformers (not to mention their western advisors) that state firms not 
only retained their self-managed structures but lacked concentrated and clearly-defined 
ownership rights. For as D~browski and his colleagues note in their perceptive article entitled 
'Polish State Enterprises and the Properties of Performance: Stabilisation, Marketisation, 
Privatisation', "the politics and economics of the collapse of communism [in Poland] left the 
councils not only with full control over the operational decisions of firms but with de jure and 
de facto veto powers over government decisions to transfer assets ... 9J In short, issues of corporate 
governance - the precise form of monitoring or control of the management and performance of 
firms - proved as important as questions regarding the form(s) of privatisation. 
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A second key event in Polish ownership transfonnation was a conference in Warsaw on 
17-18 November 1988 in which two competing plans for privatisation were presented. The first~ 
- and the one eventually chosen by the Balcerowicz Group in late 1989 - was a highly ambitious 
programme of public stock offerings based on the conventional British model pursued by the 
Thatcher administration in the 1980s. Its author, Stefan Kawalec. referred to it as 'privatisation 
from above' in which the state would take on the role of setting up the institutions of a capital 
market and auction off enterprises to investors in an objective and transparent manner. The 
second model was developed by two liberal academics from the University of Gdansk, Jan 
Szomburg and Janusz Lewandowski. Known as the 'Mass Privatisation Programme' (MPP), it 
advocated "a radical transfer of property rights from the state administration to the broad masses 
of society.,,95 The first of its kind in Eastern Europe, the Plan was based on the principle of a free 
distribution of shares through vouchers. Lewandowski and Szomburg, together with many other 
Polish and East European experts, believed this approach could overcome the capital and 
institutional inadequacies plaguing all post-communist states. The history of the Programme is 
contained in a paper written by Lewandowski entitled 'The Political Struggle over Mass 
Privatisation in Poland'96 in which he explains that. unlike the 1992 Czechoslovak scheme 
developed by Vaclav Klaus which focused on the rapid transfer of ownership, Poland's MPP 
stressed economic, notably corporate governance, objectives. 
These two visions of ownership transfonnation - Kawalec' s British model and 
Lewandowski's citizens' ownership scheme - dominated the Polish privatisation agenda in 1990-
1991. Both, however, were faced with the political stumbling block of enterprise refonn: 
commercialisation, or the transfonnation of the legal status of a state enterprise into a joint-stock 
company wholly owned by the state and subject to commercial principles. For this interim step 
towards privatisation - strongly recommended by the western financial institutions and their 
advisors in late 1989 - in which the state sought to clarify property rights by disempowering 
democratically-elected workers' councils and vesting governance in the hands of state-appointed 
corporate boards conflicted with the legacy of self-management. In a decentralised enterprise 
culture such as Poland's, commercialisation was perceived not so much ali a provisional fonn of 
privatisation but rather as recentralisation, even renationalisation. It is here where the path 
dependency model of post-communist refonn is at its most convincing. A paper which addresses 
these issues in detail (aside from the numerous reports on enterprise adjustment issued by the 
D~browski team97) is a report co-authored by Barbara Blaszczyk and Tomasz Gruszecki entitled 
'Privatisation in Poland, Laws and Institutions (April 1990 -January 1991 )'98. 
While the Kawalec and Lewandowski blueprints dominated the policy agenda. a third. 
less publicised, proposal drawn up by a group of 23 parliamentarians under the leadership of 
Ryszard Bugaj proved equally significant. Geared towards self-management practices and 
awarding preference to employee ownership, the 'Law on Ownership Transformation of State-
Owned Enterprises' based its provisions on the economic section of the 1989 Round Table 
Accords. A passionate defender of this Law, and one who has repeatedly emphasised a social 
democratic alternative to the Balcerowicz Plan, is Tadeusz Kowalik. In a number of western 
publications99, Kowalik, like his colleague Bugaj, claims the economic document adopted at the 
Round Table could have conceivably provided the basis for an adaptive transformation stressing 
self-management methods, varied forms of ownership and, crucially. a corporatist-style pact as 
advocated by Ost. One of the key themes in Kowalik's works is that the severe deterioration in 
the Polish macroeconomy in August 1989 "only demanded [strict] anti-inflationary measures and 
not a [giant] 'leap' to any particular kind of system."((X) Yet as he himself recognised, the 
political underpinnings of 'shock therapy' dictated a radical stance on all reform fronts. 
irrespective of the inherent differences in the speed of the 'three zatsias', i.e. stabilisation can 
proceed much faster than institutional changes. These philosophical considerations proved 
highly controversial and led to a number of misconceptions in the early 1 990s concerning the 
pace and content of post-communist reform programmes. 
The departure of Balcerowicz from government in late 1991 led to more innovati ve forms 
of neo-liberalism as favoured by Jacek Kuron, ironically one of the chief instigators of 'shock 
therapy' .101 Kuron's firm social democratic credentials provided the basis for a quasi-corporatist 
pact with employers and trade unions in the second-half of 1992. For the first time in Poland's 
post-communist refonns, the authorities recognised the importance of negotiation in restructuring 
industry. The 'Pact on State-Owned Enterprises' signed in February 1993 was a marked 
departure from the technical conception of privatisation in 1990-91. Kuron admitted as much 
in his manifesto published following the victory of the post-communist left in the September 
1993 parliamentary elections. Entitled 'A Republic for All' ('Rzeczpospolita dla Kaidego ')IO~, 
the manifesto claimed that whilst Balcerowicz(ism) had succeeded in stabilising the economy. 
he had failed to provide neo-liberalism with an effective political. let alone social. voice as a 
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result of poor consultation and insufficient presentation. 
Interestingly, KurOli co-authored another paper on a similar theme entitled "Negotiated 
Strategy in the Process of Economic Transformation' ('Strategia Negocjacyjna w Procesie 
Transfonnacji Gospodarki '), this time with Jerzy Hausner, a Professor of Public Economy at the 
Krak6w Academy of Economics. Hausner emerged as the political brains behind Grzegorz 
Kolodko's new 'Strategy for Poland' adopted in June 1994. As Poland's new Finance and 
Deputy Prime Minister (the same posts held by Balcerowicz), Kolodko sought to articulate a 
post- 'shock therapy' vision for the transition 103, privileging negotiation and favouring the 
restructuring of enterprises prior to their privatisation. Yet his professed alternative - an 
ambiguous document which built on KurOli's Pact and openly endorsed an industrial policy -
placed central administrative reform and mass commercialisation at the top of its agenda. For 
the workers' councils, in particular, this new 'managerialism' 1~ differed little from that pursued 
under previous governments. 
PRESENTATION OF ANALYSIS 
This discussion of post-communist reform places the Polish case in the context of the two 
schools outlined above - the 'transition' perspective emphasising choice, strategic action, and 
conventional models versus the 'adaptation' philosophy stressing the legacies of the past and 
country-specific institutional constraints. While the views of both schools are by no means 
exhaustive of the analytical and conceptual issues inherent in Eastern Europe's transformations, 
they offer valuable insights on the politics of initiating and sustaining transition programmes. 
Far from representing mutually exclusive frameworks as is often portrayed, they focus on 
different elements of change. This derives from contrasting perspectives on countries' initial 
conditions prior to the launch of post-communist reform. Just as 'transitologists' are concerned 
with the founding moments of the new system and believe the 'exit phase' displays similar 
characteristics across the region and is instrumental in defining the reform agenda, 
'adaptationists' perceive the 'paths of extrication' in less homogeneous terms as a result of 
distinct historical and structural factors, notably the indigenous governance structures of state 
enterprises. 
Focusing primarily on political factors in a given time frame and eager to demonstrate 
how grand designs originate from the elevation of specific agendas (accompanied by the 
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relegation of others) in moments of crisis, 'transitologists' are at their most convincing when 
describing the conception of radical economic reform. The window of opportunity which 
underpinned Poland's 'shock therapy' programme in autumn 1989 is a poignant illustration of 
this. Equally compelling is the 'adaptationists" depiction of the obstacles faced by the Polish 
neo-liberals in overcoming the legacy of the self-managed enterprise model. The numerous 
efforts to disband workers' councils through forced commercialisation partly served to discredit 
the state-driven privatisation regime adopted in late 1989. For as Stark noted, the councils 
constituted "the most important institutional legacy in the economic realm of Poland's extrication 
from state socialism."105 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the conception and implementation of Polish 'shock 
therapy' as a test-case of the relevance of both schools. Poland's pioneering role in post-
communist reform is invariably used as a point de reference for the 'transition' perspective. This 
stems from an overemphasis on the macroeconomics of the Balcerowicz Plan, together with an 
unfortunate tendency to compare this particular aspect of Poland's reforms with other countries' 
less dramatic changes; the preferred contrast is Hungary. By focusing on the endogenous aspects 
of the Polish transformation (as opposed to the external elements, although naturally the two are 
interrelated), this analysis will critically examine the myth that 'shock therapy' encompassed the 
entirety of the policy regime. The objective is to disaggregate the Plan by separating the radical 
macroeconomic component from the process of large-scale privatisation: the former, it is argued, 
is inextricably linked to the period of 'extraordinary politics' while the latter is much more path 
dependent and requires an appreciation of the self-management reforms in 1981-82. 
Only in this manner, I believe, can we come to grips with the false dichotomy that 
pervades the literature on post-communist transitions. By going beyond the familiar technical 
analyses that either neglect the importance of pre-1989 developments or focus exclusively on the 
original reform model, this study traces the political and philosophical evolution of 
'Balcerowiczism'; a term which I believe still characterised the Polish policy regime following 
its author's departure from government and the broad continuity in macroeconomic policy and 
corporate governance objectives. Whilst the period of 'extraordinary politics' provided the 
baptism for Polish neo-liberalism, its political trajectory under successive governments proved 
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more complex. As a result of certain policy-makers' perceived attachment to the prescriptions 
advanced by the first school, the 1990-1991 era acquired the 'shock therapy' label. I believe this 
is misconceived and unhelpful in view of the practice of 'shock therapy'. particularly with regard 
to large-scale privatisation. 
I propose, then, to categorise Polish neo-liberalism into four political variants which 
reveal the mutual inclusiveness of both schools and the appearance of elements of each at 
different stages in, and in different areas of, the reform process. This typology is based on the 
view that Balcerowiczism represents a recognisable policy framework in which to assess its 
political and economic trajectory. The first variant is the original BalcermviczIMa:owiecki model 
in 1990 with its roots in the period of 'extraordinary politics'. One of its defining characteristics 
was the Balcerowicz Plan's attempt (with strong encouragement from Sachs) to present 'shock 
therapy' as an all-encompassing programme for a giant 'leap to the market'. This led to severe 
misunderstandings regarding the pace and direction of post-communist reform. Ironically. the 
privatisation regime initially favoured in this variant - Kawalec's British model - proved 
extremely time-consuming and, if anything. emphasised quality over speed. A second feature 
of this model was a technocratic policy style. This stemmed from the anti-inflationary objectives 
of the government; ones which dictated policy towards state firms and excluded privatisation 
programmes which could be seen to endanger macroeconomic stability. The third aspect was a 
strong desire on the part of Prime Minister Mazowiecki to preserve the artificial unity of the 
Solidarity movement. Favouring a gradual, peaceful democratisation that adhered to the Round 
Table compromise with the communists, the government tried to extend the period of 
'extraordinary politics' for as long as possible. 
The second variant is the Wa/~a-Initiated GdaIisk Liberals' version in 1991 with its roots 
In the 'acceleration' drive in spring 1990. This 'second face' of Polish neo-liberalism as 
presented by the Gdansk Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) of Premier Bielecki resurrected 
Lewandowski's Mass Privatisation Programme (MPP) as part of an effort to speed up 
microeconomic and institutional changes. Wa1~sa's eclectic policy formulations in his bid to 
become President of Poland were a contributing factor in prolonging the Balcerowicz Plan, albeit 
with a new emphasis on non-equivalent forms of privatisation. A key element of this variant was 
a belated recognition of a more active role for the state in the restructuring of industry. 
Lewandowski's revised MPP parallelled the launch of other, more interventionist. approaches 
26 
aimed at monitoring finns' behaviour and providing clearer incentives for enterprises to adjust. 
The crucial feature of this version was the rapid acceleration of the privatisation of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises - to say nothing of the explosive growth of the private sector - through 
the less-publicised 'liquidation' paths favouring management and/or employee buyouts: precisely 
those which the first model had sought to avoid. 
The third variant is Kuroli's Negotiated Pact prepared in the second-half of 1992 in 
response to an outbreak of militant strikes. Adopting a corporatist-style approach as a means of 
addressing deep-seated grievances on the part of employees in state finns, the Pact was a bold 
departure from the original BalcerowiczlMazowiecki model. Dubbed the 'second step' of Polish 
refonn, it placed ownership changes on an equal footing with labour relations and acknowledged 
the sociopolitical dimensions to privatisation in contrast to the purely technical concerns. The 
Pact accentuated the negotiated character of Polish privatisation by easing the requirements for 
the popular 'liquidation' routes in the hope of speeding up ownership changes. While political 
animosities between the two main unions - Solidarity and the ex-communist All Poland Alliance 
of Trade Unions (OPZZ) - delayed the signing of the agreement, it was the Pact's prohibitive 
social commitments which led to its unravelling. Yet the social partnership envisaged in the 
contract tempered some of the more doctrinaire a~pects of Polish neo-liberalism and opened the 
door to the fourth variant as presented in the Strategy for Poland. 
Kolodko's 'Social Alternative' claimed to have reversed the harsh liberalism of the first 
two variants and spearheaded a new approach to the post-communist transition slowly emerging 
in academic and policy circles in 1993-94 (assisted by a rapid investment- and export-led 
recovery beginning in spring 1992). A key feature of this variant, given added weight by World 
Bank research on Polish enterprise behaviour indicating state finns were adjusting reasonably 
well to macroeconomic and competitive pressures, was the view that the restructuring of 
enterprises prior to their privatisation could improve efficiency and contribute to effective 
corporate governance. A second element was the elevation of Kuron's negotiated framework in 
policy-making. Hausner's academic works provided much of the intellectual and political 
justification for this. Finally. a strong emphasis on medium-term policy fonnulation and an 
almost compulsive need to 'sell' the Strategy to a sceptical audience stemmed from a strong 
personal desire on the part of Kolodko to end Balcerowizism once and for all. Given the 
Strategy's fiscal prudence, firm commitment to European integration. and general contempt of 
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employee ownership, this seemed unlikely. 
I believe these four variants of neo-liberalism contribute to a better understandino of the e 
political dynamics that influenced Poland's economic reforms. Elements of both schools are 
visible in the actions and preferences of policy-makers (and their opponents) in the four 
approaches. The 'transition' perspective is most apparent in the window of opportunity which 
gave birth to the Balcerowicz Plan and offers insights on the politics of launching radical reform. 
The 'adaptation' philosophy, meanwhile, derives its analytic strength from the difficulties in 
implementing large-scale privatisation in view of an indigenous enterprise structure. Each 
variant proposed new solutions to these problems. The principal objective throughout was to 
commercialise firms and disempower democratically-elected workers' councils. Only in 
recognising the importance of the 1981-82 reforms in which the self-management system has its 
legal roots can we hope to understand the obstacles faced by Polish neo-liberals. At the very 
least, these caution against sweeping statements on 'shock therapy' and emphasise the role of 
initial conditions in assessing post-communist reform strategies. 
Field Work and Summary of Chapters 
This study benefited from field work carried out in Warsaw in the first-half of 1996 as well as 
a series of interviews conducted at the headquarters of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) in London. Because of my limited knowledge of Polish at the time, the 
use of Polish sources often depended on the aid of a translator. The interviews, it should be 
stressed, were carried out in English or in French. Preparations for an extended stay at the 
Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (lSP-PAN) in Warsaw were 
made whilst attending the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies held at 
the University of Warsaw in early August 1995. Upon returning to the Polish capital, I was able 
to establish contacts with the Institute of Economics (lNE) , the World Economy Research 
Institute (WERI) of the Warsaw School of Economics, and the Centre for Social and Economic 
Research (CASE), a foundation set up by Balcerowicz following his departure from government. 
Various informal seminars and workshops provided valuable information on the record of Polish 
reform since 1989. A fruitful venue was a conference organised by CASE on 'Ownership 
Transformation and Restructuring Processes in Central and Eastern Europe' in the middle of 
April 1996. Key speakers included Lewandowski, Balcerowicz and Krzysztof Lis. Poland' s first 
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post-communist privatisation chief. Barbara Blaszczyk, an expert on the subject who helped 
draft the July 1990 Privatisation Law, spoke extensively on the successes and failures of Polish 
privatisation. Conversations with Marek D~browski and Stefan Kawalec, both members of the 
Balcerowicz Group, provided me with first-hand knowledge of the Polish transition. 
Research carried out in the parliament's library enabled me to obtain transcripts of key 
parliamentary debates, notably those pertaining to the passage of the Mass Privatisation 
Programme as well as the Strategy for Poland in June 1994. Articles from the Polish press were 
also available from the library's daily press reviews. The government's Public Opinion Research 
Centre (CBOS) provided me with a number of their 1990-91 surveys on privatisation, in addition 
to questionnaires dealing with the implementation of the Balcerowicz Plan. Access to 
government departments - the Council of Ministers (URM), the Government Plenipotentiary for 
European Integration and Foreign Assistance, and the Ministries of Labour, Finance, and 
Ownership Transformation respectively - as well as the offices of the lMF and World Bank 
missions were arranged. The Press Office of URM put me in touch with government aides and 
provided relevant documents and legislation. 
Three key primary sources, in particular, were of enormous value to this study. The first 
IS an official copy of the 22 December 1989 Letter of Intent 106 sent by Ba1cerowicz and 
Wladyslaw Baka (the then head of the Central Bank) to the lMF headquarters in Washington. 
Consisting of an exceptional letter addressed to Michel Camdessus, the Fund's Managing 
Director, and a 30-page Memorandum outlining Poland's 'shock therapy' agenda as well its long-
term goals for the transition, the document constitutes the core of the Ba1cerowicz Plan. The 
second source is a copy of the Pact on State-Owned Enterprises 107 drawn up by KurOl} in summer 
1992. Finally, the third document is a text of Kolodko's Strategy for Poiand108 passed by the 
parliament in June 1994 setting out the country's economic agenda for the following three years. 
Statistical data on the Polish economy originates primarily from the Organisation for Cooperation 
and Economic Development (OECD),s Economic Surveys on Poland as well a~ the EBRD's 
Transition Reports. For more in-depth analyses, the Central Planning Office (CUP) as well as 
the Central Statistical Office (GUS) provided me with a number of reports. With regard to 
employees' responses to the reforms, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's offices in Warsaw offered 
a selection of publications. The most extensive surveys were conducted by Juliusz Gardawski. 
His work entitled Poland's Industrial Workers on the Retunl to Democracy and the Market 
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Economyl09 is a compilation of his 1991-94 surveys. 
During my stay in Warsaw and following my return to England several key interviews 
were arranged with prominent figures in the Polish reform process. The first meeting with 
Waldemar Kuczytiski 110 provided a unique insight into the conception of 'shock therapy'. As 
economic advisor to Premier Mazowiecki in late 1989-1990 (and, for a brief duration. Poland's 
first Minister of Ownership Transformation), Kuczynski was responsible for selecting 
Balcerowicz as Finance Minister in early September 1989. The second meeting with Markus 
Rodiauer lll , the current Resident Representative of the IMF in Warsaw, focused on the thinking 
of the financial institutions in 1989-90 with respect to the implementation of economic refonn. 
I questioned Rodlauer on the disparities between the forecasts and the actual results of 'shock 
therapy' (see Appendix 4). The third meeting with Jerzy Hausner l12 focused on the 
academic/advisor's reaction to Kur0I1's Pact as well as his objectives in helping to draw up 
Kolodko's Strategy for Poland. The fourth meeting with Jerzy Eysymontt l13 , Balcerowicz's 
successor, dealt with the latter's attempts to restore growth to the Polish economy in the first-half 
of 1992. Finally, conversations with Balcerowicz"~ and Bielecki 115 at the headquarters of the 
EBRD proved equally illuminating. During his stay in the Chief Economist's Office, 
Balcerowicz commented on the significance of the period of 'extraordinary politics' and on his 
country's success in launching a 'critical mass' of economic measures early on. Bielecki, now 
a Director at the Bank in charge of Poland, Bulgaria and Albania, discussed the problems 
associated with Lewandowski's Mass Privatisation Plan as well as his role in overseeing the 
implementation of Kuron's Pact. His reflections on the way in which his policies differed from 
those of his predecessor were insightful. 
In part an historical account, this study examines the genesis, implementation and 
aftermath of the Balcerowicz Plan. In the next chapter, the rationale and enabling factors behind 
the adoption of 'shock therapy' are explored. The first part focuses on the legacy of the People's 
Republic, with particular reference to the self-management reforms during the 'First Stage' of 
economic Iiberalisation in 1981-82. The role of the Network in bringing together Solidarity-
affiliated economists to devise a programme for a radical decentralisation of enterprise 
management is discussed. I argue that these objectives had a strong political character: namely 
to reduce the power of the nomenklatura (and thus the state) in directing firms' operations. The 
remainder of Chapter 2 analyses the origins of the Balcerowicz Plan, starting with the arrival of 
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Sachs in June 1989 following Solidarity's historic electoral victory. The period of 'extraordinary 
politics', together with the dramatic deterioration of the macroeconomy in August 1989. 
radicalised economic thinking and resulted in the abandonment of the social democratic agenda .... 
agreed on at the Round Table in favour of a neo-liberal design promoted by an independent group 
of (ex-Network) economists gathered around Ba1cerowicz. The key ingredients and 
philosophical underpinnings of the Plan are then discussed. 
Chapter 3 analyses the political trajectory of the Balcerowicz Plan in the months 
following its launch in January 1990. The first two political variants of neo-liberalism - the 
BalcerowiczIMazowiecki model in late 1989-1990 and the WaJ~a-initiated Gdarisk Liberals' 
alternative in 1991 - are placed in the context of competing privatisation strategies dating back 
to November 1988. The first part of the chapter argues that while significant progress was made 
early on in stabilising the economy, protracted parliamentary debates on Kawalec's British model 
delayed plans for large-scale privatisation. The bitterly contested 'war at the top' in spring 1990 
between Premier Mazowiecki' s supporters and those of W al~sa resulted in a political shift in 
favour of 'acceleration'. The success of 'bottom-up' privatisation techniques. coupled with the 
rapid growth of the private sector, convinced Prime Minister Bielecki of the necessity of 
according greater emphasis to the multi-track approach to privatisation. The latter-half of the 
chapter discusses the similar obstacles faced by Lewandowski's revised Mass Privatisation 
Programme in clarifying property rights. As declining inflation rates revealed the true impact of 
stabilisation, calls for state intervention - from both ends of the political spectrum - and a 
loosening of fiscal controls became more pronounced. Chapter 3 ends with a brief assessment 
of the Balcerowicz Plan following its author's exit from government. 
Chapter 4 examines the post-Balcerowicz evolution of neo-liberalism under the third and 
fourth variants: Kuroli's Negotiated Pact and KoJodko's 'Social Alternative '. The chapter begins 
by focusing on the broken promises of the government of Jan Olszewski as a contributing factor 
to the outbreak of strikes in July-August 1992. Promoting his initiative as a change in philosophy 
in Polish reform, Kuron introduced corporatist-style pacts as a means of speeding up and 
diversifying privatisation processes. Although an innovative approach to industrial relations. the 
Pact merely extended the deadline for forced commercialisation and widened the scope of 
collective bargaining. Chapter 4 concludes with KoIodko' s Strategy for Poland presented in June 
1994. Defined not so much by what it stood for but for what it claimed to reject. the Strategy 
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attempted to articulate a post-'shock therapy' vision for the Polish transition by incorporating 
KurOll's negotiated framework into a new socially-oriented approach to governing. Kolodko's 
firm anti-inflationary stance, together with his mass commercialisation drive. nevertheless 
indicated broad continuity in policy. 
In Chapter 5, the 'shock therapy versus gradualism' controversy is explored. In many 
ways a spurious debate, the arguments stem from the false dichotomy between Poland' s emphasis 
on radical macroeconomics and Hungary's long-standing gradualist development strategy - less 
abrupt in view of the experience gained from 20 years of 'goulash communism'. The views of 
three prominent Central European policy-makers are discussed in order to accentuate the 
importance of initial conditions as well as caution against the use of labels in describing reform 
strategies. The second part of the chapter discusses Hungary's 'gradualist' approach to the 
(post)communist transformation. Revealing strong path dependent characteristics dating back 
to the early 1960s, the country's welfare-driven policies survived the 1990 political transition 
intact. External preoccupations, notably servicing the country's substantial foreign debt. help 
explain why Hungary opted for stability instead of dramatic measures. The final section presents 
the views of the standard bearers of both reform schools: Gray's 'culturallhistorical determinism' 
versus Sachs's 'portable capitalism'. I argue that the debate stems largely from Sachs's 
willingness to separate the means of transition from the ends; a view which Gray believes is, at 
best, misconceived and, at worst, dangerous given the precise 'means' Sachs has in mind. 
The final chapter returns to the theme of initial conditions in analysing post-communist 
reforms. Dismissing the notion of 'general lessons' of the Polish transition. the chapter instead 
argues for clear distinctions between reform measures; between the ('extraordinary') politics of 
stabilisation versus that of large-scale privatisation. Six key aspects of the Polish transformation 
are discussed and a brief summary of the four variants of neo-liberalism is provided. I conclude 
with reflections on the relevance of the two schools and the need for clarity as well as a mutually 
inclusive approach. 
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CHAPTER 2 SOLIDARITY'S UMBRELLA 
What happened to that unprecedented mass movement called 'Solidarity' and its partially 
socialist, syndicalist programme of a 'Self-Governing Republic'? -Tadeusz Kowalik
' 
INTRODUCTION 
By virtue of its 'big bang' on 1 January 1990, Poland became the darling of the 'economics of 
transition' literature. Eager to dramatise the end of the previous policy period, followers of this 
new sub-discipline preferred to gloss over (or else ignore) pre-1989 developments. The notion 
that "Poland began the transfonnation by launching a programme of stabilisation at the beginning 
of 1990"2 figured in many of the introductory statements of analyses extolling the 'transition' 
perspective. While indicative of the radical nature of 'shock therapy' , such views fail to account 
for the historical factors which influenced its design and implementation. For it is the two faces 
which characterised Poland's public life in the last decade of the People's Republic - the official 
communist ideology enforced by the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) and the diverse 
worker-intelligentsia links centred around the opposition movement Solidarity - which revealed 
both the imperatives and difficulties in embarking on systemic change. 
Unlike the Hungarian revolution in 1956, or the Prague Spring in 1968, the rise of 
Solidarity presented a sustained yet peaceful challenge to the monopoly of the party-state. If it 
were not for the broad goals which encompassed Solidarity's social, economic and political 
agenda, the movement would have been unable to maintain its unity underground, let alone 
assume the leadership of Eastern Europe's first non-communist government. In its 16 months 
of freedom in 1980-81, Solidarity initiated a 'public striptease ,3 of the institutions of state 
socialism. This began with various proposals aimed at decentralising decision-making at the 
enterprise level. The self-management refonns "proved an excellent strategy for smoothing over 
antagonisms between professionals and workers in Solidarity."~ Indeed self-management 
emerged as the opposition's common denominator in its attempts to rationalise and democratise 
central planning. Those who stressed the fonner invariably went on to preach economic 
liberalism in 1989 while those who favoured the latter remained faithful to their cause. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the contrasting perspectives on Poland's initial 
conditions prior to the launch of 'shock therapy'. The 'transition' school focuses on the unique 
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period of 'extraordinary politics' following the victory of Solidarity in Eastern Europe' s first 
democratic elections. The origins of the 'big bang' are traced to the politically-charged events 
in summer 1989 beginning with the arrival of Jeffrey Sachs, followed by the audacious moves 
of Lech Wal~sa in stitching together a Solidarity-led coalition, and ending with the appointment 
of Leszek Balcerowicz as Finance Minister and the official presentation of his Plan on 17 
December. The dramatic deterioration of the macroeconomy resulted in the abandonment of the 
social democratic agenda agreed on at the Round Table in favour of a neo-liberal programme 
with strong emphasis on short-term stabilisation. 
The philosophical underpinnings of the Balcerowicz Plan are placed in the context of a 
decentralised enterprise culture which required the establishment of conventional forms of 
corporate governance prior to firms' privatisation. This is where the arguments of the 
'adaptation' school with its emphasis on indigenous institutions are compelling. The entrenched 
position of the workers' councils in the governance structure of state enterprises has its legal 
roots in two crucial pieces of legislation enacted during the 'First Stage' of economic 
liberalisation in 1981-82: the Act on State Enterprises and the Act on Workers' Self-
Management. Unlike the more centralised Czechoslovak model. Poland's state firms prided 
themselves on their autonomous character and objected to plans aimed at recentralising authority. 
While Wal~sa's union provided tacit support for radical stabilisation, Solidarity's self-
management wing proved more recalcitrant in the sphere of privatisation. The opening of the 
post-communist Solidarity umbrella, and the gradual closing of it months later, were influenced 
by these two sides to the movement, each steeped in the history of the opposition in its long 
struggle against communism. 
SOLIDARITY AND THE COMMUNISTS' LEGACY 
It was Stalin who remarked that applying socialism to Poland was akin to saddling a cow. 
Matters of independence and national consciousness were inextricably linked to the complex 
tasks of institution-building ever since Poland reemerged as a nation state in 1918. A turbulent 
history of multiple partitions, together with the humiliation endured under foreign occupation, 
could easily have ended in desperation, if not resignation. had it not been for the heroic resistance 
that figured prominently in successive repressions. Poland's Jewry and intelligentsia suffered 
the most under Nazi rule while the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (to say nothing of the 
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deliberate inaction of the Red Army at the time of the Warsaw Uprising) condemned the Soviet 
Union equally in the eyes of the Polish state. Following the tightening of Soviet hegemony in 
1948, the 'nationalist-deviationist' wing of the newly constituted PZPR led by Wladyslaw 
Gomulka was denounced by the Soviet authorities, thereby facilitating the ascension of a 
conservative faction allied uncritically to the Soviet cause. "Although the extremes of Stalinism 
in collectivisation, mass terror and personality cult were more limited in Poland"'. the perceived 
illegitimacy of the regime set up under First Secretary Boleslaw Bierut presaged further 
difficulties in administering communism. 
Gomulka's 'Socialist Renewal' 
Attempts at restricting the role of the Catholic Church, in many ways the preserver of national 
and cultural identity, as well as subjecting the peasantry - the largest segment of the Polish 
population - to central planning contributed to the first major crisis in June 1956. Subsequent 
to Khrushchev's formal denunciation of Stalin's rule. workers' riots in Poznan provoked a sharp 
crackdown causing the deaths of numerous activists. Despite Moscow's demands for a swift 
condemnation of the events, Gomulka and his nationalist-minded colleagues gained the upper 
hand. Brought into office in October 1956 proclaiming a home-grown 'Polish road to socialism', 
Gomulka's popularity stemmed from his promise to place Soviet-Polish relations on a more 
equal footing and to embark on comprehensive reforms. 
The 'Polish October' was important for several reasons. Chief among these was the fact 
that workers themselves had instigated a major uprising in a communist country. The 
spontaneous formation of workers' councils (rady praco'tvn;c:e) in state-owned enterprises 
signified a strong grass-roots demand for the democratisation, or at least the decentralisation, of 
economic management. A month after Gomulka assumed office, a Workers' Council Act was 
passed allowing employees of firms to "scrutinise and comment on the [enterprise's] annual plan, 
profits and performance; to agree to any changes in the internal organisational structure and 
production process; and to approve the appointment of the factory director.'06 By the end of 1957. 
almost half of all state firms had councils.7 The decollectivisation of agriculture, the 
improvement in Church-State relations. as well as the greater press freedoms accorded to the 
intelligentsia suggested the 'Polish October' had eased tensions within society. The creation of 
an Economic Council functioning alongside the government and grouping eminent economists 
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such as Oskar Lange and Wlodzimierz Brus led to the publication of its 'Theses' in April 1957. 
The recommendations advanced by the Council - "the democratisation of the economy". 
it was claimed, necessitated "the active participation of employees, workers' councils. local 
authorities and the parliament (Sejm) in the development of the Plan"s - placed Poland in the 
vanguard of East European reform. Yet once the fever of 1956 subsided, the Gomulka regime 
reneged on its commitments and gradually reasserted control. In December 1958 the role of the 
councils was reduced "to a position of complete impotence,,9 with the introduction of a law 
incorporating the bodies into party-based organisations. The PZPR clamped down on other 
short-lived freedoms by tightening censorship laws and becoming increasingly intolerant of 
'revisionist' thinking, both within the party and outside. Following on the heels of a sharp 
rebuke of the PZPR's inattentiveness to cultural policy in the form of a letter addressed by 34 
prominent intellectuals, two young Marxist students influenced by Trotskyite thinking published 
their own 'Open Letter to the Party' in 1965 accusing the authorities of betraying the interests 
of the working class through self-serving bureaucratic centralisation. 10 For their 'revolutionary 
incitement' , J acek Kuroti and Karol Modzelewski were sentenced to prison for several years. 
The decade ended with student protests in March 1968 centred around Warsaw University in 
response to the cancellation of the 19th century Polish writer Adam Mickiewicz's play. 
'Forefathers' Eve' (Dziady). Adopting anti-semitic propaganda in assigning blame, the Party 
exposed the factional divisions within its ranks. Gomulka's 'socialist renewal', it seemed, had 
given way to conservative retrenchment. A mass exodus of talented professionals II, either as a 
result of persecution or disillusionment, underscored the illegitimacy of the party-state. 
Gierek's Legacy of Debt 
In response to an ill-timed measure to raise food prices in December 1970, just days before 
Christmas, widespread rioting erupted on the Baltic coast, notably in the shipyards of Gdatisk, 
Gdynia and Szczecin where the idea of forming independent trade unions was first raised. I:! 
Fearing a loss of control the Party repressed the strikers, thereby causing hundreds of deaths. On 
20 December Gomulka resigned in disgrace and was replaced by the pragmatic Silesian party 
boss Edward Gierek. Together with his new Prime Minister. Piotr Jaroszewicz, Gierek 
personally negotiated with the striking workers and agreed to rescind the price increase. Lacking 
the charisma of his predecessor, Gierek "tried to build support for his leadership through 
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technocratic refonn and [a] consumer revolution."13 External finance was to provide the key for 
his lofty aspirations of creating a 'second Poland'. The centrepiece of his agenda was the 'New 
Development Strategy' calling for accelerated growth, increased consumption and a huge surge 
in investment. By borrowing heavily from western banks to purchase investment and consumer 
goods, Gierek believed he could engineer a technological boom which, in tum, would allow 
Poland to payoff its debts by using the proceeds from exports. In the first-half of the 1970s, 
living conditions improved substantially as a result of a rise in real wages: 6.8% per year between 
1971 and 1975. 14 Integration into the world economy nevertheless required an efficient 
allocation of imports and constituted a test -case of whether "an outward-oriented economic 
strategy [could in fact be pursued] within the institutional framework of state socialism."15 
The key administrative component of Gierek's Strategy - the introduction of Large 
Economic Organisations (Wielka Organizacja Gospodarcza or WOGs) - came into effect in 
January 1973. Linking a number of strategic enterprises in a given sector, the WOGs achieved 
huge bargaining power in attracting investment, often outbidding branch ministries. Yet it soon 
became clear that the WOGs were creating imbalances in the economy as a result of managerial 
incompetence and pervasive corruption (the centralising tendencies of these bodies reduced the 
number of workers' councils to just over 500 in 1978, down from 6000 in 1972 16). The failure 
to engage in financial reform, coupled with the adverse external conditions following the 1973 
oil shock, contributed to the emergence of severe macroeconomic tensions in 1975-76 as the 
Polish economy experienced its first balance of payments crisis. Foreign debt increased from 
$1.2 billion in 1971 to $20.7 billion in 1979 with the crucial debt service ratio soaring from 
12.4% to 75% respectively.17 In a belated attempt to arrest the growth in imports and boost 
exports, the Party discarded its commitment to keep prices stable and raised the price of meat on 
24 June 1976. 
The measure belied the government's consultative approach "on which Gierek prided 
himself'18 and led to renewed strikes and demonstrations; this time in the city of Radom as well 
as Ursus, a Warsaw suburb. Despite (again) withdrawing the price increase, the regime used 
brute force to quell the protests resulting in the deaths of 17 activists and the imprisonment of 
numerous workers. On 23 September 1976, a group of 14 opposition intellectuals fonned the 
Committee for the Defence of Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnik6w or KOR). The significance 
of this date. both to those who portray KOR a~ instrumental in raising the political consciousness 
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of the working class 19 as well as others who assign a subsidiary role to the organisation10• rests 
with the view that the Committee engineered a distinctive opposition strategy which came to 
symbolise the political role played by the Solidarity trade union in August 1980. 
The Rise of Solidarity 
KOR's founding members, KurOl} and Antoni Macierewicz (other key participants included 
Adam Michnik, Bogdan Boruszewicz, and Jan Jozef Lipski), subscribed to the 'post-revisionist' 
philosophy of the eminent theorist and KOR member Leszek Kolakowski. 21 As David Ost points 
out, the new politics of dissent was in fact a form of 'anti-politics': "Forget about the state. the 
opposition counselled. Forget about 'politics'. Let's start at the bottom and rebuild civil society 
instead.,,22 Although KOR was hardly a homogeneous body (social democrats such as Kurori 
mingled with more nationalist-minded figures such as Macierewicz), its 'anti-politics' served as 
a rallying cry for other independent forces. By rejecting the state and its power relations, KOR 
argued for the democratic transformation and self-organisation of civil society. In a famous 1976 
article entitled 'A New Evolutionism':!3, Michnik encapsulated many of the themes developed 
by Kolakowski when he criticised the 1956 and 1968 generation of opposition intellectuals for 
relying too heavily on the party-state's capacity for reform. In Michnik's view, the opposition 
should instead concentrate on a gradual expansion of civil liberties and human rights; an 
objective which the working class, intelligentsia and the Church could all unite on. It was the 
latter which the secular-minded Michnik recognised as a key agent of change in the struggle 
against communism, a postulate he revised in the post-communist context. "The Church is a 
force resisting absolute power", said Michnik, "it protects civil society against the state, and 
therefore plays a fundamentally democratic role, even when it continues to adopt culturally 
conservative positions which reinforce its hold over the population.,,24 
The election of the Archbishop of Krakow, Karol Wojtyla, to the Papacy in October 1978, 
together with his triumphal return home the following June, proved a momentous occasion for 
the opposition. Not only did the Pope identify with the spiritual, cultural and national aspirations 
of the majority of Poles, he encouraged them. A profusion of dissent throughout the late 1970s 
further underscored the weakness of the Gierek regime. Groups as diverse as the Catholic 
Intellectuals Club (Klubi Inteligencji Katolickiej or KIK) and the Movement for the Defence of 
Human and Civil Rights (Rueh Obrollv Praw C:Jowieka i Obywatela or ROPCiO) drew 
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inspiration from KOR's 'anti-politics'. The 'Flying University', operating out of the ba~ements 
of prominent dissidents, offered alternative sources of intellectual development. A reform 
commission entitled the Experience and Future Group (Dos wiadc~enie i PrzyszloSc or DiP) 
under the direction Stefan Bratkowski brought together party members, opposition intellectuals 
and Catholic figures to discuss the state of the nation. The findings pointed to the deleterious 
effects of the regime's policies on the country's psychological and social health. 25 In April 1978, 
workers on the Baltic coast, assisted by intellectuals such as the Gdansk-based Boruszewicz2tl , 
set up the Committee for Free Trade Unions of the Coast whose founders included the future 
Chairman of Solidarity, Lech Walysa. Oscillating between confrontation and compromise, 
ensnared in a perilous debt trap, and confronted with an economic crisis characterised by falling 
investment and rising inflation, the PZPR initiated gradual price increases in July 1980 which, 
evidently, produced a disproportionate response. 
The literature detailing the Solidarity movement's 500 days as communist Europe's first 
independent trade union differs on the accent placed on the opposition's social, economic and 
political goals. Alain Touraine and his colleagues, at the cost of over-simplification, refer to 
three phases: the syndical or union phase from August 1980 to late March 1981; the economic 
phase from April to late September 1981; and the political phase culminating in the declaration 
of Martial Law in December 1981.27 Concentrating more on tactical-ideological splits within the 
movement, Jadwiga Staniszkis perceives the above phases in terms of a self-limiting revolution, 
an identity crisis, and open conspiracy respectively.2M The question as to whether different 
individuals (or groups of individuals) at different stages may, or may not, have emphasised one 
tendency or another is misleading. Solidarity's diffuse structure and all-embracing character 
precluded the elevation of one agenda to the detriment of others while the lack of clarity 
accompanying its goals blurred the distinct functions performed by its leaders. 
As late as 15 August 1980, "the only thing at stake was a wage claim. ,,29 When the strikes 
spread to the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk, an Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee (Mirdzyzakladow.v 
Komitet Strajkowy or MKS) was formed with the charismatic Walysa at its head. Deeming it fair 
that all enterprises in the region be awarded a similar wage increase, the MKS drew up a list of 
21 demands on 16-17 August calling for independent trade unions and the right to strike. Other 
demands included access to the media, the release of prisoners, and 'publicly approved' anti-
crisis measures involving a rise in pensions and wages.30 On 24 August, a 'committee of experts' 
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was formed to advise the GdaIisk MKS. Its seven members included three Catholic intellectuals 
(Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Andrzej Wielowiejski and Bogdan Czywinski). two economists 
(Waldemar Kuczynski and Tadeusz Kowalik), one historian (Bronislaw Geremek). and the 
sociologist Staniszkis. While most accounts of the committee tend to emphasise its 'moderating' 
influence31 , pressure from both the striking workers and the experts (together with the Church) 
compelled the Gierek leadership to sign up to the Gdansk Accords on 31 August. "Under a 
crucifix and using a souvenir pen of the Pope's recent visit, Wal~sa signed the agreement that 
was to allow the formation of the Niezaleiny SamorzlJdny ZwiEJZek Zawodow), (Independent Self-
Governing Trade Union) Solidamosc.,,32 
The Self-Management Reforms 
The regime's accession to the 21 demands - similar agreements were signed in Szczecin and 
Jastrz~bie - put to rest any lingering hope that it commanded the allegiance of the majority of 
Poles. The overwhelming support for the Accords, with 92% of the public in favour of the 
agreements33 , placed the 9 million member-strong Solidarity union at the forefront of East 
European reform. The 'self-limiting' character of the movement was evident in its decision to 
recognise the communists' leading role in the state. If Solidarity was not a political party and yet 
its legal recognition enabled it to confront the authorities with a host of demands. what was its 
precise function in autumn 1980? Most observers claim the signing of the Accords marked the 
end of the opposition's 'anti-political' stance. With its application for registration formally 
approved on 10 November 1980, Solidarity became a political force shaping the direction of 
Polish reform. "By calling for a single national union [- albeit with a decentralised regional 
structure -] that would pose a political counterweight to the state, [the opposition] was saying that 
the conflict had already passed the stage where societal democratisation was the only goal."w 
The union began by pressing the PZPR on a host of employment-related issues. including 
the demand for free Saturdays. Given the optimism expressed by the public that Solidarity could 
(and should) improve the standard of living35, syndical action alone was deemed insufficient in 
both securing and preserving the union's autonomy. While the new Party leader, the former 
Interior Minister Stanislaw Kania, promised to uphold the Accords, rising numbers of strikes and 
arrests throughout the New Year revealed the difficulties in reaching a consensus. The 
deterioration in the economy. aggravated by inflationary wage settlements, suspended investment 
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projects, and declining exports, convinced the opposition (and the regime. albeit for different 
reasons) that a more resolute approach was needed. The 'Bydgoszcz incident' on 19 March 1981 
in which Solidarity activists were beaten by the police accentuated the increasing polarisation of 
vIews. 
Touraine and his team view the rise of the self-management (samorz'l'f) movement in 
early 1981 as a "meeting point between trade union and political action."36 Certainly this was 
not how the Party viewed the reform and, according to some observers, was not what the 
designers of self-management had in mind. Contrary to popular opinion, the self-management 
agenda did not originate from within the Solidarity union. The reform was a product of the 
technical intelligentsia in the rejuvenated workers' councils and not of the workers themselves; 
some even saw a "potential rival to the new unions in a system of worker self-management."J7 
The first explicit reference to self-management was in Point Six of the Gdansk Accords which 
briefly stated that "economic reform [should] be based on the strengthening, autonomous 
operation and participation of the workers' councils in [enterprises'] management. ,,38 The 
urgency of devising a reform programme placed self-management on the political agenda in late 
1980. Economic experts on Solidarity's provisional National Coordinating Commission 
(Krajowa Komisja Porozumiewowcza or KKP) such as Ryszard Bugaj "argued strongly that the 
union [should] abandon its [purely syndicalist] posture and take on an active role in promoting 
economic reform, including 'authentic samorZlld' .',)9 
In early April 1981, two Solidarity activists - Jacek Merkel, a colleague of Wal~sa's at 
the Lenin Shipyards, and Jerzy Milewski, an advisor from the Polish Academy of Sciences -
founded the Network of Enterprise Organisations of Solidarity (Siec). Grouping workers' 
councils in 17 of Poland's largest and strongest state firms, the Network began work on a 
programme of 'radical decentralisation' at the enterprise level aimed at replacing the traditional 
state enterprise with a more democratically-oriented · social 'one. It was during these months that 
a profusion of self-management schemes (Domenico Nuti lists seven competing projects 
including the proposals being drawn up the Party-Government Commission for Economic 
Reform40) provided the conceptual framework for the 'First Stage' of economic liberalisation. 
The common objective uniting all opposition self-management plans was an attempt to 
weaken the power base of the nomenklatura in state enterprises. The reforms were intended as 
Han instrument of economic rebirth" aimed at "reducing the influence of central administrative 
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planning.,,41 The Network viewed enterprise autonomy and industrial democracy as indivisible 
and based their programme on this premise. One of their consultants was Leszek Ba1cerowicz 
who, at the time, was in charge of a young refonn team at Warsaw's Central School of Planning 
and Statistics (his group included other prominent post-communist refonners such as Marek 
DClbrowski and Jerzy Eysymontt). The Network had been impressed"':! with Ba1cerowicz's first 
'Plan' published in November 1980 entitled 'Economic Refonn: Main Direction and Means of 
Implementation' (Reforma Gospodarcza: GJowne Kieriunki i Sposoby Realizacji) which 
concurred with the group's objectives on rationalising the behaviour of state finns. 
Balcerowicz recalls how "we wanted to propose something which would be consistent 
with our sense of realism. In this sense, we arrived at the conception of self-management as a 
social factor which would grant the enterprise independence and autonomy.""') A more candid 
post-1989 justification for endorsing self-management was provided by Witold Trzeciakowski 
who claimed that he chose samorZlled "on the principle of a choice between scarlet fever and 
influenza.,,44 With Balcerowicz's assistance, as well as that of other independent economists, the 
Network drew up a programme of refonn which acted as a counter-proposal to a draft law being 
prepared by the government. Entitled' Siec Draft Law on Social Enterprises', the bill differed 
from the Refonn Commission's proposals on three counts: firstly, the social (as opposed to state) 
enterprise was to be the fundamental organisational unit of the economy; secondly, the director 
was to be appointed by the workers' councils (as opposed to the founding organ or branch 
ministry with the agreement of the councils); and thirdly, the enterprise was to be managed by 
its workers (as opposed to its director) through their organs of self-management.",5 
The Network's proposals were among a raft of measures adopted at Solidarity's First 
Congress in Gdansk in September-October 1981. The Party had already agreed on a programme 
of 'internal democratisation' and 'economic renewal' at its own 'Extraordinary Party Congress' 
in July "despite open Soviet disapproval.,,46 Held amid Soviet naval exercises along the Baltic 
Coa'it, further strikes and arrests, a severe economic crisis (imports and exports had plummeted, 
foreign debt had soared to $25.5 billion and investment and production alone were -22% and -
12% respectively47), and splits in the opposition between 'pragmatists' and 'fundamentalists', 
Solidarity's Congress was a spectacle of political theatre. Its roughly 900 delegates - 47% of 
whom claimed working class origins. 33% intelligentsia, 14% peasant, and 5% mixed 
backgrounds4M - convened in two stages; the first from 5-10 September and the second from 26 
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September to 7 October. Dozens of resolutions were passed defining the character. structure and 
position(s) of the union on aspects of political, social and economic reform. Solidarity's 'Magna 
Carta'49 for a 'Self-Governing Republic' comprised 37 theses which, although vague and 
visionary, revealed the extent of the union's aspirations. 
George Sanford refers to schisms between 'moderates' and 'radicals' in the debates 
concerning the final draft to be adopted: "Was [Solidarity], as argued by Wal~sa and his Church-
and Gdansk-based advisors, primarily an independent and self-managing national trade union 
federation concerned with workplace problems? Or, as the radicals argued, was it a political and 
social movement whose [very] survival depended on a major transformation, [possibly even an] 
overthrow, of the communist system?"so Economic experts associated with the first position. the 
so-called 'realists' such as Bugaj and Kuczynski, favoured a gradual restoration of market 
equilibrium and a strong emphasis on self-management. The more intransigent elements 
represented by the Lublin economist Stefan Kurowski, dubbed the 'fantasy merchants,sl. 
championed full-scale liberalism and an abandonment of piecemeal measures. The debates 
surrounding the elections for President were equally contentious, this time with regard to the 
precise composition of the KKP; whether it should be nationalist or democratic, centralised or 
decentralised, union-led or intelligentsia-driven, and, crucially, to what extent it should oppose 
the regime. The final vote proved inconclusive: "Whereas Szeczcin union leader Marian Jurczyk 
[(25% of the vote)] demanded free elections to the Sejm, Andrzej Gwiazda of Gdansk [(9%)] 
exhorted workers to take greater control [of the movement] and Bydgoszcz leader Jan Rulewski 
[(6%)] mocked and challenged the Warsaw Pact; Wal~sa [(55%)], for his part, began his speech 
by urging respect for the authorities. "S2 
On 18 October 1981, the Defence Minister W ojciech J aruzelski replaced Kania as First 
Secretary. The recession had reached crisis-point and pressure from the Soviet authorities was 
mounting. Whether "Solidarity had [by then] sowed the seeds of its own destruction"s3 by 
issuing increasingly radical demands is debatable. The dissolution of KOR on 29 September, 
coupled with a wave of strikes throughout October and November. certainly indicated a strongly 
political agenda. The Party claimed Solidarity had lost control of its members. Even 60% of the 
public believed the union wa\\ partly responsible for the conflicts dividing society; and 40% of 
respondents were of the opinion that both sides were to blame for the economic crisis (compared 
to 27% in December 1980).5" The decision to impose Martial Law on 13 December 1981 is an 
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issue which, to this day, divides the Polish political establishment. It is questionable whether. 
as Jaruzelski still claims55, the dangers of a full-scale Soviet invasion justified the 'lesser evil': 
a relatively mild crackdown on the opposition, the internment of thousands of its members, the 
annulment of the Gdansk Accords, and the banning of the Solidarity union together with other 
independent organisations. The pretext for declaring a state of emergency was that economic 
reform had been 'hijacked' by 'anarcho-syndicalist' elements. This appears to suggest that the 
Party believed its reform agenda would have benefited from a (re)centralisation of controls. or 
that the Reform Commission's economic proposals were somehow incompatible with 
Solidarity's self-management programme. To an extent this was true. Yet as the new 
administration's 'First Stage' of reforms later revealed, the principles and assumptions of 
enterprise autonomy favoured by Solidarity were broadly endorsed by the Party. That Martial 
Law was entirely incompatible with industrial democracy only served to illustrate that "the 
similarities Solidarity had with socialist principles were as important as the differences [it] raised 
with 'real socialism."s6 
The September 1981 Legislation 
The imposition of western sanctions, moral outrage on the part of the Church, and a further 
isolation of the Party did not stop J aruzelski' s administration (now operating as the Military 
Council for National Salvation) from proceeding with its economic blueprint adopted at the Party 
Congress in July. Known as the 'Triple S' regimeS7 in which enterprises were to become self-
managed, self-dependent and self-financed, the programme represented a compromise with the 
Network's draft law. From the outset, the authorities had attacked the Network, "likening their 
ideas to Yugoslav revisionism"(views not far removed from those expressed by certain neo-
liberals in 1989 - see last section) and "rejecting the Network's radicalism on central planning.,,58 
It therefore came as a disappointment to Siec that the Party opted to legislate separately on 
enterprise autonomy and workers' self-management. On 25 September 1981, two bills were 
passed by the Sejm: the Act on State Enterprises and the Act on Workers' Self-Management. The 
bone of contention between the KKP Commission responsible for submitting the Network's 
proposals to parliament and the Sejm committee charged with overseeing the passage of the 
Reform Commission's draft Acts had centred on who wali to appoint (and dismiss) managers in 
state firms: the state or the workers' councils. 
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The Party, according to Peter Raina, claimed it would "never abandon its right to recruit 
people for managerial posts and would protect them [at all costS]."S9 In the end, it reconciled 
itself to a compromise solution which stressed that managers would be appointed by both the 
'founding organ' (the state's regional and provincial ministries responsible for supervising state 
firms) and the workers' councils, except in those firms of strategic importance where the 
decisions of the 'founding organ' would prevail. The Act on State Enterprises provided the legal 
basis for the 'Triple S' regime by stipulating that Polish state firms would now become 
"independent, self-managing and self-financing units.,,60 The Act on Workers' Self-
Management, meanwhile, endowed workers' councils (composed of 15 members elected for two-
year terms by secret ballot by all the workers in an enterprise61 ) with substantial rights in the 
management and governance of enterprises. Raina lists 17 legally-binding provisions including 
the approval of long-term plans and objectives of enterprises, the annual review of the activities 
of firms, the power to decide on the proportion of profits distributed to workers and, crucially, 
the power to review the appointment and dismissal of directors and other managerial personne1.6~ 
In short, the councils were accorded the right of veto in a swathe of industries where the state 
formerly held sway. Whilst Solidarity had strongly criticised both laws at its Congress and had 
even promised to hold a national referendum on self-management, a decisive step - analogous, 
in certain respects, to the implementation of the New Economic Mechanism in Hungary in 1968 -
towards denationalisation had been taken. Jan Szomburg claimed that "one can say that central 
planning in Poland came to an end with the passage of this legislation and that enterprises 
became - at least formally - fully independent entities with respect to their productive and 
investment activities. ,,63 
Reflections Underground 
Following the Pope's plea for dialogue, Martial Law was formally lifted in July 1983. Yet the 
removal of Solidarity from the political scene alienated many independent economists, thereby 
depriving the regime of much-needed technical and professional support. Despite a relative 
stabil isation of the economy with real wages once again growing from 1984 to 1986M , society 
was characterised by a sense of apathy and dejection. Feelings of betrayal on the part of the 
opposition turned to humiliation with the enactment of a new trade union law in October 1982 
effectively dissolving Solidarity and allowing the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions 
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(Ognolpolskie Porozumienie Zwiqzkow Zawodowyeh or OPZZ) to take its place - as well as seize 
its al)sets. Now operating underground - the legendary Warsaw escapee Zbigniew Bujak formed 
the Provisional Coordinating Committee (Tymezasowa Komisja Krajowa or TKK) that served 
as the 'official' clandestine Solidarity - Wal~sa's union gradually became a symbol. a myth.65 
This 'myth' nevertheless had to face up to the fact that "it lost, and in the aftermath of this 
seemingly historical defeat everything [it] believed in became suspect.,,66 
Wal~sa's award of the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1983, together with the tragic 
discovery of the body of a kidnapped Solidarity priest, Father Jerzy Popieluszko, underscored the 
moral and political bankruptcy of the communist regime. The Party's attempts to forge a 'social 
contract,67 under a 'rejuvenated' leadership proved a dismal failure. Deficiencies in the 'First 
Stage' of reforms led to a rise in inegalitarian attitudes. In 1984, the Poles (Polae),) research 
team under the direction of Wladyslaw Adamski revealed a marked increase in support for 
differentiation in incomes, private enterprise (according to 'official figures', the private sector 
share of GNP already amounted to 19%, employing close to 30% of the labour force68 ), and the 
dismissal of inefficient employees.69 Lena Kolarska-BobiIiska, herself a member of the team, 
noted that respondents' approval of market -based institutions was juxtaposed with a strong desire 
for the state to retain its social functions, together with a fear of unemployment. This 'myth of 
the market'70 resulted in a gradual reorientation in the opposition's thinking; an abandonment of 
the purely collectivist, syndicalist demands of the past. The notion that "Solidarity had lost 
because [it had been] too left-wing, too close to the left-wing views of KOR,,71 gained currency 
in intellectual circles through the wide dissemination of samizdat publications. 
Jerzy Szacki observes these developments from the perspective ofthe history of economic 
liberalism in Poland during the 1980s. He stresses that while the philosophy of economic 
liberalism per se appealed to a minority of dissidents, its political value as an alternative 
'neglected path of anti-communism' n increased. The father figure of Polish economic liberalism 
in the 1980s was the Hayekian theorist Miroslaw Dzielski who talked of a more creative strategy 
of confronting the regime. Instead of one based on political intransigence, the aim was to coax 
the authorities into ceding their monopoly by embracing capitalism. Ost notes similar shifts in 
the opposition's thinking: "The new wisdom held that the 'next Solidarity' had to work for 
[economic reform] above all. that such was the only solid foundation for political pluralism. 
'Property Rights theory' became the hot topic in Warsaw in 1984 and even prominent radicals 
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like Staniszkis became ardent proponents of private capitar'7~ (see below). 
The brutal legacy of Martial Law and the pervasive distrust of the regime compelled the 
Party to search for new ways of enticing members of the opposition into supporting 'reformist' 
mealiures. Vacillations in policy, coupled with increased divisions within the PZPR hierarchy. 
precluded substantial concessions. The appointment of Zbigniew Messner as Prime Minister in 
November 1985 was preceded by the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Soviet leader's restructuring (perestroika) 
announced at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986 opened the door to a 'Second Stage' of 
Polish economic liberalisation in 1986-88. The ingredients were virtually identical to those of 
the 'First'. New legislation included the authorisation of joint-ventures with foreign firms. a 
loosening of restrictions on currency exchange (aided by Poland's readmission to the Bretton 
Woods institutions in spring 1986), the commercialisation of the banking sector, cuts in subsidies 
together with price increases, and the completion of the reform of central administration.7-1 The 
political concomitants of these measures consisted of a Kadcirist strategy of reconciliation with 
the opposition. Self-management practices were once again permitted (workers' councils were 
active in 70% of state firms by the end of 198775), major amnesties for political prisoners were 
announced, censorship restrictions were eased, and a referendum in November 1987 was held 
calling for austerity and mild politicalliberalisation - the low turnout invalidated the results but 
not the economic measures. 
On 25 October 1987 a new 'aboveground' body formed by Wal~sa and 10 regional 
representatives called the National Executive Commission (Krajowa Komisja Wykanowcza or 
KKK) replaced Bujak's 'underground' TKK. Ost describes how this 'second' Solidarity incurred 
the wrath ofWal~sa's old opponents on the KKP by coming out in favour of economic liberalism 
and hinting at a possible 'anti-crisis pact' with the authorities.76 As strikes broke out in April-
May 1988, Wal~sa, once again assisted by the Church, preached moderation and strove to 
disassociate himself from the events. The establishment of the 'Working Group of Solidarity' 
headed by Gwiazda and other 'hard-liners' was a rebuke to the KKK's perceived indifference to 
workers' concerns. As the views of the Party and those of the opposition slowly converged (at 
least on matters of economic refonn and the need for negotiations) following an escalation of 
industrial unrest on the eighth anniversary of the Gdansk Accords. it wali clear a new Solidarity 
had emerged, one in favour of compromise: "It was Wal~sa, together with his hand-picked 
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advisors and colleagues [on the KKK] who constituted the closest thing to a national Solidarity 
leadership. They were the ones who had to respond. They were the ones who had to create new 
structures. They were Solidarity now.,,77 
'Parachutists' and 'Perestroikists' 
The Party's economic liberalism intensified following the appointment of the progressive 
Mieczyslaw Rakowski as Premier in September 1988. Saddling his predecessor with the failure 
of the 'Second Stage', Rakowski threw his weight behind an invigorated 'Plan for the 
Consolidation of the National Economy' promising to arrest the sharp rise in inflation - the end-
year rate surged from 25.3% in 1987 to 61.3% in 1988 as a result of higher wage settlements 78 -
and place the public and private sectors on an equal footing. The inclusion of Mieczyslaw 
Wilczek in the cabinet as Minister of Industry, together with the unsuccessful attempt to enlist 
the services of the opposition economist Aleksander PaczyIiski in the Ministry of Housing, both 
active supporters of private enterprise, testified to the renewed impetus behind economic 
liberalisation. The 'political capitalism' or 'spontaneous privatisation' associated with Poland's 
dying days of communism can be traced to the Economic Activity Act of December 1988 
encouraging the development of joint-stock companies (sp6Jki) and other fOnTIS of "inter-sectoral 
capital formation.,,79 
Various accounts of these developments80 point to cases of rampant abuse and widespread 
corruption. These assertions are based on anecdotal evidence suggesting members of the 
nomenklatura capitalised on the more liberal environment in order to siphon off state assets and 
'reinvest' them in private firms of which they, or their friends and relatives, were the 
shareholders (the case of 19loopol, one of the large foreign trade conglomerates, was probably 
the most conspicuous example of such 'sweetheart deals'). This led to a deterioration in 
enterprises' financial condition and thus an increase in the state budget. According to Staniszkis, 
'spontaneous privatisation' was not entirely prejudicial as it offered hopes that the nomenklatura 
would eventually be willing to surrender its political monopoly in exchange for economic 
security.KI Perceptions of 'parachutists' as opposed to 'perestroikists'82, however. led to public 
outrage and served to discredit privatisation in the eyes of the public. Partly for this reason. 
opposition economists began to debate alternative proposals for large-scale privatisation. 
Following the first legal anti-socialist economic conference in April 1987 organised by 
54 
the Catholic University of Lublin (key figures included Kurowski, Tomaliz Gruszecki and Jan 
Winiecki), a second gathering of economists took place at Warsaw's Central School of Planning 
and Statistics on 17-18 November 1988. Entitled 'Proposals for the Transformation of the Polish 
Economy', the conference brought together scholars from different backgrounds. Two of the 
participants, Marcin Swi~icki and Marek D~browski, presented plans for a 'reorganisation of 
the public sector' and employees' self-management respectively (the first serious proposal for 
reform based on employee ownership had already been presented by the opposition economist 
Rafal Krawczyk in 1985). The two main contributions came from Stefan Kawalec, on the one 
hand, and Janusz Lewandowski and Jan Szomburg, on the other (see next chapter for the 
evolution of these two routes). Kawalec's proposal, entitled 'Outline of a Privatisation 
Programme for the Polish Economy (Zarys Programu Prywaty~acji Polskiej Gospodarki)"'''. 
based its recommendations on conventional forms of privatisation as practiced by the Thatcher 
administration in the 1980s. Referring to his plans as 'privatisation from above', Kawalec 
proposed turning state firms into corporate entities and then selling their shares to investors 
through a capital market. The advantages of such a scheme, according to Kawalec. were 
improved efficiency, increased budgetary revenue (combined with powerful deflationary effects) 
and the creation of a broad base of shareholders.x~ 
Lewandowski and Szomburg's proposal, on the other hand, entitled 'Property Reform 
as a Basis for Social and Economic Reform (Uwlaszczenie lako Fundament Refonn.\' Spoleczno-
Gm,podarczej)H5, was decidedly unconventional and was based on a free distribution of shares 
to the public through vouchers. Its conceptual roots could be traced to a plan put forward by the 
eminent liberal economist Milton Friedman in the mid-1970s to privatise the British and Italian 
state sectors. The two economists had developed their scheme in their home town of Gdansk. 
They argued, like many other East European experts, that capital and institutional inadequacies 
precluded the application of standard models of privatisation; especially in view of the scale of 
ownership transformation. Instead the two academics favoured a radical, swift "transfer of 
property rights from the state to the broad masses of society.',H6 The voucher scheme, according 
to LewandowskiH7, received a frosty reception at the conference and. perhaps for this reason. was 
dismissed as naive and utopian. 
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The Round Table Negotiations 
The 1989 Round Table talks (OkrqgJy S(01) stemmed from a series of contacts - encouraged and 
facilitated by the Church - between the Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak and W aI~sa' s hand-
picked team of advisors; officially recognised on 18 December 1988 as the Citizens' Committee 
under the Chairman of Solidarity. The Committee, according to WaI~sa, represented "the 
sharpest minds and greatest authorities of the country" yet, at the same time. functioned "outside 
the union, the creation of which was a consequence of Solidarity's duties to society in general. "Illl 
The social democratic bent of the body - prominent members included Geremek. Mazowiecki 
and Michnik - was challenged by more nationalist-minded figures within the opposition who felt 
marginalised. Gwiazda's Working Group joined forces with the Confederation for an 
Independent Poland (KPN) - a party with firm roots in the opposition dating back to the late 
1970s - in condemning the negotiations. The prospect of entering into formal talks with the 
communist regime, the significance and legitimacy of which. to say nothing of the final outcome, 
were questionable, provoked heated debates on the implications of reaching an accord. It was 
only after an acrimonious PZPR plenum on 17-18 January 1989 that the authorities themselves 
finally agreed to Jaruzelski's proposals for 'pluralism' in the trade union and political spheres, 
thus clearing the way for preliminary meetings with the 'constructive opposition' at a secret villa 
outside Warsaw known as Magdalenka. 
Unlike the previous negotiations in Gdansk in 1980 where "the MKS' s conversations 
were broadcast over a loudspeaker system so that the mass of striking workers could keep track 
of the bargaining,,89, the discussions of the Round Table working groups - the three key 
committees were those on trade union pluralism chaired by Mazowiecki, Aleksander 
KwaSniewski and Romuald Sosnowski; socio-economic policy headed by Trzeciakowski and 
Wladyslaw Baka: and political pluralism led by Geremek and Janusz Reykowski - were 
conducted by a select group of individuals often having to repair to Magdalenka to 'resolve' their 
differences.Q() Yet the reclusive character of the talks should not disguise the unpredictable and, 
as would soon become apparent. unintended outcome of the negotiations; a consequence of the 
competing agendas. "The communists", notes Frances Millard, "fully expected the arrangement 
to benefit them: they expected to continue to control the state even while relinquishing some of 
their previous mechanisms of rule. Solidarity expected this too, but while the communists saw 
a deal as presenting the possibility of peaceful transformation within the system, Solidarity saw 
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it as the first phase of the transformation of the system.,,91 
Commencing on 6 February and ending on 5 April, the Round Table talks laid the 
foundations for Poland's systemic transformation. The final provisions called for a formal end 
to the seven-year old ban on the Solidarity union; the revival of the pre-war bicameral legislature 
through semi-free elections ensuring the PZPR and its allies - the United Peasant Party (ZSL) and 
the Democratic Party (SO) - of 65% of the seats, with the new Senate to be elected by a free vote; 
the election of a President (presumably Jaruzelski) with a six-year term by both houses of the 
National Assembly; the reform of state institutions, notably an independent judiciary; open access 
to the media; and, finally, the adoption of an economic document entitled 'Positions on Social 
and Economic Policy and Systemic Reform'. The political implications of the accords 
overshadowed the economic contents. Solidarity regained its legality on 17 April and was 
assured of its status as the 'loyal' opposition. The unprecedented nature of the agreement, 
sanctioned by Moscow as a legitimate right of each socialist country to pursue its own form of 
politicalliberalisation92, testified to the exhaustion of 'real socialism'. Nowhere was this more 
evident than in the economic section of the negotiations. For what was revealing was not so 
much the agreement itself (the measures were more a declaration of intent rather than an official 
programme) as the converging opinions on the scope and direction of economic reform: "Bugaj, 
Solidarity's social democrat, often had more in common with Baka on the government side than 
he had with Janusz Beksiak, Solidarity's other [liberal-minded] negotiator. Beksiak, meanwhile, 
could find much in common with the government's free market liberal, Wilczek"9J. 
The recognised authority on the philosophical underpinnings of the 'Positions' document 
is Tadeusz Kowalik. For it was he who, when observing the rise of the neo-liberal agenda in the 
coming months, insisted that "things could have turned out differently. There was, after all, an 
alternative programme [of transformation in spring 1989].,,1)4 Barring the excessive 80% wage 
indexation figure demanded by the opposition (20% less than that demanded by the OPZZ), the 
'Principles' could have conceivably provided the basis for an evolutionary transformation relying 
on long-established patterns of self-management and the gradual restoration of market 
equilibrium. One of the document's key elements was a constitutional guarantee demanded by 
Solidarity for varied forms of ownership (see next chapter for a refinement of this position). A 
National Property Fund was to be set up which would distribute state assets in accordance with 
clearly defined laws agreed on in the Sejm. Strong parliamentary oversight and a prominent role 
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for employee ownership were, in Kowalik's view, compatible with Solidarity's manifesto 
adopted eight years earlier. Bugaj himself, in a recent interview, noted that even ardent liberals 
signed up to the agreement, at the time deeming an evolutionary transformation to be better than 
none. ''The Round Table was in our hands", he lamented; "even the most dogmatic liberals such 
as Beksiak and Cezary J6zefiak accepted the formula of an evolutionary transformation. They 
were there, they signed everything." 95 In short, the Positions document "was the most radical 
of all reforms, but without the 'shock therapy' .,,96 
A TIME OF 'EXTRAORDINARY POLITICS' 
That it was the regime and not Solidarity who, for various reasons, favoured holding early 
elections on 4 June 1989 was best illustrated by WaI~sa's comment: "None of us want these 
elections, they are the terrible price we have to pay in order to get our union back."91 Meeting 
on 23 April, the closely-knit Citizens' Committee approved a list of candidates to contest the 
35% of seats reserved for 'independents' in the Sejm and the full 100 in the Senate, adopted an 
electoral programme, and put in place the local and regional bodies comprising the Solidarity 
Citizens' Committees (Komitety Obywatelskie or KO). The KO, with the help of the Church and 
the new Solidarity daily Gazeta Wyborcza, mounted an effective campaign designed to expose 
the divisions in the PZPR leadership and convince the public that the elections constituted the 
first step in Poland's transition to democracy. The deterioration of the economy with a rise in 
shortages and an erosion in the value of the zloty diverted attention away from the poll. 
Expressing its support for a "policy of full employment", the "elimination of the nomenklatura" 
in the privatisation of state assets, and the promotion of agriculture as "the country's most 
important priority,,98, the KO upheld the 'Positions' document. The Party, for its part, refused 
to publish its election manifesto until 29 May99 and witnessed its leadership jostle for places on 
the so-called National List of 35 seats which, although uncontested, required the approval of a 
majority of the electorate. 
When the final results were announced it was obvious the regime had underestimated the 
bitter resentment towards it - much more decisive than actual support for Solidarity candidates. 
Already in the first round. the opposition managed to capture all but one of the 161 seats out of 
460 in the Sejm and 92 in the loo-member Senate; in the second round. two weeks later. these 
numhers rose to 161 and 99 respectively. To add insult to injury. only two of the Party's 
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candidates on the National List garnered the minimum 50% of votes necessary for election: 
voters simply crossed out their names. While the turnout was relatively low at 629c. the results 
sent shock waves throughout Eastern Europe and attested to the profound shift in Polish politics. 
As Solidarity rejoiced over its spectacular showing, all the more surprising in view of the 
spontaneity and improvisation that characterised its campaign, a sense of incredulity and 
apprehension began to sink in. As for the Party, its propaganda machine had failed miserably and 
it was left with a discredited and insecure Round Table strategy. 
The opposition's 'identity crisis'JOO following the elections became more pronounced in 
the summer months. Now consisting of various decision-making centres - the KKW in Gdansk. 
the disparate members elected to the parliament and Senate comprising the Citizens' 
Parliamentary Club (Obywatelskie Klub Parlamentarny or OKP), the regional Citizens' 
Committees, and Walysa and his advisors - the opposition was faced with practical dilemmas 
over its precise role(s) in the new political environment. On 6 June, Jaruzelski chose to include 
Solidarity in a future coalition government. This marked the beginning of a 72-day political 
marathon culminating in the appointment of Mazowiecki as leader of Poland's first non-
communist government. The OKP's immediate reaction to Jaruzelski's offer was one of caution, 
if not repudiation. The Club's 16-person presidium chaired by Geremek rejected the idea of a 
'grand coalition' as a ploy on the part of PZPR; Geremek himself remarked that the communists 
were only interested in saddling the opposition with "the Ministry of Debts, the Ministry of 
W retched Housing, and the Ministry of Abysmal Labour." IOJ 
The reasoning, at this stage, was that the Party's consent to holding free and fair elections 
In 1993 would grant Solidarity the time and the means to organise itself as an effective 
opposition and, in so doing, ensure the proper implementation of the Round Table agreements. 
The first test of the viability of this approach came on 29 June when, contrary to expectations, 
Jaruzelski announced he would not seek the Presidency. Indelibly associated with the 
introduction of Martial Law, he proposed his colleague Kiszczak for the post, thereby shifting 
attention to the man responsible for implementing the crackdown. The prospect of lending its 
support to either candidate proved disheartening for the opposition, creating perceptions of a 
wide gulf between its moral and political authority. These perceptions intensified in the coming 
weeks as it became clear Solidarity needed to revise its assumptions in forming a 'shadow 
cabinet' and entertain the prospect of sharing power. The fear of being awarded decorative 
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functions, or worse as envisioned by Geremek, inspired radicalism in thinking. Timothy Garton 
Ash captured the political atmosphere in Poland in early July 1989: "To enter government while 
the basic structures remained unchanged would be, [Solidarity] said, to condemn yourself to 
failure. To change these structures required time. But time is what they did not have. They had 
won the election. The country needed them - now." 102 
Sachs's Stimulus 
Gorbachev's speech at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 6 July professing 'non-
interference' in the internal affairs of East European states 103, together with Jaruzelski's 
embarrassing one-vote confirmation to the Presidency two weeks later (realising he could rely 
on Solidarity's tacit support after all, he reversed himself and was elected head of state owing to 
the creative arithmetic of 37 members of the OKP who either abstained, spoiled their ballots or 
'forgot' to vote), underlined the acute dilemma confronting the Polish political establishment. 
In a vain attempt to arrest "the chaotic spiral in which wage and subsidy increases fed still more 
price rises"l04 the Rakowski government imposed a wage and price freeze in late June. This did 
little to impress the G-7 Group of industrialised nations at its annual summit in Paris. With 
financial aid to Hungary and Poland high on the agenda, the consensus was that without a radical 
stabilisation plan (and preferably a new set of faces), promises of financial assistance would not 
be forthcoming. 
Floating a proposal in a front-page editorial of his paper on 4 July, Michnik suggested the 
concept of 'Your President - Our Premier' as a way out of the crisis. Representing a minority 
view at the time, Michnik (also acting as a deputy in the Sejm) endorsed an alliance between the 
democratic opposition and the reformist segment of the PZPR that would, in effect, grant 
Solidarity the Premiership in exchange for Jaruzelski's accession to the Presidency. This "new 
order that would be acceptable to all the main political forces"105 was swiftly denounced by other 
figures in the OKP a~, at best, premature 106 and, at worst, "a temptation [on the part of Michnik] 
of playing the role of an aVll1l1-garde.',I07 A second article on 20 July, this time in Polityka 
written by Kuron entitled 'A Government: When, What Kind and Whose' lOB, echoed Michnik's 
thinking by stressing that only a cabinet with Solidarity's full backing would have the political 
legitimacy to carry out radical economic reform. As he later revealed in his memoirs 109, Kuron, 
at the time, was championing the cause of economic liberalism through his contacts with two 
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economists: Sachs and Beksiak. 
The origins of 'shock therapy' can partly be traced to Sachs's arrival in Warsaw on 18 
June. Poland's crushing $40 billion foreign debt owed to western governments and banks had 
compelled the Solidarity leadership to seek international advice on the mechanics of 
implementing a comprehensive systemic adjustment programme; a sine qua non of any debt 
restructuring agreement. The 'Outline of Proposals for the Economic Programme of Solidarity' 
(Zarys Proponowanego Programu Gospodarczego 'SolidamoSci')IIO, or 'Sachs Plan'. was 
presented to members of the OKP on 28 July by its author and his colleague David Lipton. Sachs 
had been invited to Poland courtesy of the Stefan Batory Foundation funded by the American 
financier and philanthropist George Soros. The 'Outline' "quickened the pulse and clarified the 
terms of the debate" I I I by arguing for a 'shock' approach to suppressing inflation; at the time in 
the 'high' as opposed to the 'hyper' category (see Appendix 2). Price liberalisation, drastic cuts 
in subsidies, a balanced budget, the promotion of free trade, and the immediate convertibility of 
the currency constituted major conceptual breakthroughs in Polish economic reform. Addressing 
the OKP, Sachs boasted of his successes in Bolivia in the mid-1980s where he helped the then 
Planning Minister Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada eradicate the 60,000% inflation rate devastating 
the economy. He even found time to quote his Bolivian client with a phrase which came to 
symbolise his economic philosophy: "If you are going to chop off a cat's tail, do it in one stroke, 
not bit by bit.,,112 
The Plan itself was broken down into various stages with sharp anti-inflationary measures 
to be introduced in the first three months, followed by a host of microeconomic, institutional and 
regulatory changes (see below for Sachs's equally explicit advice on privatisation). Aside from 
technical support offered by the two advisors, as well as their pleas to western governments for 
speedy financial assistance, the main attraction of their programme was the fact that it was one, 
and a radical one at that. In his detailed account of Polish 'shock therapy' , Sachs emphasises this 
point: "it was here that economic and political logic coalesced. I stressed that the idea of radical 
reform was not just an economic strategy, but also a political strategy to overcome Solidarity's 
lack of personnel and control in the ministries."1 D The stimulus provided by Sachs - "while 
listening to [him] speak, Kurori. had heard his colleague Bugaj whisper 'what nonsense that chap 
talks' and replied 'I don't know much about [his economic agenda] but I know it has [immediate] 
political value"ll", - convinced other Polish economists of the merits of a 'shock' approach, 
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including certain members present at the economic section of the Round Table Accords. 
A similar argument for speed was presented in a second 'Outline' drawn up by a team of 
economists under Beksiak. Judging stabilisation and liberalisation to be "two sides of the same 
coin"115, Beksiak and his colleagues - Gruszecki, Winiecki and Aleksander Jedra~zczyk _ 
prepared a crash programme of radical anti-inflationary measures combined with structural 
transformation. The plan, entitled 'Outline of a Programme of Stabilisation and Systemic 
Change' 116, was, if anything, more liberal than Sachs's. While the American advisors favoured 
the use of wage controls in stabilising the economy, the Beksiak team believed this would freeze 
wage differentials and thus preferred controlling consumption rather than incomes: "For us 
liberalisation means liberalisation - and that includes the price of labour." 117 They were equally 
sceptical of the fixed exchange rate mechanism and preferred to let the :Joty float as soon as 
possible. 
The differentia specifica of their plan was the emphasis on rapid institutional changes, 
specifically the immediate transformation of state firms into joint-stock companies with 20% of 
the shares distributed free of charge to employees. As "the only shares with voting rights", 
workers would then be able to "appoint a new board of directors that would, in tum, appoint a 
\ 
new manager" I 18; the quickest and most effective way, according to the Beksiak team, of ridding 
state firms of the nomenklatura. Anti-inflationary concerns, however, took centre stage on I 
August when, in his last act as Premier, Rakowski (cynically some say) eliminated all remaining 
price controls on agricultural products. Though in principle correct, the manner in which the 
reform was executed sparked a hyperinflationary bonfire (see Appendix 2). 
Wal~sa's Coup-de-Theatre 
Financial catalitrophe was accompanied by humiliation for the opposition when, on 2 August, the 
Sejm approved Kiszczak's nomination as Premier. With controversy still rife over the OKP's 
decision to facilitate the accession of Jaruzelski to the Presidency, the opposition spurned 
Kiszczak's offer to join a coalition, this time insisting on an 'all or nothing' approach. As the 
political impasse intensified with Kiszczak stymied in his attempts to form a cabinet, Wal~sa, 
seemingly out of nowhere. produced the master stroke. On 7 August he presented "as a virtual 
fait accompli" I 19 his proposal for a 'small coalition' between Solidarity and the two satellite 
formations. Jerzy Jozwiak's SD and Roman Malinowski's ZSL. Naturally. this caught the entire 
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political establishment by surprise and, at first, was frowned upon by members of the OKP who 
resented Wal~sa's behind-the-scenes manoeuverings. The PZPR. for its part. under its new 
leader Rakowski, condemned the idea as a betrayal of the Round Table. 120 
The fact remained that no other viable solutions were on offer. With the a~sistance of his 
Plenipotentiary for Coalition Talks, laroslaw KaczyIiski, Wal~sa conducted exploratory meetings 
with the SD and the ZSL and, following Kiszczak's withdrawal from the Premiership. announced 
a coalition pact between the three partners on 17 August. Up until the last minute, OKP deputies 
a~ diverse as Bugaj and Paczynski resisted Solidarity's entry into office, preferring a non-party 
cabinet which would be responsible for dismantling the nomenklatura.':! 1 WaI~sa's historic 
proposal - Sachs described it as "a typically brilliant manoeuvre"1:!:! - was finally embraced by 
the OKP faute de mieux. In customary style, the Chairman boasted: "I alone succeeded in doing 
what two-hundred-and-sixty of you were unable to do.'·1:!J With the backing of his union in 
Gdansk, W aI~sa managed to outflank the communists, sway the two puppet parties into awarding 
Solidarity the Premiership, and reassert his authority on the Polish (and East European) political 
scene. 
In conferring the post of Prime Minister on Mazowiecki - the other candidates were 
KurOIl and Geremek - laruzelski chose the soft-spoken, mild-mannered 62-year old Catholic 
intellectual with firm roots in the opposition. Mazowiecki's previous functions as a Znak (the 
relatively independent lay Catholic grouping in the Sejm) deputy in the 1960s, an editor-in-chief 
of the Catholic monthly Wi~iand later the Solidarity weekly Tygodnik Solidamosc, and, last but 
not least, a long-term advisor to W aI~sa signified that he, for one, had had his feet in the state, 
Church and Solidarity camps. 124 In his brief speech to parliament on 24 August, Mazowiecki 
sought to play to each of these audiences by stressing the new cabinet's consensual approach as 
a "government of all Poles", its obligation to speak the truth, and its commitment to profound 
changes in the political and institutional spheres. 125 The key message in his address was a 
promise to arrest the inflationary spiral and embark on profound economic restructuring. "The 
long-term strategic objective of this administration", said Mazowiecki, "will be the adoption of 
tried and tested market institutions; a precondition for their creation will be the restoration of 
market equilibrium through the suppression of inflation. a task of the highest social, political and 
economic importance.',126 In order to separate his government's responsibility from that of its 
communist predecessors, Mazowiecki proposed drawing a thick line (gruba Iin;a) under the pal\t: 
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a metaphor which came to haunt him in the ensuing months as a number of his critics interpreted 
it as a policy of leniency towards the communist nomenklatura. For the moment. the Sejm's 
overwhelming confirmation of his appointment - 387 votes for, 4 against and 4 abstentions _ 
crowned the opposition's spectacular achievement and gave birth to Poland's post-communist 
regIme. 
'Looking for a Ludwig Erhard' 
Faced with a crisis over its exclusion from office, the PZPR insisted it be awarded the Defence 
and Interior Ministries. That the communists were eventually assured of receiving "two more 
than the bare minimum of two ministries than had at one time appeared [likely]"1~7 underscored 
the fragility of the 'small coalition'. As if to make matters worse, the U.S. President George 
Bush, in a fleeting visit to Poland in mid-July, promised a paltry $119 million in foreign aid; 
roughly one percent of the sum Solidarity was requesting (W aI~sa had already accused western 
governments of "behaving like hesitant virgins:'128). The primordial concern of the incoming 
cabinet, therefore, was to capitalise on its popular legitimacy by convincing the West, notably 
its financial institutions, of its readiness to embark on comprehensive reforms. The search for 
a suitable Finance and Deputy Prime Minister for the Economy took centre-stage in the weeks 
leading up to the cabinet's confirmation on 12 September. With limited knowledge of 
economics, Mazowiecki entrusted the task to his confidant and economic advisor Waldemar 
Kuczynski. Anxious to find a candidate for the posts lest he be the one appointed, Kuczynski 
began a frantic search for an economist who, according to him, would adhere to, and espouse, 
"the general direction of the radical anti-inflationary policy already chosen by Mazowiecki on 
24 August. ,,129 
Contemplating the appointment of various individuals, KuczyIiski, with the assistance 
of his long-time associate Stanislaw Gomulka of the London School of Economics, entertained 
the option of selecting Bugaj, Trzeciakowski and J6zefiak. The final decision to appoint 
Balcerowicz, only after the latter declined the offer on two or three separate occaliions and then 
reversed himselfuo, was, according to Kuczynski, a consequence of the favourable impression 
he had made on the Premier. In "looking for his Ludwig Erhard" Mazowiecki had been informed 
by Kuczynski of "the stubborn and indefatigable character of Balcerowicz during the fading years 
of the Gierek regime when, against all odds, he assembled a closely-knit group of researchers to 
64 
work on a blueprint of radical refonn.,,131 Naturally, Balcerowicz's economics (not to mention 
Poland's) had evolved considerably since then. The 1980 self-management plan commissioned 
by Siec had been replaced by a April 1989 version advocating stringent anti-inflationary policies~ 
price rises in August alone reached close to 40% (see Appendix 2). 
The fonnation of the cabinet in early September had a surreal air to it. Henryk Wujec. 
a Secretary of the OKP Presidium, remarked how "virtually straight from prison, we found 
ourselves in the 'palaces of power' ."132 The nomination of Kurmi to the Ministry of Labour 
alongside his old foe Kiszczak in the Interior Ministry - another PZPR candidate, General Florian 
Siwicki, became Minister of Defence - was inconceivable only weeks earlier. The cabinet line-
up announced by Mazowiecki on 12 September comprised 24 ministers with Solidarity holding 
12 of the portfolios, the SD three, the ZSL four, the PZPR four, and one independent (see 
Appendix 3). The key posts were those responsible for the economy. With overall control over 
economic policy, Balcerowicz had a strong say in appointing the liberal-minded Tadeusz 
Syryjczyk to the Ministry of Industryl33; Paczynski became Minister of Housing; and Jerzy 
Osiatynski, another Solidarity advisor, was appointed head of the Central Planning Office (CUP). 
In his speech to the Sejm, Mazowiecki claimed to be "a man of Solidarity, loyal to the 
August [1980] heritage"134 yet revealed little, if any, sympathy for trade union concerns 
(Kuczynski remarked that, "generally speaking, we were fairly independent from the union"1J5). 
Instead, the objective was to carry out "pioneering changes in the economy to initiate the 
transition to a modem market economy"; this 'breakthrough' was conditional on the "total 
elimination of empty money", a policy which Mazowiecki stressed might well involve 
"temporary falls in production and the standard of living.',136 Radical economic refonn would 
be juxtaposed with the judicious application of legal principles. The Prime Minister promised 
to uphold the Round Table compromise by cooperating fully with the President and the Sejm. 
He also announced plans to construct an appropriate legal framework for the post-communist 
state (including a new constitution), and "apply criteria of professionalism and competence in 
the selection of state administrators."13? Concluding his address on matters of foreign policy. 
Mazowiecki instructed his Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, to begin preparations for 
Poland's entry into European political institutions while respecting its treaty obligations with the 
Soviet Union. A key objective for Poland in its relations with western governments was the 
lchievement of a favourable debt accord: in this respect "he who helps fal\t helps twice."138 In 
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hort, the government'" programme e"pou~ed the t\\ 0 liberali"m" - economic and political -
l\'ourcd by its member~.1J9 
~HE BALCEROWICZ PLA:\ 
'he challengcs confronting thc 'Balcerowicz Group' - its key members included Ka\\alcc. 
)4hrowski and Wojciech Misi'lgl40 - in September 1989 were considerable. Poland \\'a" entering 
I period of hyperinflation, the budget deficit was approaching 1 OC;c of GOP (partly becau"c of 
he excessive wage increases agreed on at the Round Table), pervasivc shortage" remained. thc 
loty was worthless, and the servicing of the country's large foreign debt wa" con"uming a 
~rowing share of national income. The structural flaw" of 'real sociali"m' left Poland with a 
,tate-dominated (roughly 7(YIr of GOP) and Soviet market-dependent cconomic h~hC. Thc 
redecming' characteristics of the People's Republic were the predominantly private o\\ncr"hip 
)f land (close to 80%, albeit with millions of small unproductive holding" \\ith an aVCl"agc "i/c 
)1' only 7.2 hectares I41 ). a sizable privatc "cctor employing over J(Y,'( of the labour force. and, in 
he pa"t year, a relatively free foreign exchange market together with a two-tiered banking "y"lL'm 
~stablishing the National Bank of Poland (NBP) as a central bank and creating nine ne\\ regional 
)nes. The double-edged sword of Polish economics was the self-management legacy. On the 
)Ile hand, the de jure and de.tllcto autonomy of state firms had facilitated informal privati"ations 
n thc late 1980s which, despite their unsavoury political charactcr. had contributed to the growth 
)f the private sector. On the other hand. the ill-defined ownership "tructure in \\hich manager". 
ill' state bureaucracy and the workers' councils all had righh ovcr enterpri"e,,' a""eh needed to 
1e clarified if privatisation was to proceed. 
Property rights in thc state sector, according to Kre"imir Sajko. wcre based on the 
xinciple of 'divided oWl1l'rship: "The state i" the owner in the economic and public law "cn"c, 
.vhile the entcrprisc" [thcmselvcs\ have o\\'ncr"hip rights O\'l?r the asseh [they] hold."142 Unlike 
,he former ('/l'choslovakia whcre a centralised governance structure in the Stalini"t mould left 
,he post-L'ommunist state with full control o\'er firm,,' operations (or evcn in Hungary whcrc at 
,ea"t managl'rs - instead of labour - \\'cre the dominant force L Polish cnterpri"e" were not 
:\a"sical "tate-owned entitil'" already in l'orporate form \\'ho"e "hares Wcl"C held hy the "tate. and 
lenCl' \\hthL' prl\'ati"ation "imply requirl'd the tran"fer of these conccntrated "hare" into pri\ ate 
l.llld" The "df-managed "tructure of Polt"h firms had resulted in a propert: righh vacuum. 01 
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orts, in which anyone of the three key "takeholder" - the manager". the "tate. or the worker .... ' 
:ouncib- could effectively veto decisions to transfer a"set", In "hort, the problem LI('in~ the new 
~ovemment, at lea"t in the "hort term, wa" not privatisation per se but rather how the .... Llte could 
'ea\sert it'-, ownership claims by e<..,tablishing a provisional system of corporate governance that 
Nould centralise property rights in the hands of responsible manager" pending pri\'atisation, 
The range of issues to be addressed by the new government might ha\'e called 1\)1' 
perhaps benefited from) a public debate on the methodes) of transition to a market economy, 
[his was not to be. The urgency in developing a comprehensive reform programme precluded 
engthy discussions. Balcerowicz's appointment signalled the rise of the free market 
: H'o/norVI//.:mn'j school of transformation. The government's policies would be based on 'pro\'en 
~conomic models', i.e. standard macroeconomic measures (accentuated by the hyperintlationary 
~nvironment), a strong emphasis on free trade and private enterprise, and a limited role for the 
~tatl' in the restructuring of industry. The new refonners perceived issues of pri \'ate property and 
l'l'l'l' markets in holistic tellTIS; in other words "they believed they could both create and allocate 
property rights"l~l by simply privatising state assets, Macroeconomic stabilisation, by imposing 
hard hudget constraints and exposing firms to foreign competition, would, it was claimed, 
rrovide the microeconomic incentives for state enterprises to adjust. Only ""trict financial 
di"ciplil1l' [would] provide the real background for a true verification of the economic potential 
[)r state enterprises, Tight credit [would] force loss makers out of operation and ensure profit-
takers take their place."I-w Judging state firms to be incapable of wage restraint and operational 
restructuring, the Balcerowicz Group saw privatisation not only as an end in itself but as a means 
to transform the Polish economy. 
:\ \Vindow of Opportunit~ 
The shen pre"eIlce of Solidarity representatives in office generated enormous trust in the cabinet 
(Sl'l' Appendix,')). \\' al~sa' s decision to stay on the sidelines and delegate the task" of ~overnin~ 
to hi" intellectual advisors - he had stated, quite openly, that "if I build a strong union, I \\tli he 
ouilding an oh"taclc to reform"I~:\, yL't later L'onfcssed that "certain forces persuaded [me] that 
, . ' "1·11, 
Poland needed a period of social calm and that publIc debate "hould be muted tor some tllne -
~rantcd \L!/owil'l'ki's gO\'L'rnment a precious window of opportunity to L'arry out radical 
.;t;thdisation, It was <llhantageou" for Ba\cerowicz that practically no one had l1L'ard of him, Thi" 
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llowed him to focll', hi" energies on economic matter". At the annual meeting" of the \Vorld 
~ank and the IMF in Washington in late September, Balcerowicz hurst onto the "cene with ~l 
)reliminary outline of the government'" economic programme. Proficient in English and 
Jerman. he cultivated relation"hips with key members of the Bretton \\'oods in"titutions. 
On 9 October. the cabinet adopted a plan entitled 'Economic Programme: Chief 
\""umptions and Directions (Program Gospodarczy: G/OH'lle Za/oZenia i Kienlllki).IH Dunhed 
he 'Balcerowicz Plan' in the media, it emphasised two main objectin?,,: the immediate 
,uppre""ioll of inflation and the swift change of the economic system based on 'tried and te"lL'd 
nethods'. The anti-inflationary component profited from expert opinion - aside from Sachs. 
Jomulka and Jacek Rostowski joined other Polish economish in collahorating with the J\ 1F 
nission Il,~ - which based its advice on the orthodoxies of fiscal and monetary control emnraced 
)y many of the Latin American reformers in the 1980s. According to Balcerowicz. "the quality 
md effectiveness of stabilisation would determine how successful the institutional change" 
Nould he."'-l() Questioned on the precise duration of the government's honeymoon period. he 
'esponded by saying that he was "convinced Poland [was] witnessing an unrepeatable hi"torical 
~xperiment, observed by the entire world. to transform its future ... 150 
A strong aversion on the part of the Balcerowicz Group to a 'third way' ba"l'd on 
Norkers' scI f-management or corporatist arrangements set the tone of Poli"h reform. Kowalik 
loubts whether a social democrat such as l\.LlIowiecki with "strong social corporati"t 
nclinations" understood the full consequences of adopting 'shock therapy': "Thi" wa" a man 
Nho had always been looking for his model in Bonn, but landed unexpectedly in Chicago."'51 
W'hik the' Positions' document. in Kowalik's view, "would not have been incompatible with. 
,ay. Austrian- or Swedish-style corporatism"':i~, the Balcerowicz Group chose to effect a 
.lr~lI11atic reorientation of reform away from a social democratic agenda and towards full-"clle 
iberalism. Interestingly. Bugaj had encouraged Balcerowicz to take part in the Round Tank 
li"cu"sions. The latter had declined the offer. partly as a result of his then expected departure 
o England on a research fellowship. hut primarily. according to Bugaj. because "he \iewed the 
{ound Table agrl'ements as a purely political affair based on Solidarity's utopian notion" of an 
~\'()lutionar\' transformation. Even if this was true. this was still the biggest event in Poli"h 
li"tor\': and Balcerowici claimed hl' did not 'han? timl" ."I:i.l 
Bugaj i" certainly COITl'ct in claiming that Balcero\\ici W~h ill-disposed toward" any 
6X 
orporatist arrangement as the latter rc\'ealed in hi" memoir,,: "\\'e knew from the experienl.'e ()f 
,atin American countrie" that trade unions had been consulted over [economIc policy], 
Iowever, at the time, I could not envi"ion any pos"ibility of agreeing on and "igning - in "uch 
short period - any kind of social pact."I54 Did Rakow"ki'" mishandled price liberalisation, then, 
xcludc the possibility of a programme other than one similar to Sachs'",? All the e\idence 
'oint" in the affirmative. That there was already a pre-hyperinflationary impulse to '"hock 
herapy' ensured that Balcerowicz, to a greater or le"ser extent, was gi\'en a free h~md in 
:conomic policy. 
['he Privatisation Impasse 
['he Polish privatisation process was less amenable to radical solutions, S/omburg notes thrL'e 
'-
listinct features which the Balcerowicz Group had to contend with in late 1989: the confll"ed 
,tate of propelty rights in state enterprises; a strong attachment to employee l mnership ha"L'd on 
I hi"tory of self-management: and the weak capacity of the state to monitor and supervi"e the 
)ehaviollr of enterprises, ISS All three factors "trongly influenced the course of e\'enls, From the 
)eginning, the government was faced with two distinct approache" to ownership tran"formation, 
t could proceed with an organic method as advocated by Janos Kornai 15b wherehy the state relied 
lT1 the spontaneous development of the private sector to gradually reduce the puhlic "ector's 
hare of the economy; or, alternatively, it could adopt a constructivist approach using the political 
md administrative power of the state to establish the institutional infrastructure of the market. 
kcau"e of lingering resentment towards the 'political capitalism' of the late 1980s and a "trong 
Iesire to hrandish its reformist credentials, the government felt compelled to assume dirL'ct 
ontrol over pri\'atisation and take an active stance - scepticism towards the nascent private 
ector's capacity to reform the economy was another factor. 
The next question was whether to pursue equivalent forms of pri\'atisation - the tran"fer 
,1' "tate assets at market value and with mmket instruments - or non-equivalent ones - the transfer 
,1' a""l'ts hclo\\' market value and by non-market means. Equi \'alent method" required till' 
"tabli"hIllent of a capital market and would inevitably entail an L'xtraordinary degreL' or 
nstitutional engineering over a short period of time: "one giant leap to an Anglo-S;l,\llT1-"tyle 
apital market \\ith a stock exchange,·IS7 according to one oh"l~ner. :\on-equi\alent form". on 
ile othl'r hand, L'ither hy di"tributing "hare" to l'mployel'" or el"L' tn the puhlic at largl', \\ould 
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uicken the pace of privatisation and prove politically or socially attracti\e. \\'hile employee 
,wnership "would be the natural continuation of self-management"'I:'x practice" and potentially 
erve to motivate the workforce and minimise indu .... trial conflict-.. citizens' ownership \\ould 
lopefully lay the foundations for a middle class and popularise capitali .... m in the eye" of million." 
If shareholders (a separate matter altogether was the issue of reprivatisation, or the re"titution 
If property to their former or legal owners). Tradeoffs, then, in the objecti\"(~s of pri\'ati"ation -
peed and feasibility, on the one hand, versus quality and efficiency. on the other; or greater 
alrness versus increased budgetary revenue - were among the dilemmas confronted by the 
;overnment. 
In opting for a tough anti-inflationary stance, the Balcewwicz Group c lo"ed the door to 
.ny privatisation programme which could be seen to endanger the task of combattin~ 
lyperinflation. At the time, ownership transformation was seen throu~h a macroeconomic len" 
.nd the emphasis was on quality as opposed to speed. Kawakc' s British modcJ was the ideal 
)ath in this respect (see next chapter). As Anthony Levitas notes, the new ~o\t~rnment '·"ou~ht 
o create private property by defining the state as the auctioneer of its asset-. and kttin~ the 
narket determine the optimal distribution of property rights. The whole operation had a much-
lesired air of normalcy about it.,·1)9 Critical and distrustful of employee o\\'nership (Branko 
~i1ano\'ic states that "several government documents explicitly referred to the failure of the 
(ug.oslav model"160), Balcerowicz was con\'inced that a stron~ role for employee ownership 
vould jeopardise corporate governance and undermine the state' s plans to create a pri \'ate I y 
Iwned, corporate-based economy.161 
Kuc/,ytlski notes that Sachs's role was important in the early pri\'atisation debates. His 
ampaign for a 'shock' approach had already been widely publicised. notably in \lichnik's 
;1I;('{1I H \'horc;(/ 162. and. in KllC/) 11ski' s view, had "offered strong intellectual and educational 
upport." I(,~ Prior to arriving in Warsa\v. Sachs had been advising the Yugoslav ~o\'ernment 
.. Iw"e modcJ of enterprise made Poland's look rcJativcJy centralised. This is a cnll'ial point 
eClllse. according. to one obsenTr. "Sachs [felt] the Yugoslav outcome would differ 
['undamentally] from Poland's for Yug.oslavia would maintain, in larg.e me:bure. it-. "c1f-
1;\Il;Ig.l'1l1l'nt approach to corporate g.o\'emancl,"lt>-l (the implication here being that Poland would 
ot). Sachs l'I;limed thl' gre;ltc"t danger Poland f,\l'ed in late 1989 - a"ide from hyperinflation and 
cfaulting. on it-. lkhts - was a situation in which insiders of firms \\ould chalknge the state'" 
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power to privatise its assets by capitalising on ambiguous property rights. Kawalec's British 
model based on lengthy valuations would, in Sachs's view, lead to paralysis as the government 
became embroiled in case-by-case bargaining. Instead, he proposed a rapid mass privatisation 
programme based on a free distribution of shares through investment funds. 165 
His primary concern was for the state to fully assert its ownership rights in order to ensure 
that it, and it alone, could dispose of its assets as it saw fit. Whether or not influenced by his 
experience in Yugoslavia, Sachs viewed the establishment of effective corporate governance as 
a matter of the utmost urgency. Statements such as "there is still no one [in Polish firms] to lose 
anything from the decapitalisation of state property"; "there are strong reasons, on grounds of 
equity and efficiency, for rejecting [employee ownership]"; and, crucially, "the complete 
inadequacy of the current structure of governance, in which the manager is completely 
unmonitored, or, [even worse], is monitored by the workers' councils"l66 signified that Sachs. 
for one, felt post-communist self-management, a la Polonaise ou ala Yougoslave, to be a distinct 
liability. 
His proposal, therefore, and the one which, in his view, would determine whether (mass) 
privatisation would proceed unimpeded, was for the state to forcibly commercialise enterprises 
by concentrating property rights in the hands of state-appointed corporate boards pending 
privatisation. Recognising that this entailed political risks, he nevertheless believed that these 
risks "paled in comparison to the potential economic gains."167 This desire to tum the page on 
self-management was shared by the Balcerowicz Group which favoured a similar approach aimed 
at removing the workers' councils from the policy process. The government's "insurance policy 
against worker-run firms"168 was the passage of the Act on the Transformation of State-Owned 
Enterprises. This was designed to convert state firms into corporate form by changing the legal 
status of enterprises into joint-stock companies wholly owned by the state and subject to 
commercial principles. Workers' councils would then be disbanded and corporate governance 
vested in a new board of directors appointed by the state. 
At lightning speed, the self-management lobby - the workers' councils in the large state 
firms centred around the Network (see first section) together with their parliamentary 
representatives - sprung into action and, for obvious reasons, resisted such a move. The lobby 
contributed to a passionate debate on the precise interpretation of commercialisation in the 
context of a decentralised enterprise culture. "As the only organised social group capable of 
71 
articulating a [clear] position on privatisation,,169, the self-management activists portrayed 
commercialisation as recentralisation (which it was), even renationalisation, instead of as a 
provisional system of governance pending privatisation. Indeed the Ba1cerowicz Group itself 
was divided over the rationale and consequences of commercialisation. Was this, as Balcerowicz 
and Syryjczyk argued, simply a means of strengthening the position of managers vis-a-vis the 
workers' councils, thereby improving the prospects for privatisation and foreign investment: or, 
alternatively, was the state, as D'lbrowski feared, in danger of (re)politicising the economy by 
assuming direct responsibility for enterprises' operations?17o The question facing Polish 
reformers, then, was whether to run the risk of alienating the Solidarity-led councils before the 
launch of 'shock therapy'. For unlike "the fragmenting Solidarity movement, the councils 
constituted a powerful para-political movement and were [quite willing] to oppose the economic 
strategy of the government.,,17l The quiet withdrawal of the draft Act in the dying days of 1989 
in the face of stiff resistance from the self-management movement presaged further difficulties 
in the privatisation of Poland's state firms. 
The Unveiling 
With a keen sense of the historical drama being played out, Ba1cerowicz presented his Plan to 
the Sejm on 17 December. According to Ost, Walysa, just days before, had told his union that 
"the Plan was in the interests of workers since a 'Solidarity government' had produced it.,.J72 
Laying the foundations for radical economic reform in Eastern Europe, the Finance Minister 
announced that anti-inflationary measures would be accorded top priority: "The Polish economy 
is gravely ill. An operation is needed - a deep surgical incision which will remove the inflation 
devastating our economy.,,173 He presented to the parliament the 11 draft laws and regulations 
comprising the package of economic legislation to be implemented on 1 January 1990. A special 
legislative procedure was agreed on with deputies and senators to expedite the bills' passage 
before the New Year; the PZPR contingent, according to one observer, presented little, if any, 
opposition.1 74 The 'shock' approach was justified on the grounds that political and economic 
logic dictated a once-and-for-all purge of inflation. Pyschological elements, as Balcerowicz later 
pointed out, were also at work: "I remembered from Leon Festinger's psychological theory of 
cognitive dissonance that people are more likely to adapt internally to quick, radical changes if 
they consider them irreversible than they are to gradual changes."175 An extraordinary 
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commission chaired by the OKP deputy Andrzej Zawislak grouping dozens of members of 
parliament from the respective caucuses managed to approve the legislation by 27 December. 
President J aruzelski then signed the bills into law. 
In his address, Balcerowicz infonned the chamber that the cabinet's economic programme 
was dependent (and based) on an upcoming agreement with the IMF - a $1 billion stabilisation 
fund for the convertibility of the zloty constituted the other main foreign ingredient. The signing 
of a Letter of Intent with the Fund on 22 December 1989 capped four months of frantic activity 
in the development of Poland's post-communist economic strategy. Drawn up by Balcerowicz 
and Baka (the head of the Central Bank), the document included an exceptional letter addressed 
to the IMF's Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, as well as a 30-page Memorandum of 
Economic Policies. The following elements, derived from the Letter itself, deserve 
consideration: 
GOALS 
• To stabilise the economy quickly and decisively by bringing about a rapid and lasting 
deceleration in the rate of inflation and eliminating shortages. 
• To press ahead forcefully in transforming the economic system by moving to market 
mechanisms. 
STRATEGY 
• The two goals are interdependent. Economic stabilisation is a necessary prerequisite for 
success in pursuing systemic changes. Yet without systemic changes, economic 
stabilisation will not pave the way for sustained growth in output. 
• We believe speed is of the essence, so that the transitional stage - so hard on society - will 
be as short as possible. Radical change is also dictated by the bad experience with 
piecemeal reforms in the 1980s. 
STABILISATION COMPONENT 
• The freeing in January 1990 of virtually all remaining price controls. Only 3-5% of 
consumer spending - mostly rents, public utilities and public transportation fares - will 
be subject to restrictions. Only 5% of producer prices - hard coal, coke and electricity -
will be subject to restrictions. With regards to energy pricing, the government does not 
consider it realistic in the present circumstances to raise the domestic price of coal to 
world levels. Coal prices will, however, be increased by 400% to industry and 600% to 
households. Electricity prices will increase by 300%. 
• The unification of the foreign exchange market on 1 January 1990 in addition to the 
elimination of all quantative restrictions on imports from the convertible currency area. 
The export trade regime will also be substantially liberalised. The exchange rate is to be 
set at 9500 zloty per US dollar. Financial policies should enable the monetary authorities 





programme. The new exchange rate - underpinned by a $1 billion stabilisation fund - will 
provide a stable anchor in the fight against inflation. 
A restrictive tax-based incomes policy based on the application of a steep progressive tax 
on wage awards in excess of a specified norm (no more than 30% of the rate of inflation 
in January and 20% for the following three months). This second anchor complements 
the exchange rate policy. The tax is to be implemented without exceptions or reliefs. 
Taxes on excess wage increases will be levied at the following rates: 200% for an excess 
up to 2% of the permitted amount; 300-500% for an excess of more than 2lk. Our plans 
in this area have been discussed with the labour movement. We expect over the medium-
term to shift to a system of wage determination which permits greater income 
differentiation and wage flexibility. 
Attainment of fiscal balance in the state budget through cuts in total expenditure 
amounting to 3% of GDP (subsidies to be cut by more than 7% of GDP, primarily on 
food and coal). Most of the revenue increase is to be achieved by raising the burden of 
taxation on enterprises. Pending the introduction of major tax reform in 1991-92, we 
must continue to rely heavily on the taxation of the state sector. 
A major tightening of credit policy involving no direct or indirect financing of the state 
budget on the part of the Central Bank. Strict limits on the money supply to the 
nongovernment sector. A restoration of the value of the zloty by the introduction of 
positive real interest rates. 
SYSTEMIC COMPONENT 
• Legislation to be introduced for the setting up of an organisational framework for the 
transformation of state-owned enterprises. Main forms envisaged are joint-stock 
companies, worker-owned entities and socialised enterprises. 
• The sale of state assets. The basic mechanism will be public stock offerings, open to all. 
Solutions will be applied to facilitate the purchase of stock by employees. The 
government is committed to wide-ranging privatisation. 
• The breaking up of monopolies, notably the elimination of coal and energy 
'communities' . 
• Amend legislation governing bankruptcies. 
• Modernisation of the banking system; setting up of a securities exchange with strong 
regulatory powers. 
• Revision of the labour code to allow for a genuine flexible labour market. 
• Establishment of a modem social safety net to shelter the poorest members in society. 
Establishment of a Labour Fund to be financed by a 2% payroll tax in order to provide 
a protective shield for workers made redundant. Pension benefits and family allowances 
will be revalued on a quarterly basis (the average pension benefit will be maintained at 
52% of the average monthly wage). 176 
In addition to the above measures, the Plan requested the immediate disbursement of a 
$545 million Stand-By Arrangement from the IMF to help sustain the policies. It is noteworthy 
that Balcerowicz related the Letter to the 'Washington Consensus' prescriptions discussed in 
Chapter I: "I note that the programme included practically all its elements, but also many 
others.',177 The stabilisation component foreca~t a number of outcomes in the first year of 
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implementation (see Appendix 4 for a contrast with the actual results). Yet the Plan's authors 
repeatedly stressed the unique and unprecedented character of the changes. Contingency plans 
were therefore prepared and a review of the programme was to be undertaken in the coming 
months. The year ended with a fundamental shift in Polish policy-making commensurate with, 
possibly exceeding, the dramatic political changes in the summer months. Poland spearheaded 
radical reform with the adoption of the first neo-liberal economic framework in Eastern Europe. 
The huge expectations generated by Solidarity's leading role in the government compelled 
Mazowiecki to accord top priority to the economy; if only to supersede the fragile political 
consensus reached at the Round Table. While some were angered by the lack of public debate, 
the unspoken consensus was that the Solidarity leadership would, for the time being, provide a 
protective umbrella over the Plan. The period of 'extraordinary politics' inspired confidence in 
the government, masking, at times suppressing, differences of opinion; at the time "it was not 
important to ask 'how?' or 'in what form?', because this seemed unimportant:,178 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter analysed two distinct aspects of Poland's initial conditions - the period of 
'extraordinary politics' in the second-half of 1989 and the self-management legacy with its roots 
in the September 1981 legislation - prior to the launch of 'shock therapy'. Both of these factors 
were a product of the Solidarity inheritance; perhaps best illustrated by Ost's memorable 
comment when surveying the Polish political scene in mid-1989: "Where else is a '68 radical like 
Michnik such a key player today?,,179 The political forces which underpin the 'transition' 
perspective are seen in the Schmitteresque environment following Solidarity's historic victory 
in the 4 June elections. Michnik's adventurous proposal for Solidarity to form a government laid 
the groundwork for Wal~sa's coup-de-theatre in announcing a coalition pact with the SD and the 
ZSL. That Sachs himself deemed it essential to provide a day-by-day analysis of these events in 
his account of Polish 'shock therapy' 180 underscores their significance in the conception of radical 
reform. The passage from a social democratic agenda at the Round Table to a neo-liberal 
programme emphasising stringent macroeconomic policies, while strongly influenced by the 
sharp deterioration of the economy in August 1989, can only be explained (if it can be explained 
at all) by the paradoxical role - Kowalik prefers the term 'liberal incarnation,lt\1 - played by senior 
figures in the Solidarity leadership, in particular Kuron and Michnik. Yet just as W al~sa' s union 
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"stood as the putative social base of a government that stated its intention [to proceed with full-
scale capitalism],,182, it was Solidarity's self-management wing that proved more resistant to the 
Balcerowicz Plan. 
The institutional legacies which lie at the heart of the 'adaptation' perspective reach as 
far back as the Economic Council's 1957 'Theses'. The decisive step towards denationalisation 
was taken in September 1981 with compromise legislation between the Network and the PZPR' s 
Reform Commission granting legal rights to workers' councils in the management of firms' 
assets. Once perceived as a bastion of resistance against the power-base of the nomenklatura. 
self-management bodies emerged from communism with their rights intact, eager to preserve 
Poland's indigenous form of corporate governance. Assuming office in a hyperinflationary 
climate and driven by strong faith in Anglo-Saxon-style capitalism, the Balcerowicz Group. 
while once agreeing that self-management was an improvement on central planning, perceived 
private ownership as preferable to self-management. Yet unlike the Czechoslovak or Hungarian 
exits from communism where the state or market-oriented managers were the dominant players, 
labour remained the key actor in Poland's state firms. Sachs's comment that "it would [have] 
been so much easier had [Poland's] enterprises taken the form of [classical centralised] 
enterprises already in corporate form"183 is revealing and symbolises yet another paradox in 
Polish reform. For while Poland was once at the forefront of economic liberalisation, its self-
management inheritance turned out to be something of a curse in the eyes of the country's neo-
liberal elites. As the Balcerowicz Group came to realise in the months ahead, the prerequisites 
to large-scale privatisation proved just as important as the reform itself. State-driven 
privatisation, as envisaged in late 1989, emerged as one of the greatest flaws in the 'shock 
therapy' design. 
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CHAPTER 3 CONSTRAINED LIBERALISM 
The most characteristic feature of Polish economic policy in [1990-1991] wa~ a 
Thatcherite monetary framework combined with an almost Yugoslav model of enterprise. 
-J anusz Lewandowski 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The focal point of post-communist reform in the early 1990s was the Balcerowicz Plan in Poland. 
According to one observer, "Polish economic policy from October 1989 until approximately mid-
1991 was based upon a reasonably coherent economic philosophy.":! If Hungary prided itself on 
its debt-servicing record, the former Czechoslovakia on its capitalist traditions, then Poland, in 
the words of its second post-communist Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, had its "radical 
macroeconomic agenda.,,3 There is little doubt that this aspect of Poland's transition, rightly or 
wrongly, singled out the country's policy regime in the eyes of many. Tadeusz Mazowiecki's 
government acted decisively in setting in place a tough anti-inflationary regime of fiscal and 
monetary controls; the "politics of stabilisation", noted Waldemar Kuczynski. "demanded 
nothing less.,,4 Yet three months into the programme, the Chairman of Solidarity Lech WaI~sa 
had accused the government of dragging its feet over democratisation, governing in an insular 
manner and, if anything, not being radical enough in implementing economic reform. The 
notorious 'war at the top' in spring 1990, while partly the result of political jealousies 
accentuated by old worker-intelligentsia tensions resurfacing, threw into question the methods 
and aims of the Balcerowicz Plan. Privatisation, in particular, proved highly controversial with 
purists favouring conventional models and realists reconciling themselves with the legacy of self-
management. It is in this sphere of Poland's transformation where the contrast between both 
schools of reform is most pronounced. Interestingly, Bielecki has described this as a process of 
'constrained liberalism'.5 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the political trajectory of the Balcerowicz Plan 
in 1990-91. The first two variants of neo-liberalism, the BalcerowiczIMazowiecki model in 1990 
and the WaJrsa-initiated Gdarisk Liberals' version in 1991, are placed in the context of 
competing privatisation strategies dating back to November 1988: Kawalec's British method of 
commercial sales and Lewandowski's Mass Privatisation Programme advocating citizens' 
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ownership. In order to appreciate the difficulties faced by the two strategies, it is important to 
understand their common objective: the recentralisation of authority through commercialisation 
resulting in the elimination of the workers' councils. This process was hampered by the 
voluntarist, consensual character of Polish privatisation enshrined in the July 1990 Privatisation 
Act. A less publicised yet, in the end, equally significant scheme based on employee ownership 
ensured that state firms retained their autonomy and thus their right to veto proposals put forward 
by the government. 
This compromise law, in certain respects analogous to the September 1981 legislation 
(see previous chapter), did little to clarify ownership rights and, perhaps for this reason, favoured 
'bottom-up' privatisation schemes initiated by firms' insiders. State-driven privatisation 
nevertheless dominated the policy agenda in 1990-91 as both variants sought to institute 
conventional forms of corporate governance. This was accompanied by a technocratic policy 
style which stressed the economic prerequisites of privatisation as opposed to its social or 
political ones. This chapter argues that many of the (Yugoslav-inspired) fears with regard to 
asset stripping were exaggerated and that the deepening recession in 1991 had as much to do with 
the state's "failure to reform the banking system and improve the functioning of labour markets"t. 
as it did with external factors such as the abolition of the old Soviet trading regime. Finally, a 
contrast is drawn between the lofty aspirations of privatising half the state sector in two to three 
years and the huge boom in private sector activity; in many ways the saving grace (but not 
necessarily the direct result) of Polish 'shock therapy'. 
ELITISM AND TECHNOCRACY 
The myriad of economic measures introduced on I January 1990 delivered a profound shock to 
the Polish economy. The 'big bang' lived up to its reputation with a huge surge in prices -
'corrective inflation' in reformist discourse - in the first two weeks of January. Even the self-
assured Jeffrey Sachs admitted that although he "was very confident the price explosion would 
soon end, it was frightening to watch nonetheless.,,7 Fortunately the inflationary pressures 
subsided towards the end of the month and Poland recorded its lowest monthly rate of inflation 
for years in March with the figure standing at 4.3% (see Appendix 2). With the aid of the 
Balcerowicz Plan's two main 'anchors' - the fixed exchange rate and the punitive tax on excess 
wages known by its Polish acronym PPWW or pop;wek - the government was able to prevent 
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state firms from raising wages in line with prices. The black market practically vanished 
overnight, shortages disappeared, and street sales expanded throughout February and March. The 
steep devaluation of the zloty, together with the gradual lifting of restrictions on foreign trade. 
provided unprecedented opportunities for Polish enterprises to compete in international markets. 
Despite ongoing debates over the dramatic changes in living standards, often blurred by 
the dubious quality and varied interpretations of the country's economic statistics8• the 
Balcerowicz Group asserted its authority over economic policy with the signing of a 13-month 
Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF in early February, the passage of a tight budget. and 
an agreement to reschedule payments on the country's foreign debt for the duration of the SBA. 
In the first-half of 1990, the Plan's stabilisation component was considered a success with the 
budget moving rapidly into surplus (see Appendix 10), exports (to the West) rising and the 4,lot)' 
remaining firm. Public opinion polls, aside from showing strong support for the government (see 
Appendix 5), revealed a favourable impression of the Plan (see Appendix 7) and an intriguing 
divergence of opinions on the effects of stabilisation: 44.5% of respondents deemed the 
programme to be prejudicial to their interests yet 55% saw positive developments for the 
economy as a whole.9 
The economic 'shock' served to expose the more limited developments in the political 
sphere. Ten days before the Final Congress of the PZPR on 27-29 January 1990 in which the 
party disbanded to form a new group called Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP) 
led by the progressive-minded Aleksander KwaSniewski, Bronislaw Geremek had complained 
of "too much stabilisation and not enough freedom.'·l0 The same day Mazowiecki delivered his 
first policy speech of the year in which he laid out his vision for Poland's systemic 
transformation. He noted that in order to build stable foundations for democracy the changes 
must be "conducted with reflection"; the rule of law required the renouncement of "revenge and 
spectacular gestures.',11 Mazowiecki also emphasised his government's attachment to local and 
regional initiatives by claiming "the system cannot be introduced from above or developed 
centrally, it must be created from below."I:! His aspirations notwithstanding. the Balcerowicz 
Plan was (and could only be in the absence of established socioeconomic interests to support the 
reforms) a creation of the state. The measures contained in the Plan required an active role for 
the government in establishing the rudiments of a market economy. The initial focus on 
stabilisation. "changes that [did] not require massive learning and [could] be implemented by a 
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small group of people,,13 according to Balcerowicz, accentuated the technocratic bent of the 
reforms. 
In his dual role as Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, Balcerowicz exerted considerable 
influence on the political agenda, profiting from the initial calm to launch a critical mass of 
reforms. His position as a 'technopol'l4 (see Chapter 1) proved instrumental to the Polish 
economic transition and served to bolster the 'shock therapy' agenda. The IMF praised the 
cabinet for "recognising the unique opportunity for radical up-front stabilisation." The Fund's 
own credibility, according to Markus Rodlauer, "rode on the success of the [SBA]. the pilot 
scheme for East European reform."ls Ba1cerowicz himself later confessed that "the period of 
extraordinary politics should last as long as possible and its shortening inevitably has adverse 
consequences [for the economy]. The process of [democratisation] will take place anyway and 
there is no need to hasten it.,,16 Many in the Solidarity movement, however, took exception to 
his thinking. Jadwiga Staniszkis, for instance, objected to the government's so-called 'revolution 
from above': "The 'revolution from above' is [in fact] a discrete revolution. It is [based] on the 
rhetoric of 'stabilisation and control for the sake of the reforms'. At the same time, there are no 
visible changes at 'the bottom' .,,17 To understand why we must return to the privatisation debates 
in which the government adopted a technocratic view of ownership transformation based on 
rational economic criteria. 
The Privatisation Debates 
Nowhere was the state's role more apparent than in the sphere of large-scale privatisation; this 
contrasted with the decentralised 'small' privatisation of retail outlets and service establishments 
which gathered pace throughout 1990, partly as a result of previously enacted legislation. In 
order to transfer the roughly 8500 state enterprises into private hands, the government needed to 
adopt new legal and organisational frameworks "guaranteeing substantive political control over 
the process yet flexible enough not to stifle different methods."18 From the beginning, the cabinet 
signalled its preference for Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) through a capital market. The new 
Plenipotentiary for Ownership Transformation, Krzysztof Lis, adopted Kawalec' s 1988 British 
model (see previous chapter) and emerged as a fierce "opponent of the idea of employee 
ownership.,,19 Lis, whose Agency for Property Transformation was symbolically located in 
BaJcerowicz's Finance Ministry pending the enactment of legislation creating an institutionally 
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separate Ministry, embarked on a highly ambitious programme of public stock offerings in early 
1990. The justification for the British model, aside from its presumed deflationary and budgetary 
value, derived from "a strong attachment to Anglo-Saxon-type capital markets (itself partly due 
to the influence of aid-financed investment bankers and financial market specialists); and, more 
generally, the feeling that the valuation and sale of assets was the only 'civilised' approach."~o 
Targeting 20 attractive firms whose workers' councils had agreed to privatisation. Lis's Agency 
began work on a draft Act on the Privatisation of State Enterprises which advocated the forcible 
commercialisation of enterprises prior to their sale to domestic and foreign investors. 
The government's early attempts to recentralise property rights - a paradox in view of its 
professed economic liberalism - immediately drew condemnation from the self-management 
lobby as well as "others who, while not fond of the workers' councils. realised that the 
[Agency's] plans for widespread commercialisation were both politically divisive and potentially 
economically [unsound]"21 (see below). The history of the legislation leading to the passage of 
the Act in July is enlightening. The two draft laws prepared by Lis's Agency - the first on the 
privatisation of state firms and the second on the creation of a Ministry of Privatisation - were 
discussed by the cabinet over a period of six months. At the end of March 1990. the laws were 
sent to a special parliamentary committee on privatisation chaired by the OKP deputy Andrzej 
Zawislak. A counter-proposal to these bills was drawn up by a group of 23 deputies under the 
leadership of Ryszard Bugaj, the Chairman of the Sejm's Commission on the Economy, Budget 
and Finance. The bone(s) of contention between the two versions related to the envisaged scope 
of the legislation; the institutional framework of the privatisation process, notably the degree of 
political control over it; the choice of privatisation methods; and, crucially, the role and 
importance of employee ownership.22 
From the outset, Lis's Agency favoured a law which would apply purely economic 
criteria to privatisation. The main objectives were greater efficiency, access to the capital 
markets. and increased foreign investment. According to Barbara Blaszczyk and Tomasz 
Gruszecki, the explanatory statement of the Agency's draft law claimed that "privatisation should 
be implemented under the state's supervision and on the basis of rational economic methods so 
ali to the lay the foundations for a capital market as well ali protect [shareholders] of privatised 
firms ... 23 In a separate article Gruszecki described this approach as aiming for "correctness of 
form and elegance of execution."24 The law would apply to all state enterprises and a decisive 
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role would be given to the President of the Agency who, in tum, would be responsible to the 
government. Two methods of privatisation were listed: privatisation by IPO for all large firms 
in which the President of the Agency would direct the entire process, and privatisation by 
'liquidation' for small- and medium-sized finns in which insiders would be able to sell. lease or 
transfer the assets of their enterprise. The only provision for employees was for them to be 
entitled to appoint one-third of the members of the corporate boards in commercialised firms -
the issue of reprivatisation was not even mentioned. 
The counter-proposal bill, entitled 'Law on Ownership Transformation of State-Owned 
Enterprises', was supported by two sizable factions in the Sejm: one led by Bugaj in his other role 
as head of the Group for the Defence of Workers' Interests (prominent members included Karol 
Modzelewski, Bogdan Lis and Grazyna Staniszewska) and the other by Andrzej Milkowski. the 
Vice-President of the Association of Self-Management Activists. The bill itself had been drawn 
up by Professor Juliuz Izdebski of Warsaw University and Krzysztof Ludwiniak, a member of 
the US employee ownership movement advocating Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPS).~5 
The workers' councils, the government's 16-member economic advisory body known as the 
Economic Council chaired by Witold Trzeciakowski, and a host of other independent economists 
and associations26 had all found elements in the draft Law which they supported. The self-
management lobby had its own journal (Tygodnik Robotnicz-y), its own research institute 
(SIBISZ) and, according to Jan Szomburg, "was over-represented in the Sejm, was influential in 
the economic press, and had very dynamic activists [at the time]:":!7 The shared view was that 
the government's bill was a highly centralised, etatiste piece of legislation which attempted to 
impose one specific path of privatisation without consultation or compromise. Central to this 
view was a strong objection to the limited scope for parliamentary scrutiny of privatisation -
Bugaj later commented that the government seemed to have forgotten that the British model 
involves strong parliamentary oversight of individual privatisations28 - as well as the inadequate 
provisions for employee ownership. 
With a strong emphasis on the socio-political dimensions of ownership transformation, 
the Sejm representatives' bill proposed that the main decision-making body on privatisation 
should be the National Property Council, as recommended by the 'Positions' document endorsed 
at the Round Table negotiations (see previous chapter). "The Council [- appointed hy the Sejm 
and composed of parliamentarians as well as high-ranking members of the Constitutional 
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Tribunal -] would conduct quasi-judicial investigations for each enterprise separately; announce 
its verdict as to whether privatisation should [proceed]; and, if so, [detennine] which methods 
should be applied.,,29 A National Property Fund would then implement the decisions of the 
Council and would contribute funds to an Employee Shareholding Fund (no less than 20% of the 
annual income of the Fund30). In short, the counter-proposal was a refined version of the 
'Positions' document and sought to ensure strong political control over the privatisation process 
as well as accord priority to employee ownership. For three full months, the Zawislak Committee 
debated the two drafts with the hope of reaching a compromise. 
The practical implementation of a large-scale privatisation programme was therefore 
delayed at a time when the public expressed its strongest support for ownership transformation. 
Two opinion polls in March and April 1990 revealed sharp discrepancies between respondents' 
general desire for privatisation and their limited knowledge of the cabinet's plans in this area. 
The first poll indicated 83% support for privatisation coming from those who considered 
themselves well-infonned on the economy; 50% were in favour of privatising most or all of the 
large finns, and 76% believed this should be accomplished in no more than two to three years. 31 
The second questionnaire revealed that while 52% of respondents believed a general decision to 
privatise had been taken, only 21 % thought the government had agreed on a precise path (for the 
43% who believed a decision to privatise had not been taken, 72% claimed the government was 
unsure of the precise route). Finally 43.5% of those who believed privatisation was proceeding 
too slowly judged ownership reforms to be of secondary importance to the government; 30% 
claimed it was not even favoured by the cabinet. 3:! Conceptual and technical discussions 
consumed the Mazowiecki government's privatisation agenda at the most opportune moment to 
proceed with rapid ownership changes. Had Lis's Agency been more willing to entertain 
unconventional routes in early 1990, or at least not been so attached to the British model, 
privatisation might not have emerged as such a politically contentious issue. 
Divisions in Solidarity 
The Bugaj and Milkowski factions were only two of the many informal lobbies and pressure 
groups exerting influence over the reforms. Jozef Slisz's farmers' lobby had stepped up its 
criticisms of Balcerowicz's tight credit policies while members of the eclectic Economic Council 
engaged in heated debates over the consequences of commercialisation. Differences of opinion 
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within the OKP - between social democrats and economic liberals as well as between nationalists 
and moderates - were microcosms of the Solidarity movement's disparate elements. Already in 
November 1989, the Polish journalist Piotr Wierzbicki drew up his own political topography of 
the Solidarity camp. In an article entitled 'The Family, The Retinue and the Court':\3, Wierzbicki 
concurred with Staniszkis's notion of a German feudalist 'Standestaat' comprised of different 
estates (in this case Solidarity camps) united not by socioeconomic interest but by common 
ethos.34 
According to Wierzbicki, the 'Family' constituted the veteran opposition leaders in the 
Workers' Defence Committee (KOR) now gathered in the OKP. Grouped under Geremek and 
including prominent figures such as Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, the 'Family' was 
dominated by secular-minded social democrats, "ideologically close, disciplined and extremely 
well organised.,,35 It was in a position of strength since it was willing to abide by the Round 
Table formula and, through Michnik's control of Ga~efa Wyborc~a, was able to advance its 
agenda. Less charitable observations, of which there were many. talked of a discrete alliance 
between Michnik and KwaSniewski's SdRP in which the two men complimented each other for 
arranging a peaceful transition: "KwaSniewski called Michnik an exemplary European", while 
the latter reciprocated by referring to the SdRP leader as "a man who had civilised the PZPR."3fl 
The 'Retinue' consisted of the assorted Christian Democrats, free-market liberals, and moderate 
nationalists that entered Mazowiecki's cabinet in September 1989. Less secular-minded than the 
'Family', but equally pragmatic, the 'Retinue' identified with the Premier's political and 
economic liberalism. Wierzbicki singles out Aleksander Hall, Mazowiecki's Minister for 
Political Parties, as the personal embodiment of the group's moderate style. 
Finally, the 'Court' stood for the more radical, uncompromising elements gathered around 
W a1~sa who, ever since the formation of Mazowiecki' s cabinet, felt marginalised, possibly 
threatened, by the status quo. Based in Gdansk, notably in the Solidarity union's National 
Executive Commission (Krajowa Komisja Wykanowc~a or KKW), the 'Court' voiced its 
criticisms in the weekly editions of Tygodnik SolidanlOscedited by the Wal~sa protege Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski. Maintaining warm relations with the Church and espousing a fierce anti-
communism, the 'Court' believed the Round Table Accords, following the dissolution of the 
PZPR, were, at best, a hindrance to Poland's systemic reforms, and, at worst, a vehicle for the 
advancement of a (neo-)communist agenda.37 Although at odds over the degree to (ano manner 
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in) which the group should compel the government to renounce the Round Table compromise. 
the 'Court' was adamant that an injection of pluralism be given to the Solidarity patient lest the 
'Family' and 'Retinue' consolidate their positions. Wierzbicki, whose political allegiances lay 
finnly with the 'Court', argued for an honest airing of differences within the Solidarity movement 
and claimed that "the problem [at present] is not that Poles are arguing too much. but that they 
are arguing too little !,,38 
The 'Court's influence grew after Solidarity's Second Congress on 19-24 April 1990 in 
which delegates criticised the government for failing to consult with the union and refusing to 
discuss an 'alternative' programme to the Balcerowicz Plan.39 The largest group of delegates 
declared themselves to be for a "pluralistic system of ownership with a wide variety of individual 
and institutional forms.,,40 Wal~sa nevertheless managed to prolong the 'dual role' of the union 
as a representative of workers' interests and as a defender of economic reform (he also managed 
to extend his Chairmanship of the union). It was the latter function, as David Ost notes 
paradoxically, which Wal~sa emphasised: "The reason workers are suffering is because the 
government is not moving towards capitalism fast enough[ !],"'I The message was symptomatic 
of the symbolic as opposed to material legitimacy he relied on at a time when stabilisation 
resulted in huge falls in production - 20% in the first quarter alone - and a sharp decrease in real 
wages. This was the time when the government should have been more responsive to the 
'Court's concerns given that it was the latter who held the Solidarity umbrella; this was the time 
when the period of 'extraordinary politics' lost its relevance. 
The' Acceleration' Drive 
Calling for an 'acceleration' of the reforms, harsher treatment of the nomenklatura, and greater 
independence for the Citizens' Committees (KO), W al~sa expressed his frustration and 
impatience with Mazowiecki's perceived aloofness. As for the 'Retinue', it continued to support 
the Premier's non-confrontational and evolutionary political stance. Mazowiecki's attachment 
to moral values, principles he believed could absorb the possible social unrest caused by the 
Balcerowicz Plan42• became the hallmark of his administration: "The Prime Minister and his team 
decided to ba~e their contacts with the public, as well as with their critics, on a moral code. That 
code meant telling society the truth about unfavourable consequences of reform. standing firm, 
and justifying the absence of a particular decision on theoretical grounds .. -4:\ In an article in early 
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March, Michnik went a step further by warning that any splits in the Solidarity movement _ either 
inside the 'Family' or else in the KO - risked undermining economic reform."'"' The schisms 
between the Wal~sa camp and the government intensified throughout the spring as it became 
clear the latter was unwilling to countenance a more radical stance. With growing support from 
disparate elements within the Solidarity movement who, for various reasons. were dissatisfied 
with the "dry, legallanguage't45 of institutional change, the 'Court' challenged the government's 
monopoly on the 'Solidarity Ethos'; its artificiality, it claimed, needed to be exposed. 
The formation of a new party, the Centre Alliance (PC), on 12 May headed by Kaczynski 
provided impetus to the 'Court's' political agenda. Grouping 41 deputies and 12 Senators from 
the OKP and bringing together parties as diverse as the Christian National Union (ZChN). the 
Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), and Slisz's Polish Peasant Party-Solidarity (PSL-S), the 
PC championed the causes of 'acceleration' and 'decommunisation'. Fielding W al~sa as its 
candidate for the Presidency - its first official statement was that laruzelski should resign from 
his post
46 
- and calling for an end to the "transitional stage between communism and 
democracy,,47, the PC effectively ended the Mazowiecki cabinet's peaceful nine-month 
cohabitation with the former PZPR. 
The Alliance resented the dominance of 'Warsaw intellectuals' inside the OKP and in the 
cabinet. Wal~sa himself felt excluded from the policy process and betrayed by his erstwhile 
colleague Mazowiecki who, not only had spumed his demands for 'acceleration'. but had chosen 
to seek the support of the 'Family' rather than lean on the 'Court'",M; a decision which prompted 
the Chairman to call for the removal of the Solidarity logo from the masthead of Gazeta 
Wyborcza. The first signs of industrial unrest came in May when railworkers in Slupsk 
demanded an end to the popiwek. The poor turnout in the local elections the same month, 
together with the gradual decline in support for the government (Appendix 5 and 6) and the 
Balcerowicz Plan (Appendix 7), signalled that the Solidarity umbrella was in need of repair. In 
the months ahead, the PC, with the assistance of the KLD and a host of other independent 
economists, coordinated its attacks on the government's 'monopoly' with a series of critiques on 
the alleged delays in economic reform. As Marek D~browski noted. "one might think that [the 
objective] of 'acceleration' wa~ the rapid promotion ofWaJ~sa to the Presidency and a massive 
purge of the nomenklatura. However the PC [developed] its own economic programme which 
generally supported the Balcerowicz Plan but at the same time suggested [it] could be 
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implemented [much] more quickly.,,49 
Wal~sa's denunciations of the government exposed and exacerbated the political 
divisions within the Solidarity movement. At an emotionally-charged meeting of the Citizens' 
Committees on 30 June-l July 1990, Zdzislaw Najder, whose role it was to prevent the merger 
of the OKP and the Committees into a single bloc under the control of Mazowiecki. argued ... 
against including the KO "in a formula which no longer exists - that of unity imposed by a 
common foe."sO Zbigniew Bujak, meanwhile, echoed the Premier's words in favouring a loose 
federation of regional and local bodies set up to provide political support for the reforms. 51 In 
the end, W al~sa' s pluralist version triumphed and many intellectuals, ashamed at the Solidarity 
Chairman's 'disruptive' behaviour, chose to resign. In the summer months. "a dramatic 
escalation in both the degree of bitterness and drama of the political battle""! ensued. On the 
economic front, the continued delay in the legislative framework for privatisation fuelled 
accusations of nomenklatura capitalism. 
A June opinion poll questioning those who declared themselves to be sympathetic to the 
Solidarity union revealed 76% in favour of privatisation: a lower figure of 55% was reported by 
those who aligned themselves with the former communist All Poland Alliance of Trade Unions 
(OPZZ).53 Sixty percent of respondents who had watched at least a dozen television appearances 
of Ba1cerowicz announcing the government's economic agenda claimed to have only fragmentary 
knowledge of the cabinet's plans for privatisation. For those who considered themselves 
'experts' in the field, 30% advocated straight sell-offs. while 55% favoured a voucher-based 
scheme.54 The same day as the Citizens' Committees were debating the country's political 
future, the KLD hosted its first National Convention in Warsaw. The final resolution endorsed 
the "privatisation and de-monopolisation of the economy in such a way as to enable the creation 
and development of domestic capital through citizens' shareholdings in order to universalise 
ownership in Poland."ss This position, among others, was taken up by Wal~sa in his drive for 
the Presidency. As the lustre began to fade from Kawalec's British model in mid-1990, Janusz 
Lewandowski and Jan Szomburg's Mass Privatisation Plan (MPP) (see previous chapter) proved 
increasingly attractive in view of its perceived emphasis on the rapid transfer of ownership rights 
to the public. 
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THE 'WAR AT THE TOP' 
The incessant pressure on Mazowiecki to repudiate the Round Table Accords and call early 
elections met with resistance on the part of members of his cabinet, Balcerowicz included. The 
government's spokeswoman, Malgorzata Niezabitowska, issued the mildest of rebuttals by 
calling the Solidarity Chairman's remarks 'unhelpful'; other, less dispassionate, voices accused 
WaI~sa of harbouring 'dictatorial ambitions' .56 Yet not all of Mazowiecki's ministers took the 
same line. Trzeciakowski, for instance, lamented the Premier's stubborn, legalistic approach: 
"Mazowiecki told me that in politics it is absolutely essential to preserve the same morals as in 
public life. Then I knew it was impossible for me to reason with him."57 On 6 July 1990, the 
Premier relented and informed the Sejm of his decision to replace the ex-PZPR Defence and 
Interior Ministers (see Appendix 3) with independent appointees; at the same time using the 
occasion to express his alarm at the "threat to our calm Polish road of transformation"5!!. 
He also announced a relaxation in monetary and fiscal policy in view of the good 
standing of the budget (see Appendix 10): a temporary easing of the popiwek coupled with a 
lowering of interest rates from a crushing 66% to 34%. Both of these concessions did little to 
assuage the concerns of the Wal~sa camp. Mazowiecki's 'thick line' policy (see previous 
chapter) was increasingly viewed as "one of leniency and forgiveness,,59 towards members of the 
former nomenklatura. President J aruzelski now represented the last vestige of communist rule 
and it was only a matter of time before he himself would agree to shorten his tenure and make 
way for Poland's first fully-free elections. 
The July 1990 Privatisation Act 
As if to accentuate perceptions of delay and protracted debate, the Sejm belatedly passed the 
legislation on the privatisation of state enterprises on 13 July; the final vote was 329 for, 12 
against and 39 abstentions. After some 20 versions60 and concessions on the part of the 
government to the citizens' ownership lobby in the OKP (these had been made on a 'lesser of two 
evils' basis in order to draw votes away from the employee ownership scheme), the Act on the 
Privatisation of State Enterprises61 - accompanied by the Act on the Establishment of the Office 
of the Minister for Ownership Transformation - favoured the government's proposals but, 
significantly. left the self-managed governance structure in place. Whilst the government 
(through the new Ministry of Privatisation) would assume responsibility for devising the 
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framework for privatisation, a standing committee in the Sejm would "exercise overall control 
over ownership transfonnation as well as monitor its implementation"62; it would not. however. 
have the right to vote on individual privatisations. 
The 26 articles devoted to the British model known as 'capital' privatisation (in contrast 
to the mere six on the so-called 'liquidation' routes) reflected the government's thinking at the 
time. Intended for large finns, the capital route would begin by a decision by the Ministry of 
Privatisation to commercialise a firm in order to then ostensibly sell it to a domestic or foreign 
investor. The self-management lobby's 'insurance policy' against forcible commercialisation lay 
in the all-important Article 5 of the Act: "The Minister of Ownership Transfonnation may 
[transfonn] a state enterprise into [corporate fonn] only upon ajoint motion of the director of the 
enterprise and the workers' council, submitted after having sought the opinion of the general 
assembly of employees as well as the opinion of the founding organ [(the branch ministry or 
provincial representative supervising the finn)]"63 
In short, state enterprises were ceded the right to veto plans for commercialisation and/or 
privatisation (Article 6 of the Act did in fact state that the Prime Minister could. in exceptional 
circumstances, order the privatisation of the of the enterprise but the initiative rested with the 
firm itself). In cases where commercialisation occurred, workers' councils would be replaced 
by western-style corporate boards known as supervisory boards in which employees were entitled 
to appoint two of the six representatives (Article 17) and were offered 20% of the firm's shares 
on preferential terms (Article 24 t~ - the Act's most controversial article in view of the 
Bugaj/Milkowski factions' demands for much stronger provisions for employee ownership. 
Almost as an afterthought, three or four paragraphs were added at the end of the Act dealing with 
the liquidation routes which applied to small- and medium-sized finns. 
Designed to facilitate a "decentralised and bottom-up process that accommodated itself 
best to [insiders],,6s, the liquidation paths did not, as it would seem to indicate. refer to 
bankruptcy per se. Rather the aim was to offer smaller finns the choice of deciding on their own 
fonns of privatisation. Two methods were envisaged: the first for enterprises in relatively good 
standing and the second for those in arrears. The fonner provided for management and/or 
employee buyouts (MESOs) either through the direct sale of finns' assets. the use of these assets 
to set up a new private company. or the leasing of these assets for a specified duration (Article 
37). The latter granted enterprises the right to appoint a liquidator to sell off their assets and 
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reimburse their creditors (Article 19 of the September 1981 Law on State Enterprises). 66 The 
issue of reprivatisation, it should be stressed, was not considered and foreign companies were 
only allowed to purchase a mere 10% of the shares in state enterprises; a pennit from the Agency 
for Foreign Investment was required for acquisitions above this amount and there were notable 
restrictions on the repatriation of profits. 
Just as the BugajlMilkowski factions secured their imprint on the Act, the Gdansk 
Liberals' lobby managed to ensure that citizens' ownership schemes remained in contention a'i 
a method of privati sat ion. Jan KrzysztofBielecki and Jacek Merkel, in consultation with outside 
experts from the KLD including Lewandowski and Szomburg67, submitted their own proposals 
at the end of June which, in Article 23 of the Act, were recognised as a potential route for 
privatisation: "The Sejm shall, upon a motion of the [government] adopt resolutions on the issue 
and value of privatisation bonds designed to pay for 1) the acquisition of rights on shares [in 
commercialised firms] and/or 2) the acquisition of titles to participate in financial institutions 
having at their disposal shares [in commercialised firms].,,68 The Article also stated that the 
bonds in question would be issued free of charge to the public. 
In short, the Act on State Enterprises favoured the British model but dropped plans for 
a single controlling body - the Ministry of Privatisation - detennining the privatisation process. 
More importantly, it institutionalised a voluntarist, consensual approach to ownership 
transformation by retaining the self-managed enterprise structure of 1981. The Act attempted 
to strike a balance between the interests of the state and those of the finns: "The legislators' 
intention was to stimulate employees' interest in privatisation without hindering its progress."69 
While both privatisation methods - the capital path and the liquidation routes - involved the 
elimination of the workers' councils and their replacement with more conventional supervisory 
boards, the second method allowed the councils to exchange their governance functions for 
favourable privatisation procedures; a crucial factor for the future course of Polish privatisation. 
It is noteworthy that the Act did not include any provisions which would grant the councils a 
diminished but nonetheless guaranteed institutional role in enterprise reform
70
: an indication the 
self-management lobby had. after all, suffered a major setback. 
The real significance of the legislation. not fully recognised at the time. was that it 
ensured a multi-track process for ownership transfomlation; one which emerged a, a precious 
asset in view of the limited success of the British model. We can see. therefore. that Polish 
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privatisation proved particularly path dependent even though the Act envisaged corporate 
governance changes aimed at gradually removing the councils from the policy process. The 
'shock therapists' were unable to centralise property rights in the manner in which Sachs and 
others had advocated: by administrative decree. Ownership rights were still dispersed and it wa'\ 
the enterprises themselves, rather than the state, that would ultimately decide whether 
commercialisation, let alone privatisation, was in their best interest. 
The Presidential Elections 
Three days after the Act's passage, Mazowiecki' s supporters established their own political group 
called the Citizens' Movement for Democratic Action (ROAD). Formed on the initiative of the 
journalist Jerzy Turowicz and counting among its members 23 deputies and 23 Senators from the 
OKP, ROAD's firm Solidarity pedigree placed it in direct competition with Kaczynski's PC. 
Comprised of prominent Warsaw intellectuals with a social democratic bent such as Geremek, 
Kurml and Michnik, ROAD espoused the non-confrontational stance of Mazowiecki. At its 
Founding Congress on 28 July, aptly entitled 'Freedom without Chaos', the group portrayed itself 
as a proponent of evolutionary political changes and cautioned against what it saw as "the 
nationalist excesses and brutalisation of public life [in recent months].,,71 While ROAD 
dismissed the left-right labels favoured by the PC, it did its best to disassociate itself from the 
populist instincts of the Alliance; instead emphasising its strong attachment to parliamentary 
democracy and European values. Bujak, one of ROAD's founders, astutely declared that "we 
are simply to the west of centre [Alliance]."n 
Mazowiecki's supporters maintained that sheer opportunism was the motivating force 
behind the PC's actions. Clearly there was an element of truth in this. Yet ROAD, in its sober 
and intellectual manner, provided little inspiration to the public at a time when disenchantment 
with the government's policies was growing (see Appendix 5 and 6). As the 'war at the top' 
escalated throughout August and September with "the two sides exchanging a series of 
devastating insults .. D - in an acerbic television duel with Kaczytiski. Michnik went so far as to 
say "Please do not call me 'secular left' and 1 will not call you 'Muslim right'''7~ - Wal~sa all but 
announced his decision to seek the Presidency, characteristically stating: "I do not want to 
become President, 1 must become President. ,,75 
On 19 September, laruzelski agreed to shorten his tenure in office and make way for 
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Presidential elections in November. Following Wal~sa's decision to declare his candidacy. 
Mazowiecki, albeit reluctantly, accepted ROAD's endorsement and entered the race on 5 
October. With opinion polls revealing just under 60% support for the Premier and roughly 40% 
for Wal~sa76, it appeared Mazowiecki would be the likely winner. In the two months leading up 
to the vote, the sharp contrast in personalities - between a rabble-rousing W aI~sa and a sober 
Mazowiecki - together with the professed solutions to the country's troubles - the 'quick-fix' 
solutions of the Alliance versus the airy and dry words of ROAD - turned the contest in the 
Solidarity Chairman's favour. Unlike the government camp which, barring some final 
alterations, stood for unity and a continuation of the Balcerowicz Plan, the Wal~sa forces, 
profiting from their leader's eclecticism, entertained a number of alternatives. Sprinkled with 
doses of liberal, unionist and nationalist rhetoric77, the common denominator in Wal~sa's 
electoral programme, entitled 'A New Beginning', was the repeated accusation that the 
government had, as Staniszkis put it, "overestimated the impact of political participation in [the 
reforms] and underestimated the necessity for changes in property rights as the ba'iic impulse for 
the development of the [market economy]"78. Mazowiecki's electoral slogan, by contrast, was 
entitled 'The Force of Calm' (identical to Franc;ois Mitterand's 1988 campaign message: 'La 
Force Tranquille') and, perhaps for this reason, inspired little hope. 
Wal~sa's grandiose scheme of awarding each Polish citizen 100 million (old) zloty for 
privatisation purposes was a more populist offshoot of the citizens' ownership programmes 
favoured by the KLD. Lewandowski and Szomburg dedicated their 'Decalogue for 
Privatisation79 - a programme calling for accelerated ownership transformations, notably for 
small- and medium-sized firms - to the Solidarity Chairman's campaign. The PC, for its part, 
preferred to concentrate on 'decommunisation' and the (re)assertion of Polish independence vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union, particularly a speeding up of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish 
soil. The Alliance's economic experts, notably the eminent liberal economist and longtime 
Wal~sa advisor Stefan Kurowski, were, to varying degrees, critical of the Balcerowicz Plan's 
'exaggerated' fiscalism. Both the popiwek tax and the fixed exchange rate were perceived as 
contributing factors to the huge falls in production~ 'acceleration', in this instance, meant a 
loosening of the anti-inflationary screws.80 
The State Electoral Commission's presentation of the list of candidates for President 
contained the names of four other individuals: Roman Bartoszcze, the Rural Solidarity activist 
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who emerged as head of the reconstituted Polish Peasant Party (PSL): Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz, the non-party candidate heading the Democratic Left's Parliamentary Club and 
supported by KwaSniewski's SdRP; Leszek Moczulski, the fiercely anti-cornmunist leader of the 
Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN); and Stanislaw Tymitiski, an unknown Polish 
emigre businessman. The first three candidates' campaigns were, for the most part. 
unremarkable and reflected their respective constituencies' traditional concerns: an end to the 
tight credit policies of 1990 as well as guaranteed minimum prices for farm produce; a strong 
• attachment to the principles of the welfare state, coupled with a more balanced approach in 
favour of the public sector (positions, to a greater or lesser extent, endorsed by Bugaj's newly 
formed 'Workers' Solidarity' group (Solidamosc Pracy) in their 'alternative' Economic Theses 
fleshed out in November81 ); and a total abrogation of the Round Table Accords in order to 
implement 'radical decommunisation' at both the political and economic levels. 
Tyminski, meanwhile, wa~ the quintessential dark horse. He had appeared from nowhere 
and, in the space of a few weeks, had managed to steal some of the popUlist fire from WaI~sa's 
campaign. Tyminski accused Mazowiecki personally of treason in selling off the state's assets 
for a pittance and depicted the Balcerowicz Plan as a financial conspiracy engineered by Wall 
Street. His demagogic manner caught the public's eye as he boasted of his material riches in 
Canada and spiritual ones in Peru. In a curious book entitled 'Holy Dogs', he offered "tips on 
how to build America in Poland. ,,1\2 Appealing to the unemployed and disaffected - his strongest 
support lay in the depressed Silesian coal mining areas - as well a~ with the "younger generation 
of workers who had no personal affinity with Solidarity"83, Tyminski capitalised on the public's 
irritation with the 'war at the top' (see Appendix 5 for the marked drop in support for Solidarity) 
and offered a host of instant, albeit frivolous, remedies for Poland's ills. An opinion poll 
released one week before the election revealed the impact he had had on the electorate's thinking: 
30% of respondents believed Tyminski most capable of overcoming the recession (in contrast 
to 27% putting their faith in W aI~sa) and 29% felt he would best address the issue of privatising 
state enterprises (as opposed to 34% favouring WaI~sa).tw 
The cold shower for Poland's post-communist elites came on 25 November when 
Tymitiski managed to capture nearly one-quarter of the vote, humiliating Mazowiecki (180/() and 
forcing WaI~sa (40%) into a nmoff on 9 December. The non-Solidarity vote. together with the 
sizable level of abstention, contributed to Tymitiski' s success. Aside from the respectable 9.2 o/c 
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accorded to Cimoszewicz, the other two candidates managed to gamer just under 10% between 
them. Although receiving most of his 4 million or so votes from the young and those with only 
primary or vocational education85, Tyminski placed W aI~sa in an awkward position as he now 
had to woo the disgraced, and offended, Mazowiecki camp into lending him its support. The 
froideur between the two sides, the visible shock on the part of the political establishment 
(Geremek went so far as to say that "Poles are [simply] not adult enough for democracy"sh), and 
the resignation of the cabinet as a sign of protest against the populist tone of the campaign 
signified that W aI~sa could hardly take their support for granted. 
Despite continued objections to a WaI~sa Presidency87, the Chairman, with the help of 
the Church as well as Tyminski's own political (possibly mental) blunders, managed to win a 
convincing victory with nearly 75% of the vote. While his opponent's performance remained 
stable, it was clear the country had sensed a threat and chose to side with the known quantity. 
Yet the fact remained that W aI~sa had widened the gulf between his erstwhile advisors and the 
advocates of 'acceleration'. On 2 December, ROAD, Hall's Democratic Right Fomm (Forum 
Prawicy Demokratycznej) and the various electoral committees under Mazowiecki banded 
together to form a new party called the Democratic Union (UD). Despite having endorsed 
Wal~sa in the second roundfaute de mieux, the UD believed the stabilisation programme, even 
Balcerowicz, was, in the words of Kuczynski, "expendable under a WaI~sa Presidency".88 
According to this view, the Tyminski phenomenon had been unleashed by the Solidarity 
Chairman and there was little reason to think he would place fiscal pmdence at the top of his 
agenda. The fact remained that WaI~sa had averted danger and, as one observer put it, "perhaps 
[could] claim credit for having flushed out such previously unsuspected depths of resentment at 
such an early stage in [Poland's transition].,,89 
'Shock Therapy' in 1990 
Presenting its final report to the Sejm on 14 December, the Mazowiecki cabinet prided itself on 
having eliminated hyperinflation and restored value to the zloty. Convinced Poland was now "a 
different country" in which "a rational economic system for market competition existed"QO. the 
outgoing Premier spoke out against empty gestures and promises while conceding that a 'new 
consensus' needed to be developed. On the one hand. he was correct in his assertion that 
macroeconomic stability had been preserved. The successes of 1990 exceeded the expectations 
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of the Balcerowicz Group91, and the IM~2, as the country surpassed many of the performance 
criteria agreed with the Fund, leading some economists to criticise the Finance Ministry for 
excessive overshooting.93 The end-year figure for inflation stood at 250%, primarily as a result 
of the 'corrective jump' in January. Current account surpluses were registered in response to a 
13.7% increase in exports (notably a 43% rise in the volume of trade going to the West)~. the 
budget was in good standing (see Appendix 10), foreign reserves were climbing, and shortages 
had vanished. 
By far the most spectacular achievement in Polish economic reform had been the dynamic 
growth of the private sector. The fiscal and monetary loosening in July had. according to 
Balcerowicz, resulted in a 15-fold increase in loans to the private sector: total credit, meanwhile. 
soared from 3.6% to 15.4%.95 Industrial production in the private sphere grew by almost 9%. 
employing close to 50% of the workforce (82% in trade) and amounting to 31.4% ofGDP.96 The 
number of registered individual businesses surged from roughly 820,000 to 1.3 million by the end 
of 1990.97 While the turning-point here may well have been Rakowski's December 1988 Act on 
Economic Activities (see previous chapter), the organic growth of the private sector, irrespective 
of the government's emphasis on state-driven privatisation and in spite of the crushing 
macroeconomic regime, turned out to be one of the welcome revelations of 1990. 
The negative effects of 'shock therapy' were self-evident. A steep recession in the state 
sector savaged Poland's industrial base resulting in a 24% drop in production and an 11.6% 
decrease in GDP (see Appendix 4 for contrast between forecasts and results). Admittedly part 
of the contraction could be attributed to so-called 'pure socialist output,98; production which, to 
a greater or lesser extent, stemmed from the previous directives of central planning. The 
outdated statistical system also failed to compensate for the growth in private sector activity. Yet 
the huge decrease in real wages (roughly 25% compared to an initial forecast of 10%), the rise 
in unemployment, and the increase in the poverty gap99 (salaries below the minimum level of 
income required to meet the approved standard of living), notably among industrial workers, 
reflected the hardships of adjustment. In view of these bleak figures, it seemed remarkable that 
there were no major strikes throughout the year. not to mention any bankruptcies among the large 
state firms. 
Whilst growing signs of industrial unrest were visible in the latter-half of the year. the 
total number of strikes in 1990 amounted to only 250; half of these occurred in one enterprise 
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alone, the Polish State Railways (PKP). On the whole, these were of short duration. attracting 
less than 30% of employees in affected areas 100 and, for the most part, were limited to the issue 
of wage increases. Indeed the initial wave of job losses had been largely voluntary: employees 
took advantage of lucrative early retirement schemes and were awarded hefty pensions of up to 
three-quarters of the average wage. As for large-scale bankruptcies, the high rates of inflation 
in the early part of the year boosted finns' profits and depressed real wages. allowing enterprises 
to avoid mass lay-offs. Many of the large finns exploited their monopolistic positions and 
limited production to compensate for the drop in demand. The government's initial emphasis 
on stabilisation resulted in a certain inattentiveness towards structural changes, particularly in the 
banking and financial sectors. The notion that 1990 had been a year of "unsustainable 
performance and minimal adjustment,,101 was confirmed by the gradual build-up of inter-
enterprise debt. The problem of "nobody's banks lending to nobody's firms .. \02 had yet to be 
addressed. 
The root cause of these problems could be traced to the modest results of the state's role 
as the auctioneer of its assets. The British model of large-scale privatisation had failed to cut the 
Gordian knot of confused property rights. Out of the 20 firms chosen by Lis's Agency, a mere 
5 had gone on the market by the end of the year; this, despite the rosy assumptions of the 
government's privatisation blueprint approved by the Sejm on 9 November which aimed for a 
35% decrease in state assets by 1994.103 On 30 November, Kuczynski, in his new role as 
Minister of Ownership Transformation, had authorised subscriptions to shares in 5 of the 58 
commercialised enterprises (see Appendix 11). Many of these new joint-stock companies chose 
to become commercialised on the grounds they would be exempt from the popiwek and 
dywidendataxes (the latter was levied on the fixed assets of state firms) rather than as a strategic 
decision to change ownership. As an incentive to privatise, firms were told that 
commercialisation would immediately result in a 20% decrease in the popiwek. I~ 
Only the Exbud construction firm in Kielce met the deadline for subscriptions. The time-
consuming nature of the process - it took several months for consulting firms to value the 
enterprises - and the cost of the services involved - 22% of the value of issued shares and almost 
14% of the total value of the five companies lO5 - raised serious doubts concerning the viability 
of IPOs. These were all the more apparent considering that the "least organised of the 
government's efforts to privatise state firms - enterprise-led liquidation - proved the most 
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Mazowiecki government's "fateful mistake", in his words, in opting for the British model~ only 
an "across-the-board approach to large-scale firms that would cut through the logistical and 
political problems" 1 12 associated with self-management would, according to Sachs. help speed 
up privatisation. As Poland entered 1991, the state's frustrated role as the auctioneer of its assets 
turned to one of distributor: "If public offerings were justified [on the grounds] of neo-l i beral 
faith in the market's ability to allocate resources, including property rights, then the justification 
for [citizens' ownership methods] grew out of an attempt to save [neo-liberalism] from its own 
failures to specify exactly what [was] meant by private property." 1 13 That the envisaged voucher 
scheme once again placed governance objectives at the centre of enterprise reform questioned 
its ability to legitimate enterprise-level ownership changes. 
The uncertain position of Balcerowicz after the elections 114, notably the absence of a clear 
verdict on his Plan (see Appendix 6 and 7) was, to a large extent, attributable to Wal~sa. As far 
as international opinion was concerned, notably that of the IMF, the Finance Minister had 
become the guarantor of Poland's economic reforms. Domestically, however, Wal~sa's victory 
in the elections raised the expectations of disparate elements within the Solidarity movement; 
industrial and agricultural lobbies hoped for an end to tight credit and an assortment of liberals 
(and extreme liberals) believed the reforms would benefit from a purge of the nomenklatura, a 
broadening of privatisation methods, and new' anchors' for economic policy. Juxtaposed with 
these economic aspirations were ones relating to the appositeness of the Round Table formula. 
Kaczynski's PC, together with other parties who had campaigned on behalf of W al~sa, 
anticipated fully free parliamentary elections in the spring and a fresh set of faces - ideally their 
own - in the new cabinet. 
The first sign the President-elect was unwilling to interpret his victory as a mandate for 
the above demands came on 18 December when Jan Olszewski, a Solidarity lawyer, abandoned 
his attempts to form a government due to 'personnel' differences with W al~sa (the focus of the 
dispute, it emerged, was the precise role(s) of BalcerowiczI15 ). In finally appointing Bielecki as 
Premier, four days after his swearing in as head of state on 22 December, Wal~sa chose the little-
known entrepreneur and KLD member from his home town of Gdansk. Although initially 
portrayed as a pawn in the hands of the President by certain factions in the Sejm l16 • Bielecki 
represented the second face of Polish neo-liberalism that had contributed to the 'acceleration' 
drive. With its roots in the liberal Pr:.eg/qd Polityczny journal dating back to 1983. the KLD, 
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successful.,,'06 MEBOs constituted the bulk of Polish ownership transformations in 1990 (see 
Appendix 11). The 72 firms that qualified for the liquidation routes embarked on a path 
"designed to facilitate a decentralised, bottom-up process whereby interested enterprises could 
take the initiative to privatise themselves."I07 The fact that the workers' councils, the here noire 
of the Balcerowicz Group and the financial institutions, were, in many instances, the instigators 
of these changes was revealing. At the very least, it questioned the assumptions in late 1989 that 
firms' self-managed status was inimical to market reform. 
A compelling analysis of state enterprise adjustment in the first-half of 1990108 shed new 
light on the capacity of firms to undergo restructuring. The views expressed differed from the 
hitherto hostile attitude taken towards the workers' councils. In examining a number of small. 
medium and large firms in different sectors and with different profiles, Janusz DClbrowski and 
his colleagues concluded that, in the case of the first two categories of enterprises, the councils 
acted as agents of change playing off recalcitrant managers and unions against each other in order 
to devise an appropriate route for privatisation. The OEeD's 1992 Economic Survey on Poland 
backed up these claims by noting that 275 managers from the communist era had been dismissed 
by the councils in the first nine months of 1990 - as opposed to 44 the previous year. 109 The 
councils' desired form of ownership, moreover, was not, as was generally assumed, self-
management per se but rather mixed ownership schemes in which the sale of shares constituted 
one element among others. "It would be extremely unwise". the DClbrowski team cautioned, "to 
eliminate the councils [at all costs] for they widen the pool of industrial skills available to firms 
and serve [as a counter-weight] to unions' [wage-maximising] interests:" 10 
The authors' main argument, however, was that tight macroeconomics alone was 
insufficient as a means of assessing firms' true microeconomic potential in the new market 
environment; these policies had not, they claimed, resolved the stalemate over property rights in 
the large enterprises where "new rights and entitlements had yet to be defined"lll The DClbrowski 
team opted for a solution close to the hearts of the Gdansk Liberals (DClbrowski himself was a 
prominent member of the KLD-affiliated Gdansk Institute for Market Economics (lBnGR» 
emphasising a partial give-away of state assets combined with enterprises' immediate 
commercialisation: insiders would be compensated through increased representation on the 
supervisory boards while the public would finally acquire ownership rights through investment 
funds holding shares in the enterprises. Sachs himself favoured a similar scheme in view of the 
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through its chief strategists Lewandowski and Szomburg, had come out forcefully in favour of 
rapid privatisation. Sensing this to be a way of enlivening the reforms. of providing 'shock 
therapy' with a new elan, Wal~sa opted for change, insisting, at the same time, that "Vice 
Premier Balcerowicz' s Plan will continue." 117 
THE GDANSK LIBERALS' TURN 
Bielecki assumed office in early January 1991 amid hopes of a relea~e from the grip of 
stabilisation. Yet as he himself later admitted 118, this 'release' had already occurred in the form 
of a loosening of fiscal and monetary policy in July; followed by a further retightening in the last 
quarter of 1990 as it became apparent inflation was rising. Indeed some argued that Balcerowicz 
engineered a second wave of recession in late 1990-early 1991 by embarking on a 'Keynesian 
roller coaster' 119 of stop-and-go macroeconomic management; while interest rates were in the 
mid-30s in autumn, they were now set at 55%. to be raised to 72% the following month. 110 A 
second 'release' was provided by the final abolition of the Council for Mutual and Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) trading regime with the Soviet Union on 1 January 1991. Hidden subsidies 
on energy vanished and the traditional market for a host of Poland's (and other Eal\t European 
countries') state enterprises disappeared as payments were switched from the old transferable 
rouble system to hard currencies. The short-term consequences of both of these developments -
a retightening of macroeconomic policy coupled with the adverse external conditions confronted 
by a number of SOEs - in the face of an ongoing recession compounded the new government's 
problems. From the beginning, however, Bielecki favoured a less rigid, more innovative 
economic liberalism than previously implemented. 
In his maiden speech to the Sejm on 5 January, he emphasised his determination to 
provide dynamism to the reforms by according top priority to the restructuring of state 
enterprises. Praising Balcerowicz for "mastering the art of stabilisation", Bielecki nevertheless 
renounced "textbook measures" and placed his faith in small-scale ownership and competition 
as "the key to enlivening the state sector."111 Stressing his cabinet would neither "impede nor 
delay privatisation by waiting endlessly for a bankruptcy to occur"11~, the Prime Minister 
announced an extension of ownership reform to the widest group of beneficiaries. A diversity 
of methods. with particular emphasis accorded to the liquidation routes but also including 
reprivatisation. would be encouraged. His main domestic objectives were financial and banking 
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reform (including the setting up of a stock exchange as well as drafting an attractive foreign 
investment law), new pensions legislation, the promotion of agriculture, and 'cordial' relations 
with the unions. In foreign affairs Bielecki singled out closer relations with Germany (as 
opposed to France under the previous cabinet), the signing of a debt accord. and an Association 
Agreement with the European Community. Presenting the chamber with a makeshift government 
of experts designed to presumably see the country through until parliamentary elections in the 
spring, Bielecki rewarded the PC by appointing the party's economic experts, Jerzy Eysymontt 
and Adam Glapiriski, to the Office of Central Planning (CUP) and the Ministry of Housing 
respectively. The other key portfolios (see Appendix 8) went to the KLD with Lewandowski 
assuming the Ministry of Privatisation and Zawislak replacing Syryjczyk as Minister of Industry. 
Michal Boni, a Solidarity union negotiator, accepted the poisoned chalice of Minister of Labour. 
Both Balcerowicz and Skubiszewski retained their posts. 
While the Round Table formula was still in existence, with the 'contract' Sejm broadly 
consisting of three main factions (the postcommunists gathered under Cimoszewicz' s Democratic 
Left Club, the disparate members of the OKP - minus the 46 who left to form the UD's 
parliamentary Club - and Jan Zych's PSL caucus - see Appendix 9), the ex-communists were 
now formally in opposition 123 and, despite having voted for the cabinet, had little sympathy for 
the KLD's brand of liberalism. As if to accentuate the perceived illegitimacy of the 'contract' 
parliament, Wal~sa, sensing that spring elections were impractical in view of the Pope's visit in 
June, began preparations to form a 'Political Council' grouping individuals representing non-
parliamentary interests. This Council eventually became an Advisory Committee consisting of 
political and economic proponents of 'acceleration'. Several of its members, including Kurowski 
and Jan Winiecki 12~, were, to varying degrees, critical of the Balcerowicz Plan and were hoping 
for corrections in policy. 
The Popiwek Controversies 
As soon as the cabinet assumed office, the 'battles over the popiwek' 125 began in earnest. In 
exempting private firms from the tax (now changed from the total wage bill to the average wage 
norm), the Finance Ministry increased the level of taxation on the state sector to 84Cj~ of total 
revenues. This figure provided the basis on which the 1991 budget was constructed and 




signed with the IMF in April. The latter, aside from being tied to a favourable 
debt accord, forecast a 3.5% rise in GDP in 1991, a 5% growth in industrial production. and a 
drop in inflation down to 36% (see Appendix 4). For the moment, the issue of wage controls 
consumed the cabinet's agenda. Staunch liberals such as Kurowski and Winiecki called for the 
immediate abolition of the popiwek127 on the grounds the tax constituted a 'highly visible form 
of state intervention' 128 and precluded differentiated wage settlements based on productivity 
levels. These two were joined by a host of managers in state firms who felt the tax wa~ outdated 
and prejudicial given the deteriorating financial condition of state enterprises. A survey by 
Marek Belka and his colleagues revealed that directors felt discriminated against vis-a-vis their 
private sector counterparts and "expressed irritation at having to still deal with [a restrictive tax] 
whose role and time they felt had [long] passed.,,129 
Trade unions, on the other hand, were far more intransigent. The former communist 
OPZZ, under its chairman Alfred Miodowicz, was deeply critical of the Ba1cerowicz Plan. 
Pressing for wage increases (notably in the transport sector), it organised a series of 
demonstrations throughout February chanting 'Down with the popiwek!', 'Down with 
Ba1cerowicz!' and 'Down with the government!' 130 With an older and larger membership than 
Solidarity and a strong role in allocating social service funds in the large state firms (see next 
chapter), the OPZZ, aside from its political stance, was less willing to endure the anti-inflationary 
regime. A 1991 survey found that 52% of the union's members felt 'real socialism', if properly 
administered, was still worth preserving; this contrasted with a 30% figure for those affiliated 
with Solidarity. 131 The union's inability to mount an effective opposition to the Plan, however, 
stemmed partly from its tainted past as an organ of the PZPR. 
The Solidarity union, meanwhile, although still willing to grant the government a 
protective umbrella, was equally finn in denouncing the popiwek. The newly-elected Chairman 
of the union, Marian Krzaklewski, endorsed the notion of joint responsibility for the reforms yet 
declared that unionist functions would now take precedence. Solidarity would run its own slate 
of candidates in the upcoming parliamentary elections so as to ensure it had its own labour lobby 
in the Sejm. Convinced the(ir) new President would compel the government to rescind the tax, 
the KKW felt betrayed once it emerged that W aI~sa, following 'consultations' with Ba1cerowicz. 
favoured a more gradual phasing out of the tax. At Solidarity's Third Congress on 23-24 
February. Bielecki delivered a speech in which he deeply regretted the previous cabinet's 
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"omission of a white paper which would have, without emotion, depicted the true state of the 
Polish economy in late 1989.,,132 
Pleading for the union's continued support in overcoming the recession, he attempted to 
justify his decision to preserve the popiwek on the grounds that state firms would sink deeper into 
debt if they were freed from the state's anti-inflationary anchor. Bielecki, like Ba1cerowicz l1 -'. 
alluded to the paradoxical meeting of the minds between former communists and doctrinaire 
liberals who, albeit for different reasons, were demanding the tax's abolition: "The 
shortsightedness of the former is pure demagogy, while the plan of the latter envisages the 
withdrawal of the state [in conditions of near total public ownership].,,134 Clearly centralised 
incomes polices such as the popiwek were a politician's nightmare; that private firms were now 
exempt from the tax was equally difficult for the government to justify. Yet given that large-
scale privatisation and tax reform had been considerably delayed, the government had little 
choice but to keep the tax in place. Ideological factors also played their part. The Bielecki 
cabinet, like its predecessor, was convinced state firms were unable to restrain wage pressures 
(or restructure for that matter) until fully privatised. 
Both main unions, however, were, for the moment, confining their criticisms to wage-
related issues and were not calling for an abandonment of economic reform. In his yearly 
'Workers' (Robotnicy) surveys, luliusz Gardawski claimed that 'moderate modernisation' - a 
rather eclectic formulation emphasising employee ownership, bankruptcies for indebted firms, 
and Polish capital leading to competition and autonomy for enterprises - best characterised the 
attitude of public sector employees. 135 This economic orientation was, according to Gardawski, 
attributable to a certain ambivalence towards privatisation: while workers endorsed the general 
principle of ownership transformation, they expressed a sceptical, distrustful attitude towards 
privati sat ion when referring to their own enterprise (see Appendix 13). "This peculiar yes-no 
conflict in approving privatisation on a [macro] scale [while, at the same time,] opposing 
denationalisation of one's own firm is a fact whose significance [should not be 
underestimatedr l36, Gardawski noted. Part of this ambivalence could be traced to the limited 
restructuring that occurred in 1990. As the full effects of CMEA trade shock became apparent. 
and declining inflation rates revealed the true impact of stabilisation, this ambivalence towards 
privatisation turned to outright hostility. It was in this atmosphere that Lewandowski began work 
on his original Mass Privatisation Plan (Program Pows:ecll1lej Prywaty:£l(ji). 
11 I 
Mass Privatisation, Polish Style 
The popiwek was only one example of the state's active role in building capitalism. This 
dilemma for Poland's post-communist elites became more acute with the presence of self-
proclaimed liberals in office. Macroeconomic stabilisation was accorded precedence in 1990 and 
thus accentuated the technocratic character of the Ba1cerowicz Plan. The new government. 
however, placed citizens' ownership, decentralisation and the popularisation of the market at the 
top of its agenda. It was therefore paradoxical to hear Bielecki concede, amid accusations of 
'verbal liberalism'137 from some of his free-market critics, that the state needed to participate 
more actively in creating the proper conditions for capitalism: "This is not a liberal motto, it is 
how things really are.,,138 The implementation of Lewandowski's Ma~s Privatisation Programme 
(MPP) reflected these realities. 
Ever since its first presentation in November 1988, the programme sought to overcome 
the impediments of shallow markets and lengthy valuations. Lewandowski and Szomburg - with 
strong encouragement from the PC, members of the Solidarity union (including W aI~sa), and a 
host of other independent economists - had championed the MPP all throughout 1990 a'i a means 
of speeding up ownership transformation and rendering it socially attractive. Lewandowski 
himself, in one of his first press conferences following his appointment to the cabinet. stated that 
"the energy of the Ministry [of Privatisation] was somewhat wrongly directed; it concentrated 
too much on public offers of shares and it gave insufficient attention to small privatisation and 
to non-conventional methods."139 Yet practically all the arguments in favour of mass 
privatisation were based on the ideal 1988 version emphasising highly dispersed ownership, 
political as opposed to economic goals, and speed as opposed to efficiency. With a deepening 
recession and a self-managed enterprise model still in place, these aspirations gave way to hard-
headed a'isessments of the programme's viability. 
The preliminary work on the MPP began as soon as Lewandowski assumed office 
(support for privatisation was still relatively favourable - see Appendix 12). With financial aid 
from the British Know-How Fund, Jerzy Thieme, the project's manager in the Ministry of 
Privatisation, recruited the services of the British investment bank S.G.Warburg in order to 
examine the logistical, organisational and economic feasibility of the programme.
loU1 
Immediately 
embroiled in technical arguments over how to reconcile his 1988 version based on the simple 
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transfer of ownership with the need to establish effective corporate governance. and facing 
resistance from sections of the economic establishment (this ranged from supporters of 
conventional privatisation who objected to 'shortcuts'141 being made, to fears of an excessive 
concentration of shares in the hands of the nomenklatura as vouchers were exchanged for 
money), Lewandowski began his 'privatisation offensive' 142 in inauspicious circumstances. His 
original scheme was, to all intents and purposes, impractical in view of the deteriorating financial 
condition of state enterprises; the budget recorded its first deficit since the start of the 
Balcerowicz Plan in February (see Appendix 10). Rather the aim, as Lewandowski later 
confessed, was to reconcile social considerations (as opposed to political ones which. according 
to him, "never played a part in the preparation of the MPp,,143) with the harsh economic realities 
of 1991: "Eighty percent of society consists of frustrated workers who believe they deserve to 
be rewarded for overthrowing communism. Something has to be done for them in order to save 
the reforms."I44 
A second key priority for the cabinet was a law on foreign investment. The paltry $88 
million invested in Poland in 1990 belied the rosy forecasts in late 1989. Assisted by his 
economic advisor, Anthony Doran, a microeconomist seconded from the Word Bank's 
International Finance Corporation, Bielecki commenced work on a law which. in his words, 
would "streamline foreign investment and be 'sexy' for investors."145 The aim was to offer a 
huge package of tax-based incentives to foreign firms for a limited period of three to four years. 
Doran provided invaluable advice on the intricacies of the proposed law and, more importantly. 
assisted the cabinet in its delicate foreign debt negotiations with the Paris Club of Creditor 
Nations. On 18 April 1991, Poland concluded a three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 
agreement with the IMF which, in turn, led to a historic debt accord with the Paris Club 
effectively reducing the country's foreign debt obligations to western governments - 65% of the 
total - by 50% (a separate, yet equally important, development in April was the opening of the 
first stock exchange since the war on the top floor of the former PZPR party headquarters). The 
IMF. according to Rodlauer. was, at the time. "entirely unaware of the extent of the collapse of 
the budget"146 and, as far as Bielecki was concerned, "there was simply no time to renegotiate an 
admittedly irrational budget."147 
As the deficit increased throughout the spring and the effects of the CMEA trade shock 
became more visible. Lewandowski met Bielecki in early May to inform him that "he had 
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fundamentally changed his mind"'4M with regard to the MPP's objectives: "The financial crisis 
affecting state enterprises [demanded that] the programme provide a genuine restructuring 
~ 
capacity to the state sector. This element became at least as important as the universal access to 
ownership rights.,,149 Following lengthy deliberations inside the Ministry of Privatisation. 
Thieme's group concluded that the MPP would focus primarily on improving corporate 
governance. The Polish approach, therefore, unlike the Czechoslovak MPP implemented the 
year after, eschewed dispersed ownership on the grounds this would do little to address the 
underlying microeconomic impediments to privatisation stemming from confused property rights 
and hence weak incentives for firms to adjust. Thieme's scheme sacrificed political gains 
associated with a transfer of assets to the public en masse in order to concentrate on providing 
a strong role for institutional investors through state-managed investment funds (see below), 
Only with the passage of time - four years elapsed from the moment Lewandowski officially 
presented the MPP in June 1991 to its actual implementation in autumn 1995 - did this closely 
monitored process tum out to be more effective, at least economically speaking, in improving 
enterprise governance than the Czechoslovakian and Russian MPPs granting largely unregulated 
funds a free hand in privatisation. '50 
The Sejm ' s decision to postpone parliamentary elections until October offered Thieme's 
group time to prepare the revised MPP. Increased tensions between the President and the 
parliament over the precise formula for the electoral law led to a disruptive four month tug-of-
war culminating in W aI~sa finally consenting to a mixed proportional-majority bill satisfying no 
one. The perpetuation of the 'contract' Sejm for another six months subjected the country to a 
long drawn out unofficial election campaign in which political animosities precluded the passage 
of key pieces of legislation. A programmatic divorce, of sorts, between members of the cabinet 
occurred in the spring when the PC's two ministers, GlapiIiski and Eysymontt, broke ranks with 
Balcerowicz in arguing for a mild fiscal stimulus as part of an 'anti-recessionary' programme. 151 
Bugaj's Labour Solidarity was equally critical of the cabinet's anti-inflationary stance and had 
a strong ally in the person of Jan Mujzei. the Vice Chainnan of the Economic Council. His idea 
for a 'selective industrial policy'152 found an echo in the President's Advisory Committee whose 
much-touted Economic Conference on 17 May was hailed (by its organisers) as a turning point 
in Polish economic policy. IS.' 
In the end. the only 'turning point' was the government's decision to devalue the currency 
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by 15% to 11,200 zloty to the dollar. From now on, the doty would be pegged to a basket of 
currencies which reflected more accurately the country's closer trade links with Germany. This 
'loosening of the screws' - against the advice of Balcerowicz and the IMF - was the first sign that 
the tough anti-inflationary regime was becoming increasingly untenable. As the embattled 
Finance Minister defended his Plan in the Sejm on 23 May by stressing that "drops in production 
have occurred in all the former Soviet bloc states irrespective of the type of reforms they have 
undertaken"I54, Krzaklewski's union held its first nationwide day of protest against the cabinet's 
'erroneous' policies. Solidarity objected to the emergence of what it perceived as 'red 
capitalism' benefiting the nomenklatura. These arguments soured the atmosphere surrounding 
Lewandowski's MPP and, despite the considerable progress in 'small' privatisation as well as 
the liquidation routes (see Appendix 11), undermined confidence in the project. 
The passage of the cabinet's foreign investment law, or Law on Companies with Foreign 
Participation, on 14 June marked a significant victory for the government. The legislation 
ensured equal treatment for both domestic and foreign firms and, with the exception of 
regulations pertaining to the purchase of land, provided a host of fresh incentives to invest in 
priority sectors. In addition, the Law abolished most permit requirements and allowed foreigners 
to repatriate 100% of their profits. ISS Other key pieces of the cabinet's legislation, however, 
notably a draft pensions bill submitted in early May, were held up by arcane debates over the 
electoral law. Talks with the recession-plagued European Community over the proposed 
Association Agreement proved equally labourious. The government was sceptical ali to whether 
an asymmetrical partnership - EC duties on Polish products lowered at a much faster rate than 
Polish duties on EC goods - could be guaranteed. This was largely a consequence of the 
Community's reluctance to grant Poland full access to its agricultural, textile and steel sectors; 
the key competitive areas for Polish exports. 
Bielecki himself noted that "in external terms, we generally felt that the euphoria of the 
West was evaporating and we tried to achieve as much as we could in as short a time as 
possible."156 Sensing the public's growing disenchantment with the reforms (see Appendix 6 and 
7), the President proposed special powers for the cabinet on 11 June as a means of circumventing 
the Sejm and compensating for the delay in drafting a post-communist constitution. These were 
declined on the grounds they would do little to address the underlying causes of the economic 
crisis. On 27 June, Lewandowski finally presented the Mass Privatisation Programme at a pre"" 
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conference. The MPP had only been discussed by the cabinet two weeks prior to its formal 
announcement. The parliament, meanwhile, had not been consulted with regard to its contents 
and there was no educational campaign to inform the public of its objectives. 
The original 1988 scheme was dropped in favour of an amended version introducing the 
concept of 'National Wealth Management Funds' .157 The programme called for the immediate 
commercialisation of 400 of the largest state firms generating 25% of industrial output and 
employing 12% of the labour force. Shares in these finns would be allocated in the following 
manner: 10% to employees, 60% to the Funds, and the remaining 30% held by the state. Shares 
in the Funds themselves would be distributed free of charge to each eligible Polish citizen. The 
Funds, meanwhile, would hire western consulting firms to ensure proper management of the 
enterprises in their respective portfolios (out of the 60% of shares in a given firm allocated to one 
of the 10 or 20 Funds envisaged in the Programme, 33% would be held by one Fund alone with 
the remaining 27% split evenly among the rest). In short, "the selection procedures ensured that 
effective control would be exercised by one leading Fund. The approach relied on extensive 
oversight by the government to achieve ownership and control of both the enterprises and of the 
Funds themselves."158 The Polish programme differed markedly from the Czechoslovak scheme 
in the order of priority accorded to its three stages: the creation of carefully regulated investment 
funds; the distribution of shares among the Funds; and, only then. the distribution of the Funds' 
shares to the public. Corporate governance, as opposed to the rapid transfer of assets, was the 
differentia specifica of the Polish MPP. 
On the surface, Thieme's scheme represented a departure from the previous cabinet' s 
emphasis on IPOs. Yet like the British model, it required the government to "unilaterally 
determine privatisation procedures.'·159 In calling for the commercialisation of hundreds of state 
firms, the authorities once again insisted that workers' councils give up their rights and cease to 
exist. Perhaps recognising the difficulties of such a scheme, the government began work on a 
more varied package of restructuring measures. A discernible shift in policy occurred in late July 
when the Industry Minister, Zawislak, wa~ replaced by the more interventionist-minded Henryka 
Bochniarz. With an increasing number of state enterprises sinking deeper into deht (incestuous 
links between the nine state banks and the large enterprises precluded major bankruptcies with 
the former allocating 90% of commercial creditl6C). Bochniarz was put in charge of estahlishing 
a unified Ministry of Industry and Trade that would address "the nexus between privatisation and 
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industrial policy and that [for the first time] had as [its] slogan: 'restructure then privatise' ."Itd 
For the moment, mass privatisation a la Polonaise continued to operate under tht? assumption 
that commercialisation - and the associated governance changes - would provide effecti ve 
management structures and improve firms' efficiency pending privatisation. Inherent in this view 
was a belief that enterprises which commercialised themselves did so in order to prepare for 
privatisation. Yet with a deepening recession and an increasing number of finns incurring losses. 
a new incentive for commercialisation arose: a desire to be renationalised in order to live off the 
state. 
FRAGMENTATION AND THE LIMITS TO STABILISATION 
The cabinet's pragmatic or 'practical liberalism' Lewandowski had referred to in an interview 
in April 162 was given new relevance with the government's tepid endorsement of an industrial 
policy. Only seven firms had been sold via capital privatisation since the beginning of the year 
(see Appendix 11) and the profitability of large enterprises was -3.6% - compared to 25% in the 
first six months of 1990. 163 Parallel to the implementation of Lewandowski's MPP. Bochniarz 
initiated work on a 'sectoral' privatisation scheme aimed at identifying the correct method of 
privatisation by commissioning studies on entire branches of industry instead of individual finns. 
It was hoped this would reduce consultancy fees by avoiding unnecessary duplications inherent 
in a case-by-case approach. This was accompanied by a more overt industrial policy of 
'prioritising and ranking' .164 The reasoning here was that since the infirm banking sector 
provided no guarantees that indebted enterprises would be shut down, the government had to pick 
its own 'winners and losers' by dividing firms into various categories of (in)solvency. 
Yet the real problem confronting the government was that there was no effective 
mechanism for monitoring and assessing state enterprises' behaviour. A lack of organised and 
up-to-date infonnation on firms precluded a large-scale restructuring andlor privatisation strategy 
that would address the specific needs of enterprises, notably those targeted for sell-offs; hence 
the success achieved in the liquidation routes where the practical knowledge of insiders was 
matched by greater awareness of firms' true potential. l65 The liquidation paths nevertheless 
applied to smaller enterprises and. while a close link existed between privatisation (albeit mostly 
in the form of workers and managers leasing state property) and restructuring 1M. were di ... tinct 
from the legal and organisational harriers confronted by the large finns. Prior to his resignation. 
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Zawislak had described these problems as the 'Bermuda Triangle' 167 of Polish enterpri"e reform. 
Is Commercialisation the Answer? 
In a separate 1991 survey of Polish privatisation, the D(}browski team once again found that. in 
the case of small- and medium-sized finns, support for ownership changes on the part of the 
workers' councils was stronger than generally assumed. "What is particularly striking about 
these liquidations", they stressed, "is not only the strength of the motivations of [the councils] 
but the clarity of their intentions [with regard to privatisation],,168 - even more surprising given 
that privatisation required their institutional elimination. The same could not be said for the large ... 
enterprises where the high inflation rates of 1990 masked many of the microeconomic and 
structural weaknesses of enterprise reform. The 'Bermuda Triangle' essentially referred to an 
alleged desire on the part of all three actors at the enterprise level - the councils. the managers 
and the unions - to "prolong the status quo"169 by impeding plans for commercialisation and/or 
privatisation. The councils naturally objected to their institutional liquidation and therefore 
resisted changes in governance; the managers, notably holdovers from the communist era, also 
feared losing their positions as well as their extensive connections with the state banks; and the 
unions, having not been properly consulted or informed on the logistics of privatisation. generally 
favoured public ownership (see Appendix 13). Analysts such as Wojciech BieIikowski who did 
not discriminate between small and large firms and who felt all self-managed enterprises 
irrespective of size "work for their own destruction" 170 evidently felt mass commercialisation was 
the answer. The D(}browski team, on the other hand, were more circumspect. 
What wa'i troubling, they claimed, was that commercialisation. a'i an attempt to introduce 
more effective management structures and improve firms' performance, was not having the 
desired effect (admittedly the recession had much to do with this). Contrary to the spirit of 
commercialisation, many of the state firms that were transforming themselves into joint-stock 
companies were continuing to do so solely on the grounds of becoming exempt from punitive 
taxes and thus improving the prospects for wage increa'ies or loans from the state. Another 
dilemma inherent in commercialisation was that by eliminating the councils an important channel 
of communication between management and labour ceased to exist. thereby making it more 
difficult for the newly installed supervisory boards to explain the rationale for privati\ation to a 
disgruntled workforce l71 : if that was indeed their aim. The most dynamic adjustment efforts. 
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according to the DClbrowski team, were to be found in the insider-led liquidation routes where 
"the councils came to see survival as being linked to privatisation:' 172 
Szomburg concurred with the team by suggesting that delays in privatisation. together 
with a deepening recession, confirmed many of the fears of those who. from the outset, viewed 
commercialisation with a degree of scepticism: "A new motive for commercialisation emerged 
within firms [in 1991]: the desire to relieve themselves of their self-managed responsibilities 
[and] return to the protective umbrella of the state in the hope [the latter] would not allow them 
to go bankrupt.,,)73 Roman Frydman and his colleagues were of the same opinion and noted that. 
in many cases, the workers' councils' parting shot prior to being dissolved was to ensure that the 
new corporate boards provide them with guarantees that no mass lay-offs would occur following 
commercialisation, thus defeating the purpose of commercialisation. "Informal reports". 
according to Frydman and his associates, "indicate that the supervisory boards [in many 
commercialised firms] are either passive or are ignored by insiders. It appears that 
[commercialisation] has not yielded the desired changes in corporate governance and behaviour 
of state enterprises.,,)74 These revelations questioned the state's motives in winning back control 
over 'its' firms if the only demonstrable effect was softer budget constraints. Moreover, they calit 
doubt over the views of those, like Sachs, who placed their faith in corporate boards as a means 
of improving firms' efficiency. For the real irony of Polish enterprise reform in mid-1991 was 
that, from a strictly macroeconomic standpoint, the self-managed firm was an ally of the 'shock 
therapists'; a bulwark against a further etatisation of the economy. 
The Parliamentary Elections 
In the run-up to Poland's first fully free parliamentary elections on 27 October 1991, the 
economic situation deteriorated further with a collapse in the budget in the autumn (see Appendix 
10). Balcerowicz, whose resignation from the Deputy Premiership had been sought by a number 
of his critics ("He should simply restrict himself to what he does best"m Kaczynski said drily), 
announced in early August that, for personal reasons, he would not seek a post in the next 
cabinet. Confidence in Poland's institutions, let alone in the government's ability to extricate the 
country from recession had plummeted in recent months (see Appendix 5 and 6 respectively) and 
W aI~sa was becoming increa~ingly critical of Balcerowicz' s 'conceptual rigidities' .l7h New 
impon tariffs on agricultural products failed to placate angry farmers anti the popiwek was still 
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the subject of intense controversy. Although the attempted coup d'etat in the Soviet Lrnion on 
19 August temporarily diverted attention away from domestic troubles (Bielecki admitted that 
"for the first time in my life, I genuinely felt like a member of the European Community"ln). 
delays in passing the cabinet's emergency legislation compelled the Premier to submit his 
resignation on 30 August. 
Following an emotionally-charged Budget Amendment speech by Balcerowicz the 
previous day in which he proposed further cuts in spending, including an overhaul of the 
profligate pensions system, and a freeze on public sector wages 178, Bielecki announced that the 
Polish state was threatened with "paralysis in decision-making". 179 The upsurge in strikes, the 
despondency among the public, and the parliament's general disapproval of the cabinet's 
economic agenda had, according to Bielecki, convinced him of the negative repercussions of 
postponing spring elections. The Sejm's unwillingness to accept his resignation offered him a 
chance to appeal for special powers in palising emergency laws (these were part of a package of 
ad hoc amendments aimed at increasing the powers of the government vis-a-vis the Sejm). The 
parliament's final refusal to comply with his demands capped a two year period. almost to the 
day, in which the appositeness of the Round Table formula revealed its limitations. With the 
IMF suspending relations with the government in September and the impending exit of 
Balcerowicz, the neo-liberal policy regime was under threat: "The effects of recession, tight 
money, and fiscal discrimination against state firms had [by now] made the liberals' industrial 
policy a political and economic non-starter,',IIIO 
The fate of Lewandowski's MPP was determined by both the tiscal crisis confronting the 
state as well as the continued reservations regarding its implementation. The former was 
attributable to the government's reliance on the profits from state firms as the main source of 
revenue. Anti-inflationary imperatives collided with institutional realities. specifically the 
delayed reform of the tax system with personal income tax and V AT put off until 1992. in 
producing what Janos Komai and others referred to ali the 'fiscal trap'181: "The hardening of the 
budget constraint causes economic activity to contract, thereby reducing the tax base: meanwhile. 
spending on [social benefits] represents a growing burden on the budget,"IK:! These difficultie .. 
were compounded by strong opposition to the proposed pensions legislation. The Sejm 'J 
decision to reject the cabinet's version of the bill in latc September - "the most expensive and 
severe defeat for my govemment"llI~ according to Bielecki - was prompted hy fierce 
120 
condemnation of the measures, notably on the part of the OPZZ. Amid taunts of "Boni [the 
Labour Minister] is delivering the pensioners to their graves"I~, parliamentary commissions 
began deliberating over various drafts and were only able to agree on a compromise bill nine days 
before the elections. 
The other constraints to the MPP stemmed from professional criticism of the project. 
Aside from the drop in support for privatisation (27% of respondents deemed it disadvantageous 
for the economy compared to 25% believing it to be beneficial; while 42Ck disapproved of the 
MPP in contrast to 15% who supported it I85 ), most critiques focused on the precise role of the 
'National Wealth Management Funds'. Fears of a "new layer of neo-socialist bureaucracy" lilt> 
in which the Funds would become heavily politicised and lobby vigorously for more money 
conjured up images of Gierek' s WOGs in the mid-1970s. A strong role for foreign consultants 
as well as the risk of the nomenklatura buying up vouchers were among other objections being 
raised. Bielecki's distrust of the programme, the President's continued attachment to his 100 
million zloty version (together with the public's confusion or equation of the twO)11I7 and, 
crucially, the limited success - and questionable objectives - in commercialising the 400 
designated enterprises (see Appendix 11) forced Lewandowski to scale down the Programme and 
delay its implementation until after the elections. 
The electoral campaign differed markedly from the Presidential poll a year earlier, not 
least because of the sheer number of parties - over one hundred, albeit with limited recognition 
and/or volatile constituencies - as well ali the strongly proportional electoral law enacted in July. 
Broadly divided into four groups (Solidarity 'pro-reform' parties, Solidarity 'anti-reform' parties, 
the ex-communists, and a mass of 'couch parties' pressing mostly single-issue agendas IXX), the 
main contestants concentrated on emotive issues such as 'decommunisation', the role of the 
Church, and the neo-liberal policy regime. That these three dimensions to the transition, i.e. 
communist-purging versus communist-forgiving, clerical versus secular, and liberal versus 
interventionist, cut across party lines precluded coherent programmes and sowed confusion in 
the minds of the electorate. With regard to the first issue, Kaczynski's PC, Moczulski's KPN, 
Wieslaw Chrzanowski's ZChN (the main force behind Catholic Electoral Action (WAK» and 
Krzaklewski's Solidarity, together with the movement's peasant offshoots. all campaigned 
vigorously under the banner of decommunisation and, to varying degrees, were in favour of 
'Iustration': laws providing for the removal of former communist functionaries or informants. 
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They were opposed, first and foremost, by the ex-communist parties - the Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) (an amalgamation of 20 or so political groupings of which KwaSniewski's SdRP 
was the largest) and Waldermar Pawlak's PSL - as well as Mazowiecki's UD and Bielecki's 
KLD. The latter three were equally ill-disposed towards the ZChN's religious fundamentalism, 
notably its anti-abortion crusade. 
The economics of the campaign featured an outpouring of criticism directed at the 
Balcerowicz Plan, including its author l89 . Populist, even anti-semitic l90, attacks on the Finance 
Minister were fuelled by the media's coverage of various pathological phenomena emerging in 
Poland's nascent capitalist system. These stemmed largely from the poorly regulated banking 
sector. Two high-profile corruption scandals, the Art-B affair and the FOZZ conspiracy, revealed 
the infirmity of the country's financial system. The former led to the resignation (and subsequent 
arrest) of the head of the Central Bank, Grzegorz Wojtowicz, a~ it transpired that Art-B, the firm 
in question, had exploited inefficiencies in the banking system to eam interest on the same funds 
deposited in numerous accounts. The second case involved a private firm operating under the 
name of the then defunct Foreign Debt Servicing Fund (FOZZ) in order to embezzle state 
finances. Other legal improprieties, mainly because of lax customs regulations, such as 'alcohol 
affair' (in which Ba1cerowicz himself was implicated)l!)l, the 'cigarette affair' and the 'rouble 
affair' testified to the primitive state of Polish capitalism. 
The bulk of criticism was reserved for the Plan's perceived shortcomings in tackling the 
recession. With 50% of respondents in July voicing their displea~ure with the policy regime (see 
Appendix 7), the search for alternatives intensified. A recent poll revealed that 67% of those 
questioned deemed the Plan's social costs to be excessive: 50% believed the Plan was only one 
of a number of routes; and more than 50% were either in favour of an entirely new Plan or else 
a new one combining elements of the old. I!):! While mass privatisation may have been sold as a 
panacea for the country's ills in the Presidential elections, monetary and fiscal relaxation, coupled 
with increased state intervention, were the chosen favourites this time around. In its final 
'Testament' concluding its two-year stint as the government's advisory body. Trzeciakowski's 
Economic Council noted that "the assumption that the economy would pick up of its own accord 
without state intervention"'!)" wa~ flawed. A more forceful advocate of this view was WaJ~sa's 
economic advisor and celebrated lMF critic Kurowski. At the second installment of the 
President's economic conferences in late SeptemoerlQ.l, he castigateJ the IMF for leading the 
122 
country into recession through monetary strangulation.'95 The KPN. the peasant parties. and the 
PC endorsed many of Kurowski's misgivings concerning the anti-inflationary regime and argued 
for a 'breakthrough' (przeJom) in the transition (see next chapter). Indeed all the main political 
contestants in the elections, with the exception of the UO and the KLO, were in favour of some 
form of monetary and fiscal relaxation; this, at time when the budget deficit was approaching 6 
to 7% of GOP. 
An all-encompassing critique of the Balcerowicz Plan was published in the form of an 
Open Letter to the President 196 on 15-16 October. Its authors, Beksiak and Winiecki. while 
strongly liberal in outlook, argued for a more active role for the state in restructuring industry. 
Their main criticism was that an overly-restrictive ( 'inelastic' in their words) macroeconomic 
policy had failed because of an inattentiveness to institutional changes. Seemingly oblivious to 
the legal impediments to commercial ising state firms. the Letter nevertheless argued for a 
speeding up of privatisation "at any cost [to efficiency) and with the explicit objective of creating 
new owners, rather than as a source of income for the budget:· 197 Aside from their demand for 
a relaxation in monetary policy, as well as the elimination of the popiwek and dywidendll taxes, 
the authors' main recommendation dealt with the restructuring and commercialisation of the 
banking sector in order to address the pernicious issue of inter-enterprise debt. 
Industrial polices of a more genuine and traditional kind were demanded by left-of-centre 
groups competing in the elections. Bugaj's Labour Solidarity. Bujak's newly-formed Democratic 
Social Movement (Ruch Demokratyczna-SpoJeczIlY), and, if one includes Kuron's rumblings 
about a 'social pactd91! (see next chapter), Mazowiecki's UO were all advocating corrections to 
the liberal regime. These emphasised options for self-management and an end to fiscal 
discrimination. Bujak's own electoral slogan was 'I am sorry about Solidarity' .199 Krzaklewski' s 
union's demands for 'positive state intervention':!oo and the SLO's concern for parity between 
public and private sectors provided further evidence of anti-liberal sentiment at opposite ends of 
the political spectrum. The only parties which broadly endorsed the Balcerowicz Plan - now 
contained in the government's Principles on Socio-Economic Policy for 1992:!ol - were the UO 
and the KLO. Two weeks before the elections, both of these parties, surprisingly, were in the 
lead with 20% and 8% support respectively.~o:! 
Whether or not it represented, as one observer put it, "a collective act of national hara-
kiri"~o'. the splintering of the Sejm on 27 October 1991 came as a shock. Even in the Senate. 
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where a majority system applied, dozens of groups gained representation. In the parliament. a 
total of 29 parties managed to win seats despite (or perhaps because of) the low turnout of .. B~(. 
Boni's pensions legislation, the lingering effects of the 'war at the top', and the economic and 
social malaise all played their parts. The proportional electoral law , with no minimum threshold. 
lived up to its reputation with no single group dominating the Sejm. The so-to-speak 'winner' 
was Mazowiecki's UO with 12.3%. Yet in reality the party performed poorly. KaczyDski's PC 
received just under 9%, the KPN 7.5%, Bielecki's KLO 7.5%, the PSL 8.69('. and Solidarity a 
meagre 5%. The surprise performance of the SLO with almost 12%, coupled with the strong 
showing of W AK with close to 9%, underlined the disparate attitudes of the Polish electorate. 
The new parliament was of a broadly centre-right orientation with a number of potential 
candidates to be included in a future coalition. Hostility towards the UD2(~, especially on the part 
of the PC and W AK, detracted from what little consensus there was on economic matters. The 
exit of Balcerowicz raised expectations (and fears) that Poland was about to embark in a new 
direction with a much stronger emphasis on fighting the recession - and the nomenklatura -
instead of inflation. Balcerowicz's departure "marked the end of the first stage of Polish 
economic reform commonly associated with his name,,205 and left open the question of a viable 
alternati ve. 
'Shock Therapy' in 1991 
The suspension of relations with the IMF was one of a number of setbacks. For the second year 
running the Balcerowicz Plan failed to meet its key targets (see Appendix 4) and the ambitious 
goal of privatising half the state sector by 1993 was unfulfillable with one-third of state firms 
reporting pre-tax losses while 40% reporting after-tax losses.206 The economy had again 
contracted, this time by 7.6%; industrial production fell by 12%; inflation was at 70%; and 
foreign investment barely exceeded $100 million (several important deals, nonetheless. are worth 
noting: Philips took a 51 % stake in Polam-Pila, Poland's largest producer of fluorescent bulbs; 
Gerber acquired 60% of Alima, a baby food factory; Unilever bought an 80% stake in the Pollena 
detergents plant - Coke, Thomson. Asea Brown Boveri and Alcatel were among other large 
foreign investors). In addition, unemployment doubled, real wages remained at their 1990 levels. 
and the poverty gap widened with the brunt of social costs shifting to farmers and mixed 
households. 207 The number of strikes in 1991 rose to 305 with their average size and duration 
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increasing by 80%, notably in state farms.208 Confidence in Poland's institutions (see Appendix 
5) and support for privatisation (see Appendix 12) had sunk and the reforms were characterised 
by a deep sense of despair. On the positive side, the private sector's share of GOP soared to ~5% 
(almost a 15 point increase since 1990), employing 55% of the labour force and creating 1.5 
million new firms since 1989209 ; all this, while the bulk of the country's state enterprises 
remained languishing in the recession. 
The most successful privatisations, not surprisingly, were conducted via the decentraIised 
liquidation routes with close to 200 firms deleted from the register of state enterprises compared 
to the modest number of 30 sold via the capital path (see Appendix 11). In the 20 
commercialised and/or privatised enterprises surveyed by the OC}browski team in 1991, insiders 
initiated privatisation proceedings in 15 of them: in all but two, workers' councils played an 
important role in explaining privatisation plans to the workforce irrespective of whether they 
themselves initiated the change in ownership.210 On this basis alone one has to question the 
merits of commercialisation as an institutional mechanism to facilitate privatisation. 
Macroeconomic policy per se proved inadequate in forcing state enterprises to adjust - in part due 
to conflicting signals from both governments but primarily as a result of cumbersome and 
ineffective bankruptcy procedures - and little was accomplished in the way of clarifying property 
rights or implementing reprivatisation. 
Lewandowski's MPP, hailed as a popular alternative to Kawalec's British model in 1990, 
emerged as a carbon copy of the latter in the sphere of corporate governance. As Anthony 
Levitas notes, "legally there was [absolutely] no difference between the state as auctioneer and 
as distributor of its assets. Both required that firms give up their rights."211 The July 1990 
Privatisation Act nevertheless prolonged the self-managed enterprise model at a time when the 
banking and budgetary crises were not yet apparent. Neo-liberalism's failures only became clear 
once the Balcerowicz Plan's radical macroeconomics collided with the more complex 
microeconomics of enterprise reform. Delays in implementing institutional measures or, in the 
words of the OECD's 1992 Survey, to "put in place many of the structural reforms rapidly 
enough to establish the conditions for successful stabilisation,,212, impugned the Plan's logic and 
questioned the assumptions of 'shock therapy'. 
125 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter focused on the two political variants of Polish neo-liberalism during the 'shock 
therapy' years of 1990-91: the original BalcerowiczlMazowiecki model and the WaJrsa-illitillted 
Gdarisk Liberals' alternative. While both had their roots in distinct political conditions. the 
former in the period of 'extraordinary politics' and the latter in the 'acceleration' drive. they 
approached large-scale privatisation with similar objectives. The purists in the first variant 
perceived the British model of commercial sales as the most effective safeguard against employee 
ownership - or any other 'shortcuts' for that matter. A strong philosophical attraction to Anglo-
Saxon-style capital markets and an unwillingness to sacrifice quality for speed resulted in a 
technical approach to ownership transformation. The realists in the second variant, while equally 
constructivist, understood that capital and institutional inadequacies plaguing all post-communist 
economies precluded "one giant leap to a developed securities markeC~ll. Instead they believed. 
perhaps na'ively, that the only way to move ahead swiftly was to forsake quality and to 
depoliticise the property rights conflict by assigning ownership rights ell masse to the public. Yet 
as Lewandowski himself admitted in the opening quotation to this chapter, the self-managed 
enterprise model - accompanied by a steep recession - precluded Czechoslovak-style giveaways 
and focused Polish decision-makers' attention on corporate governance. As the only organised 
social group capable of (legally) challenging the privatisation regime, the self-management lobby 
defended the rights of the workers' councils and ensured that the commercialisation controversy 
"dominated political and professional debates in 1990 and 1991 :<!I" 
It is worthwhile once again mentioning Sachs's comment when setting out his proposals 
for Polish privatisation in early 1990: "The political risks of [commercialisation) pale in 
comparison to the potential economic gains. ,,215 This was not prescient on his part. One need 
only reflect on the words of Tomasz Stankiewicz, the Ministry of Privatisation' s Director of 
Commercialised Firms, to realise that the fears on the part of Polish reformers that state 
enterprises would perceive commercialisation as an unwelcome form of renationalisation were 
justified: "Mass commercialisation would have made me a second Hilary Minc (the economic 
tsar of Polish Stalinism)."216 This candid a'isertion epitomises the difficulties faced by the Polish 
nco-liberals in their attempts to undo the legacy of self-management. 'Shock therapy' wa.\ 
undoubtedly radical in its macroeconomics yet left much to be desired on the microcconomic 
fronl. The failure to disentangle the property rights knot (to the state' s advantage) and. once 
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commercialisation occurred, to achieve the efficiency and governance objectives inherent in 
commercialisation constituted one of the key setbacks of the 'big bang' . 
One of the important questions concerning Polish privatisation in late 1991 was whether 
the self-managed enterprise model was, as many neo-liberals argued, the main impediment to 
reform. In Blaszczyk's opinion, the underpinnings of commercialisation needed to be rea~sessed: 
"If a state firm run by managers appointed by the state administration is the only realistic 
alternative to [a] self-managed firm, the former seems no more effective than the latter."~17 
Clearly the poor performance of many joint-stock companies was a consequence of the recession 
and not an argument against commercialisation per se. Yet given the political risks in forcible 
commercialisation and the success of the workers' council-initiated liquidation routes, might not 
a more indigenous form of neo-liberalism providing a stronger role for employee ownership and 
greater choice in privatisation methods have been more appropriate? As far as the D'lbrowski 
team were concerned, "the blame being placed on firms for their failure to adapt had [less] to do 
with their worker-run character [than] in the failure of the state to undertake [deeper] institutional 
reforms.,,218 With a democratically-elected Sejm and the departure of Ba1cerowicz, new hopes 
arose for a more conciliatory stance towards state enterprises. Slowly but surely. a renaissance 
of employees' participation in the privatisation process emerged, albeit one tempered by 
'Ba1cerowiczism' . 
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CHAPTER 4 'BALCEROWICZISM' WITHOUT BALCEROWICZ 
Many of the [liberal] experts and politicians who struggled with an imaginary socialist 
enemy in the fonn of employee ownership are the main advocates of the Pact on State 
Enterprises with strong syndicalist and neo-corporatist [undertones]. -Barbara Blaszczyk 
and Marek Dctbrowski 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In extending the focus of this study to encompass the two-and-a-half years leading up to the 
passage of the 'Strategy for Poland' in June 1994, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
philosophical and conceptual evolution of 'Ba1cerowiczism': a broadly neo-liberal framework 
in which anti-inflationary objectives, systemic reforms and swift European integration constituted 
the key priorities. The term is appropriate, in my opinion, in view of the enduring legacy its 
author bequeathed on the Polish policy regime; one which served as the frame of reference for 
the post-Ba1cerowicz transition. The shift from the technocratic stabilisation phase to the 
institutional changes of budgetary, banking and enterprise reform took place amid increasing 
antipathy towards neo-liberalism. In academic and policy-making circles, analysts. prematurely 
or belatedly depending on one's view, began to adopt a more critical perspective of post-
communist refonn which questioned some of the assumptions behind the 'three zatsias'. Even 
standard bearers of the 'Washington Consensus', such as the late Michael Bruno, in a seminal 
article in the IMF's Staff Papers in December 1992, posed hitherto taboo questions in the in-
house journals of the western financial institutions: "Was the initial price shock necessary?"; 
"Was the output collapse unavoidable?"; "Is rapid privatisation the answer?"; and. perish the 
thought, "What, if anything, can ensure the maintenance of a social consensus over the period 
of the reform programme and its political sustainability?".! Others, such ali Richard Portes. spoke 
of 'transformation traps'~ which focused on early errors in implementation and hoped to alert 
other East European countries of the risks in embarking on 'shock therapy'. Once the exemplary 
pupil of neo-liberalism, Poland. ali it entered 1992, had to extricate itself from a number of these 
traps while simultaneously avoiding others along the way. Balcerowicz had left his road map but 
it was up to the disparate body of parliamentarians in the newly-elected Sejm (prodded hy 
President W aI~sa) to decide on whether his directions were the right ones. 
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Two policy-makers, in particular, made their mark on Polish economic policy in the 
1992-94 years. The first, the flamboyant and down-to-earth Jacek KurOli, was partly responsible 
for launching 'shock therapy' and, by his own admission, had 'taken the leap' in the absence of 
a credible altemative.
4 
The second, the highly ambitious Grzegorz KoIodko, was a renowned 
critic of the Balcerowicz Plan and claimed to have devised an alternative to 'shock therapy' as 
early as mid-1993.5 What united these two, at least philosophically, was an attempt to add a 
social dimension to Poland's economic transition. In his familiar role as Minister of Labour. the 
imaginative KuroIi sought to extend the political boundaries of Balcerowiczism by alleviating 
some of its austere elements. KuroIi's 'Pact on State Enterprises' concluded with the main 
unions and the Employers' Confederation in February 1993 was, following Kawalec' s British 
model and Lewandowski's Mass Privatisation Programme, the third major attempt in as many 
years at accelerating privatisation. A quasi-corporatist arrangement emphasising social 
partnership, the Pact would have been almost inconceivable under the aegis of Ba1cerowicz. 
Inspired by KuroIi's methods6, yet objecting to the framework in which they operated, Kolodko, 
with the assistance of his Chief Advisor Jerzy Hausner, seized on the Pact's negotiated 
philosophy to help define a new socioeconomic agenda for the victorious ex-communist parties 
in the September 1993 parliamentary elections. Kolodko' s Strategy for Poland, the first medium-
term policy document since the Ba1cerowicz Plan, claimed to have reversed the 'destructive anti-
inflationary policies' of 1990-91 and placed Poland on a path of rapid, yet more equitable, 
growth. 
These last two variants of Polish neo-liberalism, Kuron's Negotiated Pact and KoJodko's 
'Social Alternative " engaged in revisionism to justify their agendas. Kolodko, in particular. 
dctined his Strategy as much in relation to the Balcerowicz Plan as an attempt to fashion a new 
approach to the Polish transition. Yet while the Pact was willing to (further) sacrifice the quality 
of privatisation - by increasing workers' participation and according greater emphasis to the 
popular liquidation routes - in the hope this might speed up ownership changes, the Strategy once 
again reasserted the state's role as the manager of its assets and perceived commercialisation as 
the key objective. Both of these aims - the Pact's continued emphasis on privatisation and the 
Strategy's renewed commercialisation drive - have. at least in the sphere of corporate 
governance, maintained the broad thrust of Polish economic policy. The self-management lobby, 
although progressively weaker, experienced Ba1cerowiczism without Ba1cerowicz. 
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NO 'BREAKTHROUGH' 
The unclear verdict rendered in the October 1991 parliamentary elections (see previous chapter) 
placed neo-liberalism in an awkward, defensive-looking position. Poland's first fully democratic 
Sejrn since the 1920s was, on the whole, comprised of parties eager to translate their anti-
Balcerowicz rhetoric into practical realities. Forceful proponents of a 'breakthrough' (pr:eJom) 
in the transition - a politically-laden term calling for a reflationary, interventionist stance in 
economic policy in order to restrain the 'liberal excesses' of 1990-1991 - included Kaczynski' s 
PC, Moczulski' s KPN, Chrzanowski's ZChN, as well as Gabriel Janowski's Solidarity-backed 
Peasant Alliance (PL). It seemed odd, therefore, that Bielecki's Liberals would join these four 
in a five-party coalition proposing the PC's Jan Olszewski as Premier. With the stigma of elitism 
isolating Mazowiecki's UD and a political quarantine, of sorts, still imposed on KwaSniewski's 
SLD, the 'coalition of five' emerged as the front runner to form a cabinet. 
Constitutional skirmishes with President WaI~sa (the 'contract' Sejm had precluded 
agreement on a new constitution, thus obscuring the prerogatives of government formation 7), 
together with the sudden withdrawal of the KLD and the KPN over economic policy and 
personnel disputes respectively, underscored the fragility of the coalition. Convinced WaI~sa 
was determined to veto his nomination and groping for suitable candidates to fill his cabinet (the 
former, Olszewski claimed, impeded the latter), the Premier-designate abruptly resigned from 
his mission on 17 December. The day after, the parliament voted to reject his resignation fearing 
the President himself might assume the post. In the end, the tireless campaign on the part of 
Kaczynski to win approval for his PC colleague, the unofficial support of Pawlak's PSL, and the 
consensus that the six-week interregnum had lasted long enough, enabled Olszewski to present 
his hastily-arranged cabinet to the Sejm on 21 December under the slogan of a 'government of 
hope'. 
Retracting his familiar sharp criticisms of the Balcerowicz Plan, Olszewski nevertheless 
deplored what he called the 'provisional' character of Poland's post-communist governments: 
"I am not saying this as an accusation, but as a matter of fact. They were 'temporary' because 
they were based on provisional arrangements."s The enduring structures of communist rule, 
according to Olszewski, had vitiated many of the reforms introduced by the two pn:vious 
cabinets. Describing the economic situation as 'catastrophic', he alluded to the Beksiak Letter 
(see previous chapter) to lend weight to his arguments concerning the previous governments' 
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neglect of institutional measures. Olszewski reserved his sharpest words for the 'erroneous' 
privatisation record of his predecessors: "The privatisation process must be clearly organised and 
subject to more effective control in order to prevent abuses and the plundering of state property.',q 
Promising to deal separately with privatisation and reprivatisation, Olszewski announced the 
immediate establishment of a State Treasury (Skarbu PaIistwa) to clarify ownership rights once 
and for all and supervise the handling of state assets; the words 'social control' were repeatedly 
used. On the macroeconomic front, he pledged to restore relations with the IMF based on a 
'renegotiated' agreement, accord top priority to overcoming the recession by stimulating exports 
and easing the burden of taxation on state firms, and begin the arduous task of clearing up the bad 
debts afflicting the banking sector. 
Social policy, legal and administrative reforms, and the signing of a concordat with the 
Vatican were also listed as key priorities. The trade unions were promised consultative functions 
in the formulation of policy and farmers were pledged increased support in restructuring their 
farms with the help of the recently established Agricultural Property Agency. In foreign affairs 
Olszewski stressed closer links with NATO and stronger ties with the Baltic states as well as the 
other newly-independent republics of the former USSR. The cabinet line-up contained few 
recognised authorities yet its novelty was the appointment of four cabinet-rank 'directors' of 
ministries destined to be liquidated or consolidated. Tomasz Gruszecki. an independent 
economist, and Andrzej Lipko, a member of the tiny Christian Democratic Party (PChD), were 
put in charge of the Privatisation and Industry and Trade portfolios respectively which, together 
with the Ministry of Communications, were meant to be incorporated into an all-powerful 
Ministry of Economy; this was meant to place privatisation policy in a more integrated 
framework of economic decision-making. Eysymonu, the head of the Central Planning Office 
(CUP), kept his post and took over Balcerowicz's position as head of the cabinet's economic 
committee (KERM), while Karol Lutkowski, a little-known economist, emerged as the surprise 
choice to head the Finance Ministry. Skubiszewski, having just congratulated his chief 
negotiator laroslaw Mulewicz on the historic signing of Poland's Association Agreement with 
the European Community (see below), remained at Foreign Affairs. The appointment of fervent 
nationalists such as the ZChN's Antoni Macierewicz (Internal Affairs) and Zhigniew Dyka 
(Justice) to sensitive posts proved highly controversial. In the end, the cabinet was confirmed 
by a vote of 235 to 60 with 139 abstentions; Mazowiecki' s UD and Bielecki' s KLD (together 
with the President) withheld judgement pending the announcement of a concrete economic plan. 
Budgetary Constraints 
From the outset, Olszewski's cabinet was constrained in its attempt to effect a 'breakthrough'. 
The Association Agreement signed in Brussels on 15 December imposed certain safeguards on 
the direction of reform. Covering all areas of relations between Poland and the EC, i.e. political. 
economic (specifically trade-related), and legal affairs, the commercial side of the Agreement 
took effect as early as 1 March 1992; the treaty itself came into force on I February 1994. 
Representing, in the words of the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and 
Foreign Assistance, "the strategic policy goal of future membership in the European 
Community"IO, the Agreement's acquis communautaire - the raft of legislative measures and 
regulations adopted by each EC applicant to approximate those of the Community - ranged from 
financial protocols liberalising the banking sector to educational programmes aligning Polish 
curriculums with EC ones. A period of roughly 10 years was envisaged to implement the 7000 
or so measures contained in the treaty. The key area~ of economic integration lay with the tenets 
of the European Single Market providing for the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
labour. An asymmetrical relationship called on EC member states to eliminate all tariff and non-
tariff barriers on industrial goods by 1 January 1996; Poland would then follow suit three years 
later. The requirements of a "stable constitutional order and effective democratic institutions 
fulfilling their obligations and actively participating in the European integration process" I 1 were 
viewed as a test-case of Poland's commitment to membership. 
The more immediate concerns dealt with the provisional budget bequeathed by the 
outgoing cabinet. In the absence of a Chairman of the Central Bank (the previous Sejm rejected 
8alcerowicz's nominee, Marek DClbrowski, for the postl 2) and faced with a budget deficit which, 
according to an IMF forecast 1\ was veering towards 7-8% of GDP, the government had little 
choice but to accept the measures contained in the previous draft. With a 'heavy heart""' 
Lutkowski announced the government would not only implement the interim budget but would 
also proceed with delayed energy price increases due to come into effect on I January 1992. 
Eager to make amends for its about-tum lest its anti-recessionary credentials be frowned upon. 
the cabinet made a point of withholding the so-called 'Balcerowicz testament,15 on which the 
budget wal\ based. Displaying his reservations with the 'testament'. Olszewski wa.1\ unequivocal: 
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"We cannot undersign a practice which, for over a year if not more. consisted in turnina a blind 
:::: 
eye to the growing negative phenomena in the economy."16 Heaping blame on his predecessors 
yet, at the same time, directing his ministers to uphold the original forecasts did little to convince 
sceptics of the cabinet's resolve in overcoming the recession. 
The early months of 1992 were characterised by alarmist, at times incendiary. rhetoric 
from the government. Prior to Eysymontt's presentation of the revised outline for economic 
policy, the government issued its Report on the State of the Nation 17. Glossing over the 
achievements of the Balcerowicz Plan, the Report's authors held the previous cabinets 
responsible for the country's economic and social malaise. The ZChN's imprint was palpable 
in sections dealing with the collapse of the moral fabric of society as a result of 'social evils and 
corrupt practices' 18 stemming from legal lacunas. Intolerable levels of (economic) cri me, 
anachronisms in the functioning of the state administration and the main organs of power. and 
the 'decimation' of the state sector (roughly 40% of state firms, together with 50Ck of state farms. 
were believed to be insolvent l9) were among a number of ominous declarations. Olszewski 
himself spoke of a situation in which the "invisible hand of the market proved to be the hand of 
the swindler, plundering public funds from the state treasury.":!o Whether such statements 
rendered Eysymontt's job any easier when he presented the cabinet's 'Principles of 
Socioeconomic Policy for 1992' (ZaJozenia Polityki SpoJec-;.no-Gospodarcz.ej lla 1992 rok):!1 on 
15 February was doubtful. Since the Principles were the trailer for the budget, the government 
left itself room for manoeuvre. The much-heralded (or -feared) 'breakthrough' had been quietly 
dropped in favour of what Eysymontt described as "a rearranging of accents given the difficult 
circumstances". :!:! 
The main objective was to arrest the fall in production in 1992 and then, hopefully. 
restore economic growth by 1993-94 without triggering an increase in inflation. A two-pronged 
strategy was proposed: "an aggressive promotion of exports (coupled with a deceleration of 
imports) and an investor-friendly economic environment.":!J As of July 1992, the 'I.n,,·idemlll tax 
on enterprises' assets would be reduced by more than half, thereby encouraging firms to invest 
more heavily. To make up for lost revenue, Eysymontt announced a rise in sales tax in 
preparation for the implementation of V AT in 1993. A slight increase in the money supply at a 
rate exceeding that of inflation, coupled with more favourable terms of credit for farmers and 
construction firms, constituted the other fiscal sweeteners.:!"' Budgetary stability would be 
maintained with the deficit capped at 5% of GDP and the popiwek tax on wage increa'\es. much 
to the union's displeasure, was to remain in place. As if to accentuate policy continuity. 
Eysymontt conceded that an increase in consumption had been ruled out - at least for the next 
three years. 
The Principles, not surprisingly, were accorded mixed reviews.25 Lutkowski's resignation 
the same day the programme was announced heightened speculation that the cabinet was 
suffering from economic schizophrenia. The Finance Minister had assisted in Balcerowicz' s 
more austere version of the programme26 and, apparently, had objected to several of his cabinet 
colleagues' cavalier treatment of macroeconomic policy by contenting themselves with a 10-129'c 
budget deficit and inflation in the mid-70s.27 Ba1cerowicz, for his part, with the support of 
members of the Sejm who had joined his reform lobby entitled the Social Movement for 
Economic Initiatives (SpoJeczny Ruch Inicjatyw Gospodarczy or SPRING)28, repeatedly stressed 
his 'six cardinal principles' emphasising hard budget constraints and rapid privatisation. 2Q Both 
of these recommendations, it now seemed, were subject to revision. The analogy of a 'dry 
sponge' 30 was used by the government in its attempt to justify an increase in the money supply; 
the rationale was that since enterprises had been starved of credit, a slight 'loosening of the 
screws' would hardly result in hyperinflation. It was in the sphere of privatisation, however, 
where Olszewski's government wanted to make its mark. According to Eysymontt, the decision 
not to appoint a Deputy Premier for the economy was precisely to ensure that central 
administrative reform would proceed unimpeded31 ; hence the commencement of legal 
proceedings to establish the State Treasury. 
The State Treasury 
An advisor to the two previous governments on commercialising the state sector, Gruszecki 
emerged as the chief advocate of a centrally-managed state property trust charged with 
overseeing the privatisation process. A first draft on the Law on Establishing the State Treasury 
had been completed as early as mid-1990 but had encountered resistance on the part of the self-
management lobby ali well a host of independent economists. 32 The concept of a Treasury wa~ 
based on the East German experience with the Treullll1ld. One of the first steps following 
Gennan unification in 1990 was the establishment of a state agency, the TreululIldll1lstall, 
responsible for "mandating the conversion of all state enterprises into corporate form oy 
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administrative decree" (this quotation comes from Sachs who in 1989 had advised the Polish 
government to adopt a similar modeli3. The Treuhand itself was charged by law with privatising 
and restructuring all enterprises under its control. Its ra;soll-d'etre stemmed from the collapse 
of the East German state - a development which questioned its relevance in the Polish context 
where the state remained fully functional. 
Given the problems Poland had encountered with the dozens of 'founding organs' 
scattered across the country and the impediments associated with the 'Bennuda Triangle' 
syndrome (see previous chapter), the objective of the Treasury would be to centralise ownership 
rights to an unprecedented degree and restore order to a hitherto "overextended and confused 
[privatisation] effort.,,34 Yet in view of a history of enterprise autonomy and the power of the 
self-management lobby, the establishment of a "strong bureaucratic agency with an almost 
unquestioned mandate to impose radical, sweeping, and rapid restructuring [and] privatisation"'~ 
had been viewed as political suicide by the Mazowiecki and Bielecki cabinets. Moreover. the 
record of Polish privatisation in 1991 had shown that there was a real danger that mass 
commercialisation, given the desperate financial condition of state finns. would make the state -
instead of the firms - directly responsible for their upkeep pending privatisation. 
The Olszewski government nevertheless viewed the creation of the Treasury as desirable 
on the grounds of ensuring proper '''social' control over 'national' property and [guaranteeing] 
fair privatisation"36 (see contrast with Kolodko's views on the role of this institution). This 
conception derived from a view that the previous governments had neglected the legal and ethical 
dimensions to ownership transformation in their rush to privatise. Aside from initiating work on 
a separate 'reprivatisation fund' (since the settling of all restitution claims was expected to 
amount to roughly $18 billion37, part of the proceeds from capital sales would be made available 
for reprivatisation purposes), the government favoured a reassessment of the methods and 
direction of Poland's privatisation regime. Following Bochniarz's attempts to wrest control over 
industrial policy from the Ministries of Privatisation and Finance. Olszewski' s government 
continued to insist on a clear division of powers between budgetary matters. on the one hand. and 
the restructuring and privatisation of industry. on the other. Eysymontt himself claimed that "far 
too much authority had been concentrated in the Finance Ministry"lS and believed anti-
recessionary objectives would best be served by strong institutional counter-weights to financial 
policy. The establishment of the Ministry of Economy and the Treasury. together. would redrc" 
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the balance in favour of a more interventionist role for the state: "lust because you privati~c IOC;-
a year doesn't mean the other 90% should not be looked after'·w. Gruszecki cautioned. 
These assumptions were criticised by various liberal members of the Sejm who belicved 
the 'Principles' would, in the words of the KLD's Donald Tusk. "impose excessive financial 
strains on the budget.,,4Q Others, such as the KPN's Krzysztof Krol. attacked the document for 
"its rigid continuation of the Balcerowicz line.,,41 In the end. an unholy alliance of opinions. 
together with difficulties in deciphering the cabinet's economic language. resulted in the 
parliament voting down the programme on 5 March by a vote of 171 to 138 with 38 abstentions. 
Similar voting patterns were displayed in the final confirmation of W al~sa' s appointee. Hanna 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz, for head of the Central Bank. 
A Political Impasse 
The appointment of Andrzej Olechowski, an independent economist with a strong reputation in 
banking circles, as Finance Minister was meant to add credibility to the cabinet's economic team. 
Immediately dispatched to Washington in early March to gain the IMFs imprimatur for the 5% 
budget deficit, Olechowski seemed to provide direction to Polish economic reform:~2 In ordt!r 
to gain the necessary votes to pass the budget (as well as other pieces of the cabinet's legislation), 
the government had to consider broadening its parliamentary base to include Mazowiecki' sUO, 
and possibly Bielecki's KLD, yet, at the same time, contemplating talks with Moczulski's KPN. 
The PC's laroslaw Kaczytiski - together with his twin brother Lech - engaged in a series of 
politically fraught negotiations with the UD throughout March and April which, if anything, 
further exposed the divisions between the centrist, liberal-minded UO and the more nationalist. 
interventionist-prone parties represented in the cabinet.4J 
lust as Olechowski managed to convince the IMF that a 5% deficit wali the bare minimum 
Poland could afford in the present circumstances (the Fund steadfastly refused to countenance 
anything over 3.5% but, according to Markus Rodlauer. eventually "softened its stance in view 
of [its] failure to anticipate the enormous difficulties and time constraints involved in building 
an efficient tax system''"'"'), Hcnryk Goryszewski. the ZChN's economic spokesman in the S(:i"', 
praised the cabinet for having "stood up to the unprecedented pressure exerted by the IMF and 
defended Poland's national sovereignty:,",5 Emotions were also running high in the sphere of 
education where Minister Andrzej Stelmachowski. a passionate believer in religious instruction. 
1-t7 
aroused controversy with his plans to abolish the Academy of Sciences and forbid teachers from 
going on strike.
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As the government's cultural authoritarianism intensified. a vituperative 
political style precluded a widening of the coalition. Olszewski himself retreated into moral 
propaganda and often blamed the media for his government's woes. 
A bruising battle with the President in April over the respective jurisdiction of the head 
of state and the Minister of Defence precipitated a long drawn out crisis culminating in the 
latter's resignation a month later. Olechowski followed suit on 7 May in response to the Sejm's 
decision to uphold the Constitutional Tribunal's ruling that sections of the previous cabinet' s 
hastily arranged pensions legislation were unconstitutional47 ; new wage settlements in the public 
sector, together with revised old-age and disability pensions, laid to rest any hopes of meeting 
the 5% deficit target. Wal~sa had already contemplated removing Olszewski from his post-l8• 
dissatisfied with the tenor of his premiership and going so far as to publish his own privatisation 
proposals (Andrzej Kozakiewicz, an Under-Secretary of State in the President's Chancellery. in 
cooperation with Oruzecki's Ministry, resumed work on Wal~sa's old 100 million :/(1)' scheme: 
this time floating a figure of 300 million zloty to be made available to each eligible citizen in the 
form of long-term investment bonds, interest-free in the first 10 years-l9). 
Operating without the full backing of the two peasant parties and deprived of special 
powers, the government was faced with the unpalatable decision of having to resign in order to 
pass its budget. Seemingly undeterred and exhibiting a bunker-like mentality, the government 
capitalised on a 'lustration' resolution passed in the Sejm in late May to up the political ante. 
Macierewicz disobeyed the President's warnings of the legal, not to mention personal. 
implications of revealing the names of public figures who had allegedly collaborated with the 
communist security services. Instead he presented a dubious list of 64 individuals which. 
apparently, contained the names of respected figures in the Solidarity camp - W al~sa included. 
Recriminations ensued and a vote-of-no-confidence was tabled by the 'small coalition' 
representing the UD, the KLD and Janusz RewiIiski's small liberal group, the Polish Economic 
Programme (PPO). On 4 June 1992. following the President's motion for a no confidence vote. 
Olszewski's government was unceremoniously removed from office by a huge margin of 273 
votes to 119 with 33 abstentions. The day after. the parliament passed the 1992 budget in a 
virtually unchanged form from that presented by Olechowski. 
The awful fcar of having the country's political future decided in the Ministry of Internal 
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Affairs contributed to the downfall of Olszewski's cabinet. The issue of "I ustration' di vided the 
political establishment with the Premier himself leaving the PC to inaugurate his new nationalist 
party, the Movement for the RepUblic (RdR). Olszewski, together with other 'pro-lustration' 
elements in the Solidarity camp, depicted his ouster as a coup d' Itat engineered by W aJ~sa: 
"'Whose Poland is it to be?', [he] asked metaphorically: 'ours' or the communists?,,50 Economic 
factors also played a part in the government's defeat. The cabinet's desire to distance itself from 
Balcerowicz(ism) presented a serious challenge to liberal continuity. The absence of a 
recognisable and credible strategy to extricate the country from recession - tentative signs of a 
recovery, ironically, were registered in the construction industry in March with a 13.4% increase 
in production relative to the same month the previous ye~1 - deprived the government of support 
from both ends of the economic spectrum. 
Liberals in the UD and the KLD, together with their acolytes in the media, accused 
Olszewski of jeopardising the stabilisation regime; one influential columnist for the weekly 
Polityka even suggested that "with a weak Finance Minister and no head of the Central Bank [up 
until March], we could have ended up like the Ukraine. ")~ Large-scale privatisation slowed 
markedly in the first-half of 1992 with only 6 firms sold via capital privatisation compared to 
almost 20 in the second half of 1991 53 (a key development, nonetheless, was a lucrative foreign 
investment deal worth an estimated $1.7 billion invol ving FIAT's purchase of the FSM car plant 
in Tychy on 28 May - see below for political repercussions). Advocates of rellation, meanwhile. 
comprising, first and foremost, the trade unions as well as those parties which initially supported 
the cabinet, felt bitterly disappointed. Having dashed all hopes of across the board wage 
increases and cheap credits for state firms, Olszewski' s government sowed the seeds for an 
outbreak of industrial unrest in the summer. 
KURON'S PACT ON STATE ENTERPRISES 
"There are no guarantees the recession will not deepen. There are no guarantees because there 
is no long-term plan for recovery. We will not move ahead unless there is a clear concept of the 
future: unless a strategic plan emerges.")~ Political divisions prompted President WaJ~sa to speak 
out forcefully in favour of coherence in economic decision making. Whether by nominating the 
young Pawlak for the post of Premier on 6 June he believed he wa'\ contributing to this objective 
was debatable. Once again characterised by constitutional wranglings (WaI~sa chose the PSL 
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leader because he was convinced the parliament, specifically its Solidarity camp. had run out of 
breath and was incapable of agreeing on a Prime Minister) as well a~ sharp differences over 
economic policy, Pawlak's 33-day mission to form a cabinet ended in failure. :\ delicately 
poised seven-party coalition comprising the 'small coalition', the ZChN. two pea~ant groupings. 
and Pawel LClczkowski's tiny PChD emerged in early July as an alternative to WaJ~sa's 
preference for a Pawlak premiership. The Solidarity union's parliamentary caucus played an 
important role in bridging ideological divides and, in the end, was able to rekindle the 'Solidarity 
cause'. Proposing the ~O's Hanna Suchocka for the post of Prime Minister. the coalition chose 
the pragmatic constitutional lawyer from Poznati. Whilst claiming the support of only half the 
deputies in the Sejm, the ZChN's Deputy Premier-designate. Goryszewski. proclaimed the 
cabinet "a government of ideological peace. ,,55 
In her maiden speech to the parliament on 10 July, Suchocka began by refuting the 
promulgations of her predecessor: "No force, domestic or foreign. has succeeded in assuming 
control over the Polish state for its own ends.,,56 Promising a government of national accord. she 
urged the Sejm to quickly adopt the 'small constitution' clarifying the prerogatives of government 
fonnation. Stressing popular themes such as law and order, local government. an improvement 
in the health and education sectors, as well as the principles of a 'social market'. Suchocka tried 
to strike a balance between the liberal, Christian Democratic and peasant interests of her cabinet. 
Insisting on fiscal prudence and the implementation of much-needed tax and banking reforms, 
she nevertheless favoured a stronger role for workers' participation in the privatisation of state 
firms. While "negotiations on an appropriate pact with trade unions [would] be undertaken 
without delay", Suchocka reminded her audience that "it was in Poland where independent 
economists first came up with the idea of universal [or mass] privatisation as a radical means of 
transforming the economy.,,57 
An Agricultural Restructuring Fund would begin purchasing farmers' debts in order to 
reschedule them on more favourable terms (by mid-1992, 400 state farms had gone bankrupt and 
another 800 were virtually insolvent5H). The Labour Code would be amended in conjunction with 
an overhaul of the social security system. Finally, the Sejm's recent ratification of the 
Association Agreement with the EC would allow the government to deepen the Pf()CC"S of 
integration while guarding against "dishonest foreign competition:'
w 
The cabinet line-up was 
a model of compromise with the 'small coalition' receiving 10 of the posts. the ZChN 5. 
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Janowsksi's PL 4, and the rest evenly distributed amongst the other partners. Goryszew~ki and 
Utczkowski were both named Deputy Premiers for the economy and social affairs respectively: 
Jerzy Osiatytiski, Mazowiecki' s CUP Director, took the Finance Ministry: Kurori reclaimed his 
favourite spot in the Labour Ministry (with Boni appointed ali one of his deputies): Lewandowski 
replaced Gruszecki with the explicit purpose of steering through the MPP: Bielecki was named 
a Minister without portfolio, provisionally in charge of relations with the EC: and Foreign 
Minister Skubiszewski was now serving in his fourth post-communist cabinet. The government 
was confirmed by a vote of 226 to 124 with 28 abstentions. Olszewski' s RdR. together with 
Bugaj and Zbigniew Bujak's newly formed Labour Union (UP), were among those who opposed 
the confirmation. 
Summer Strikes 
No sooner had the government assumed office than it was confronted with a series of explosive 
strikes. A sharp increase in strike activity in the first-half of the year. primarily in the education 
sector but also of a more vehement kind as exemplified by Andrzej Lepper's new radical 'Self-
Defence' (Samoobrona) union specialising in road blockades and 'anti-expropriation exercises'60, 
had been partly attributable to the mixed signals emanating from the previous cabinet. The new 
wave of protests was equally vociferous in its demands and, although at times illegal (the opaque 
Labour code posited that in order for a strike to be considered legal. arbitration, conciliation, or 
a referendum amongst the workforce was necessary), gathered momentum day by day. The 
protesters' grievances were not all identical and, in the case of the WSK-PZL aviation plant in 
Mielec, were tied to the restructuring of entire branches of industry. Staving off bankruptcy, .. md 
operating in an area of high structural unemployment, WSK Mielec had been unable to pay its 
workers ever since the firm had been deprived of its traditional markets in the former Soviet 
Union. The strike fizzled out in late August only when the Ministry of Industry finally con~ented 
to a rescue programme involving a reorganisation of the enterprise's operations together with 
guaranteed government contracts. tli 
The two largest strikes since the inception of 'shock therapy'. a legal one involving ~ome 
38,000 employees at the Polskll Mied: copper combine in Lubin and an illegal one at the FS~I 
car plant in Tychy. revealed the desperate state of industrial relations. In the case of the former. 
the provisional status associated with commercialisation resulted in workers pres\ing the new 
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supervisory board, i.e. the state, for an end to the poph ... ek and dywidenda taxe". The 
government, for its part, maintained, rather disingenuously, that it was not a party to individual 
wage disputes. Andrzej Machalski, the Chairman of Polska Miedz's supervisory board (and. 
coincidentally, the head of the Polish Employers' Confederation (Konfederacj; PrllcodawCl1'" 
Polskich or KPP» responded to the strike by threatening to dissolve the combine - an illeoal act 
e 
prompting the government to immediately disavow his statement.6:! In the end. Lewandowski. 
as the state's representative on the board, intervened in the dispute by giving the management 
leave of absence and, to all intents and purposes, assuming de facto responsibility over the finn' s 
day-to-day operations. 
Militant strikes in Tychy, meanwhile, revealed strong anti-foreign capital sentiment 
regarding FIAT's 90% stake in its joint venture with FSM. Confident the car maker would not 
withdraw from the contract based on previous investments in the plantb1 • the strikers reneged on 
a previous agreement not to raise wages - negotiated by the local Solidarity branch - and instead 
demanded salaries amounting to 10% of the market value of the Cinquecento car assembled at 
the factory. In short, while the Polska Miedz strike questioned the virtues of commercialisation 
as the unions made financial demands on the state - instead of the workers' councils or the 
managers nominated by the councils in the case of self-managed firms - and turned the 'Bermuda 
Triangle' into a potentially more damaging two-sided argument over privatisation. the FSM 
strike revealed deep hostility towards foreign capital (see Appendix 13) and an unwillingness to 
accept the logic of privatisation. 
Fearing an escalation of the strikes, Kuron met with leaders of the main unions to impress 
upon them the importance of preaching moderation. As early as 25 July. he informed the 
parliament of his Ministry's plans for "a novel approach to restructuring industry"M and 
presented a host of social, financial, and employment-related initiatives. While the initial 
reaction, both on the part of the unions and the Sejm, was one of cautious optimism, the 
emotionally-charged events of 10 August revealed the urgency in reaching a consenSllS. In 
scenes reminiscent of August 1980, leaders of six radical unions comprising Marian Jurczyk's 
rabidly anti-communist Solidarity '80 and, ironically. six other postcommunist unions organised 
a National Interunion Negotiating Strike Committee. Drawing up a list of 21 demands calling 
for an end to the 'chaotic and larcenous' privatisation programme. a cancellation of enterpri"e,' 
debts, ohligatory consultations on the cabinet's economic policy. and the indictment of tho"e 
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responsible for the 'ruin' of the national economl5, the Committee placed the government. not 
to mention the two other main unions, in a difficult position. For just as Suchocka refused to be 
drawn on the subject of the 21 demands, the Network (Siec) - the Solidarity-affiliated self-
management activists in the large state firms (see Chapter 2) - urged Krzaklewski to adopt a 
confrontational stance. In the end, W al~sa' s discrete dealings with the Network. coupled with 
Kuron's overtures towards Solidarity and the OPZZ, managed to placate some of the more 
intransigent elements and offered Suchocka's cabinet a respite to proceed with its 'Pact on State 
Enterprises' (Pakt 0 Przedsifhiorstwie 0 PaIistwowym).66 
A 'Stroke of Ingenuity' 
.. It was a stroke of ingenuity on his part; nothing more, nothing less."h7 That even Bugaj 
recognised the concerted effort on the part of Kuron to negotiate the terms of enterprise reform 
was significant. Following the limited success of the British model in 1990 and the (similar) 
obstacles encountered by the Mass Privatisation Programme in 1991. KurOli's Pact represented 
the third major attempt in as many years at privatising Poland's state enterprises. Drawn up in 
the Labour Ministry with strong input from Boni as well as another Deputy Minister. the late 
Andrzej B~czkowski, the Pact was, in essence, willing to place ownership transformation on an 
equal footing with industrial relations - in itself a demonstrable shift in policy. The Pact's main 
objective - by no means embraced by other Ministries, notably Privatisation and Finance (see 
below) - was to institutionalise a social contract offering workers a stronger role in the 
management and methods of privatisation in exchange for taking greater responsibility in the 
running of state firms. This was to be undertaken in conjunction with a comprehensive debt 
restructuring agreement involving the state banks as well as the introduction of modem social 
security mechanisms. 
The notion of a social contract had been envisaged in late 1989 but was resisted by the 
BaJcerowicz Group on philosophical and practical grounds68 (see Chapter 2). The Pact stemmed 
from the Democratic Union's own electoral programme in the October 1991 electionsf>'1 entitled 
'Pact for Poland'. Yet. fundamentally. the initiative was the brainchild of Kurori.
711 
In a series 
of articles in the press throughout July and August. notably in his special columns in Ga:t'la 
~\'borc:a71, he sympathised with the strikers and claimed that a 'second step' (drug; krok) had 
in fact been sought by Mazowiecki in autumn 1990 but that. at the time. "we did not know 
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[(perhaps did not want to know)] how to do this."?:! Although refraining from directly criticising 
the Balcerowicz Plan, KurOl} claimed that "employees in state enterprises should be given [more] 
autonomy, given a chance. Already in late 1990 it was clear to me that apart from political 
democracy we needed workers' democracy.,,73 Quite a statement from an early advocate of 
'shock therapy'. 
In a conversation with Bielecki following the continnation of Suchocka's cabinet. Kuron 
informed the ex-Premier - subsequently put in charge of the Pact's implementation - that "he was 
extremely fond of introducing social pacts as a means of legitimating privatisation:,7-' Bielecki. 
who at first sensed these to be "a dangerous fonn of corporatism", eventually consented 
providing "these pacts offer us a chance to speed up privatisation ... even if this means giving 
workers 30% of the shares !,,75 Initially insisting on a two-month cut off period in which state 
firms would be allowed to select their own routes for privatisation, Bielecki later agreed to 
extend the deadline for compulsory commercialisation to six months (an indication of the tense 
atmosphere surrounding the talks). Asked whether the Pact constituted a form of blackmail, a 
quasi-corporatist arrangement providing various social and financial guarantees in exchange for 
a firm commitment to privatisation, Bielecki was philosophical: "This Pact, as far as I was 
concerned, was a means of repaying my debts from 1991 when I overemphasised the technical 
and economic aspects of privatisation at the expense of the necessary transfer of ownership. Yes, 
I suppose it could be construed as a bribe, a form of corporatism. Yet our [unconcealed] 
intention was clear: we wanted to speed up privatisation."76 Hardly a Kuronesque endorsement 
of workers' democracy. 
As the unions soon realised, the Pact was tied to (if not dependent on) the passage of 
other pieces of the cabinet's legislation, in particular Lewandowski's MPP and a tight budget 
designed to restore relations with the IMF. With the adoption of the interim 'small constitution' 
in mid-October strengthening the government's powers V;S-Q-l';S the parliament", the cabinet 
pressed ahead with its ambitious agenda. A wafer-thin parliamentary majority, however, together 
with an, at best, ambivalent attitude towards privatisation (within the cabinet and outside -see 
Appendix 12), hindered the pa~sage of the MPP. A nerve-wracking series of no-confidence vntes 
against Lewandowski, spearheaded by Moczulski' s KPN and supported by a farrago of peasant 
and Christian Nationalist deputies representing the coalition, laid bare the divisions "urrounding 
privalisalion. This convinced the government to negotiate directly with the union",711 On 9 
IS-l 
September, Suchocka and five of her ministers presented the first draft of the Pact on State 
Enterprises at a televised press conference. The document brought together 14 draft laws and 
amendments to existing laws
79 
covering four key areas: inducements for privatisation. including ... 
the freedom for firms to choose their own paths of transformation and the distribution of 10 to 
15% of the enterprises' stock to employees free of charge (a notable departure from Krlysztof 
Lis's thinking in early 1990 - see previous chapter); selective debt relief aimed at addressin o the eo 
huge build up of inter-enterprise debt stemming from the insolvency of roughly half of all state 
enterprises80; new wage settlement procedures leading to the removal of the popiwek and 
dywidenda taxes; and, finally, safeguards against bankruptcy compelling employers to contribute 
to a 'guaranteed wage fund' to provide severance pay. 
Tripartite negotiations involving the Employers' Confederation. the main unions and the 
government commenced on 6 October. Fifteen trade unions in all were invited to participatc~1 
in the three working groups on finance, privatisation and social policy. Four of these. including 
Jurczyk's Solidarity '80, walked out citing the cabinet's unwillingness to negotiate the terms of 
its economic programme, while Solidarity refused to sit at the same table as Ewa Spychalska' s 
OPZZ. luliusz Gardawski's 1992 Workers (Robotllicy) Survey revealed the important political 
functions performed by Krzaklewski' s union. Questioned on the most effective way of defending 
employees' interests, 48% of all workers surveyed chose direct negotiations between Solidarity 
and the government (23% opted for similar talks with the OPZZ, 14% for direct assistance from 
the President, 21 % for strikes, and as many as 26% deemed the situation beyond repair).x1 
Moreover, while 72% of Solidarity members questioned favoured bilateral negotiations with the 
cabinet, only 8% of OPZZ members placed their faith in direct talks with the government~ instead 
43% of the union's respondents felt bilateral negotiations between the government and Solidarity 
would achieve a better deal!!J. lerzy Drygalski. an Under-Secretary of State in the Privatisation 
Ministry heading his department's side of the talks, admitted that whilst it was often the OPZZ 
who appeared more amenable to compromise, Solidarity's economic concerns predominated and. 
for the most part, were indistinguishable from political agendas.X-l 
Training programmes for union leaders were set up in each enterprise and with the 
cooperation of the media, local governments. and the provincial administrations (Wojt'wOl/a) 
considerable educational efforts were undertaken to 'sell the Pact' to the unions (Kuron admitted 
that if 30% of enterprises signed up to the agreement, it could be considered a succe"s!l~). As the 
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talks dragged on into November, it was clear the three sides viewed the Pact's provisions in a 
different light. An October opinion poll commissioned by CBOS revealed not only that 72lk of 
workers were unaware of the proposed legislation (20% knew 'something' about it) hut that 
conflicting signals, together with an abundance of information. prevented a clear assessment of 
the Pact.
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Managers viewed the clarification of ownership rights and a swift reduction in 
enterprises' debts as the two crucial elements of the contract.. Unions, meanwhile, perceived 
social guarantees, employee participation, and the abolition of the popiwek as the main 
advantages.
87 
Bielecki himself foresaw the dangers in proceeding with three separate. and 
potentially contradictory, working groups and expressed his reservations to Suchocka in late 
1992: "All of a sudden I realised that BClczkowski's [social policy] group was slowly emerging 
as an independent, integral, and sometimes dominating element. This had to be avoided,'·)lli 
The extent to which the Pact's 'new deal'R9 - the visionary expression used by Boni in 
promoting his Ministry's initiative - was contingent upon the successful implementation of other 
pieces of the cabinet's legislation was made clear on 9 October when Suchocka presented her 
cabinet's economic programme90. Promising to double national income in 10 years. increase 
foreign investment (recently given a much-needed boost by the International Paper Corporation's 
$120 million 80% stake in the ZCP pulp and paper mill factory in Kwidzyn). achieve a 
favourable debt accord with the London Club of commercial banks and overcome the crisis in 
public finances, Suchocka called for consumption to be limited to half the growth in GNP over 
the next decade. This drew condemnation from the unions as well as the varied advocates of 
reflation in the Sejm, prompting fears that the Pact's social provisions were fictitious. In the end. 
the cabinet's programme passed by a mere three votes.91 Both Solidarity and the OPZZ, together 
with a host of other small unions, signed up to the Pact only after extracting favourable 
concessions: Solidarity set new conditions on Lewandowski' s MPP requiring a change in the 
name of the Programme from Mass Privatisation to National Investment Funds (Narodowy 
FlIlldtts~e Inwestycyjny) while the OPZZ insisted on a modified Pact based on amendments to 
the Labour Code in the area of collective bargaining. The year ended with a resumption of strikes 
over wage increases and promises of restructuring - this time in the Silesian coal mines. Poland' s 
tepid economic recovery, lost in a myriad of gloomy statistics (real wages once again fell by 
2,3% Q~, the net profitability of state firms - including those commercialised - was negati \"\:'11. and 
foreign investment for the year barely exceeded $280 million~ - see Appendix 16 for key 
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figures), was hailed by the cabinet as a sign of the rapid growth of the private sector'l': now 
constituting almost 50% of GDP, employing 55% of the labour force. and contributing 47Cic of 
external trade.96 
The Pact's Facts 
Suchocka's threats to resign should the Sejm fail to pass the IMF-approved budget capped at 5% 
of GOP - she claimed that any extra expenditures were tantamount "to an expression of a 
different reform concept" while Jan Rulewski, a prominent Solidarity deputy, pointed to the 
"absurd asymmetry,,97 between the bill and the Pact - provided the political context for the 
signing of the 'Pact on State Enterprises in the Process of Transformation ,98 on 22 February 
1993. Three versions were signed simultaneously: the first with Solidarity. the second with the 
OPZZ, and the third with seven other unions ranging from the Mining Supervisors' Union to the 
Railway Workers' Union. The first and third agreements were virtually identical barring minor 
differences in the language and accent placed on privatisation. Solidarity's version stressed that 
"privatisation is an essential part of reform. Work will be undertaken. without delay, to create 
a general [framework] for [mass privatisation] involving [different forms of ownership]. The 
first step will entail the implementation of the Law on National Investment Funds and their 
Privatisation."99 Enterprises were to be given six months to come up with an appropriate route 
(IPO, trade sales, MPP, or liquidation paths); failing that, they would be forcibly commercialised. 
Employees were granted 10% of the shares - Solidarity had requested 25%100 - in a given firm 
free of charge and the right to acquire an additional 10% on preferential terms. Once 
commercialised, workers would still be allowed to elect one-third of the seats on firms' 
supervisory boards. Lastly, leasing conditions for enterprises opting for the popular liquidation 
routes would be eased. 
In the sphere of wage bargaining, all of the agreements began by stating that "a permanent 
dialogue and [the search] for [a consensus] between the three major partners in society is 
necessary for the economic growth of the country and an improvement in its living standards."'o, 
The Pact proposed to abolish the dywidenda tax on I July 1993 and to replace the popiwek with 
a less centralised two-tier stmcture for wage negotiations. A Tripartite Commission representing 
the unions, management, and the government would debate wage limits at the national level. 
while enterprises themselves would negotiate specific wages within the t,,,cal constrainl~ "el by 
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the Commission. The Employers Confederation endorsed the mealiures while emphasising that 
the elimination of the popiwek could only be undertaken "in parallel with malis privatisation and 
the restructuring of [firms]." 102 
The sections pertaining to social issues were given higher priority in the Pact initialled 
with Spychalska's union (another distinctive feature of the OPZZ's version was an introductory 
statement on changes to the law on privatisation which claimed that "it is necessary to ensure that 
[enterprises], together with their employees, are able to decide independently on their [preferred 
route for ownership transformation], based primarily on [efficiency criteria] as well as satisfying 
employees' interests" 103). All three pacts stipulated that employers would contribute to a 
'guaranteed wage fund' protecting employees against the threat of bankruptcy: severance pay 
would entail a minimum of three months full wages. In addition, an ohligatory 'social fund' 
would provide workers with various work-related benefits such as housing subsidies and 
transportation discounts. The fund, despite strong opposition from the KPP. was to be extended 
to private firms with the level of employers' contributions subject to negotiation through 
collective bargaining. 104 Labour safety and hygiene standards were also included in the Pact. The 
OPZZ insisted on the Sejm enacting a Charter of Social Guarantees lO5 enshrining the Pact's social 
clauses into law - various amendments to the Labour Code were introduced for this purpose. 
Finally, the provisions on corporate debt relief were to proceed independently of the rest 
of the legislation. The much-praised Law on the Financial Restructuring of Banks and 
Enterprises drawn up in the Finance Ministry under Stefan Kawalec '06 was passed by the Sejm 
in December 1992 and, arguably, constituted the greatest economic achievement of the cabinet. 
Described as "the most ingenious and comprehensive reform aimed at simultaneously solving 
the financial and structural problems of both banks and enterprises,.107, the Law provided for 
'bank conciliation proceedings' giving recapitalised banks a strong role in the restructuring and 
governance of state firms. 
The Pact's Unravelling 
The reactions to the Pact were, for the most part, restrained: in this sense the agreement 
constituted a victory for the government since no one opposed it outright. Spychalska talked of 
"limited successes for trade unions that will hopefully lead to increased social dialogue". 1111 The 
UP's Karol Modzelewski believed the Pact's "small steps in a progressive direction" were not 
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half as significant as the government's final admission that "it could no longer carry out its 
refonns without trying to reach [some form of] compromise."I09 Kurori hailed the agreement as 
unprecedented in scope and as a "first step in the direction of a social order based on social 
contracts" 1 10 while Krzaklewski admitted that, providing the legislation was implemented. the 
Pact would improve social dialogue and economic efficiency. Liberals. meanwhile. were 
concerned the Pact's provisions on privatisation would compel the government to revise its 
assumptions regarding the enterprises targeted for mass privatisation: 'The Pact sanctions 
[employees'] appropriation of state assets and makes a fiction of ownership by the [soon to be 
established] State Treasury"lll, noted Lewandowski. Others stated that "in the context of 
experience gained during the first two years of Poland's transformation, bribing our 'anti-
communist Bolsheviks' of Solidarity descent was unavoidable."1 12 
The risks in proceeding with the initiative were clear from the outset. These included the 
inflationary repercussions in lifting the two enterprise taxes; the illusory hopes for across the 
board wage increases and universal debt forgiveness; and, more importantly. the limited 
knowledge on the part of the unions of the Pact's provisions and the concomitant responsibilities 
in adhering to them (see Appendix 13 for the shortcomings in this area). Kurori's role, as one 
observer put it, had been to hark back to the romantic era of Solidarity in 1980-81. to 'soften the 
blow', and to assuage workers' fears by repeatedly stressing the Pact's social dimension, notably 
its negotiated character. '13 What he overlooked, according to Bielecki. were the legislative 
obstacles to its implementation. 1 14 
Following the Sejm's rejection of the MPP on 18 March, the cabinet decided, once again. 
to modify the Programme; this time by incorporating an SLDIOPZZ amendment involving two 
types of share certificates: one for all eligible citizens and the other for certain groups of 
pensioners and public sector employees (the first would involve 400 firms, the second 2(0). 
Faced with a competitive 'mass privatisation' programme in the form of the 
President's'lNetwork's '300 million :loty' scheme. and unable to rely on the support of its 
Christian Nationalist and peasant coalition partners. the government depended on the votes of 
the SLD to pass the MPP on 30 April 1993. The Law on National Investment Funds and their 
Privatisation was approved by a vote of 215 for. 178 against and 22 abstentions: Solidarity's 26 
deputies split their votes. 115 Convinced the authorities were reneging on their (social) duty to 
implement the Pact, and increasingly committed to Olszewski's fierce anti-communist stance. 
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Krzaklewski's union tabled a motion of no confidence on the very cabinet it helped create. 
Closing the Solidarity umbrella on 27 May 1993 by stating that "from now on, no government 
will have the right to call itself a 'Solidarity' [cabinet]"116, the union, to its own astonishment. 
managed to pull the rug from under the government as a result of yet another exotic alliance of 
nationalist and ex-communist votes. With his customary flair for the theatrical. Wal~sa dissolved 
the parliament and called for early elections in September. The Pact. as well as other pieces of 
the cabinet's legislation, were put on hold or simply abandoned. 
A Change in Philosophy? 
The Pact's quasi-corporatist features raised interesting questions for Balcerowiczism. Was it 
simply a tactical move on the part of the authorities designed to forestall further strikes or. 
alternatively, did it amount to a philosophical change in the Polish transition? In my opinion 
Kowalik is wrong to suggest the Pact represented "the most spectacular concession by [the 
government] to social pressures,,117 (admittedly, given his social democratic beliefs. it may have 
appeared so to him at the time). Indeed as his colleague Modzelewski observed, the term 
'workers' council' was never even mentioned in the Pactl18~ hence the Network's disregard for 
the agreement. It seems the aim of the agreement was to adhere to the corporate governance 
objectives set out in late 1989 - commercialisation ostensibly leading to privatisation - by 
circumventing the self-management lobby which, with an increal\ing number of fimls being 
commercialised, was in a weaker position and offering various inducements to unions and 
managers in the hope of accelerating privatisation. 
As Poland's 1994 DEeD Economic Survey noted: "Under the Pact, legal incorporation 
of enterprises and the termination of the [workers' councils] were viewed as essential steps 
towards privatisation and [improved enterprise governance]. There was little presumption that 
the state could be an effective owner,,119 (see next section for a contrast in philosophy). That the 
Pact continued to view the liquidation routes as a second-best solution to privatisation was 
nevertheless significant. This suggests the contract recognised the etatiste dangers inherent in 
mass commercialisation and. in the case of small- and medium-sized finns. was willing to 
sacrifice the quality of corporate governance in the hope that a decentralised approach would 
hasten privatisation. If this was indeed the case. then the Pact endorsed the Dctbrowski team· ... 
research findings on enterprise behaviour (see previous chapter) which called for clear 
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distinctions between small and large finns as the fonner were quite capable of restructuring and 
improving efficiency while preserving their self-managed status. 
The Pact's negotiated character, as two senior editors of the weekJy Polityka argued, W.b 
nevertheless an indication of the pressing need to reorient Ba1cerowiczism away from it!-. 
technocratic conception in 1990-91 and towards a sociopolitical compromise. Janina 
Paradowska and Jerzy BaczyIiski claimed the agreement represented the last concrete attempt at 
rescuing the 'Main Plan' , i.e. the Balcerowicz framework, from the increa~ingly popular leftist 
alternatives which, ever since the Olszewski government's declarations of a 'breakthrough', had 
convinced the political establishment of a 'third way' .120 Kurmi himself, almost a year after the 
defeat of Suchocka's government, admitted as much in his manifesto entitled . A Republic for 
Everyone' (Rzeczpospolita dia Kaidego),121 In a 16-page expose in the economic weekly Zyci(' 
Gospodarcze, he reflected on the genesis of the Ba1cerowicz Plan, its strengths and weaknesses. 
and the ta~ks that lay ahead (at the time of writing, Kuron was a member of the newly established 
Freedom Union (UW) party, the product of a merger between Bielecki's KLD and Mazowiccki's 
UD), While still maintaining that the 'shock' approach was the only realistic option in 1989-90. 
Kuron faulted the early governments for mishandling privatisation and. as a consequence, 
jeopardising the Solidarity umbrella. 
In a candid account - perhaps too candid for the likes of his liberal colleagues in thc UW 
- of the 'psychosis of betrayal' that afflicted the Solidarity union in the early 1990s, Kurori 
alluded to the stark contrast between the electoral programme of the Citizens' Committees in 
May 1989 (see Chapter 2) and the 'technocratic-statist revolution from above' that characterised 
the Ba1cerowicz Plan 122; a position virtually identical to that taken by other Polish social 
democrats such as Kowalik 12J and Bugaj. According to Kurori. "passing from a system of central 
planning to the market economy requires, at least initially, effective management by the statc 
administration. Yet at the same time building the institutions of capitalism is inherently a social 
proccss. [Regrettably], neither the [Mazowiecki] government nor the Citizens' Parliamentary 
Club developed such a programme. Instead. the government appealed for patiencc, which. in 
essence, meant: "We will do it for you, you need only wait .... 12~ (see next section for similar 
views on the part of Hausner). Presenting the main idea" of his programme - citi/cns' owncrship. 
options for self-management, local and regional development as wcll as s(x'ial security refoml' -
Kuron stressed that it would have becn advisable to proceed with I-A.'\\'andowski anJ Sf{l(llhurg', 
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1988 MPP in the first phase of the Balcerowicz Plan; this would have increased support for the 
Plan and assuaged fears regarding nomenklatura privatisation. The Pact, according to Kurori. 
was partly intended to serve this purpose and it came as no surprise to him that the recently 
victorious ex-communist parties "adopted the phraseology of the Pact to suit their own 
interests,,125 (see next section). 
KuroIi's post-Pact revelations are significant in view of their author's prominent role in 
the conception of 'shock therapy,126 (it was Sachs, after all, who, in autumn 1989. gave the 
dishevelled KuroIi his own tie as a sign of respect). What is clear is that his manifesto, as well 
as the Pact, are open to interpretation. On the one hand, one could argue that the 'second step' 
should have been taken much earlier; that its conception should not have depended on Kurori 
alone and should have been institutionalised in the decision-making process; and that perhaps 
the workers' councils ought to have been recognised (or at least consulted) in the agreement 
given that commercialisation still required their consent. Social democrats such as Ost. Kowalik 
or Modzelewski would go a step further by arguing that corporatist arrangements were both 
morally and practically justified given the social base of the Solidarity movement. The 'psychosis 
of betrayal', in their view, stemmed from the neo-liberals' ivory tower approach to governing 
coupled with their exaggerated fears of asset stripping in late 1989. 
Alternatively, one could point to KuroIi's repeated defence of the 'shock' approach: the 
absence of the consensual and financial prerequisites for corporatism in Poland in the early 
1990s; and the legal and logistical impediments to tripartite negotiations as a result of the sclf-
managed enterprise model. Indeed the latter may be one of the reasons, aside from 
politicaVculturai traditions, why the former Czechoslovakia, with a much stronger and centralised 
state, found it easier to implement corporatist arrangements 117 - as well as proceed with rapid, 
'top down' privatisation. As far as the Pact is concerned, I tend to agree with Bugaj that it wa\ 
a calie of quick thinking on KurOIi's part and that the contract, as Bielecki never ceased to point 
out, was always intended - and perceived - as a means of speeding up privatisation. Yet the 
manifesto suggests the Pact's philosophical underpinnings were as important ali its pmctical aim" 
and that KurOll genuinely wanted to change the tone of. and possibly make amends for. 
Balcerowiczism. For this, he is to be applauded. 
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A NEW 'STRATEGY FOR POLAND'? 
What began in Vilnius in 1992 made its way to Warsaw in 1993. On 19 September. Poles 
returned the two ex-communist parties to power. As a consequence of both the palisage of a new 
electoral law stipulating a five percent threshold for parties (eight percent for coalitions) and the 
perennial disarray in the Solidarity camp, KwaSniewski's SLO and Pawlak's PSL managed to 
obtain just over one-third of the votes, translating into 65% of the seats in the 5ejm together with 
76 in the loo-seat Senate. Moderate, pragmatic and running a well-organised campaign aimed 
at cushioning the effects of stabilisation, the SLD's 20.4% of the vote wali ali much a reward for 
the party's disciplined behaviour as a vote-of-no-confidence in Solidarity's emotionally-laden 
and ideologically divisive politics. The PSL's 15.4%, coupled with the Labour Union's 7AC7c • 
constituted further evidence of hostility towards privatisation and the longing for a 'social 
alternative'. The expulsion of the nationalist right - the Solidarity union. the PC, the ZChN-led 
'Fatherland' (Ojczyzna) coalition, and Olszewski's milieu - from the parliament. barring the 
KPN's meagre 5.8%, underscored the leftward shift in the transition. Indeed had it not been for 
the 10.6% accorded to Mazowiecki's UO, and the 5.4% going to the WaI~sa-sponsored Non-
Party Bloc for the Support of Refonn (BBWR), economic liberalism would have been deprived 
of political representation. 
Amid ominous predictions of 'creeping economic destruction' .. 3009'c inflation within 
six months' and a 'national catastrophe' 12K (the latter remark was attributable to the former Pol ish 
Director of the EBRD, Jan Winiecki, who, apparently, felt he could no longer 'do business' with 
a cabinet comprised of ex-communists), the SLO's liberal wing under KwaSniewski went out of 
its way to convince the financial community of its detennination to ensure (macro)economic 
stability. Originally aiming for a 'historic compromise' with the UO, the Alliance eventually 
signed a coalition pact with the PSL on 13 October - already having lost the support of Bugaj' s 
party over charges of 'liberal continuity'. In a delicate power sharing arrangement handing 
Pawlak the premiership and control over the state administration in exchange for the SLD's 
command of the main economic portfolios - the atmosphere surrounding the talk" was described 
as "one of a total lack of mutual trust, with everyone suspicious of everyone dse" ' .!'" -
KwaSniewski deliberately chose to take on the role of an emillellCt' grist' supervising the cabinet', 
work in parliament. If moderates like him were to be believed, a majority coalition wa' an 
improvement on the interminable debates and cliff-hanging votes of the pn:vious 5t.']",. A, the 
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Financial Times put it, "Poland may enjoy something it has not seen [in a while]: a period in 
which the government can take a medium- to long-tenn view of the economy rather than engage 
in crisis management.,,130 
Pawlak's presentation of his government's programme on 8 November laid the 
groundwork for a realignment of Polish economic refonn. Differentiating his cabinet from those 
of his predecessors not by its "general objectives but by its methods, ways and means of 
implementation", he claimed that "a significant part of the social costs [borne in the transition] 
were a result of mistakes, including, above all, excessive dogmatism:'P' Placing the battle 
against unemployment - now (officially) standing at roughly 13% - as one of his government's 
chief priorities, Pawlak promised to boost pensions and wages, reform the health and education 
sectors, increase exports and investment, and "ensure similar levels of agricultural protection as 
in other countries" .132 Decrying the erratic, and at times illegal, management of puhl ic finances 
under the Solidarity governments, the PSL leader promised to raise additional revenue by 
targeting the grey economy while, at the same time, curbing inflation and achieving a favourable 
debt accord with the London Club of private banks. The strategic objectives of European 
integration and NATO membership were to be accompanied by strengthened economic and 
political cooperation further East. 
KwaSniewski's address the following day was more specific. Having firstly apologised 
to those wronged by the communist authorities, he went on to speak of flexibility and a variety 
of approaches to managing the state sector: "This is how we understood the essence of [Kuroo' s 
Pact)."!:U Replacing the "magic word of privatisation with that of commercialisaticM" , 
KwaSniewski placed efficiency criteria and strong management controls by the soon to be 
established State Treasury as the bases for enterprise reform. Perceiving privatisation solely as 
a means to an end, the SLD Chairman claimed the previous governments' fixation with 
transferring nominal ownership into private hands had penalised state enterprises: many of 
Which, according to him, had made significant progress in restructuring their operations and 
improving corporate governance. A change in philosophy, therefore, according equal treatment 
to public and private sectors was needed. KwaSniewski noted that "experts from the financial 
institutions have concluded that many state firms have managed reasonably well in market 
conditions. This should make even the most ardent of liberals [think twice rD~ (see hclow for 
Marek Belka's study on enterprise behaviour). 
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The coalition's stewardship of the economy in the early months of 1994 revealed ~harp 
differences over the extent to (and manner in) which the government should distinguish itself 
from its Solidarity-based predecessors. Aside from the two parties' mutual interests in ensuring 
greater protection for public sector employees, raising consumption and lowering unemployment. 
opposing views on budgetary allocations, structural reforms, and the pace and scope of European 
integration could be discerned. The single-minded resolve of the PSL \'is-a-vis aoricultural e 
protection was antithetical to the largely urban, consumer-oriented and internationalist outlook 
of the Alliance. A damaging intra-coalition battle in January over the privatisation of Balik S/fSki 
(one of the 9 commercialised state banks of which Wielkopolski Bank Kredytou'y wa~ the first 
to be privati sed in April 1993) confirmed Bugaj's prophecies concerning liberal continuity. 
Pawlak's 'pro-social' 136 agenda struck a chord with the 60 or so OPZZ deputies belonging 
to the SLD, thereby splitting the party and leading to the resignation of its liberal Finance 
Minister Marek Borowski. Poland was placed in the uncomfortable position of having to submit 
its formal application for membership in the European Union (EU) on 8 April 1994 while facing 
"awkward questions about change, continuity. and credibility in economic policy.'·(l7 Deprived 
of an authoritative voice on economic affairs for nearly three months and temporarily operating 
without wage controls, the SLD, after considerable difficulty. managed to win approval for its 
candidate Grzegorz Kolodko to become Finance and Deputy Prime Minister for the economy on 
27 April. A former Director of the Institute of Finance and Professor at the Warsaw School of 
Economics (SGH), Kolodko had been a member of the government' s Economic Counci I in 1990-
91 and had issued a number of critiques of the Balcerowicz Plan."!! His most recent publication. 
presented informally to Pawlak in early October 1993. was a 44-point programme entitled 
'Strategy for Poland' (Strategia dla Polski); this appeared in the form of a working paper as well 
a~ an extended article in a November issue of Zycie Gospodarc:e,l:19 Immediately following his 
appointment to the cabinet, Kolodko mounted an artful media campaign on behalf of his 
document l40, won the cabinet's approval for it on 27 May. and presented it to the Sejm as early 
as 9 June. 
An Ambitious Agenda 
A 69-page summary of the economic objectives of the Polish transformation in 1994-97. the 
Stnnegy contained 10 sections covering areas such ali wage settlements, social security reform. 
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management of state property (in conjunction with the reform of the central administration). 
macroeconomic stabilisation, and the development of agriculture. The introduction to the 
document began by stating that there was a general consensus that the social costs of the 
transition had been excessive. The political verdict rendered in the elections necessitated the 
development of a strategic concept of reform designed to serve three purposes: [rapid] economic 
growth, systemic and macroeconomic stabilisation, and an improvement in living standards. loll 
The Strategy privileged negotiation in resolving industrial disputes. Labour relations would from 
now on be conducted in a decentralised manner through the Tripartite Commission offering a 
flexible framework for collective bargaining. In the sphere of social security reform. the 
document proposed moving as quickly as possible from a system ba~ed on wage indexation to 
one based on prices. All key areas, i.e. old-age and disability pensions. health insurance. 
unemployment assistance and sickness benefits would be subject to a radical overhaul. Pensions 
were to operate on a two-, possibly three-tiered system providing for the ba~ic state pension 
together with a privately funded scheme. 
Ownership transformation ('privatisation' was replaced by 'management of state 
property') would be subject to "wide public approval, and a [variety] of routes and methods:'I~l 
In order to improve corporate governance, a programme of mass commercialisation would he 
launched in 1995. As part of the long overdue process of central administrative refoml. the new 
State Treasury would centralise hitherto dispersed ownership functions and "exercise more 
effective control"14] over state firms. This would strengthen the position of managers and 
ostensibly "create more favourable conditions for an acceleration of ownership 
transformation."I44 Both the Mass Privatisation Programme and the restructuring of the banking 
sector would proceed on course. The Strategy's tough anti-inflationary stance presaged 
continuity in macroeconomic policy. Rosy forecasts of 5% growth (or more) for the next four 
years, single digit inflation by 1997, rising exports and investment, increased consumption. and 
lower unemployment 145 seemed to offer the best of both worlds. KoIodko' s programme was 
designed to eventually fulfil the EU's 'Maalitricht criteria' of a budget deficit not exceeding 3lJc 
ofGDP. public debt at or below 60% of GDP. and inflation and interest rate differentials roughly 
within 2% of the respective rates of the three star performers in the EU
I
.&6. Finally. the Strategy 
offered vague recommendations on how to rationalise agricultural investments. boost export'- and 
find alternative sources of development: direct intervention. it was stressed. would be severely 
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limited. '47 The words 'peace and quiet', 'social consensus' and 'negotiation' permeated the 
document. 
Mixed Reception 
The Strategy's reception was interesting to observe. The IMF's Rodlauer. while finding the 
SLO's economics "difficult to decipher and couched in a different language than that of the 
previous cabinets", praised KoIodko's plan as "a crucial guiding framework for macroeconomic 
policy formulation and implementation"'48; Jan Wejchert, the President of the Polish Business 
Council, responded by saying: "We have been demanding the development of an economic 
strategy for more than two years now,,149; and President Wal~sa, who had attended the Strategy's 
presentation in the Sejm, welcomed it as "the best project in the last five years. "I~O 
Parliamentarians, notably those from the opposition, were more circumspect. During the 
Strategy's parliamentary debate on 23 June, Borowski congratulated his colleague for presenting 
the first "long-term programme for reform which broadly continues the policies of the previous 
cabinets but in a style which is acceptable to society."'51 Borowski claimed the novelty of the 
document lay in its assumption that privatisation was not, in itself. a precondition for success. 
The OPZZ's Spychalska also complimented KoIodko on assigning priority to long-term decision-
making. The three main objectives of the Strategy were, according to her. acceptable from the 
union's point of view. While recognising that principles of social fairness had. for the first time. 
been mentioned alongside profits and capital. Spychalska feared this was simply a 'socio-
technical device' rather than an actual change in philosophy. I,,:! 
Bugaj's comments were more revealing. The Labour Union chief found the Strategy to 
he extremely vague and short on specifics; the absence of a coherent industrial policy. moreover, 
was, according to him, inexcusable: "If anything, this is a step back from [Suchocka's Trade and 
Industry Minister] Niewiarowski's proposals.'·15_~ He applauded the decision to involve workers 
in the process of ownership transformation yet failed to understand how this could be achieved 
given the renewed emphasis on commercialisation. Deploring the Strategy's anti-intlationary 
stance for its professed goals and its 'lack of realism'. Bugaj claimed his party could not. in all 
honesty, support the programme: "This document will not. as far 'l~ I can see. dimini\h the slx:ial 
costs of the transition and therefore does not constitute a genuine leftist alternative."'S-l Only a 
clear and unambiguous statement on the precise economic model for the tram,formation would. 
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according to Bugaj, provide an indication of whether the government had truly renounced 
Balcerowiczism. 
The Freedom Union's Syryjczyk was equally critical of the Strategy's nebulous character. 
The UW deputy claimed to recognise elements of his own party's thinking "which, at one time. 
were discounted by the present coalition partners and are now embraced [in the Strategy)."15~ 
Syryjczyk objected to what he saw as the contradictory aspects of the programme, namely the 
accent placed on anti-inflationary objectives while, at the same time, "centralising authority in 
the hands of management [ali a means] of avoiding the necessary restructuring and privatisation 
of strategic industries, notably in the energy sector. This will inevitably increa~e the budget 
deficit.,,156 The notion of joint responsibility for the refonns, moreover, as envisaged in Kuroo's 
Pact, had, according to Syryjczyk, been discarded in favour of a much more centralised approach. 
The UW joined the UP in rejecting the plan. Yet, in the end, the Strategy was passed by a 
comfortable majority of 244 to 87 with 13 abstentions. 
The Strategy's Philosophy 
With the official launch of the first medium-tenn policy framework since the BaIcerowicz Plan, 
observers of the Polish transition were keen to draw conclusions on the shifts in policy inherent 
in Kolodko's Strategy. The Deputy Premier himself came under intense scrutiny in the weeks 
and months following his appointment to the cabinet. Was he, a~ some suggested. the new 
'postcommunist Balcerowicz,?'57 Was it sensible to compare his Strategy - drawn up and 
implemented amid a rapid recovery characterised by investment- and export-led growth (see 
Appendix 17) - with the hyperinflationary environment associated with launch of the 
BaIcerowicz Plan? Perhaps the answers to these questions would not have generated as much 
interest had it not been for the strong desire on the part of Kolodko to assert his authority on 
Polish economic policy and claim, in countless interviews and press conferences. that his 
Strategy had been developed "as an alternative to the Balcerowicz Plan."1511 
A member of the technocratic left, though politically unaffiliated. Kolodko had often 
voiced his reservations with the neo-liberal design. His objections - spelt out in a recent paper 
co-authored with his long-time colleague Domenico Nuti aptly entitled 'The Polish 
Ahemative'159 _ concerned the restrictive financial policies (or 'overshooting') in the first-half 
of 1990; the 'overzealous' Iiberalisation of trade, notably the lack of protection accorded to the 
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domestic market following the collapse of the CMEA (itself much too premature in Kolodko' s 
view); the delayed budgetary and tax refonns contributing to the 'fiscal trap': and. crucially. the 
'state desertion' inherent in the privatisation crusades undertaken under Balcerowicz. l60 
Adamant that the signs of recovery in 1992-93 were attributable to the softening. if not the 
abandonment, of many of the 'shock therapy' policies of 1990-91, Kolodko claimed that the 
"creative destruction' of the early years was replaced with schemes aimed at improving the 
management of the state sector - instruments designed for this purpose included the Pact on State 
Enterprises." 161 
In a similar style to Balcerowicz, Kolodko brought his own closely-knit team of advisors 
into government in May 1994 to lend intellectual support to his policies. The three key figures 
were Jerzy Hausner, his Chief Advisor; Danuta Hubner, an Undersecretary of State in the 
Ministry of Industry and Poland's Chief Negotiator with the OEeD; and Jan Monkiewicz. an 
Undersecretary of State in the Council of Ministers in charge of banking reform. The' Kolodko 
Group' proved adept at promoting the Strategy in the media: often appearing as a team peddling 
the same message l62: long-tenn strategy fonnulation and a decrea'\e in the social costs of reform. 
The fact that Kolodko's press coverage was, for the most part, quite critical may have convinced 
him to redouble his efforts at 'selling' his package (a critic of the Finance Minister noted that "he 
spends more time fighting the fictitious enemies of his policies than he does implementing 
them"16J). The philosophical underpinnings of the Strategy, notably the accent placed on 
negotiation, could be traced to Hausner's academic works. Indeed the first distinguishing 
characteristic of the Strategy Kolodko listed in a recent book outlining his agenda referred to his 
programme's 'social democratic' philosophy as opposed to the 'liberal fundamentalist' approach 
of 1990-91. 164 A more refined version, as presented by Hausner, talked of an 'interactive versus 
imperative method of transformation'. 165 
It is a little known fact that Hausner's theoretical analysis appeared in a 1994 paper co-
authored with Kuron entitled 'Negotiated Strategy in the Process of Transformation' ( 'Slralt'gili 
Negocjacyj1l11 w Procesie Tra1lsformacji Gospodllrki ')166 in which both authors extolled the 
vinues of social partnership in implementing economic reform. Hausner claims that "there is real 
merit in contra~ting the Strategy for Poland with the Balcerowicz Plan because the philosophical 
basis of the two programmes is entirely diffcrent,'·'tl7 Polish nco-liberalism, according to 
Hausner. was faced with a systemic vacuum in 1989 in the absence of social force ... and 
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institutional arrangements which could give direction to the refonns. Seemingly encouraoed h" 
e . 
trus, the Balcerowicz Group reposed its trust in liberal doctrine and implemented its programme 
in a centralised, technocratic manner, treating the public as passive objects in the transition: "The 
aim here was to stimulate, using the limited means available, the desired changes in mentality 
and behaviour and to adjust them to the new ideology. What [the Balcerowicz Group] wal\, in 
essence, saying was: "Believe us, trust us we will lead you to the promised land: you need not 
worry about your own interests.",,168 This 'imperative' method of refonn, according to Hausner. 
proved ruinous by the end of 1991 and, slowly but surely, gave way to an 'interactive' approach 
as apparently favoured by Kolodko. 
The 'interactive' method consists in eliciting the desired changes through an ongoing 
process of social interaction resulting from a genuine discourse between the authorities and the 
public. Rather than claiming that there is no alternative to 'shock therapy', the 'interactive 
method' envisions a variety of capitalisms and acknowledges that the role and scope of the state 
will be subject to negotiation. 169 Hausner, in a more genuine manner than KoIodko, accepts that 
"in a hyperinflationary context you are hardly able to discuss a negotiated discourse. Either you 
are able to implement a radical 'shock' approach or you are not able to do it at all. The question, 
in my view, becomes how and when to shift from the 'imperative' to the 'interactive' method.'·I7O 
That he believes the two approaches to be mutually exclusive, that it is "highly douhtful whether 
it is possible to quickly replace one with the other" 171 , raises interesting questions concerning the 
extent to which Kolodko's Strategy was able to distance itself from Ba1cerowiczism. 
Continuity and Change 
One can safely set aside the macroeconomics of the Strategy as they differ little from the 
Solidarity-based government's fiscal and monetary policies (the fiscal follow-up to the Strategy 
entitled 'Package 2000' ('Pakietu 2000')172 was described by Bugaj as "the most liberal document 
in the history of post-communist Poland"'7J). Where there is room for interpretation is in the 
Strategy's microeconomic assumptions, specifically with regard to privatisation. It seems 
Kolodko concurred with the findings of Marek Belka (coincidentally his succes-..or as Finance 
Minister in February 1997) and his associates in their report on Polish enterpri-..e behaviour 
covering the period from June 1989 to June 1992. Published in the same journal in which Sachs 
and Lipton launched their mass privatisation strategy in early 1990 (sec Chapter 2)' the Belka 
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report challenged the conventional wisdom that privatisation wa'i a sine qua non for improving 
state finns' efficiency and establishing effective management structures. A change in the 
macroeconomic environment of enterprises was, according to the report, significant in ibelf: 
"Our findings suggest that hard budgets and import competition - essential ingredients of [the 
Balcerowicz Plan] - can exert [sufficient] adjustment pressures even when changes in ownership 
lag behind.,,174 Moreover, unlike the D'lbrowski team's findings, the Belka study took a more 
sceptical view of the workers' councils (and employee ownership in general). Instead, it 
emphasised "the importance of addressing firm-level managerial incentives and empowering 
managers"; also noting that the latter "expressed a distinct preference for commercialisation and. 
after restructuring, privatisation.,,175 In short, the Belka study endorsed the Balcerowicz Plan's 
hard budget constraints but questioned the need for (rapid) privatisation. 
The Strategy for Poland's Section 6 on ·Management of State Property' is the point de 
reference in determining to what extent Kolodko departed from Balcerowiczism. In the sphere 
of corporate governance the Strategy is highly reminiscent of the Mazowiecki government's early 
attempts to pa"s a law on the forcible commercialisation of state finns (see Chapter 2). KoIodko 
once again placed commercialisation at the centre of Polish political and economic debates; 
admittedly at a time when the self-management lobby was much weaker. Charging the previous 
governments with "grossly neglecting and penalising the state sector"I7t'. he perceived 
commercialisation as a means of redressing the balance in favour of public ownership as well as 
facilitating a decentralised wage bargaining mechanism in which managers would have greater 
negotiating power in setting wages. Whereas liberal-minded Privatisation Ministers from 
Kuczytiski to Lewandowski perceived commercialisation as a prelude to privatisation (whether 
they were correct in their assumptions is another matter), the Strategy. while equally 
contemptuous of the workers' councils, focused on governance objectives as opposed to the 
transfer of nominal ownership into private hands. Unlike the Pact, it did not discriminate 
hctween small and large firms and viewed the self-managed governance structure as a di~tinct 
disadvantage - irrespective of enterprises' size. 
Not surprisingly, liberals accused Kolodko of strengthening the role of managers for 
political purposes and using the newly established State Treasury to exert influence over firms' 
operations. Jan Szomburg. for instance. characterised Kolodko's mass commercialisation drive 
as essentially "using the same instrument [- commercialisation -I to serve different end ... ," 17 ' 
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Similar fears of a 'cloak of commercialisation' were expressed by the World Bank which 
criticised Monkiewicz's bank consolidation programme (since Polish banks' capital bases were 
too small to meet foreign competition, the government decided to merge several state banks into 
three or four large groups) for "assuming that the state has a better knowledge of how to 
restructure/merge banks than the private sector."178 These views are slightly exaggerated and 
hardly unique to Polish developments. What is significant, however, a~ the Council on Social 
and Economic Strategy (the new version of the Economic Council) observed, is that "the Strategy 
made no mention of the specific privatisation process which radically altered the ownership 
structure [of the Polish economy]: the spontaneous, large-scale establishment of the new private 
sector.,,179 Thus it appears that the Strategy, like the Ba1cerowicz Plan in late 1989, did not 
distinguish between the privatisation of the economy resulting in an increase in the share of the 
private sector and the privatisation of state assets which, by all accounts, was not half as 
significant as the former in lifting Poland out of recession. 
A Turning Point? 
It is worth mentioning a recent debate on the shifts in Polish economic policy.'KO Pitting 
KuczyIiski against Hausner, the discussion focused not so much on the 'shock therapy' years of 
1990-91 but instead on which of the two main reform teams - those associated with 
Ba1cerowicz(ism) and the members comprising the 'Kolodko Group' - deserved the credit for 
Poland's economic recovery. What is interesting is that both economists' arguments revolved 
around the philosophically ambiguous 1992-93 years; the notion of a sharp break in policy 
following the left's victory was dismissed by both advisors. While Kuczynski's objective 
seemed to be to force Hausner to admit that Ba1cerowiczism wa~ alive and well in 1996, 
Hausner's comments constituted an attempt to associate the Strategy for Poland with the 
philosophy of the Pact on State Enterprises. This is not surprising given Hausner's respect for 
Kuron: "I regard him as a kind of guru who provided all of us with inspiration"'II', he noted 
recently. 
Just as Kuczynski accused Kolodko of hypocrisy in criticising the Balcerowicz Plan for 
its "destructive anti-inflationary policies", Hausner pointed to dogmatists like Syryjczyk who 
once claimed "the best industrial policy is no industrial policy.','K1 Kuczynski refuted this by 
claiming that the Solidarity-based cabinets "started to intervene in the economy a" carly a~ mid-
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1990"1113, and then went on to claim credit for policies such as tax reform. the Law on Financial 
Restructuring of Banks and Enterprises, as well as the Pact. Hausner. meanwhile. maintained 
that the "one-sided macroeconomic character" of Balcerowiczism - "Everyone will remember 
that it was our team who abolished the popiwek", he boasted - compromised the negotiated 
.... 
framework of the Pact; "Yes, KurOl! may well have been the exception in your team". Hausner 
told Kuczynski, "but let us not forget the Pact was, at the time, strongly criticised within your 
ranks"l84 (in a separate interview, Hausner, like Bugaj, claimed the Pact was "simply a case of 
good intuition on KurOl!'s part. He discovered it because he was more sensitive than others"lli5). 
The two economists finished their discussion with opposing views on the significance of the 
professed change in philosophy undertaken under Kolodko: Hausner viewed it as indicative of 
"a new consensus based on a language of partnership that is more amenable to compromise". 
while Kuczynski dismissed the changes as "mere cosmetics which, if anything. conceal an 
etatiste approach to governing."186 
On the whole, there is little evidence, either in this debate or elsewhere. that KoIodko has. 
so to speak, turned the corner on Balcerowiczism. Anti-inflationary objectives, the belated 
implementation of Lewandowski's MPP, a similar (if not greater) distrust towards the workers' 
councils, and the immutabilities of European integration all cast doubt on Kolodko' s much-
repeated assertion that he has replaced neo-liberalism with "a more participatory and open-ended 
vision of the transformation." 187 That he feels forever compelled to define his Strategy in relation 
to the Balcerowicz Plan, together with Bugaj's acid test suggesting the Strategy failed to 
articulate a genuine social alternative, says more about the durability of Balcerowiczism than 
anything else. In his paper co-authored with Nuti. Kolodko talks about a 'new consenslls' that 
has supplanted the traditional 'Washington' one l88: his Strategy, he contends, led the way in 
translating this into practical policy. He also claims that the World Bank repudiated free-market 
economics in the mid 1990s (see next chapter) in favour of an 'institutionalist' approach to post-
communist reform stressing social and political factors. Lastly. he states that all the early 'rna"" 
privatisers' now recognise that effective corporate governance. as opposed to private ownership 
per se, is the key to improving efficiency in the state sector. If KoIodko is trying to pass himself 
off as an 'adaptationist', a policy-maker who adopted a more path dependent approach hased on 
historical or cultural reservations with neo-liheralism, I believe he has failed. If. on the other 
hand, he is claiming that the social dimension to the economic transformation was antithetical 
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to Balcerowiczism, then the real question is whether the social partnership envisaged in Kurori' ... 
Pact is, as this analysis suggests, a variant of Balcerowiczism or. alternatively, to coin another 
term, pre-'KoIodkoism'. That KoIodko himself regards the Pact as "a mere social democratic 
appendage"189 of neo-liberalism argues strongly in favour of the former. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter analysed the aftermath of the Balcerowicz Plan during the recovery phase of 1992-
94. One of the key features of this period was the constant struggle between technocracy and 
social dialogue; between Hausner's 'imperative' method of transformation and the 'interactive' 
approach. Both Kuron and Kolodko, in their separate ways, sought to articulate a post- 'shock 
therapy' vision for Polish reform but were constrained by macroeconomic pressures as well as 
the continued reliance on commercialisation as a means of ridding state firms of their self-
managed status. While the Pact accentuated the multi-track character of Polish privatisation hy 
easing the leasing requirements for the popular liquidation route and granting employees lSCJt, 
of the shares free of charge, it set a time limit for commercialisation and perceived privatisation 
as the ultimate goal. Yet the fact it recognised that commercialisation might not, in itself. lead 
to faster privatisation and that small- and medium-sized firms had demonstrated their capacity 
to adjust while preserving their self-managed status was significant. 
Kolodko's Strategy, meanwhile, did not discriminate between small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, on the one hand, and large ones, on the other. Like the early attempts at centralising 
ownership functions in late 1989, it viewed the forcible commercialisation of all state enterprises 
as a matter of the utmost urgency. Inspired by the Belka team's research suggesting improved 
governance through managerial incentives. together with hard budgets constraints, should be the 
main priorities for enterprise reform, Kolodko, like Gruszecki (but for different reasons), 
championed the establishment of the State Treasury as a means of clarifying ownership righh 
once and for all. Yet given his emphasis on reducing the social costs of the transition. liberals 
feared commercialisation had become a substitute for privatisation. 
It is interesting that Kolodko relaunched the commercialisation drive almost five year" 
after Sachs, Balcerowicz and others were arguing in favour of similar steps to undo the legacy 
of self-management. One has to wonder whether self-management. in a paradoxical way. 
strengthened the philosophical attraction to neo-liberalism - specifically the Briti"h model of 
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privatisation - and yet, three years later when a new approach was attempted. made it equally 
difficult for policy-makers such as Kuroti to proceed with a corporatist framework given the 
state's weak role in the supervision of state enterprises. Indeed it seems that self-management 
not only complicated neo-liberals' plans to privatise state firms, it also constituted an impediment 
to those, like Kuroti and Kolodko, who sought to adopt a social democratic approach 
emphasising trilateral negotiations between the state, employers and the unions. EviJently 
Kolodko felt the only way of ensuring tripartite consultations was for property rights to be 
centralised to an unprecedented degree. The significance of Balcerowiczism without Balcerowicz 
is that Polish decision-makers continued to rely on state-driven restructuring in spite of the much 
greater progress achieved with 'bottom-up' methods, not to mention the spectacular growth of 
the private sector. Clearly self-management, and the perceived flaws inherent in its design. was 
partly responsible for this. Whether these policies were justified given the difficulties in 
commercialising, let alone privatising, state firms is debatable. 
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CHAPTERS TOO BIG A LEAP? 
The 'shock therapy' versus 'gradualism' controversy was a wrong and false dilemma that. 
to our great regret, played an important role in determining our reform strategy. - Vac1av 
Klaus' 
INTRODUCTION 
In the introduction to its 1995 Transition Report, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) argued that "while there are core features which a market economy must 
possess, there is no unique destination for the transition."~ A cursory examination of the Report' s 
findings, however, reveals a more regimented approach to East European reform with a host of 
'transition indicators' ranging from the progress achieved in large-scale privatisation to the 
extensiveness and effectiveness of legal rules on foreign investment. The EBRD's criteria. and 
those employed by other western financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. 
have, rightly or wrongly, defined the terms of the economics of post-communist transformation. 
The expanding literature on the subject, notably the two volume set of essays edited by Olivier 
Jean Blanchard and his associates aptly entitled The Transition in Eastenl EuropeJ, invariably 
presupposes that the prescriptions offered by these institutions - sharp, contractionary fiscal and 
monetary policies, open trading regimes and the swift privatisation of state industry - constitute 
sound advice for the former centrally-planned economies. In certain cases, there is an 
unfortunate tendency to describe a "Manichean dichotomy between 'good' and 'evil' paths to 
successful transformation""; the former are associated with the 'shock therapy' school, while the 
latter are characterised by 'gradualist' methods. Aside from the unhelpful, misconceived and 
demode nature of these contributions, issues of politics, culture and history are generally absent 
from such analyses. This is a mistake, not least because the motivating forces underpinning 
transition strategies reside as much in non-economic factors as they do in technical concerns .. 
This chapter analyses the 'shock therapy versus gradualism' controversy in view of its 
political resonance in the early years of post-communist reform. At the time. observers were 
keen to draw conclusions between the radical stabilisation plan launched in Poland in January 
1990 and the less dramatic measures implemented by the first democratic administration of the 
late J6zsef Antall in Hungary. What they often failed to recognise and/or appreciate were the 
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differences in the starting points of both countries at the time of the collapse of communism. For 
the central theme of this chapter is the importance of initial conditions in accounting for 
differences in the accent placed on certain aspects of the transformation. notably macroeconomic 
stabilisation; the point de reference for 'shock therapy'. Only by disaggregating the components 
of economic reform - policies that should be carried out quickly, others that can but do not have 
to be, and ones which require a longer time frame5 - can one hope to shed light on the practical 
dilemmas which become eclipsed in the philosophical debates surrounding the changes. 
The views of three prominent Central European policymakers are discussed in order to 
point out the misconceptions in attaching simplistic labels to reform measures. A brief overview 
of Hungarian developments is then presented which suggests that while a path dependent 
approach to the transition was more pronounced than in Poland, with one observer extending the 
familiar term of 'goulash communism' to 'goulash post-communism,6, a liberal privatisation 
record of trade sales to foreigners hardly amounts to a 'gradual' embrace of market forces. 
Finally, two rival models of post-communist reform as presented by John Gray and Jeffrey Sachs 
place the 'shock therapy versus gradualism' controversy in its broader context. Their 
controversial, yet stimulating, analyses contained in two back-to-back papers issued by the 
London-based Social Market Foundation 7 stem from sharp disagreements on the appositeness 
of neo-liberalism in Eastern Europe. The sharp contrast between the views of a social theorist 
and those of a problem-solvers go to the heart of the debates surrounding systemic 
transformation, questioning both the purpose and reach of the leap to capitalism. 
'SHOCK THERAPY VERSUS GRADUALISM': A SPURIOUS DEBATE 
Questions regarding the pace of post-communist reform commanded enormous attention in the 
early stages of regime change. From the moment Poland signed its seminal Letter of Intent with 
the IMF in December 1989 (see Chapter 2) declaring "speed [to be] of the essence"~, a 
competition in radicalism - egged on by the financial institutions - ensued. With the notable 
exception of Hungary where, according to one analysis, as many as six or seven key measures 
ranging from the abolition of central quotas to a personal income tax system were already in 
place by 198810, Eal\t European countries with windows of opportunity subscribed to the maxim 
that the quality and quantity of reforms to be introduced depended on the speed at which they 
were implemented. Laszlo Csaba notes how political imperatives overtook economic arguments 
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and thus provided the baptism for 'shock therapy': "The idea of quick fixes [- policies relating 
to macroeconomic stabilisation -] was extended to structural and institutional reforms and the 
consideration of speed gained prominence among the success criteria of systemic change. "II This 
combination of two economically distinct yet politically fused elements of the transformation 
(Csaba refers to them as 'a strange couple') resulted in a great deal of confusion surrounding the 
pace, and anticipated effects, of the changes. Unwilling to specify which policies were to be 
included within the compass of 'shock therapy', "the language of the 'shockers"":! proved 
somewhat offensive to those who, for a variety of reasons, favoured a less abrasive adjustment. 
'Shock Therapy' 
The 'big bang' method of transformation has at its core an uncompromising stance towards the 
old system. By dramatising the end of the previous policy period. 'shock therapists' are. from 
the outset, preoccupied with speed, comprehensiveness and intensity; the 'shock'. they claim. is 
meant to be part of the 'therapy'. Equipped with a technocratic view of the transition. seemingly 
"untainted by historical prejudice"'3, the radical reformer places hislher faith in actions directly 
and solely related "to the attainment of the envisaged endpoint."'~ The target is an Anglo-Saxon-
style market economy based on the recipes contained in the 'Washington Consensus' 
prescriptions. Primarily concerned with establishing credibility in policymaking, domestically 
as well as internationally, the 'shocker', invariably profiting from a honeymoon period, believes 
in a simultaneous initiation of the 'three zatsias'. The intellectual rationale for this wali provided 
by Sachs in his much-publicised piece in The Economist in January 1990 in which he argued that 
"the economic and political complexities of the transition argue [overwhelmingly] in favour of 
a decisive and comprehensive approach.,·15 In a separate work dealing with Poland, his ideal 
'transition scenario', he reserved a special sub-section on 'the political context' where he once 
again stressed that "the economic strategy must take cognizance of the new political context 
Which, in [my] view, argues for a very rapid, straightforward and sharp programme of economic 
reform." 16 
Sachs is also credited with providing 'shock therapists' with their motto: "The main 
debate in reform should be about the means of transition, not the ends. [The question oil whether 
to aim for Swedish-style social democracy or Thatcherite liberalism can wait."17 While many 
accused him of hypocrisy in claiming to be politically neutral in the form of capitalism on which 
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his advice was based 18, his willingness to separate the means of reform from the ends proved a 
defining feature of the 'big bang' approach; one with which 'gradualists' begged to differ (see 
below). By claiming that tough anti-inflationary policies should not be equated with the end goal 
of the transition, that the technocratic stabilisation phase is, in certain cases, a non-negotiable part 
of adjustment, 'shockers' ensure that the interrelationships between stabilisation and institutional 
reforms are, at best, blurred. 19 Interestingly, it is the 'big bangers' who prefer to dismiss the 
sequencing debates regarding the 'three zatsias' (the order of priority among stabilisation. 
liberalisation and privatisation) and, instead, stress the Sachsian notion of a seamless web10 of 
reforms, all interconnected and strongly dependent on one another. The 'means', instead of being 
confined to short-term stabilisation, are discretely extended to microeconomic and structural 
measures, notably privatisation. 
That 'shock therapists' are aware of the differences in speed among the 'three zatsias' -
stabilisation, for instance, can be carried out much faster than institutional changes - does not 
prevent them from treating all three measures, at least politically speaking, in homologous 
terms. 21 Gerard Roland, a noted 'gradualist' who with his colleague Mathias Dewatripont has 
written on the political aspects of transition strategies22 , argues that 'big bangers' are more 
concerned with ex post political constraints, or the dangers of a backlalih and/or reversal after the 
reforms have been launched.23 Roland explains the crucial significance of the window of 
opportunity following the downfall of the old regime in providing 'shock therapists' with an 
opening to practice, what he calls, 'scorched earth politics,24: the notion of an irreversible critical 
mass of policies constraining successor governments from changing course. Since speed is 
paramount, 'shockers' have to decide on how to reconcile their preference for rapid stabilisation 
and liberalisation with the legacies of a state-dominated economy. The Schumpeterian notion 
of 'creative destruction' - a legitimating term appropriated by the radical school in its defence 
of sharp contractions in output which, in tum, act as 'purifying' forces replacing outmoded 
production lines and inefficient enterprises with more innovative forms of economic activity -
provides the philosophical underpinnings of the privatisation crusades advocated by the 'big 
bangers' . 
While intent on promoting efficient corporate governance in state enterprises. it is the 
'radicals' who champion the cause of early mass privatisation or voucher-based schemc~ ~\ 
programmes which, in contrast to the more time-consuming methods of commercial sales. do not 
188 
involve financial restructuring before privatisation. The underlying motive behind mass 
privatisation, it should be stressed, is to transfer state firms into private hands ali quickly as 
possible - irrespective of the quality of governance and/or privatisation. The assumption that 
state enterprises would be unable to restructure before privatisation. a strong aversion to self-
management or public ownership (fashionable views in Poland in late 1989 - see Chapter 2). and 
the political imperatives of popularising ownership transformation by creating a broad middle 
class of shareholders convinced 'shockers' of the merits of giveaway schemes. 
'Gradualism' 
The 'gradualist' or 'evolutionary' school of transformation, although "in practice [standing for] 
very different economic policies ranging from consistent reforms to [evasive onesr<!tl, clearly 
distinguishes between the tasks of stabilisation and structural change. Objecting to 'shockers" 
arguments for a simultaneous initiation of reforms, notably their political fluidity in the course 
of implementation, 'gradualists' are keen to engage in the sequencing debates. One observer 
even talks of a 'four-by-five matrix' in which the 'three zatsias' together with institutional 
measures are subject to different speeds, sequencing, comprehensiveness, intensities and sectoral 
requirements27; a more philosophical formulation is the late Deng Xiaoping's dictum of 'feeling 
the stones to cross the river'. Their reasoning is that since the means of transformation cannot 
(and should not) be separated from the ends, it is essential to be unambiguous on the precise 
measures adopted. Short-term stabilisation should, under no circumstances, say 'gradualists', 
obscure the long-term goals of the transformation; in other words "the problem is by no means 
solved by stating that it is untimely to discuss what kind of capitalism [a given country] is aiming 
for, because the choice has immediate and far-reaching repercussions.":!!! 
It is the perception on the part of 'evolutionists' that their radical counterparts seek to 
capitalise on the nexus of stabilisation and structural adjustment in order to impose a technocratic 
policy agenda that compels them to speak out forcefully against the politics of 'shock therapy'. 
Peter Murrell and David Stark are the chief exponents of this view. Murrell criticises the 
technocratic instincts of the 'shocker' on the grounds that the latter believes "the involvement 
of society in the creation of formal structures - new institutions, new laws, or credible policies -
is a distinct disadvantage" for the reforms; instead "the exemplary reformer is the person of 
technical prowess standing outside society ... 21) Stark, meanwhile, builds on Csaba' s arguments 
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concerning the qualitative differences between stabilisation and institutional measures hy urging 
analysts to disaggregate the transition in order to "better understand how changes in [individual] 
countries and in [individual] domains have very different temporalities."JO It is this emphasis on 
a 'plurality of transitions', in Stark's words, that provides 'gradualists' with their principal 
objection to the 'big bang': the notion of a 'standard' reform package for the entire region (see 
Gray's strongly held views on the subject). 
At the cost of over-simplification, the evolutionary school believes an exaggerated 
emphasis has been accorded to macroeconomic stabilisation; an area in which both (responsible) 
'gradualists' and 'shock therapists' agree offers little room for manoeuvre. Where 'gradualists' 
part ways with 'radicals' is in the sphere of institutional reforms. notably large-scale 
privatisation. Murrell accuses 'big bangers' of an over-zealous approach to privatising state 
industry; one which neglects, if not constrains, the ground-up development of the private sector 
by channelling resources to state privatisation bodies and their advisors. "The [key] theme". 
according to him, "is the [negative] trade-off between the reform of the old state sector 
institutions and the creation of new private sector ones."~1 Referring to Janos Komai's notion 
of a 'dual economy,32 - the rapid development of the nascent private sector alongside the gradual 
phasing out of the old state sector - Murrell argues that only organic privatisation processes 
similar to those which emerged in developed countries can allow for the gradual replacement of 
existing structures (attitudes and behaviours) while, at the same time, exposing them to 
competition by investing in a new private sector "uncommitted to the past.'·H Stark, meanwhile. 
focuses on the varied institutional legacies of East European countries in the spheres of politics 
and economics in order to demonstrate that post-communist "privatisation programmes are not 
derived from master blueprints but are shaped by the specific institutional resources that are the 
legacies of the paths of exit from communism. ,,3~ He has recently refined his arguments by 
suggesting that what is in fact emerging in Eastern Europe are highly indigenous forms of 
"recombinant property that will differ as much from West European capitalism as do 
contemporary Asian variants. ,,35 
'Evolutionists' are equally critical of the radical school's insistence on private ownership 
as a precondition for effective restructuring. One of the first comprehensive analyses to 
challenge the prevailing orthodoxies of the early 1990s wa~ a book written by Alice Amsden and 
her colleagues entitled The Market Meets its Match. 36 The authors claimed that the conditions 
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attached to the loans offered by western financial institutions, notably the World Bank. 
monopolised the policy debates on enterprise reform by 'disempowering Ministries of 
Industries', putting the accent on 'getting the prices right' and, above all, ruling out restructuring 
before privatisation; the latter stipulation, in the authors' opinion, proved "as significant for its 
omissions as for its commissions."3? They also argued that by focusing exclusively on a nominal 
change in ownership, the financial institutions neglected the significant restructuring undertaken 
by firms' insiders - they admit a reappraisal took place in Poland in 1992-93 and in fact refer to 
the D~browski and Belka surveys on enterprise behaviour18 (see Chapters 3 and 4) - and ended 
up favouring 'pseudo-privatisation' based on giveaway schemes (see below). The Amsden book 
joined other works on post-communist enterprise reform suggesting policy-makers would be 
better advised to focus on corporate governance and efficiency instead of privatising as quickly 
as possible. 
How Fast, How Slow? 
Given that "there still remains the [open] question of how much and how fast one should go on 
a broader reform front,,39, i.e. once price stabilisation has occurred, which of the two schools 
offers the soundest advice for the region? Clearly it is only once the initial conditions in a given 
country have been correctly diagnosed - in itself problematic - that tentative prescriptions can be 
advanced. The EBRD's 1994 Transition Report points out that while the early literature on 
economic transition concentrated on the issue of sequencing, the "debate was never resolved" 
as a result of the absence of an "optimal path""'o However, the Bank notes several "crucial 
ingredients central to the success of the reform process""". 
'Shock therapists' are on terra firma when they argue for a swift enactment of 
macroeconomic stabilisation in those countries with severe internal disequilibria in 1989 such 
as Poland, the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania. While the Balcerowicz Plan 
eliminated hyperinflation in the first month of implementation and led to resumed growth as early 
as spring 1992, the Bulgarian and Romanian programmes were symptomatic of the failure to 
achieve the critical mass of measures which, prior to the announcement of a second round of 
'shock therapy' in 1997, had dramatically impaired policy credibility. Advocates of a 'big bang' 
are at their most convincing when they point to the close relationship between a political 
breakthrough and the speedy implementation of stabilisation"':! (see Chapter 2 for the period of 
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'extraordinary politics' in Poland). One need only reflect on countries such as Russia - onl\' 
recently enjoying macroeconomic stability following four major anti-inflationary surgeries dating 
back to January 1992
43 
- not to mention the Ukraine - still in the 'muddling through' stages after 
several abortive stabilisation attempts in the early 1990s-l4 - to illustrate the perils of gradual 
stabilisation in cases of extreme hyperinflation. 
The refonn debates sharpen considerably in the sphere of microeconomic liberalisation. 
i.e. the removal of restrictions on foreign trade, the elimination of price controls. etc. The 
Balcerowicz Plan, for instance, chose to decontrol prices on sensitive goods such as energy 
gradually for fear of the inflationary repercussions as well to soften the impact on the population 
and on the large state enterprises (there was also a 'guinea pig' factor at work in the sense that 
there was no historical precedent for such a herculean manoeuvre). Questions regarding the 
degree of import liberalisation, the convertibility of the currency or the reorientation of foreign 
trade (the latter is subject to geographical and historical conditions) hardly require 'overnight' 
solutions.45 In a country like Hungary, for instance, where the first steps in liberalising prices 
were already taken as far back as the late 1960s (see next section), the merits of a 'shock' 
approach were doubtful: "If 90% of prices are already liberalised, it is hard to conceive how 
moving to 100% constitutes a 'big bang'. ,,~6 Yet the experience of those states who chose to 
administer 'shock therapy' points to a simultaneous initiation of macro and microeconomic 
liberaIisation. That their implementation is, in the words of a 'shocker', "a technically simple 
process not requiring a mass effort"~7 renders them amenable to the 'seamless web' arguments 
advanced by the 'radicals'. 
The third area of changes involving institutional refonns, notably large-scale 
privatisation, is inherently a long-tenn process. It is interesting that many . gradualists' have 
characterised the mass privatisation schemes adopted in the fonner Czechoslovakia and Russia 
as "desperate fonns of pseudo-privatisation·'~8: perhaps given added weight by a comment by a 
prominent East European policy-maker suggesting that "privatisation is when someone who 
doesn't know who the real owner is and doesn't know what it's really worth sells something to 
someone who doesn't have any money."~9 One need only contrast 'gradualist' Hungary's 
privatisation record of direct sales to domestic and foreign investors with 'radical' Poland's 
liqUidation routes favouring insiders to realise how futile the labelling of reforms can become. 
The fashionable view in the early years of transition was that "faster privatisation would 
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automatically lead to faster restructuring of enterprises":'o; hence the attraction to giveaway 
schemes. When steep falls in output, ill-defined property rights, and delayed structural reforms 
collided with the logic of privatisation, attention shifted to restructuring. 
Instead of arguing over the form of ownership, experts on privatisation, having conceded 
that a substantial number of enterprises would remain in state hands for the foreseeable future. 
began questioning the extent to which enterprise restructuring was tied to the adoption of specific 
privatisation strategies. While the conclusions reached so far are, at best. tentative, the voucher 
scheme favoured by the 'radicals' has revealed itself to be somewhat inadequate in providing 
effective corporate governanceS1 ; the exception is the Polish scheme in which the state ensured 
that the investment funds had both the incentive and the capability to improve corporate 
governance in state firms (see Chapter 3). Moreover, recent studies5~ have shown that the depth 
and pace of restructuring is more a function of macroeconomic stabilisation, notably hard budget 
constraints, than a simple transfer in ownership. According to one 'gradualist'. "the delay in 
privatisation did not [tum out] to be the trap most of us thought it was. There is still time to do 
[much] of the restructuring necessary to make privatisation successful."53 
Three Countries, Three Views 
The 'shock therapy versus gradualism' controversy. whether perceived as somewhat arid or 
lacking in specificity, typified the reform debates in the early 1990s. While there is more 
consensus at present regarding the fundamentals of adjustment. with countries as diverse as 
Slovenia and (now) Russia demonstrating the logic behind stabilisation. questions persist as to 
the 'correct recipes' for the transition. It is indicative of the importance attached to initial 
conditions that countries such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - all 'fast track' 
candidates to membership in the European Union - exhibit substantial variations in both the 
strategy and philosophy of transformation. In an insightful book on the Central European 
experience (bar Slovakia) entitled The Making of Economic Reform ;11 Easten, Europe""', Mario 
Blejer and Fabrizio Coricelli present the views of three prominent policymakers in the region: 
Vciclav Klaus, the former Czechoslovak Finance Minister and subsequent Prime Minister of the 
Czech Republic; Finance Minister Balcerowicz of Poland: and Peter Akos Bod. President of the 
National Bank of Hungary and formerly Industry Minister. Based on extensive interview, with 
the three economists concerning the origins. fonnulation and implementation of their respective 
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refonn programmes, the authors claim to have "emerged from these conversations with a 
strengthened conviction of the uniqueness of each country's experience."S5 
Klaus repeatedly emphasises the importance of devising a radical economic plan with 
strong political foundations. As the country enjoying "the most favourable initial internal and 
external macroeconomic balance"s6, the January 1991 'shock' approach to liberalising prices 
proved not half as significant as the mass privatisation scheme launched in May the following 
year, the cornerstone of the Czech transformation. As much a product of Klaus' s disl ike of "state 
bureaucrats controlling markets and choosing the future owners of state property" as his 
scepticism of foreign advice and "disregard for textbook measures,,)7, the voucher programme, 
much to Klaus's benefit, emerged as the most popular variant of East European capitalism. In 
the first wave of privatisation, 8.5 million Czechoslovaks were allowed to bid for shares in the 
roughly 1500 state firms included in the programme. 58 When Polish policy-makers were engaged 
in technical and conceptual debates surrounding ownership transfonnation (see Chapter 3), Klaus 
was "spending a lot of time defending and explaining [his] refonn blueprint to the population [at 
large] and using its support as a defence against opponents [of the programme 1"59 These actions 
were not lost on former Premier Bielecki of Poland who, in a conversation with Klaus, recalls 
his Czech colleague boasting: "While you guys were talking about nitty gritty theoretical issues, 
I was holding 250 rallies and putting my signatures on millions of coupons !"w 
Although Klaus has gone to great lengths to cultivate his Thatcherite, indeed anti-
federaIist61 , image as a politician who champions deregulation and free markets, the Republic's 
active labour market policies, together with wage increases outpacing productivity. have, it is 
now claimed, been achieved at the expense of genuine restructuring. The vaunted method of 
ma~s privatisation came under intense scrutiny when a currency crisis in spring 1997 exposed the 
microeconomic weaknesses of the programme, accentuated by poorly regulated capital markets 
and charges of corruption in the (privately created yet state-owned) investment funds.
b2 
The 
Klaus era. however, will probably best be remembered for its political stability, underpinned by 
what its fonner Premier likes to refer to a~ "the sound rational logic of the Czech people and the 
long tradition of private enterprise. ,,63 
Balcerowicz. Blejer and Coricelli note, "was more open to foreign advice,,64 in the 
formulation of his Plan (see Chapter 2). Seeing "no alternative to standard macroeconomic 
POlicies", Balcerowicz "entered government with a strong 'anti-gradualist' attitude"f>' towards 
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the transition. He states that the role of western financial institutions. notably the I\tF, was 
crucial in lending credibility to his Plan and "strengthening [his] belief066 that priority should be 
accorded to anti-inflationary measures. Keen to embrace liberal orthodoxies such a~ free trade, 
hard budget constraints, and a limited role for the state in the restructuring of industry, 
Balcerowicz admits that one of his goals was to keep his programme' s mealiures ali "un i form as 
possible. I was [therefore] against constant demands to introduce an industrial policy or [any] 
microeconomic intervention." Indeed he admits that he viewed privatisation as "the most 
important condition for enterprise restructuring. ,,67 The political foundations for his economic 
strategy reside exclusively in the period of 'extraordinary politics'. He provides no indication 
of which element(s) of his Plan helped sustain the reforms once 'normal politics' set in. While 
Klaus revels in the politics of his (once) popular malis privatisation scheme, Balcerowicz seems 
more concerned with the technicalities of transformation and the manner in which to introduce 
as opposed to nurture the reforms. 
Bod, who in a recent account of the East European transition declared that "there is no 
such thing as 'gradualism', either in Hungary or else in any of the other countries who embarked 
on profound transformations [in 1989]"68, is adamant that "a plan does not have to induce a shock 
to be comprehensive.,,69 A self-confessed path dependency advocate who is grateful his 
government did not "enter the unwarranted competition in radicalism", Bod sees little merit in 
a "once-and-for-all purge,,70 of economic structures in a country which could draw on experience 
gained from two decades of reforms. While doubtful whether Hungary's ·goulash communism' 
constituted an asset for the post-communist transformation (see next section), he echoes the 
views of Stark who has called for a "reconfiguration of institutional elements rather than their 
immediate replacement,,71 by suggesting that "there are certain existing features (resource 
combinations, institutions, traditions and values) that could come in useful [in the transition] and 
would [therefore] be a shame to bulldoze away.',n Critical of the IMF's advice on the structural 
a~pects of adjustment ("If there is such a thing as a theoretical framework for the transformation 
it is IMF conditionality,,73 he laments), Bod nevertheless praises his country's privatisation 
regime for its openness and conventional approach. "The Hungarian strategy", in his view, "in 
contrast to restitution, distribution [ or] other procedures that accord preference to [insider ... J is 
the one most in conformity with the market, the most liberal. ,,74 The reasons for this, according 
to Bod. can be traced to Hungary's high level of foreign indebtedness. 
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Blejer and Coricelli's book is a welcome, if somewhat rare. contribution to the field of 
comparative political economy of post-communist transformations. The 'shock therapy \,ersus 
gradualism' controversy generated passionate arguments partly in response to the lack of well-
researched analyses on the initial conditions of the respective countries in the region. Once these .... 
elements were more fully recognised (an eye-opening account, considered by some as a turning 
point in the reform debates75 , was Michael Bruno's article in the IMF Staff Papers76) observers 
slowly began to eschew labels and renounce simplistic ascriptions which, more often than not. 
were best left to the disciplines of psychiatry or cosmology. If the authors' findings signify 
anything, it is the need for specificity and clarity when discussing the 'three zatsia~' , notably their 
distinct speeds, as well as an appreciation of political and historical considerations in the 
conception of reform. Had the views of Yegor Gaidar of Russia or Viktor Pynzenyk of the 
Ukraine been included in their research, an even more discriminating approach would doubtless 
be required. When commenting on strategies of transition, "a particular policy should always be 
evaluated by comparing the phenomena which can be ascribed to it with the phenomena which 
could have arisen as a [result] of a realistic alternative policy, conducted under similar initial 
conditions and in similar circumstances."77 In a country like Hungary, whose 'initial' conditions 
include 20 years of reform engineering, pre-1989 developments - and their impact on post-
communist reform - are all the more significant. 
THE HUNGARIAN ROUTE 
Hungary's reforms, for a variety of reasons, some legitimate and others unjustified. are 
commonly associated with the 'gradualist' school of transformation. Hardly the prototype of a 
party-state in communist Europe, Hungary began to discard some of the more rigid and 
centralised aspects of 'real socialism' as far back as the late 1950s. By 1989, the country had 
developed practices and attitudes conducive to the functioning of markets as a result of increa'\ed 
tourism and trade links with the West. The conventional wisdom was that experience gained 
from twenty years of 'goulash communism' offered the first post-communist government a head 
start in the transition as well as certain unique 'assets' which rendered 'shock therapy' 
unnecessary. That these views have recently been questioned by Hungarian policymakers and 
academics78 _ primarily on economic as opposed to political grounds - should not disguise their 
resonance in 1990-1991. The decision to include Hungary in this analysis i~ in order to 
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investigate the extent to which initial conditions were respons"bl '" h d " 
.1 e lor tea optIOn or. mort: 
precisely, the continuation of a 'gradualist' reform strategy Desc "b' thO h I " . n mg IS approac as part y 
originating from "a fear of destroying that which may be worthwhl"le und f t .I"···"<J er u ure COnultlOns . 
the DECO's July 1991 Economic Survey of Hungary underscores the path dependent character 
of the country's transformation in which the "cathartic day one of shock therapy"l«l never 
occurred. 
'Goulash Communism' 
Hungary's cautious and incremental approach to policy-making has its roots in the violent 
uprising in 1956. As the only country in the former Soviet bloc to mount a full-fledged anned 
rebellion against foreign occupation, the manner in which J .. inos Kadar's Hungarian Socialist 
Workers Party (MSzMP) 'healed the wounds' of the revolution became paramount. Starting in 
March 1963 a general amnesty for political prisoners was announced and a softening of the 
dictatorship - epitomised by Kadar's exhortation "He who is not against us is with us" - was 
discernable. "An intense desire for peace and calm"s, led the authorities to favour a pro-
consumption policy as a means of restoring a modicum of legitimacy. Following the 
appointment of Finance Minister Rezso Nyers to the Politburo in 1962. various economic drafts 
were circulated and in May 1966 a formal decision was taken to launch a 'comprehensive' reform 
programme. Although limited to the economy, the introduction of the New Economic 
Mechanism (NEM) on 1 January 1968 had profound implications for the style and substance of 
Hungarian policymaking. 
With its origins in the 'New Course' philosophy of Imre Nagy in the early 1950s. NEM 
favoured the decentralisation of central planning. By abolishing compulsory directives. the 
Mechanism ensured substantial enterprise autonomy with regards to resource and commodity 
distribution. Unlike Wlodzimierz Brus' s 1957 Theses in Poland in which workers' councils were 
granted substantial rights. NEM rewarded the managers of enterprises: a crucial distinction for 
the future course of enterprise reform. Other key ingredients included the first steps in price 
liberalisation with 58% of producer prices and as much as 219(' of consumer prices freed. the 
elimination of central quotali. differentiated incomes policies and the start of private agriculture."~ 
The golden age of 'goulal\h communism' occurred between 1966 and 1975 with how.ehold 
consumption rising year after year by an average of 5.3~c.~' With production still outpacing 
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consumption, NEM proved fairly successful, earning Hungary the title of 'the happiest barrack~ 
in the communist camp'. Indeed it was during these years when many Hungarian families 
"bought their first refrigerator, their first Trabant car, and later on took their first trip to the West. 
This was when the public came to associate reform with growing welfare. ":-" 
Notwithstanding a period of retrenchment in the mid-1970s as a result of hureaucratic 
recentralisation and external economic adversities, NEM's philosophy. notably its consumption-
oriented goals, endured. Falling investment and a drop in exports produced a rise in foreign debt 
~ 
with the country's crucial debt servicing ratio soaring to 85% by 1985.s~ The Kadar regime 
shrugged off these worries by allocating an increasing share of income towards social 
expenditures such as pensions and sickness benefits. External finance for these commitments 
was facilitated by Hungary's early admission to the IMF in 1982 in which. according to one 
observer, "an extremely effective filtering mechanism"86 helped conceal the true state of the 
country's finances. The National Bank emerged as the key institution in dealings with western 
financial institutions and determined, albeit in a secretive manner. the appropriate means of 
servicing the country's foreign debt. While Martial Law was in effect in Poland and many other 
East European states were hostile to reform, the MSzMP forged closer trade links with the 
European Community underpinned by a unified exchange rate and the legalisation of small 
private firms. 
From 1985 onwards, Hungary engaged in extensive economic liberalisation based on the 
recommendations of the 'Turning Point' blueprint approved by the party leadership.K7 The 
chronology of these measures, many of them implemented in full before 1990. is worth 
mentioning: the setting up of a two-tier banking system: bankruptcy legislation; the introduction 
of personal income and value-added taxes coupled with substantial price liberalisation: a 
Company Act allowing enterprises to commercialise themselves and resulting in one of Eastern 
Europe's most publicised foreign investments: General Electric's $150 million 51 % stake in the 
light bulb manufacturer Tungsram: and the virtual elimination of the remaining restrictions on 
foreign trade. Between 1986 and 1989, Hungary's CMEA trade grew by 9£f'c while its convertible 
currency trade surged by almost 40%.88 Although hardly exhaustive of the measures needed to 
address Hungary's underlying economic ills, "the magnitude and persistence of these step' were 
large enough to narrow the spectrum of choice [in the post-communist context!.,,1\,j 
The uninspired economic advice of the democratic opposition accentuated (as opposed 
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to defined) the gradual style of refonn. With little following amongst the technocratic elites. let 
alone focused on economic matters, the intellectual circles comprising the opposition pursued 
cultural and national interests. There were, of course. prominent refonn economists such as 
Janos Kornai and Tamas Bauer who, especially in the late 1980s. criticised the structures of 
Hungarian socialism and offered recommendations on how to effect the transition to capitalism.'~' 
Yet the main source of opposition centred around the populist poets and playwrights, on the one 
hand, and the Budapest-based intelligentsia movement, on the other; the fonner played a crucial 
role in the establishment of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) in Lakitelek on 27 
September 1987, while the latter lent its support to the creation of the Alliance of Free Democrats 
(SzDSz) on 13 November 1988. Nationalist-minded. religious and socially-conscious. the MDF 
wa'i concerned with the rights of Hungarian minorities living abroad. The Alliance. for its part. 
was predominantly secular, urban and economically more liberal. Both of these groups went on 
to broaden their agendas, yet strong differences between the two persisted and prevented them 
from forging an alliance against the regime. 
In contrast to Poland where fierce anti-communism, together with the moral and political 
bankruptcy of the laruzelski administration, acted as binding agents for the disparate elements 
within the Solidarity movement, a rather weak, divisive and fragmented opposition entered the 
'Triangular' negotiations with the MSzMP and its trade union affiliates in June 1989.(11 Assured 
that multi-party elections would be held in the near future, the two opposition parties - joined by 
Viktor Orban's Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESz) - sought to differentiate their 
positions. The refusal on the part of the Alliance and FIDESz to sign the final agreement in 
response to sharp disagreements over the timing of Presidential elections served to accentuate 
the dominance of politics over economics. The fonnation of a reconstituted Hungarian Social ist 
Party (MSzP) in October led by Imre Pozsgay, the dissolution of the National Assembly paving 
the way for spring elections, and the adoption of numerous constitutional and legal measures 
overshadowed Hungary's economic troubles; quite mild in comparison to Poland's with the end-
year inflation rate standing at 17% and the state budget practically in surplus.Q~ 
'Goulash Post-Communism ,93 
The issue of privatisation proved highly controversial in the run-up to the country's first 
democratic elections since the war. Miklos Nemeth's administration, like the last communist 
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government of Mieczyslaw Rakowski in Poland, capitalised on the Opportunities made available 
by the 1988 Company Act pennitting the establishment of joint-stock companies and other fomls 
of 'spontaneous privatisation'. As "the best organised and most powerful social actor-; in 
society,,94, managers of state firms were allowed to transfer assets from their enterprises into 
newly formed joint ventures, thereby saddling parent firms with unproductive operations and 
increasing their debts. Open to manipulation and easy profit, opposition parties condemned the 
lack of control and dire consequences for the state budget. As one of its last acts in office. 
Nemeth's cabinet adopted a law to protect state holdings by setting up a centrally-managed State 
Property Agency (SPA) in March 1990 responsible for overseeing the entire privatisation 
process. 
The campaign hardly amounted to a bidding war in radical economic measures and. to 
the extent that there were differences in policy. these were ones of emphasis as opposed to 
substance. This was not for want of a lack of advice, domestically or internationally. Kornai's 
manifesto entitled 'A Passionate Pamphlet in the Cause of Economic Transition in Hungary (this 
was translated into English under the title 'The Road to a Free Economy' )95 recommended a 
'shock' approach to stabilising the economy. Two expert groups associated with the opposition -
the IMF-backed Blue Ribbon Commission headed by Sylvia Ostry and Marton Tardos and the 
more daring Bridge Group composed of prominent Hungarian economists such as Bela Kadar 
and Gyorgy Matolcsy - stressed the importance of recognising the window of opportunity for 
launching comprehensive structural adjustment. Yet the 'no experimentation please' attitude of 
the main parties, coupled with the longing for normalcy among the public, ensured that. as one 
observer put it, "no one spoke of blood, sweat and tears."Q6 Peter Bod, at the time one of the 
Forum's economic experts, noted that "a party with a high chance of sharing governmental 
responsibility, such as the MDF, had to be careful in its [economic] formulations."Q7 Rather the 
aim was to reassure a largely dispirited population of the willingness to continue the welfare-
driven policies of the previous administrations. Komai recalls how he was "left more or less 
isolated [with] most tone-setting economists .. 98 in the opposition rejecting his proposals for fear 
of provoking an upheaval. 
The first round of the parliamentary elections on 25 March 1990 produced a dose finish 
between the Forum, headed by its skilful Christian Democratic leader Jtlzsef Antal!. and the 
Alliance led by Janos Kis (the MSzP managed to win a respectable 11%). In the ensuing two 
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weeks, political animosities between the two opposition parties escalated with the ~IDF accusing 
the SzDSz of dogmatic liberalism and the Alliance criticising the Forum' s populi~tJnationali~t 
wing.99 The relatively low turnout of 45% in the second round on 8 April wa'\ enough to en~ure 
the MDF of a convincing victory, winning almost 43% of the vote compared to the Alliance's 
24%. The equally strong showing of J6zsefTorgyan's Independent Smallholders' Party (FKgP)-
a populist peasant group promising to restore pre-1947 land ownership rights - confinned the 
appeal of 'third way' thinking in the right-of-centre parties. Paternalistic instincts and the 
philosophy of pragmatic 'gradualism' triumphed over the expert opinions of the Alliance: 
"Whereas the meaning of the first round was an unambiguous mandate for radical [political] 
change, the message of the second was moderation under the steady hand of Antall:,((l() With 
limited prospects for a 'grand coalition' between the MDF and the SzDSz, a pact was signed on 
29 April awarding Kis's party the ceremonial post of President (the well-respected Alliance 
member Arpad Goncz became Hungary's first post-communist head of state) while allowing 
Antall to form his own government. Choosing the tiny Christian Democratic Party (KDNP) and 
Torgyan's Smallholders as his coalition partners, Antall decided on an ideologically 
homogeneous cabinet stressing the cultural, national and religious values shared by its members. 
The governing camp controlled 228 out of the 396 seats in the National Assembly. 
On 22 May, Antall delivered his maiden speech to the parliament outlining his cabinet's 
agenda. Short on specifics and reflecting his non-economic priorities, the address failed to 
indicate a specific reform strategy. Stressing general principles such as freedom, democracy, a 
social market and European integration, Antall dispensed with the advice offered by the expert 
commissions and instead relied on the assumption that "the Hungarian economy is in a [much} 
better position than that of its neighbours [and therefore does not need] to make the irrevocability 
of the changes [clearly] discernible.,,101 Reversing a previous pledge in the campaign to 
reschedule the country's $21 billion foreign debt, the highest per capita in Ea'\tern Europe, Antal1 
noted that "our [entire] assessment abroad depends on our ability to service our debt" 1112 
Promising swift legislation granting the National Bank full independence, he noted the 
imponance of creating a strong and stable/orint. A 'Short-term plan of action' to stabilise the 
economy was announced in which the government's first 100 days would be devoted to 
suppressing intlation and initiating bankruptcy proceedings. In addition. a privatisation 
programme ba,ed on efficiency criteria and an injection of foreign capital would he outlined in 
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the coming months; the purchase of land would be subject to restrictions. "Good economic 
policy", Antall repeatedly stressed, required "good social policy:'IOJ 
The twin goals of European integration and the promotion of a "minorities policy which 
[pays particular attention to the] one-third of Magyars living outside [Hungary's] borders"H", 
provided the bases for foreign policy under the MDF-appointed Geza Jeszenszky. The other key 
posts in the cabinet went to the Forum, with the Smallholders receiving four (including 
Agriculture), the KDNP one, and the rest awarded to independents. The economic portfolios 
went to respected, if somewhat uninspired, candidates: Bod became Industry Minister, Bela 
Kadar took the post of Minister of International Economic Relations, Gyorgy Suninyi became 
head of the Central Bank, and Ferenc Rabat- assumed the Finance post. The SPA, under its new 
Director Lajos Csepi, was transferred from parliamentary control and placed under the direct 
supervision of the government. 
For almost four months, the cabinet operated without an economic programme. Csaba 
notes that the term 'gradualist strategy', contrary to popular opinion, was inapplicable to 
Hungarian developments in 1990.105 Instead of adopting a theoretical construct indicating clear 
priorities for the transition (characteristics commonly associated with the 'gradualist' approach -
see previous section), the government simply adapted to the well-established routines of 'slow 
but steady' change: "There was neither an organisational plan nor a programme to translate 
objectives into legislative acts; even less was there a [specific] governmental authority who could 
have been entrusted with - or alternatively blamed for - shaping the course of events."IOb On 25 
September, the government unveiled the country's first post-communist economic policy 
document entitled 'The Programme for National Renewal'. A vague and ill-defined report 
outlining the cabinet's legislative agenda for the next three years lO7 , the Programme coincided 
with the announcement of the SPA's 'First Privatisation Progarmme' targeting 20 healthy large 
firms to be sold to domestic and foreign investors. The latter forecast that the share of state-
owned property should fall below 50% of the value of total assets. lOt! 
Csepi's Agency had been put in charge of all spheres of pri vatisation. even that of small 
shops in the retail and trade sectors. Since managers exercised dt.' faCIO control over state 
enterprises' assets - the strength of trade unions wa~ considerably weaker than in Poland and the 
\ll'J h 
workers' councils were, to all intents and purposes, under the control of management - t e 
SPA's role wa~ to provide effective oversight of management-initiated privatisation". Ostensibly 
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the state was to ensure competitiveness and transparency by hiring consultants to value the asseb 
of the 2000 or so large state enterprises to be privatised. Stark notes that. in this sen"e. the SPA 
"was not directly selling enterprises but instead selling the rights to lead and manage their 
... 
privatisation"; a more critical account accused the government of excessive interference bv being . ... 
"more preoccupied with the question of who would be the seller rather than who should be thc 
new owner." I 10 The limited success of the Programme was reflected in the sale of only two of 
the twenty firms by May 1991: Pannonplast and KUNEP. III A tense taxi drivers' strike on 25 
October 1990 in response to the first post-communist 'mini bang' a fa HOllgroise with an 
unannounced increase in gasoline prices by a modest 60% provoked an outpouring of resentment 
and exposed deep divisions within the cabinet. I I:! Two professed 'shock therapists', including 
Rabar, resigned from the government in November making way for the appointment of Mihaly 
Kupa as Finance Minister, the father of Hungary's tax reforms. Kupa emerged as a forceful 
advocate of reform and placed privatisation, foreign investment and extemalliberalisation as the 
key priorities for the transition. 
The record of the Antall administration in 1990 was, ironically, quite encouraging. While 
real wages in Poland plummeted by almost 30%, the government continued the pro-consumption 
policies of its predecessors resulting in a cushioned 3% fall in wages. I D Moreover, GDP dropped 
by only 3.5%, inflation was under 30%, the budget was in surplus, unemployment was at 2,5%, 
and foreign investment rose from $187 million in 1989 to $311 million. I I" Access to the 
international capital markets, underpinned by Suninyi' s adroitness in managing the country's 
foreign debt, proved the most significant of policy contrasts between 'gradualist' yet credit-
worthy Hungary and 'radical' yet credit-risk Poland. One observer noted how the servicing of 
Hungary's debt 'raised the morale d 15 of the Antall cabinet whereas the Polish authorities were 
frowned upon for seeking greater debt forgiveness. Bielecki himself remarked how Japancsc 
banks, in particular, admired Hungary's courageous debt management record while perceiving 
his country's 'cap-in-hand' approach as "highly dishonourable and almost tantamount to hara-
k' , "116 In. 
The MDF, however. was hardly popular throughout the country and faccd mounting 
criticism from the opposition for its patronage appointments. A 'Second Privatisation 
Programme' launched in April 1991 - preceded by Kupa' s more down-to-earth economic 
, ' I J ·St· b'l'ty and Convcrtlbility' -proposals announced the previous month 10 a document entlt c a I I 
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was designed to speed up what was widely viewed as an overly ambitious and cumbersome 
process. This was followed by a 'Self-Privatisation' programme in the autumn targeted at small 
firms and aimed at decentralising the SPA's activities, as well as a restitution bill sponsored hy 
the FKgP. The basic approach to Hungarian privatisation, however. in contrast to the liquidation 
routes in Poland and the voucher scheme in the fonner Czechoslovakia. remained the direct sale 
of state assets, either via management- or investor-initiated actions. 
The collapse of the CMEA trade regime in January 1991 added to Hungary's economic 
woes, especially in view of the country's dependence on Soviet energy and its pressing need to 
export its way out of debt (63% of the proceeds from exports were targeted for this purpose 
alone I 17). Persistently high levels of budgetary redistribution - Hungary had become. in the words 
of Kornai, 'a premature welfare state' 118 with Swedish-style social transfers way beyond the 
country's financial capabilities - crowded out much-needed investment and, with none of the 
parties daring to propose any major budgetary refonns, presaged a balance of payments crisis in 
the near future. The huge tax burden on companies and individuals amid a steep recession 
resulted in an increasing share of the economy operating underground and hence lower revenues 
for the state. The 'fiscal trap' (see Chapter 3) was, in Hungary's case, more damaging in view 
of the coalition's paternalistic instincts. Despite the passage of an austere bankruptcy law 
designed to arrest the growth in inter-enterprise debt, the government was fearful to embark on 
any radical manoeuvres. A legislative impasse in the second-half of 1991 exacerbated political 
tensions between the MDF and the Alliance. Charges of authoritarianism levelled at the Forum 
gained currency in August with the revelation of an internal MDF document prepared hy (mre 
K6nya, the Forum's parliamentary leader, indicating a 'party-state' mentality.119 The year ended 
with Antall's controversial dismissal of Suninyi on 29 November in response to the latter .... 
sympathies towards the opposition-inspired 'Democratic Charter'. Considering Suninyi had 
helped engineer $1.5 billion in foreign investment in 1991 alone, the move was questionable. 
The sharp deterioration in the economy in 1991 - a 12% drop in GDP, 18Cf'c fall in 
industrial production and a 4.50/0 budget deficit l20 - should be placed in the context of the general 
economic and social malaise affecting the region (see Appendix 14-16 for cross-country 
comparison). The country's budgetary crisis nevertheless resulted in Hungarian 'graduali"m's 
fall from grace in policymaking circles. Many observers lamented the Antall government'" 
failure to adopt a more resolute approach in its first months in office. Komai claimed his advice 
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should have been heeded: "I cannot get over the idea that the first democratic Hungarian 
government missed a historic, unrepeatable opportunity in 1990:'121 His statement implies that 
there in fact was a window of opportunity in 1989/90 for a (quasi-)'shock therapy' programme. 
Economically, this is debatable. In political terms there was nothing remotely comparable to the 
presence of 'extraordinary politics' in Poland where a political elite capitalised on its moral and 
symbolic authority in order to undertake painful stabilisation. 
Deeply-rooted patterns and routines in decision-making dating back to the mid-1960s 
emphasising a piecemeal approach, pro-consumption priorities, and an aversion to conflict 
remained central features of Hungary's transformation. Relative continuity in policy extending 
beyond the political change in 1990 and ending with the dreaded stabilisation programme of 
Finance Minister Lajos Bokros announced on 'Black Sunday' 12 March 19951~~ is one of the 
most revealing aspects of Hungary's 'post-communist' transition. The country's main objective 
of servicing its substantial foreign debt, while criticised by many as imposing too heavy a burden, 
defined the priorities of the Antall government's economic agenda: a stable currency, receipts 
from the proceeds of privatisation, and externalliberalisation. A radical approach in 1990, it can 
be argued, could have jeopardised these goals. "Suffice it to say that some of the 'advantages' 
[in Hungary] were mixed blessings. [But] these 'advantages' were highly publicised both 
internally and externally, and therefore the 'clean sheet' approach would have required a large 
amount of pressure to roll back 20 years of reform engineering."'~J A gradual continuation. then. 
instead of a radical departure. 
GRA Y AND SACHS: THE RIVAL MODELS 
It should be apparent by now that the 'shock therapy versus gradualism' debate detracts from the 
diverse assumptions characterising reform agendas. In overemphasising and confusing specific 
elements of the transition, the controversy leads analysts to treat all policies in homologous 
terms. While it is inevitable and, to a certain extent, necessary that generalisations on the 
trajectories of reforms are made, a constant need for clarity is called for. The difficulty, of 
course, lies in the frame of reference used to assess the progress. challenges. and ultimate goab 
of the transition. As discussed in Chapter I. the very notion of 'transition' is problematic. The 
. ··l~.& 
conceptual interchangeability of the term, "across the region [and] within any given country , 
With more open-ended issues such as development or institution building (admittedly all three 
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are interrelated), without taking into account the varied historical condl"t" f " Ions 0 respective 
countries, leads to heated arguments over the appositeness of the neo-ll"heraJ d" I f eSlgn" n tWll (1 
the most spirited expositions of the competing views on the applicability of radical reform in 
Eastern Europe, John Gray and Jeffrey Sachs provide much of the intellectual ammunition for 
the ideological and practical debates surrounding 'shock therapy'" The two works in question 
are Gray's 'Post-Communist Societies in Transition: A Social Market Perspective' and Sachs' s 
'Understanding 'Shock Therapy". Both originate from a lively exchange at a symposium 
organised by the Social Market Foundation in London on 30 June 1994. It should be stressed 
that, at the time of the symposium, the record of the post-communist countries wa'\, at best, 
mixed with an advanced group of Central European nations in the recovery phase and many of 
the former Soviet states still mired in recession. 
Gray's 'Cultural Determinism' 
Gray challenges what he calls the 'uncritical assumption' that western, specifically Anglo-Saxon, 
exemplars of market institutions can be replicated in the post-communist region. Reserving his 
sharpest words for Francis Fukuyama (Sachs hardly escapes unscathed) and his triumphalist 
declarations contained in his articlelbook entitled 'The End of Historyd25, he turns Fukuyama's 
premise on its head and suggests that what actually occurred in Eastern Europe in 1989 was not 
"an ending of history but rather its resumption on decidedly traditional lines - of ethnic and 
religious conflicts, irredentist claims, strategic calculations, and secret diplomacies."1!6 With his 
eye firmly on parts of the ex-Soviet Union and other nationalist hotbeds such as the former 
Yugoslavia (this, according to some, limits the scope of his arguments), Gray examines the 
adverse legacies - communist and pre-communist - of the region in order to illustrate the perils 
of imposing liberal frameworks in states "which are not only burdened by the ruinous 
inheritances of central planning but which also lack the legal and institutional [affinities] for the 
market. Such policies are bound to end in failure and political upheaval.,'127 
At the heart of his analysis is the view that uniform blueprints drawn up by w~"t~m 
financial institutions lack both the cultural and historical roots to function ~ffectivcly in the (Xht-
communist context. Moreover, the "disintegration, powerlessness, and para1ysis"'~' of the Wc,t's 
institutions - his argument is based on the United States' isolationist and protectionist tenden(\~s 
together with the impracticalities of a federal Europe in a recessionary-plagued Ell - preclude, 
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their viability as a model for the Eastern countries. If there is a 'model' &or the ( , l' pos -commUnt~t 
transition, a suspect proposition in the first place according to Gray, it is to be found in non-
western exemplars of capitalism which have often relied on government intervention a" well as 
varying degrees of political authoritarianism. 
Dismissing the Anglo-American, Swedish and Gennan models as inappropriate in view 
of the evolutionary nature of capitalism, the prohibitive welfare costs. and the legal and 
consensual traditions respectively (the latter, Gray admits, can be drawn on in the Czech 
Republic), the author sees advantages in the Japanese and Chinese paths of reform. Not ~o much 
a convert to these countries' political economies as an admirer of their indigenous forms of 
capitalism, specifically their rejection of an Anglo-Saxon laisse~Jaire, Gray revels in the "sodaJ 
hannony and stable communallife"'29 that, according to him, has been the driving force behind 
East Asia's economic success. He may now want to revise his arguments in view of the domestic 
upheavals associated with the region's currency crises in the second-half of 1997: the remedies 
for which, courtesy of the IMF, are decidedly laissezJaire. 
The 'social market' perspective developed in the remaining pages of his analysis seeks 
to preserve, if not strengthen, the cultural foundations of institutional change by rejecting 
programmes "which do not meet standards of legitimacy set by [countries'] underlying 
cultures.',130 'Shock therapy', as recommended by Sachs and others, can hardly hope (0 satisfy 
these requirements on the basis of its application in Bolivia: a country with pre-existing market 
institutions at the time of stabilisation. Echoing the views of Kornai and Murrell regarding the 
misplaced emphasis on privatising the state sector at the expense of the nascent private sector, 
Gray claims 'shock therapy' is bound to "strangle [the private sector] at birth and. inevitably. 
result in slump." 131 He ends by claiming that the victory of the ex -communist parties throughout 
the region stems largely from the failure to "deliver a reasonable degree of economic security to 
the general population."132 Ethnic conflicts. nationalist disputes a" well as rising levels of 
organised crime have. if anything. further eroded the legitimacy of market reform. 
Sachs's 'Portable Capitalism' 
With a flair for the rational and the logical, Sachs approaches developments in post-communi~t 
E .. . b bl hI' ·t ·nd.'cation of where he ,tand, urope from an entirely d.fferent perspective. Pro a y t e c eares • 
Was provided at the head-to-head debate with Gray at the Social Market Foundation where he 
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commented that "people say of Russia what they said five years ago about Poland. and five vear\ 
before that about Bolivia.,,\33 His role as an advisor to the Russian go\"ernment h" .. • IS numerOl .... 
articles on the subject
l34
, and his long-held view that the international community (specificall~ 
the IMF of which he has been quite critical of late1J5) was unresponsive to Moscow's early pka~ 
for assistance add weight to his rejoinder. 'Understanding 'Shock Therapy" places the economic 
and political reforms in Eastern Europe in the context of an ongoing process of globalisation and 
integration. As far as Sachs is concerned, the 'culturalist' perspective advanced by Gray ha.s little 
practical validity and, in some cases, constitutes a gross misrepresentation of the underlying 
motivations in adopting radical reform. Convinced Gray is more concerned with pi Ilorying 
Fukuyama's arguments than he is offering sensible advice to the post-communist region, Sachs 
goes to great lengths to refute the charge that 'shock therapy' "is a programme aimed at a utopian 
laissezJaire" or "a promise of a miracle cure." Instead. he claims that it is "a set of pragmatic 
choices deeply grounded in existing western economic institutions."Pc> 
While Gray sees the unravelling of these institutions as a result of national and cultural 
differences, Sachs believes the 'power and reach' of these bodies is ali significant today than after 
the Second World War. Adamant that the EU "remains the compelling magnet',m for the East 
and Central European states, Sachs perceives swift integration as the only means of reaping the 
benefits of globalisation. It is interesting that his views have evolved since the time of writing 
in response to what he perceives as the excessive social welfare transfers in a number of Central 
European countries which "now require [these] governments to think anew and resist the 
temptation to see [the French or German models] as their guide"IJ8; low spending/high saving 
Ea'lt Asia is, apparently. the preferred 'magnet'. Citing his familiar repertoire of rewards ~lIch 
as technological advances, improved trade links, access to the capital markets and a host of other 
economic and financial gains, Sachs talks of convergence and harmonisation in contrast to Gray's 
indigenous and market -sceptic approach. 
Sachs dismisses the 'culturalist' perspective by returning to his favourite theme that the 
debate in reform should be about the means of transition and not the ends; he even includes hi ... 
quotation in The Economist (see first section) as a footnote. "Shock therapy", according to hlln. 
"does not presume to dictate the specific ways of implementing private property rights. corporate 
ownership and the social safety net. These areas are. of course. the battleground of politic ... for 
the indefinite future."IJ9 Bold and decisive governments can overcome the adve~e legacll" 01 
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communism by pushing through necessary stabilisation while at the same (' . h . . lme. respectmg t e 
nation's cultural heritage; "in this sense", says Sachs, "one can eat one's cake and have it too,":';" 
One of his much-repeated criticisms of Gray is the latter's failure to distinguish betw th' 'I" ...' cen l: .bl 
track' candidates to EU membership and the former Soviet Republics (minus the Baltic "tate,,) 
whose cultural legacies may be more inimical to the market. The Czech Republic. Hungary and 
Poland, together with Slovenia and Estonia it now seems, are all fit for democratic capitali"rn and 
do not, according to Sachs, rely on "deep-seated norms of equity and fairness"I"1 to underpin their 
transitions, Furthermore, the case for Chinese 'gradualism' or Japanese-style industrial policy 
in Eastern Europe, a subject which he has dealt with separatelyl"1. neglects differences in the 
starting conditions of both regions: predominantly agricultural economies in need of 
industrialisation versus overly-industrialised countries requiring deindustrialisation, 
As for the record of 'shock therapy' , Sachs feels he ha~ been vindicated. Five years after 
Poland launched the Balcerowicz Plan, the 'staying power' of the regime. in his words. is 
considerable. He notes that Poland witnessed the smallest cumulative drop in GDP throughout 
the region, that it registered the fastest growth in Europe as early as 1993. and that. contrary to 
Gray's assertions, the private sector emerged as the very engine of this growth,I .. ' As far as 
political instability is concerned, notably in Russia, Sachs claims this is the result of a lack of 
national consensus on the broad terms of economic management and not. as some argue, the 
direct consequence of adopting 'shock therapy' (in this he is joined by others who stress that it 
was "decline which triggered transition and not vice versa, as the new fashion seem" to 
presume" 144). Contradicting his earlier assertion that issues of fairness do not figure prominently 
in Ea~t European reforms, Sachs, in a subsequent article, claims that it is "the high and escalating 
social spending, not the cuts, that offers us the [clearest] insight into the political dynamics of the 
region:" 45 Ex-communist parties, notably Gyula Hom's MSzP in Hungary. triumphed at the 
polls precisely because they were the ones who excelled at the politics of entitlemenh. notably 
higher pensions. 
A False Dichotomy 
R be Sk ' , S h' d b' ' , t 'u "t a dl" "pute over prioritic', o n "Idelsky IS correct to suggest the Gray- ac s e ate IS no J S ' 
a question of 'shock therapy' or ·gradualism'. but a deep division in political econorny,l-16 Gray. 
\Vh ' , h bl' h t f "\'1'1 S"ocl'et~' in the po"t-cornmUIlI'( o IS pnmarily concerned with t e est a IS men 0 CI .' 
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countries, raises legitimate and justified arguments concerning the 'market fundamentaJi,( 
philosophy at the beginning of the transformation. His focus on the cultural detemlinants of 
institutional change, issues overshadowed in the rush to capitalism. is supported by the path 
dependency works of Douglass North and echoed, to varying degrees, by Stark. ~turrell a~ well 
as Valerie Bunce. By drawing attention to the uniqueness of each country at the time of the 
collapse of communism - "the differences in how the pieces fell apart"I.t~ in the words of Stark _ 
as well as before the imposition of Soviet hegemony. Gray demonstrates the fallacy of anyone 
model for the transition. 
Aside from whether or not the Anglo-American exemplar constituted the preferred option 
for the East European countries in 1989 (Hungary's opposition parties, for instance. relied on 
Gennan advice), Gray is right to warn of the dangers of 'reform strait-jackets' manufactured in 
western financial institutions with scant regard for tradition or culture. One of his strongest 
points concerns the outbreak of nationalist and/or religious feuds throughout the region that augur 
poorly for the implementation of reform programmes, neo-liberal or otherwise: but are not, as 
he implies, the direct result of embarking on stabilisation. Indeed it is Gray's failure to 
differentiate between the various measures in transition programmes, their intended subjects. and 
their results that serves to weaken his otherwise stimulating analysis. Perhaps if he was able to 
present a viable alternative to neo-liberalism his arguments might appear more convincing. By 
overemphasising the ends of transformation and generalising the means. he obscures initial 
conditions and fails to account for differences in performance. 
Sachs, meanwhile, understates the means of transition - which in view of his advice in 
1989 can hardly be termed 'pragmatic' - and, in so doing, tri vialises the political economy of 
sustaining 'shock therapy'. Although he claims that the 'staying power' of the regime is what 
really matters, "one must wonder whether a two- to three-year economic depression [- or longer 
in the case of other, less fortunate, countries -] can still meaningfully qualify as a 'shock'. let 
alone a 'therapy' ."148 A leading authority in the field of comparative economics. Sach~. like 
Balcerowicz l49, argues convincingly in favour of a radical approach to eliminating hyperinflation. 
Yet his professed political neutrality with regard to the structural alipects of reform, notably hi, 
. . h' d rpont • govl'mance mnocent-like admission that "the specific contents of property fig ts an co < t: 
are a matter of national provenance"150, is, to say the least. at odds with his explicit adVIce \)fl 
rapid privatisation in 1989/90. 
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For it was Sachs, lest we forget, who championed the cau' f I se 0 ear y rna .... ' 
commercialisation in Poland during his stint as advisor to the Mazowl'eckl' . government (~ 
Chapter 2). In his Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures at the London School of Ec ~onomtcs 10 
1993, he strongly criticised the Polish authorities for consenting to a voluntary approach to large-
scale privatisation: "a highly unsatisfactory response to [the vested interests of the workers' 
councils],,15t, in his view. In calling for thousands of state firms to be rid of their self-mana2~J 
'" 
structures, he discarded long-established patterns of enterprise autonomy and viewed the 
liquidation of the councils as a sine qua non of enterprise reform; admittedly he was joined hy 
many other Polish economists. The entire rationale behind his mass pri vatisation plan. at least 
in the short term, was to ensure that self-managed firms adopt classical forms of corporate 
governance which would enable them to be bought and sold a~ quickly and easily as possihle,I~~ 
When mounting delays in commercialisation (and hence privatisation) began to undermine the 
Balcerowicz Plan, Sachs remained one of the lone voices to argue that Polish 'shock therapy' wa.\ 
proceeding on course. 153 In a similar vein, both the rise in unemployment and the fall in output 
were, "in true Panglossian style, construed as signs of progress,"I'", While Poland eventually 
recovered from its recession and is now entering its seventh year of sustained growth. the 
question as to whether 'shock therapy' deserves the credit is debatable (see previous chapter). 
Sachs's penchant for some of the East Asian variants of capitalism is an indication that he 
himself now acknowledges that 'shock therapy' wa~ either too ambitious in its goals or perhaps 
did not achieve the 'national consensus' he claims it did. 
The Gray-Sachs debate, like most polemics on the post-communist transition. contain, 
elements of truth on both sides while distorting or neglecting other aspects of reform, What 
exercises the mind most is the fact that "progress [in the] transition is not rigidly a.~sociated with 
any single opportunity (or handicap) inherited after the collapse of communism,"I~~ In other 
words Gray is entirely correct to point out the fallacy of anyone 'model'. yet Sach, j, equally 
right to feel a sense of vindication that Russia, with lower inflation rates than Poland in late 1l)97, 
can, after all. succeed where others felt it could not. While this ha.~ not prevented oh,,~rvers from 
searching for answers on the relationship(s) between different paths of tran"ition and the 
, , , , h ." 'ensus conc~rn, SWift prevallmg conditIOns at the start of the changes (t e greatest cons ' . . , 
b'l' , , "f 't ) th' criteria with which to \ta I Isatlon Ideally implemented dunng the wmdow 0 opportunt y, C 
2e".. , • 'I" . 'nt \,' 'ars intennedtate PO"llIl)flS ~SS success' or 'failure' are a matter for mterpretatlon, n n;u; Jt: ., 
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stressing the importance of early stabilisation but also callin a for great ., -~ er a\\ arene"" of the 
institutional, possibly cultural, constraints to neo-liberalism seem to be in the a~cendant. The 
World Bank, for instance, in its 1996 World Development Report l56 devoted t th' .. o e transition 
economies', emphasises non-economic factors such as history, culture and geography as equally 
relevant to the implementation of reform. Phrases such as "institutional legacies differ from 
country to country" and "what leaders can and try to accomplish is strongly shaped by the 
inherited structure of the economy"157 are a welcome departure from the single-minded Illis.'ie:,-
laire that characterised the institution's thinking in the early I 990s. 
Are we witnessing a more open-ended, path dependent philosophy in the Bank's 
operations? Is a reorientation occurring away from (early) Sachsian neo-liberalism and towards 
a more historically aware, indigenous approach as favoured by Gray'? Is there a gradual 
rehabilitation of the state in policy-making which accords greater emphasis to social and 
educational needs instead of anti-inflationary priorities, corporate governance objectives instead 
of mass privatisation, or simply quality as opposed to speed? With the passage of the 
technocratic stabilisation phase and a recognition of the inadequacies of the original blueprints. 
there is bound to be a reassessment of the goals of the transition. It seems that while the World 
Bank acknowledges that varied institutional legacies exert considerable influence over its 
policies, the 'shock therapy versus gradualism' debate (the litmus test as to whether the Bank's 
thinking has truly evolved), although perhaps not referred to as such, lingers in the minds of its 
personnel. That the institution still talks of 'two paths' of reform, one based on "an all-out 
approach" and the other model favouring "piecemeal or phased reforms"'58 is a retlection of the 
enduring dichotomy which pervades the literature on Eastern Europe' s transformations, One 
wonders if and when such thinking, misconceived and unhelpful as it is, will loose its relevance 
and be replaced by more inspiring, if equally passionate, debates. 
CONCLUSION 
d' d"'~'1 E t Csaba's professed "battle against the stereotypes that have burdened and Istorte as ern 
Europe's reforms is one I fully support. In many ways a product of the perceived contrast 
between Poland's 'radical' stance in January 1990 and Hungary's 'soft landing' into the 
Iran ' , , , . d nlany of the wrong questions sitton, the 'shock therapy versus gradualIsm controversy pose 
d h ' I .. I ' a~ter Bruno puhli,hcd hiS an t us came up With many of the wrong answers. t was on) 11 
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ground-breaking paper in December 1992
160 
that a more discerning approach toward, (he 
transition stressing countries' initial conditions was noticeable - at least in the journals of the 
financial institutions. The "very currency of the discourse" 16I , to paraphr~l'\e Gray, in 1990-91 
encouraged observers to ignore historical processes and perceive reform deoate, as 
"extraordinarily compressed in time.,,162 This tabula rasa approach was, in many ways, the n:sult 
of a strong desire on the part of 'shock therapists' to dismiss the sequencing deoates altngether 
and view stabilisation and structural adjustment as politically indivisible, 'Gradualists', on the 
other hand, preferred to disaggregate the respective measures. to 'feel the stones when crossing 
the river' and, as Bod argued, to demonstrate that comprehensiveness should not be equated with 
macroeconomics alone; institutional concerns, notably the quality of privatisation. were just ~l'" 
important. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to draw attention to these distinctions by offering 
an insight into Hungarian developments. Whether' goulash communism' is perceived as an a"l'l 
or a liability, it nevertheless exerted a strong influence on Hungary's transition. Caution as 
opposed to haste and continuity instead of wholesale change characterised the country's 
economic philosophy up until the Bokros Plan in March 1995. Healthy foreign investment 
figures, however, were enough to illustrate the importance of expectations derived from 
Hungary's reform past as the rationale on which the Antall cabinet's actions were based. Path 
dependency of a more fundamental kind was presented by Gray in his denigration of 'shock 
therapy' at a time when the record of neo-liberalism in Eastern Europe was, at best. mixed, 
Sachs's speedy rebuttal, while rightly distinguishing between different countries in the region and 
faulting Gray for not providing a credible alternative to neo-liberalism. failed to prove how its 
author's advice did not aim to dictate the specifics of structural change. thereby confirming 
Csaba's fears of a conflict-prone relationship between stabilisation and transfomlation.
16
' The 
\hock therapy versus gradualism' controversy, spurious as it is, is the embodiment of this. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
The Gray-Sachs debate provides a good illustration of the dichotomous conception of post-
communist reform. The two schools outlined in Chapter 1 - the 'transition' philosophy 
emphasising choice, strategic action and conventional models, and the 'adaptation' perspective 
stressing constraints, institutional legacies and novel approaches - are identified as much by their 
theoretical and practical advice as by their efforts to expose the flaws in each other's arguments. 
In presenting a number of both schools' assumptions, the purpose of this research has been to 
focus on elements of each in order to demonstrate that, far from being mutually exclusive. the 
two frameworks derive their analytic strength from different stages and priorities in the reform 
process - by no means confined to post-communist developments. i.e. pre-1989 factors must be 
taken into account. I have argued that it is the political and historical dimensions to economic 
reform, as opposed to the technical aspects. which offer us the clearest insights into both schools' 
thinking. 
Central to the 'transition' philosophy are the defining moments during the launching stage 
of systemic change; this is especially the case in those countries which chose the 'shock therapy' 
route. The agenda is dictated by the need to establish credibility in policy-making, to capitalise 
on the window of opportunity to implement far-reaching changes, and to renounce (or at least to 
put off) a 'third way' for fear of compromising the reform blueprint. The 'adaptation' 
perspective, on the other hand, eschews sharp historical demarcations. Emphasising the diverse 
structural and cultural legacies of the post-communist landscape. the school rejects uniform 
measures or 'quick fix' solutions. With their adherents in a broad range of disciplines, 
'adaptationists' are sceptical of technocratic, neo-liberal designs. Instead they offer ways of 
bridging the systemic divides by recognising the evolutionary nature of capitalism. the role of 
indigenous forms of ownership transformation, and the need for negotiation in sustaining the 
reforms. 
The choice of Poland as a case study stemmed from the country's pioneering role in the 
implementation of radical economic change. The darling of the 'transition' school in late 
1989/90, Poland undertook neo-liberal engineering as much in response to the desperate state of 
its macroeconomy than as a consequence of its (original) reform team's philosophical attraction 
to an Anglo-Saxon-style market economy. In examining the genesis. application and aftermath 
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of the Balcerowicz Plan, this study addressed three key issues which both schools seized on in 
order to justify their arguments: the importance of the Solidarity (union) inheritance. in particular 
the role of the versatile Lech Walf;sa, in explaining both the opening of the Solidarity umbrella 
over the Plan and the gradual closing of it months latec the legacy of enterprise autonomy with 
its legal roots in the September 1981 legislation granting workers' councils a strong say in the 
management of firms' assets - notably the manner in which competing privatisation and/or 
restructuring strategies addressed this issue; and the evolution of the 'shock therapy' regime 
following the departure of BaIcerowicz from office and the professed 'alternatives' that arose. 
In presenting four political variants of Polish neo-liberalism (to be discussed below). this 
analysis identified the underpinnings of both schools, accentuated by certain policy-makers' 
perceived attachment to elements of each, in the opportunities and constraints of successive 
governments. The 1990-1991 years constituted the focal point in the debates surrounding the 
appositeness of neo-liberalism and, rightly or wrongly, provided the basis for cross-country 
comparisons. Several important themes in this study originated from the style and substance of 
policy-making under BaIcerowicz. These themes gained new relevance in the 1992-94 phase of 
the Polish transformation. The six most salient issues were the following: 
i) The Period of 'Extraordinary Politics'. Described by an IMF official as the "window of 
opportunity in East European reform par excellence" I or, according to a less charitable 
interpretation, the moment when "Sachs 'seduced' the Solidarity movement and Balcerowicz 
'hijacked' [it]"2, the period was remarkable not so much for the opportunities it generated 
(though these were considerable) but for the manner in which other, less publicised, programmes 
were shunned or suppressed. The euphoria of the moment can hardly be over-emphasised when 
accounting for the success of the Balcerowicz Group in setting the political agenda. In almost 
all areas of reform, the goals were overly ambitious and the expectations enormous. Both of 
these factors, inevitably, led to disappointment and resentment. 
ii) The Macroeconomic Imperative. Unlike some other East European countries. Poland 
embarked on its post-communist reforms with a singular determination to stamp out 
hyperinflation. While the preoccupation with stabilisation was partly attributable to the leading 
role of the IMF. "reinforced by advisors who strongly believed in the endemic macroeconomic 
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disequilibria of socialist economies and saw hyperinflation around every corner··~. the Sachsian 
case for a 'shock' approach had already been made as early as June-July 1989. Eager to see its 
'Washington Consensus' become an East European one, the Fund saw no apparent contradiction 
- provided institutional measures were quickly implemented - between tight fiscal and monetary 
policies and the supply response on the part of the state sector. When the 'fiscal trap' in mid-
1991 exposed the inadequacies of this approach, the IMF suspended relations with the Polish 
authorities, leaving the government little choice but to persevere with its reforms. The open 
question, very much at the centre of Eastern Europe's economic transitions. is whether 
macroeconomic stabilisation (specifically the conditionality criteria imposed by the IMF) should 
have been a precondition for structural changes. The arguments are finely balanced.~ 
iii) State-Driven (yet Insider-Led) Privatisation. Polish decision-makers approached 
privatisation in 1989 with three key objectives. The first was that employee ownership or self-
management should be resisted at all costs for fear of asset stripping and jeopardising effective 
corporate governance. Public-stock offerings based on the British model of case-by-case 
valuations were the preferred option. Secondly, the ground-up development of the private sector 
favoured by Janos Kornai and others was believed to be "too weak and too small to exert an 
independent mechanism on the privatisation process.'" State-driven, 'top-down' privatisation. 
it was claimed, would ensure proper control and allow the government to determine the 
privatisation agenda by reclaiming full rights over 'its' enterprises; hence the early emphasis on 
mass commercialisation. Thirdly, political and microeconomic objectives of privatisation were 
subordinate to those of macroeconomic stabilisation. Whilst imposing hard budget constraints. 
the government hoped to maximise budgetary revenue by selling off healthy firms as part of a 
general process of establishing the rudiments of a capital market. In short, privatisation was seen 
as the best industrial policy; "stabilisation was to precede privatisation and privatisation was to 
precede industrial restructuring.,,6 All three assumptions, it turned out, were misconceived and 
led to profound disagreements over the direction and priorities of ownership transformation. 
Fortunately. the multi-track nature of Polish privatisation undid some of the damage as the 
insider-led liquidation routes emerged as the most successful path of ownership transformation. 
The explosive growth of the nascent private sector. meanwhile, "neutralised the negative 
impact,,7 of state-driven privatisation. 
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iv) Technocracy Versus Negotiation. The original Balcerowicz Plan renounced measures such 
as a corporatist-style pact or early mass privatisation on the grounds these would have 
undennined its macroeconomic agenda. Closely associated with a technocratic style of policy-
making, the Balcerowicz Group offended many who expected more inclusive and varied methods 
of reform. Walysa's calls for 'acceleration' opened the floodgates to new proposals for the 
transition. Janusz Lewandowski and Jan Szomburg's original voucher scheme wa" resurrected 
in 1991 as part of a general shift away from equivalent methods of privatisation to non-equivalent 
ones stressing citizens' ownership and worker/management buy-outs. Jacek KuroIi's Enterprise 
Pact moved further away from the original conception of the Balcerowicz Plan by placing 
ownership transformation on a par with labour relations. This innovative attempt at "combining 
pragmatic liberalism with participatory syndicalism"g sat uncomfortably with other pieces of the 
government's macroeconomic agenda. Grzegorz Kolodko and his team believed they could 
resolve this dilemma by openly embracing an industrial policy and elevating KuroIi' s negotiated 
framework in policy-making. Presenting his 'Strategy for Poland' as an 'alternative paradigm'Q 
to Balcerowiczism, Kolodko was nevertheless unable to convince Ryszard Bugaj's Labour Union 
(UP) and its self-management allies that any 'social alternative' had emerged. 
v) The Contested Origins of the Recovery. The four political variants of Polish neo-liberalism, 
starting with the purest version in January 1990 and ending with the more socially-oriented, 
dirigiste model under Kolodko in June 1994, influenced the debates on the precise origins of the 
recovery; the tentative signs of which were apparent in spring 1992. Many of the disputes 
concerning the sustainability of 'shock therapy' stemmed from the philosophically ambiguous 
1992-93 period. The following question was often asked: "[Did] the first signs of recovery 
[imply] that 'shock therapy', though with a lag, finally produced the expected results[?] [Or. 
alternatively,] could these developments be attributed to the fact that many of the 'shock therapy' 
policies [were] softened, if not reversed[?]"10 Leading reform camps associated with 
Balcerowicz, on the one hand, and Kolodko, on the other, were at pains to provide answers to 
this question. Both. not surprisingly, referred either to the 1990-91 phase (Balcerowicz)" or else 
the post-September 1993 period (Kolodko)'2 as the key to Poland's recent economic successes. 
A more discerning approach consisted in examining the intervening months when elements of 
continuity and change indicated a less clear-cut picture. 
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vi) The Importance of Initial Conditions. The Polish refonns generated intense controversv 
regarding the pace and content of transition programmes. In the early years (and even to this day) 
"unhelpful classifications and misleading metaphors,,13 served as much to obscure other 
countries' reforms as they did to misrepresent Poland's. Interestingly, it was the so-called 
'gradualists' such as Laszlo Csaba and David Stark who strove to elucidate these misconceptions 
by calling for greater awareness of states' initial conditions: for clearer distinctions between the 
different tasks of the transfonnation; and for a more thorough understanding of the diverse 'paths 
of extrication' in explaining differences in transition strategies. While it is tempting and. in 
certain cases, justified to trace these differences to particular philosophies among leading 
refonners (especially in those countries which opted for radical change such as Poland or Russia). 
historical and structural factors are equally significant. Studies of the Polish transition. 
particularly during the Balcerowicz era, need to come to grips with these two perspectives while 
recognising their mutual inclusiveness. It is the initial conditions which caution against sweeping 
generalisations and necessitate a degree of circumspection in the final analysis. 
ASSUMPTIONS IN AUTUMN 1989 
The genesis of Polish 'shock therapy' was a deeply political affair. strongly influenced by the 
outbreak of near-hyperinflation in autumn 1989. 'Transitologists' such a~ Philippe Schmitter and 
Giuseppe Di Palma no doubt revelled in the tense and uncertain atmosphere following the 
historic victory of the Solidarity forces in the 4 June elections. Adam Michnik's controversial 
yet daring proposal of 'Your President-Our Premier' initiated a six-week political roller-coaster 
in which the courage and tenacity of key individuals (as well as the resignation of others) 
detennined the final outcome. Sachs's arrival in Warsaw in mid-June, if we are to believe him. 
sharpened the minds of prominent members in the Citizens' Parliamentary Club (OKP) by 
offering them the programmatic leverage to dictate the tenns of refonn. His advice for a 'shock' 
approach, strengthened by his experience in Bolivia which evidently convinced him that "the ta"k 
ahead wa~ [by no means] as mysterious nor as complex as it [seemed]; [and that] in many ways 
it [was] a well-trodden path"l\ was taken up by parliamentarians such as Kurori with tenuous 
attachments to neo-liberalism. At the time of Tadeusz Mazowiecki' s appointment. inflation had 
soared and the excessive wage indexation clause agreed on at the Round Table was about to be 
activated. In a matter of days, Balcerowicz emerged as the country's chief economic strategist. 
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Engaged in a "war of movement,,15, to paraphrase Schmitter. in which speed. decisiveness and 
radical options transcended structural constraints, the Balcerowicz Group firmly established 
themselves in government and took charge of Poland's transition to capitalism. 
The period of 'extraordinary politics' repeatedly described by Balcerowicz provided the 
context for the conception of 'shock therapy'. Comprised of individuals who. not only were not 
present in the economic working group of the Round Table, but were ill-disposed towards its 
social democratic agenda, the Balcerowicz Group emerged as a largely independent force within 
the Polish political establishment. This point can hardly be overemphasised, for the views of 
several economists allied to the Solidarity leadership (and very present at the Round Table) were. 
for the most part, dismissed. Tadeusz Kowalik, for one, accused the Mazowiecki government 
of carrying out "a 180-degree turn"16 in socio-economic policy. Although he understated the 
significance of the hyperinflationary environment, he remained one of the lone voices to 
challenge the prevailing assumption that no established alternatives to the Balcerowicz Plan 
existed. He also saw through the Sachsian 'strategy of transition' 17 when he stated that "the open 
question [in the Polish transformation] was whether the anti-inflationary operation [(the means)] 
was to become part of a [much] larger programme of systemic changes [(the ends)]."ls Clearly 
it was, and it did. 
David Ost, in a similar vein, was adamant that had it not been for Wal~sa's decision to 
delegate the tasks of governing to his intellectual advisors - who then delegated authority to the 
Balcerowicz Group - and allow them to portray radical reform as a Solidarity conception, the 
union in GdaIisk would have been more insistent on negotiating the terms of the Plan. It) As "the 
process of radicalisation gained its own momentum,·20, partly as a result of a muzzling of 
divisions but largely in response to the deterioration of the economy, the Balcerowicz Group 
assumed control over the design and tactics of reform. Bold and far-reaching, the Government 
Economic Programme announced in early October represented the model reform package long 
sought by the international financial institutions (one observer claimed the cabinet chose the most 
radical of the three drafts put forward by the IMF mission21 ). Practically all analyses of the 
Balcerowicz Plan, whether supportive or not, agree that its contents represented a philosophically 
coherent view of the desired goal: the renunciation of a 'third way' and the empha'iis on the 
market not just as the end goal but as the means of effecting the transformation. 




The highest priority was accorded to macroeconomic stabilisation. 
strongly influenced by the so-called 'heterodox' approach. By anchoring the Plan to a fixed 
exchange rate and the freezing of wage controls (in this particular case a punitive tax-based 
incomes policy known as the popiwek was adopted), Polish policy-makers believed they stood 
a better chance at eliminating hyperinflation once and for all. The two anchors were apparently 
meant to be lifted as soon as inflation was suppressed "but no dates were given:'~-' In addition. 
huge budgetary and subsidy cuts were announced, positive interest rates were instituted. and 
almost 90% of domestic prices were freed on 1 January 1990 with the exception of energy and 
some other sensitive household items. A steep devaluation of the zloty and the lifting of the hulk 
of restrictions on foreign trade were also implemented; import tariffs were set at extremely low 
levels. With the cooperation of the newly independent Central Bank - an institution with which 
Balcerowicz's Finance Ministry enjoyed "much greater powers of coordination between 
monetary and fiscal policy,,24 than would have normally been expected - a $1 billion stabilisation 
fund was set up and the authorities were promised favourable debt reduction provided the 
stabilisation programme held in place. 
Just as the macroeconomic component of the Plan forecast a moderate output decline and 
swift recovery within six months to one year, the systemic element hoped to privatise half the 
state sector within two to three years. Several key assumptions (and omissions) of ownership 
transformation strongly influenced the course of Polish enterprise reform. The first was that the 
popular backlash against 'spontaneous privatisation' in the late 1980s required a centralised. 
hands-on approach. Secondly, the government believed macroeconomic stabilisation alone could 
provide a sufficient basis for microeconomic restructuring; this was as much a recognition of 
anti-inflationary priorities as an ideological belief in the self-correcting powers of the market. 
A common refrain in 1989-90 was 'no restructuring before privatisation·. Thirdly, since the 
success of stabilisation depended on the speed of the supply response on the part of the state 
sector. the government felt it had to take a constructivist approach to privatising the state sector. 
Kornai's notion of a 'dual economy' - slowly auctioning off the state sector while privileging the 
private sector - was rejected on the grounds this would impose unnecessary delays and 
compromise the government's radical image. 
As Peter Murrell rightly observed, the terms 'privatisation' (of the state sector) and 
'creating a private sector' were used interchangeabli5 • such was the desire to transfer nominal 
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ownership into private hands. Finally, the government had to address the confused state of 
property rights whereby the state was in the uncomfortable position of lacking the legal authoritv 
.... . 
to dispose of 'its' assets. The self-governing enterprise model with its roots in the September 
1981 legislation was still in place. As the Gdansk-based research team on enterprise behaviour 
under Janusz D~browski repeatedly stressed, the workers' councils expected their legal 
entitlements to congeal into fully-fledged property rights in 1989. The fear on the part of the 
Balcerowicz Group and their western advisors that effective corporate governance would be 
sacrificed as a result of shifting and imprecise ownership claims focused their attention on the 
vexed issue of commercialisation. 
The preoccupation with commercialisation stemmed partly from the preferred model of 
ownership transformation. With a fondness for standard, conventional approaches, Krzysztof 
Lis's Agency for Property Transformation chose the route "with the aura of normalcy about iC!6: 
the British model of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). The original aim of Polish privatisation walii 
to avoid preferential treatment by hiring western consulting firms to value state enterprises in an 
objective manner and then to auction them off to domestic and foreign investors. The logistical 
impracticalities of capital privatisation - shallow markets, scarce domestic capital. and lengthy 
valuations - strengthened the appeal of voucher-based schemes favouring a free distribution of 
shares through investment funds. The Mass Privatisation Plan (MPP). however. placed equal 
emphasis on establishing an effective system of corporate governance that would "prevent both 
managers and workers from squandering [state firms'] income and assets before full privatisation 
[took] place.,,27 
By abolishing democratically-elected workers' councils and vesting governance in the 
hands of state-appointed boards of directors. commercialisation, as envisaged in the British 
model or the MPP, was divorced from long-established patterns of self-management. US-style 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), seemingly more suited to Solidarity's powerful self-
management wing known as the Network, were rejected by the new reformers on the grounds that 
their effect was pernicious.2!! Instead, Lis's Agency, following its failed attempts to pass a law 
on mass commercialisation, "repeatedly soft-pedalled the fact that legally all privatisation plans 
had to be approved by the councils."29 At the time of the launch of 'shock therapy'. the self-
managed enterprise structure had emerged unscathed from the 'process of radicalisation·. 
The importance of the period of 'extraordinary politics', aside from its catalysing effect 
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in winning legislative approval for the Plan, lay in its "exaggerated fonn of political causality":lO 
in which key individuals and specific agendas predominated. Wal~sa's decision to 'temporarily 
retreat' to Gdansk and, to all intents and purposes, award Mazowiecki' s government carte 
blanche to proceed with stabilisation proved as significant as the Balcerowicz Group' s 
monopolisation of the policy process. An entirely discredited PZPR was. if anything. more 
willing to endorse the Plan in contrast to a number of social democratic and peasant figures in 
the OKP who, while recognising the need for national unity, objected to the programme' s 
excessively liberal bent. These incipient divisions were suppressed by the government in view 
of the huge moral and political support for rapid, radical change. Doctrinaire aspirations 
concerning the envisioned model for the economy acted as a powerful stimulus for reform. In 
many ways they compensated, possibly substituted, for the fragile coalition agreement engineered 
by WaI~sa in August 1989. In what can only be described as a paradox in view of its intended 
effects, 'shock therapy' was portrayed by the Solidarity elites as the quickest and most reliable 
path to European integration; as the most effective strategy in departing from 'real socialism': 
and as proof of a genuine transfonnation in Poland's political and economic institutions. The 
emphasis on the irrevocability of the changes was more pronounced than in any other East 
European country (in particular Hungary) and trust in the authorities was considerable. 
POLITICAL VARIANTS OF NEO-LIBERALISM 
The four variants presented in this study sought to come to grips with the constant tensions 
between macroeconomic stabilisation and the intractabilities of systemic refonn, particularly 
large-scale privatisation. As the transition progressed, the room for manoeuvre increased. The 
reasons for categorising Polish economic policy in such a manner derived from the philosophical 
and political foundations of each variant. In the first (possibly the second) and fourth cases, there 
was an explicit attempt, if not on the part of the practitioners themselves then certainly through 
their advisors and acolytes in the academic community, to associate the conception of refonn 
with one of the two schools outlined in Chapter 1. As I stressed all along. these descriptions 
were simply used to elevate (or downgrade) one particular aspect of neo-liberalism. or else to 
compare its implementation with that in another post-communist country. The enduring legacy 
of Balcerowiczism nevertheless rendered the categorisation worthwhile. especially in view of the 
third and fourth variants' attempts to distance themselves from aspects commonly associated 
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with the first variant. 
i) The MazowieckilBalcerowicz model. The exigencies of suppressing hyperinflation. together 
with Mazowiecki' s desire for a peaceful, orderly process of democratisation, combined, rather 
effectively, to offer the Balcerowicz Group a period of grace in which to stabilise the Polish 
economy. The three key features of this variant were the elitist. didactic approach to governing: 
the emphasis on macroeconomic stabilisation as the driving force of economic policy; and the 
attempted adoption of Stefan Kawalec's British model of privatisation. The shifting alliances 
among the three 'camps' of the Solidarity movement described by the Polish journalist Piotr 
Wierzbicki31 resulted in Mazowiecki's so-called 'Retinue' and Bronislaw Geremek's so-called 
'Family' emerging as defenders of the status quo bequeathed by the Round Table compromise 
with the communists. Mazowiecki, in particular, was unwilling to renounce the agreement on 
the grounds this would have destabilised the reforms and created unnecessary splits within the 
Solidarity movement. His legalistic approach to governing wali criticised by the so-called 'Court' 
grouped around W al~sa in Gdansk which sought to portray the Round Table formula as, at best, 
a hindrance to Poland's systemic transformation and, at worst, a cloak for the advancement of 
a 'leftist' agenda. The 'Revolution from Above' or 'Discrete Revolution' described by Jadwiga 
Staniszkis refined the Court's arguments by suggesting the Mazowiecki/Geremek factions' use 
of the 'Solidarity Ethos' as a legitimating symbol to carry out the reforms was outdated, counter-
productive and an impediment to interest representation. ~2 The aloof manner in governing, while 
ideal for implementing stabilisation, was a contributing factor to the 'war at the top' in spring 
1990. 
With the assistance of its two 'anchors' of fiscal and monetary policy, the Balcerowicz 
Plan was successful in eliminating hyperinflation, ending shortages and stabilising the currency. 
A dramatic drop in domestic demand in the first-half of 1990 with real wages and industrial 
production plummeting by almost 30% respectively and GOP falling by 150( .'.' was 
counterbalanced by healthy foreign trade figures, a budgetary surplus and a boom in private 
sector activity. Stanislaw Gomulka noted that "the paradoxical feature of the [Plan] wa.1\ that 
many of its important assumptions and policy aims were missed by wide margins yet all of ib 
six performance criteria [agreed with the lMF] were comfortably met in 1990."4 Critics of the 
,~ h'l 
programme attributed this to the excessive 'overshooting' in the first-half of the year· w I C 
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others took the view that "overshooting [was] an essential feature of any good stabilisation 
programme.,,36 Clearly the correct mixture of flexibility and stability is debatable given the 
unprecedented nature of the task. The more general line of criticism was that an overemphasis 
on macroeconomic measures, partly stemming from the IMF's own theoretical frameworks 
borrowed from Latin America, resulted in excessive falls in output and production. One of the 
reasons why such complaints were not as prevalent in 1990 as they were in 1991 was connected 
with the slow supply response on the part of state sector. The steep initial devaluation of the 
zhty, together with one-off inflationary gains from the early months of stabilisation. postponed 
the necessary microeconomic restructuring on the part of state firms: indeed enterprises' 
profitability increased in the first-half of 1990 by almost 30%.)7 While these developments were 
partly attributable to delays in implementing institutional changes, notably in the banking sector. 
the absence of a viable large-scale privatisation strategy was equally significant. 
Kawalec's November 1988 privatisation blueprint emerged as the preferred method in 
early 1990. Like the Hungarian reformers in 1990, Lis's Agency placed its faith in market sales. 
More interested in the quality of privatisation rather than its speed. the Agency discarded the rival 
Lewandowski and SzomburglSachs and Lipton citizens' ownership schemes on the grounds these 
would have upset the stabilisation regime. Lewandowski himself criticised the government for 
perceiving privatisation solely as an instrument of stabilisation and commented that "the threat 
of inflation was the biggest drawback for supporters of voucher privatisation in 1990."·'8 The 
Agency was even less accommodating towards the self-management counter-proposal bill 
submitted by the 23 deputies in the parliament led by Ryszard Bugaj. Arguing for strong 
parliamentary oversight of the privatisation process and preferential treatment for employees. the 
draft law was rejected out of hand by the government. Originally assuming "it had the right to 
implement whatever solution it saw fit,,39, the Agency was eventually forced to retreat from its 
plans to commercialise enterprises at will amid accusations of etatisme and strong resistance on 
the part of the workers' councils. As the stabilisation programme progressed, "the councils 
exercised their rights across a broader range of decisions" and "opposed legislation that would 
have unilaterally given the state the [power to strip them of their rights) ... .u) 
While many criticised the July 1990 privatisation law for its failure to clarify property 
rights and for granting the councils an effective veto on ownership changes-l ' , the multi-track 
approach inherent in the law emerged as the Act's strongest asset in view of the poor re~ulh 
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associated with the British model. Costly, time-consuming, and ill-suited to the realities of a 
decentralised enterprise culture, the capital route was declared a failure by the end of 1990 with 
only five large firms sold through IPOs and the realisation that "the next round would be as hard 
as the first.,,42 'Bottom-up' privatisations, on the other hand, either through the less-publicised 
liquidation paths for small- and medium-sized firms or else in the dynamic growth of the new 
private sector with a 40% increase in the number of individual proprietorships4~, constituted the 
(surprise) success story of Polish reform. The findings of the D~browski team challenged the 
Balcerowicz Plan's assumptions on three counts: macroeconomic stabilisation alone was deemed 
inadequate in assessing firms' true potential, notably in view of the lack of large-scale ... 
bankruptcies; self-managed enterprises, at least small- and medium-sized ones. were perfectly 
capable of engaging in restructuring with the workers' councils themselves often acting as the 
initiators of ownership changes; and difficulties in legitimating commercialisation and/or 
privatisation in the large enterprises required unconventional solutions compensating insiders 
while "taking ownership questions outside of an arena in which only firms and Ministries 
[participated].,,44 
ii) The Walysa-Initiated GdaIisk Liberals' Variant. Originating from the 'Court's' fears of a 
political monopoly on the part of the 'Retinue' and the 'Family', the 'war at the top' in spring 
1990 provided impetus to various programmes designed to 'accelerate' Poland's transition. The 
three key aspects to this variant were W al~sa' s eclectic policy formulations: Lewandowski's 
'privatisation offensive'; and the beginnings of an interventionist approach to economic policy. 
Ost recognised the chameleon-like behaviour of Wal~sa when he suggested that "although [the 
Solidarity Chairman] appeared to side with workers, he was in fact more closely aligned with a 
group of Gdansk Liberals who felt the 'Warsaw-Cracow' circle of liberals in government [under 
Mazowiecki] was not transforming the economy fast enough."~) In his attempts to prolong the 
Janus-like role of his union as a defender of workers' interests and as a political umbrella for the 
reforms, Wal~sa effectively suppressed the former and hoped to sustain the latter through 
carefully crafted appeals: "His was a neo-liberal economic programme with strong populi,t 
sensibilities attached to sound working class credentials''-'6, Ost aptly observed, 
Although this did little to address the deep-seated frustrations and confusions inherent 
in Solidarity's dual functions, it offered the reforms a new lease of life by emphasising theme, 
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close to the union's heart such as 'decommunisation', mass privatisation, the abolition of the 
popiwek and, last but not least, Wal~sa as President. It was laroslaw Kaczynski's Centre 
Alliance party (PC) which emerged as the political exponent of these goals and favoured a more 
'radical' liberalism than that articulated by its chief adversary, the Citizens' Movement for 
Democratic Action (ROAD). Much of the economic advice offered to W aI~sa' s campaign 
stemmed from the mass privatisation recipes advocated by Bielecki's KLD which, for the most 
part, were presented as "a correction to and bringing to life of the Balcerowicz Plan [rather than] 
its rejection.,,47 
By all accounts 1991 was the year when the Polish private sector perfonned spectacuhuly 
in spite of the anti-inflationary regime and the deepening recession. Industrial production in the 
private sphere increased by almost 25% (compared to 16% in 1990), employing 55% of the 
workforce and contributing to 45% of GDP.48 From the beginning, Bielecki's government 
signalled its desire to speed up the liquidation routes (referred to as the 'privatisation express'), 
attract much-needed foreign investment and reform the banking and financial sectors. 
Lewandowski's appointment as Minister of Ownership Transfonnation redressed the balance in 
favour of non-equivalent forms of privatisation. The voucher scheme seemed compelling in view 
of the economic and political impediments to the British model. Yet because of its new emphasis 
on improving corporate governance (as opposed to the original 1988 version's focus on the 
transfer of ownership), "this apparently simple [and attractive] idea proved a logistical 
nightmare.,,49 Unlike the Czech scheme proposed by Klaus, political considerations did not play 
a part in the MPP's preparation and the government, together with professional economists ami 
academics, remained sceptical of the project. The stumbling block once again was 
commercialisation; either as a result of the voluntarist nature of enterprise refonn or, as was 
increasingly the case throughout 1991, the new rationale behind commercialisation: an attempt 
on the part of enterprises to shift responsibility for their poor financial condition onto the state 
in the hope of winning access to new loans. 
Even a member of the D'lbrowski team admitted that "the hopes [we) placed in [mass 
privatisation] were greatly exaggerated. We also overestimated the speed of privatisation and 
succumbed to the temptation to resolve it once and for all through stock distributions in ) 990 ... ~I 
By 31 December 1991, barely 64 out of the proposed -lOO finns targeted for mass privatisalion 
had been transformed into joint-stock companies51 • While the concept of the MPP remained 
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popular - Wal~sa's competitive plan evolved from a 100 million ~/()ty credit in 1990 to three 
times as much in 1992 - the 'Bermuda Triangle' syndrome. or "the unhappy and debilitating ... 
cocktail of short-term interests of the unions, workers' councils and managers"'~. impeded plans 
for privatisation. Yet as the D'lbrowski team reiterated in their 1991 survey. the dimination of 
the councils did little to improve the atmosphere surrounding enterprises' operations. let alone 
increase their performance. Instead, the problem lay with delays in institutional reforms.~' 
Bochniarz's appointment as Industry and Trade Minister in July 1991 was the first 
concrete admission that a more interventionist approach to restructuring industry was needed. 
The meeting of the minds between extreme liberals and unionist sympathisers for the aholition 
of the popiwek, the forced devaluation of the zloty. and the budgetary crisis brought on by the 
collapse of the CMEA trade regime all suggested that Balcerowicz's anti-inflationary straitjacket 
was untenable. The special case of 1990 in which the government relied on one-off inflationary 
gains from state firms ma~ked the structural weaknesses of the Plan. The IMF's role came under 
intense scrutiny as many questioned (and objected to) the Fund's "catch-phrase that there was 
no trade-off between stabilisation and growth.",,-t A recurring theme in policy circles centred 
around Balcerowicz's monopolistic role in economic policy. Bochniarz objected to this and 
sought to shift the centre of gravity of enterprise reform away from the "one-sided monetary and 
fiscal policies,,55 of 1990 and towards a more varied approach that, for the first time, recognised 
the need for restructuring (before privatisation) and better monitoring of firms' behaviour. The 
need to create proper incentives for state enterprises to adjust by disentangling the property rights 
knot, addressing the issue of non-performing loans in the banking sector, and initiating (selective) 
industrial policies signified a more pragmatic approach. • Alternati ves' to the Ba1cerowicz Plan 
were voiced in various quarters in the run-up to the October 1991 parliamentary elections. By 
this time the IMF had suspended relations with the government, Lewandowski's 'privatisation 
offensive' had run out of steam, and KurOIi was admitting that a 'second step' was necessary. 
iii) Kuron's Negotiated Pact. The Olszewski government's inability to effect a 'hreakthrough' 
contributed to the outbreak of militant strikes in July/August 1992 modelled on the 21 demands 
issued by the Solidarity union in August 1980. Eager to prevent the situation from e ... calating 
further, KurOIl spearheaded the drive for corporatist-style social pacts as a means of containing 
the disputes. The two key aspects of this variant were the motivations on the part of Kuron in 
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proceeding with his initiative and the extent to which the Pact represented a departure from the 
original Balcerowicz framework. It was perhaps inevitable that Kurori' s ea"y rapport and 
persuasive manners were called upon by the neo-liberals to help rescue their refonns. Arguably 
the most intriguing, if somewhat enigmatic, figure in Poland's transfonnation (not only did he 
"launch Jeffrey Sachs,,56, in Kowalik's words, as the first international advisor to the Solidarity 
leadership, he became the personal embodiment of the Sachsian philosophy of separating the 
means of transition from the ends by putting his social democratic beliefs 'on hold' until after 
stabilisation was achieved), his innovative and forward-looking strategies won plaudits from all 
sections of the political establishment. 
It was clear that at some time during the implementation of the Balcerowicz Plan - Kuron 
claimed it was towards the end of 199057 - he realised technocracy alone was insufficient in 
reforming Poland's institutions. The question as to whether he should (or could) have proposed, 
possibly insisted on, his social pact at an earlier stage is debatable; given his firm endorsement 
of 'shock therapy' it seems highly unlikely. The Pact on State Enterprises had as much to do 
with KurOIl's personal style as it did with substance. That not a single union member could have 
ever conceived of Balcerowicz entertaining the prospect of negotiation was advantageous for 
Kurori.. The overriding aim of the project was an attempt to include elements of consultation and 
choice in the restructuring of industry. Following the limited achievements of the British model 
and the MPP, the Pact further accentuated the multi-track character of Polish privatisation by 
according greater weight to the more indigenous liquidation routes and extending the deadline 
for forced commercialisation. That it distinguished between small and large firms tended to 
support the D~browski team's findings. Although constrained when devising the Pact, Kuron 
attempted to alter the tone of Balcerowiczism by introducing neo-corporatist features into a 
largely unchanged liberal privatisation regime. 
The chief novelties of the Pact were the emphasis on social partnership together with a 
Willingness to place ownership transfonnation on an equal footing with labour relations. The 
most enthusiastic supporter of a social contract was Bugaj's Labour Union (UP). Even staunch 
liberals such as Marek D~browski admitted that "self-management bodies could. to a certain 
degree, [have become] the allies of market reform; that it [had been] a mistake to wage war 
against them as this [had] postponed necessary privatisation; in the end. conces,ions to 
employees had to be made.',58 The discrepancies in his statement epitomi,ed the somewhat 
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deceitful nature of the Pact. For while the contract awarded preferential treatment to employee" 
by allocating them gratuitous shares in enterprises and broadening the scope of colle~ti\'e 
bargaining, the provisional system of corporate governance sought by refonners since October 
1989 - commercialisation as a prelude to privatisation - endured, at lea~t for the large finns. It 
was no coincidence that the self-management activists centred around the Network remained 
deeply sceptical of KurOIi's proposals and realised that the basic aim of eliminating the workers' 
councils, not even referred to in the Pact, continued to dictate policy. 
The unions, meanwhile, aside from being unable to provide the basis for a genuine 
corporatist arrangement partly as a result of political animosities between Marian Krzaklewski' s 
Solidarity and Ewa Spychalska's OPZZ, posed legitimate questions concerning the state's 
financial capability to fulfil the social obligations inherent in a corporatist pact the issue which 
most felt undermined the contract from the very beginning. Yet as Kuron stressed in his May 
1994 manifesto a year later, the need for a social pact, neo-corporatist or otherwise. in 
restructuring industry was necessary in sustaining the reforms. His initiative was hardly a 
renunciation of Balcerowiczism, yet it signified a willingness to approach privatisation in socio-
political terms as opposed to the technical considerations that predominated in 1990-91. With 
the victory of the left in the September 1993 parliamentary elections. these admissions were taken 
as evidence of the failures of the 'shock therapy' model for the transition. 
iv) KoJodko's 'Social Alternative'. While many of Balcerowicz's advisors extolled the virtues 
of his Plan as "a symbol of successful transition. praised by the international financial 
institutions" and largely attributable to the 1990-91 years as Ha period of very fast and 
comprehensive reforms,,59, the Kolodko Group challenged these assumptions on numerous 
grounds. The three key features of this variant were Kolodko's dirigiste approach to enterprise 
refonn; the negotiated framework reminiscent of Kuron's Pact; and the deliberate revisionism 
inherent in the Strategy for Poland. At the time of the Strategy's launch in June 1994, Alice 
Amsden and her colleagues had just published the first comprehensive anti- 'shock therapy' 
account of Eastern Europe's transfonnations in which they challenged some of the ha~ic 
assumptions behind enterprise refonn. Referring to the research on Polish enterprise behaviour 
undertaken by Marek Belka and his colleagues which claimed that while '''shock therapy' can 
. . b' .'. 1-' d'cating the government's commitment have valuable effects by glvmg unam IgUOUS signa s m 1 
237 
to hard budgets, it [also] shows that rapid changes in ownership may be unnece"safY and that 
restructuring before privatisation [is] desirable"60, the Amsden book criticised the 'market 
fundamentalist' philosophy in the early years of the post-communist transition.!>1 
With the backing of Aleksander KwaSniewski's Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), 
Kolodko approached privatisation with similar distrust and focused his attention on strengthening 
corporate governance and improving efficiency in the state sector. Like Belka, he also claimed 
that the performance of firms had less to do with their fonn of ownership than with their external 
environment. As the first medium-term policy document since the Balcerowicz Plan, the 
Strategy placed central administrative reform and the reassertion of managerial control at the top 
of its agenda. The belated establishment of the State Treasury as the Ministry responsible for the 
supervision of state property resulted in a renewed mass commercialisation drive. Highly 
reminiscent of the attitude taken towards self-management in late 1989. Kolodko' s conception 
of enterprise reform "leaned much more heavily towards tight control by finns' directors than 
to workers' participation."62 Many liberals criticised this approach as 'recentralisation for the 
sake of recentralisation' instead of as a prelude to privatisation. Yet given their own fixation 
with recentralisation at the height of Polish neo-liberalism and their recognition that the state's 
weak role as both de jure and de facto owner of its assets had contributed to a delay in (and 
compromised the overall quality of) privatisation6" a touch of hypocrisy could be discerned. 
The Strategy's emphasis on social dialogue derived from Jerzy Hausner's academil: 
works. His theoretical analysis contrasting the 'shock therapists" so-called 'imperative method 
of transformation' with the more consensual 'interactive' approach appeared in an early 1994 
publication64 co-authored with Kuron and prefaced by Boni, another veteran of the Labour 
Ministry (Hausner himself, ironically, entered the Ministry in early 1997 as he took over the 
pensions portfolio from the late Andrzej B~czkowski). A long-time admirer of KurOli, Hausner 
had welcomed the Pact on State Enterprises and, while not perceiving "any fundamental changl' 
in the transformation programme", believed "the proposals were not purely tactical in character: 
and in this sense they [were] important."65 Central to the 'interactive method' was the view that 
the didactic policy style associated with stabilisation became divorced from the social and 
institutional realities of enterprise reform: "no one", in Hausner's view, "had tried to bridge this 
gap"66 , with the possible exception of Kuron. The Strategy's abolition of the POpiH'('k and it~ 
. IT' 'C mml'sl'on on wage ,ettlcmenh wa.' amonl! replacement with the corporatist-stye npartlte 0 s. ~ 
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a variety of measures ranging from regional development schemes to 'f' 'I't t' ,. d . I . aCI I a I\e In u"tna 
polices aimed at reorienting Poland's transition away from the harsh liberalism of 1990-91. 
Basic continuity nevertheless prevailed with anti-inflationary priorities ~till high on the agenda 
and a near certainty that the workers' councils - now treated with equal disdain in small and large 
firms - would finally become extinct. 
Kolodko repeatedly sought to "dispel the myth that Poland's economic successes were 
due primarily, or exclusively, to the 'shock therapy' policies [introduced] in January 1990:'(,' 
From the moment he published his Strategy, he promised a more gentle, peaceful transition and 
went out of his way to convince a sceptical audience that he possessed an alternative to 
Bacerowiczism combining macroeconomic orthodoxy with a social democratic appeal. His case 
rested on what he perceived as a turning of the tide in policy circles in 1992-93 when the 
traditional 'Washington Consensus' was no longer characterised by the unanimity it once 
claimed. Aside from the works of Amsden and Hausner (the latter had organised a conference 
in October 1993 in Krak6w68 in which Kolodko, Stark and many others voiced their theoretical 
and practical displeasures with the neo-liberal design), Kolodko' s views were closely aligned 
with those of his colleague Domenico Nuti. Their paper, aptly entitled 'The Polish Alternative '69, 
was nothing short of a point-by-point rebuttal of the 1990-91 years of reform. Interestingly, and 
perhaps not surprisingly given the difficulties Kolodko faced in fashioning a strategy that was 
both consistent and distinctively his own, the authors were at pains to stress that their criticisms 
"not be confused with calls for 'gradualism', [such as] those put forward by the 'social market' 
supporter John Gray.,,70 Not only did this question the legitimacy of Kolodko's 'anti-
Balcerowiczism', it suggested that, given that the Strategy's differelltia specijica lay in the sphere 
of collective bargaining, the philosophical shift could in fact be traced to Kurori's Pact. 
THE RELEVANCE OF POLISH REFORM 
It was Bielecki who, when reflecting on Poland's systemic transformation, noted that "in many 
ways our successes and failures stem from being the first [to initiate the transitionl."11 This j" 
why it is problematic to present general lessons of the Polish transition or to "ingle out 
. d' 'd al I" I t al contrast these with other countries' experiences. Poland did not m IVI u s or po lCles, e one 
h h I f be· &" arned of post-communism's' 'transformation traps'7~ when it ave t e uxury 0 mg .orew . .' 
b k d . &" 'nt Whl'ch can hardly be overemphasised. Furthermore. the notion em ar e on Its re.orms; a pOl 
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of global statements runs contrary to the spirit of this study. For the central theme of thi" 
research has been that the dichotomous conception of post-communist transitions inherent in both 
schools has led to unhelpful stereotyping as a result of insufficient attention paid to the political 
and historical determinants of economic change. It is the juxtaposition of Poland' s radical 
macroeconomic stance in January 1990 with an indigenous enterprise model ba~ed on a history 
of self-management (and the associated political and economic a~pects to these two features) that 
has served as the battleground for the arguments, and counter-arguments. of both schools. 
Transitologists', emboldened by the works of Schmitter and his colleagues on the .... 
Southern European and Latin American regime changes, found common ground with economists 
such as Sachs in suggesting conventional models could (and should) be applied to the post-
communist region. 'Adaptationists', meanwhile, often citing the work of North on path 
dependence, pointed to the institutional, historical, and possibly cultural impediments to neo-
liberal designs and called for more discriminating, multidisciplinary approaches. In the early 
phase, the advice of the former overshadowed the counsel of the latter. When 'shock therapy' 
failed to live up to expectations, when a "tabula nOll rasa .. 7 ' seemed more appropriate. or even 
when unforeseen developments compensated for faulty prescriptions (the rapid growth of 
Poland's private sector is a case in point), the debates sharpened. The dichotomy persisted, 
however, either in a 'shock therapy versus gradualism' form or else in broader philosophical 
discussions as Gray and Sachs ensured. With its four variants of neo-liberalism, each 
approaching the transition with a different perspective, Poland provided sustenance to these 
debates yet, as I argued, strengthened the case for a multifaceted approach. 
The relevance of Polish reform, I believe, lies in the importance of initial conditions in 
analysing post-communist transformations, specifically the manner in which these conditions are 
exploited _ short-term political factors in a given (yet crucial) time frame versus 'paths of 
extrication' based on structural legacies - in the reform debates. This view does not preclude 
generalisations or cross-country comparisons; on the contrary, it encourages them provided they 
are well-informed, historically aware and precise with regard to the issue(s) under consideration. 
But it departs emphatically from those all too prevalent analyses in 1989/90 which sought to 
. ~ t, t've East European country .. 7-' with scant prescnbe "a prototype reform process lor a represen a 1 • 
&" 1989 d I ts Many might argue that since Poland spearheaded radical relerence to pre- eve opmen . 
economic change. that it is the country, aside from the special case of the former Ea'\t Germany. 
240 
most closely associated with the 'shock therapy' route, and that it emerged the quickest from 
recession with the lowest cumulative drop in output, key lessons can (and should) be drawn from 
its experience. I would concur provided these 'lessons' are not presented in all-emhracing terms 
(either with respect to the Polish reform process itself or else with regards to other countries' 
transformations) and are confined to specific elements and stages. 
These caveats derive from a belief that misconceptions regarding transition programI1l~s 
stem partly from insufficient research devoted to indigenous institutions und~r communism -
particularly the forms of governance in state enterprises. Once these factors have heen accounted 
for, then another set of misunderstandings concerning the temporal aspects of post-communist 
reform measures, notably their qualitatively different political and economic features. require 
clarification. Both sets of misconceptions have been fuelled by (and have their origins in) 'shock 
therapists" willingness to merge stabilisation with structural change. The one author, in my 
mind, who recognises these analytical abuses is Csaba; Stark is more qualified on the 
institutionallhistorical aspects of post-communist privatisation regimes. The fact that Csaha is 
painted as a 'gradualist,75 merely serves to accentuate his arguments that East European reforms 
have, from the outset, been burdened by unhelpful stereotypes and faulty diagnoses. Csaba 
blames the 'tourist guides', in his words, for "compounding the tasks" of stabilisation and 
structural adjustment and, on this basis, "attempting to produce an optimal th~ory of 
transformation with validity across countries."76 While many saw merit in such exercises - the 
two-volume edition by Olivier Jean Blanchard and his colleagues77 is a case in point - and used 
Poland as their frame of reference, they failed to integrate their arguments with well-researched 
historical analyses. In the end, one was left with little insight on why Poland found it difficult 
to privatise its firms or why Hungary attracted billions in foreign investment - to say nothing of 
Russia's enduring difficulties with reform. 
A Sense of Vindication? 
If initial conditions constitute the most relevant alipect of Poland's post-communist reforms. how 
have both schools differed in diagnosing these conditions and pr~scrihing potential cures ha\ed 
h 
., t·? Before commenting on this one should state unequivoGllly that on t elf respectIve assessmen s. . . 
th . t i.' t' n of Eastern Europe proved much more difficult and much more e economic ranSlorma 10 . 
I h f t d
· 1989 irrespective of reform strategy. In other word ... hoth 
cost y t an most 0 us expec e In -. -
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'shockers' and 'gradualists' found their plans to be of little help in mitigating the hardships of 
adjustment. A cursory examination of the Polish transition indicates that "despite the (inevitable) 
mistakes, a heavily indebted post-communist economy can retreat from the brink of 
hyperinflation, be reoriented away from trade with its former allies, effect dramatic increases in 
the private sphere of economic activity, and experience the beginnings of a recovery in two to 
three years.,,78 
Equally significant is the fact that Poland seems to have overcome the perennial 
instability associated with its 'first phase,79 of democratisation. Although deep-seated emotional 
and historical divisions persist, a more mature political establishment. together with strengthened 
electoral and constitutional frameworks, have considerably reduced the volatility of the 1990-93 
years. Membership in the OECD, admission to NATO. and the prospect of swift entry into the 
European Union by the tum of the century (or shortly thereafter) illustrate the dramatic 
achievements of the past several years. Poland received $6.6 billion in foreign investment in 
1997 alone, the highest yearly amount in the region since 1989: cumulative inflows of foreign 
investment in the 1989-97 period amount to $20.6 billion which means Poland has now 
overtaken Hungary as the largest recipient of foreign investment. xo Other post-communist states 
have not been as successful in launching the critical mass of economic measures, or else have 
been bedevilled by national, religious or ethnic disputes. Poland's accomplishments stemmed 
largely from its political willingness to implement painful stabilisation early on while 
simultaneously pursuing far-reaching structural changes. The Balcerowicz Plan exerted 
considerable influence over these developments and left an enduring philosophical legacy. 
The strength of Csaba's premise that stabilisation and structural reforms need to be 
distinguished is perhaps best illustrated by the comment by Lewandowski at the beginning of 
Chapter 3. It is worth repeating for it encapsulates the intriguing juxtaposition in Polish reform 
that both schools seized on to justify their arguments: "The most characteristic feature of the 
Polish economic transition [in 1990-91] was a Thatcherite monetary framework combined with 
an almost Yugoslav enterprise model."l!l At the risk of exaggeration. I feel it is on this basis that 
post-mortems of the Balcerowicz Plan need to be conducted for many of the debates surrounding 
its implementation stem precisely from this apparent contradiction. The two schools derive much 
of their analytic strength by focusing on the conditions which shaped these two sides to Poland's 
economic reforms: the 'transitologists' centre almost exclusively on the window of opportunity 
in late 1989 that resulted in the radical stabilisation regime while the 'adaptationish' point to the 
significance of the September 1981 legislation which empowered democratically-elected 
workers' councils and complicated plans for privatisation. This discrepancy over initial 
conditions, notably the precise time frame under consideration, is, I believe, the most interesting ... 
aspect of the reforms. For not only does this go to the heart of the 'transition' versus 'adaptation' 
controversy, it underscores the need for clear distinctions between the ('extraordinary') politics 
of stabilisation and that of large-scale privatisation. The diagnoses and prescriptions of both 
schools have, for the most part, revolved around these two issues. 
In the case of the fonner, the old Chinese proverb that 'in every crisis lies an opportunity' 
epitomises the success of Polish reformers in launching rapid and comprehensive stabilisation. 
The Schmitteresque atmosphere in the second-half of 1989, while inseparable from the sudden 
deterioration of the macroeconomy in August 1989, is rightly perceived as the diJJenllill spec~/icll 
of the Polish transition and, as Komai noted with regard to Hungary'I2, immediately served to 
differentiate the 'big bang' from other less dramatic transformations. As a result of strong 
political considerations (spelt out succinctly in Sachs's controversial article published 12 days 
after the launch of the Balcerowicz Plan8J), stabilisation wa~ tied to equally 'radical' structural 
reforms, thereby creating the illusion of a 'jump into the market'. To what extent did the sharp 
stabilisation approach live up to expectations? Even if one accepts that 1990 was a special case 
and that a 'stop-go' sequence of macroeconomic management imposed unnecessary costs on the 
economy, few would dispute the a'isertion that stabilisation succeeded in its basic aim of 
restoring stability to public finances in a relatively short period and with the smallest cumulative 
drop in output. 
With the assistance of a disciplined Central Bank, Polish macroeconomic policy has 
resulted in substantial reductions in foreign debt together with a stable (and newly 
redenominated) currency. While debates still persist on the changes in living standards in the 
early years of the transition as well as the precise origins of the output decline (policy-induced 
or CMEA-driven), Poland, unlike some other Ea~t European states, is now in an advanced stage 
of structural reforms. An issue which has not faded from the policy agenda is the role of the 
IMF. For just as 'shock therapists' are accused of surreptitiously extending their 'radical' 
philosophy to institutional measures, the Fund has been criticised, by ih own ~rsonnclq. for 
. . . . Wh'l th:> IMF certainl\' undere ... timated the straying too far outSide Its area of expertise. let: .'
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difficulties Polish policy-makers faced with tax, banking and social security refonns. it was 
joined by the Ba1cerowicz Group in its erroneous forecasts concerning state-dri vt:n 
privatisation.
85 In this respect, the IMF, according to Bielecki. "completely ignored the role of 
the nascent private sector as the engine and the most important aspect of the Polish economic 
transition. ,,86 
It is in the politics and economics of large-scale privatisation where the Balcerowicz Phm 
left much to be desired. From the beginning, the D~browski team were among the few who 
recognised that the problem was not privatisation per se but how a weak state with such an 
ambitious reform agenda would be able to dictate the tenns of ownership transfonnation givt:n 
the entrenched position of insiders in state enterprises. Commenting on the vexed issue of 
commercialisation in 1990, the team joined other economists such as Barbara Blaszczyk and 
Marek D~browski87 by stressing the particular interpretation of commercialisation in the context 
of a decentralised enterprise culture: "The stalemate over property rights [could never] be brokt:n 
by the unilateral reassertion of the state's ownership claims. Politically this invites disa'\ter while 
economically it is liable to leave the state once again responsible for administering the entire 
economy.,,8S The D~browski group concurred with sociologists such as Stark!lQ in strt:ssing that 
the power of the workers' councils was simply too important (and useful) a legacy to be 
discarded; in small- and medium-sized firms they acted as "agents of change, forcing 
management to pursue more dynamic adjustment strategies [and at times] moderating union 
demands.,,90 In the case of large enterprises, the dreaded 'Bennuda Triangle' syndrome often had 
less to do with the self-managed structure of finns than it did with the state's failure to carry out 
institutional reforms. 
Did Polish reformers (and those in other post-communist states for that matter) 
underestimate the property rights conundrum in late 1989 as a key factor in the microeconomic 
response of state firms to stabilisation? Was it sensible to paint the workers' councils as the 
enemies of privatisation and to view self-management as inimical to market refonn? Who hcst 
to consult than Ba1cerowicz who, in what is considered to he his treatise on radical refonn 
entitled 'Common Fallacies in the Debate on the Economic Transition in Central and Ea ... tem 
Europe,91, seemed more circumspect on the issue of self-management. The paper itself wa ... 
written in mid-1993 following the third major attempt at commercialising ~md privatising 
Poland's state firms. While he dismissed the Belka team's findings suggt:sting state firms need 
not be privatised in order to restructure as a fall acy92 he questioned hi Os 1° h· , ear ler emp a.-.l ... on 
commercialisation: "It is true that some important problems related to property rights are not 
adequately explained in the existing literature. The missing link is the importance of the form 
of corporate governance. The basic question of whether a shift from self-[managed] enterprises 
to manager-managed or outsider-supervised enterprises brings about an improvement in overall 
economic efficiency remains, in my view, unanswered.,,93 
This is a particularly candid statement in view of his unequivocal stance on 
commercialisation in late 1989. Is this an admission on the part of Balcerowicz that too many 
privatisation eggs were placed in the basket of commercialisation? At the very least. he 
recognises that unconventional forms based on 'bottom-up' methods achieved far greater success 
than state-driven privatisation. Yet given his strong endorsement of a liberal privatisation regime 
based on direct sales a La Hongroise, Ba1cerowicz probably greeted the passage of the August 
1996 Law on Commercialisation and Privatisation of State Enterprises with a sigh of relief. For 
this bill represented the culmination of seven years' efforts on the part of successive Polish 
governments to undo the legacy of self-management. A product of KoIodko' s mass 
commercialisation drive, the Law reshaped the entire framework for medium- and large-scale 
privatisation by granting the new State Treasury the power to commercialise and privatise firms 
at will; enterprises' consent, for the first time since 1981, was no longer required. 
This was clearly not the case in 1990-1991 when the two 'top-down' privatisation 
strategies - the British model and the MPP - foundered on the shoals of commercialisation. The 
state's institutionally ambitious role as the auctioneer and then the distributor of its assets, barring 
some unrepresentative capital sales, proved costly in more ways than one. By the end of 1991, 
ownership transformations had been initiated or completed (invariably the former) in just 15% 
or 1258 state firms out of a total of 8500 at the start of the 'big bang'. The majority of these 
privatisations (950) occurred via the liquidation routes for small- and medium-sized enterprises 
and were generally in the form of leasing arrangements "nursed into the world by the councils; 
precisely the institution which [the Balcerowicz Group had] regarded as being prejuJicial to 
property reform."94 Out of the 308 firms commercialised in preparation for privatisation, only 
26 had been sold to investors by the end of 1991. It is worth mentioning a recent W orlJ Bank 
survey which underscores the significance of enterprise governance in post-communist 
privatisation strategies. Hungary. with its strong managers. succeeded in privatising .tOCk of ... tatc 
assets through direct sales to foreigners; the Czech Republic. with its more centralised structure. 
was able to proceed swiftly with its voucher-based scheme accounting for SOCK of privatisations: 
finally, Poland, with a decentralised structure, privatised 30% of the state sector through 
management and/or employee buyouts; a mere 2% of firms were sold via direct sales to 
foreigners.95 
lfthere are lessons to be learnt from Poland's experience with privatisation. these lie in 
the multi-track approach envisaged, yet understated, in the July 1990 legislative framework. If 
Stark and the Dctbrowski team were correct in stressing the importance of the workers' councils. 
then Murrell, together with Kornai, were even more prescient in their view that a vibrant private 
sector could emerge as the driving force of ownership transformation.96 Whether the explosive 
growth of private enterprise, especially in 1991. can be traced to previous legislation enacted 
under the communists, the liberal foreign trade regime favoured by Balcerowicz. or simply the 
entrepreneurial instincts of Poles, it is, in the words of Blaszczyk and D~browski. "the 
unquestionable differentia specifica of Polish privatisation ... en The fact that "there wa~ no special 
government programme or law for 'small privatisation ... 91\ is all the more significant in view of 
its pivotal role in leading Poland out of recession. 
Time for New 'Tourist Guides' 
The relevance of Polish reform, therefore, lies in these two key aspects of its initial conditions 
which fuelled the debates on the appositeness of neo-liberalism in Eastern Europe: on the one 
hand, the legacy of self-management which. as Balcerowicz now admits, is not properly 
accounted for in the 'economics of transition' literature and questions certain assumptions behind 
state-driven privatisation; and, on the other, the 'extraordinary politics' in the second-half of 
1989 which gave birth to radical stabilisation and provided the political underpinnings of the 
'shock therapy' regime. Not without historical irony yet neither by coincidence. Solidarity was 
the prime instigator in both instances. In the case of the former, it lent its support to technocratic 
reformers who preached self-management as a means of reducing the power of the nomenklatura: 
and in the case of the latter, it once again provided backing to (these same) reformers who by 
then were extolling the virtues of free markets. Although many advocates of employee 
h· . d t to thel'r beliefs and criticised their erstwhile allies for advocating owners 1 p remame rue . . 
Sachsian 'shock therapy'. the Balcerowicz Group won 'the war of movement' in autumn 1989 
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and forged ahead with its neo-liberal agenda. 
This study concentrated on Poland's initial conditions in order to illustrate in which 
refonn area(s) and at which point in time both schools are at their most convincing. In so doing. 
I believe I have achieved two purposes: firstly, to demonstrate that the tenn 'shock therapy' is 
nothing more than a set of highly-publicised macroeconomic mealiures which. a., a result of their 
strong political character at the time of their launch, are packaged as 'institutional reforms': and 
secondly to unearth the structural and historical factors which invariably get eclipsed in the 
euphoria of the moment and yet compel refonners to revise their plans and devise new 
approaches to the transition. Evidently seduced by its dramatic start, the 'tourist guides' of 
Poland's economic transition seem to have not fully come to grips with these matters and. as a 
consequence, have often disappointed the political visitor. 
I end with a comment by Sachs which, in many ways, underscores the misconceptions 
surrounding economic reform: "While shock therapy has won many battles 'on the ground', it 
has lost in the arena of public relations."99 Aside from whether he is correct in his first point, it 
is clear that what is needed above all is clarity with regard to different countries' reform paths 
and the precise measures under consideration. 'Shock therapy' lost in the arena of puhlic 
relations partly as a result of a general inattentiveness to these issues in the early years of the 
post-communist transition. Analysts such as Csaba have called for a "change in the menu of 
priorities")OO when analysing East European transformations. I fully agree. As opposed to 
concentrating on the reforms themselves, we would be better advised to begin our investigations 
with a clearer understanding of the historical and political determinants of economic change. 
Given the speed of developments in recent years, particularly in Russia, a 'second generation' 
perspective on transitions is slowly beginning to emerge; the fact that certain books and articles 
written as recently as 1993-94 are passe is a reflection of this. Clearly the 'tourist guides' have 
a responsibility to improve our understanding of the region's multifaceted developments. 
Differences in the 'paths of extrication' from communism need to be more thoroughly examined 
and a less dichotomous, more inclusive view of reform strategies is required. Perhaps then. 
'shock therapy', ideally under a less emotive name and equipped with a more enlightened 
terminology, will be better received. 
2~7 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
l.lnterview with Markus Rodlauer, Senior Resident Representative. IMF. Warsaw. 23 February 
1996. 
2.Piotr JasiIiski, 'The Transfer and Redefinition of Property Rights: Theoretical Analvsis of 
Transferring Property Rights and Transformational Privatisation in the Post-STEs·. Com~lIll1liJI 
Economies and Economic Transformation, 4, 2, 1992, p.I64. 
3.Richard Portes 'Transformation Traps', The Economic Jounwl. 104. 2. 199·t p.1184. 
4.Laza Kekic, The IMF and Eastern Europe (London, The Economist Intelligence Unit. 3rd 
Quarter 1995). ... 
5.Barbara Blaszczyk and Marek D(}browski, The Privatisation Process in Polalld, /989-1992 
(London, Centre for Research into Communist Economies. 1993). p.65. 
6.Janusz D(}browski et aI, 'Polish State Enterprises and the Properties of Performance: 
Stabilisation, Marketisation, Privatisation', Politics and Society. 19.4,1991. p.404. 
7.Stanislaw Gomulka, The IMF-Supported Programmes of Poland and Russia, 1990-/994 
Studies and Analyses 36 (Warsaw, Centre for Social and Economic Research. 1995). p. 17. 
8.Ben Slay, The Polish Economy (Princeton, Princeton University Press. 1994), p.187. 
9.Grzegorz Kolodko and Domenico Mario Nuti, The Polish Altenwtive: Old Myths. Hard Facts 
and New Strategies in the Successful Transformation of the Polish Economy. Unpublished 
Manuscript, March 1997. 
10.Kazmierz Poznanski, Stabilisation and Privatisation ill Poland (Boston. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1993), p.16. 
11.Economic Scenariosfor Poland (Warsaw. Centre for Social and Economic Research, January 
1997). 
12.Kolodko and Nuti, op.cit. 
13.Portes, op.cit., p.1179. 
14.Jeffrey Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy (Cambridge. MIT Press. 1993). p.2. 
15.Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl. 'The Conceptual Tr:lVels ~f Tra~sitologists and 
Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go? , Slm'Ic RevIl'w, 53, 1, 1994. 
p.176. 
16.Tadeusz Kowalik, 'From Self-Governing Republic to Capitalism: POlish, Workers and 
Intellectuals' in Klaus Nielsen and Marguerite Mendell. Europe: Celllrlli cmd 1:£1.\'1 (Montreal. 
Black Rose Books, 1995). p.92. 
I7.Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton, 'Creating a Market Economy in Eal\tern Europe: The Cu.,t? 
of Poland', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1. 1990, pp.99-100. 
18.Tadeusz Kowalik, 'Marketisation and Privatisation : The Polish Case'. Socialist Register. 
1991, p.261. 
19.David Ost, Shaping a New Politics in Poland: Interests in Politics in Post-Communist East 
Europe Programme on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper 8 (Cambridge. Centre for 
European Studies, Harvard University, 1991), p.13. 
20.Tadeusz Kowalik, 'A Reply to Maurice Glasman'. Ne't\! Left Review. 206. 1994. p.l.39. 
21.lbid. 
22.Leszek Balcerowicz, 'Poland' in John Williamson. The Political Economy of Policy Reform 
(Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1994). p.160. 
23.Jan Winiecki, 'The Polish Transition Programme: Underpinnings. Results. Interpretations'. 
Soviet Studies, 44, 5, 1992, p.811. 
24.John Eatwell et aI, Transformation and Integration (London. Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1995), p.179. 
25.Peter Murrell, 'Evolution in Economics and in the Economic Reform of the Centrally Planned 
Economies' in Christopher Clague and Gordon Rausser. The Emergence of Market ECOIlOmit's 
in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, Blackwell, 1992). p.45. 
26.D'}browski et aI, op.cit., p.409. 
27.Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton, 'Privatisation in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland'. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 2, 1990, p.315. 
28.lbid., p.311. 
29.lbid., p.410. 
30. Schmitter and Karl, op.cit., p.175. 
31.Piotr Wierzbicki. 'Familia, Swiat, Dwor', Tygodnik Solidarnosc, 10 November 1989. 
32.Jadwiga Staniszkis, The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Easten. Europe (Berkdey. 
University of California Press, 1991), Ch.5. 
33.Simon Johnson and Marzena Kowalska, 'Poland: The Political Economy of Shock Therapy' 
in Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb, Votingfor Refonn (Wa,\hington, The World Bank. 19(4). 
p.201. 
34.Gomulka. op.cit., p.19. 
35.Kolodko and Nuti, op.cit., pp.10-17. 
36.Gomulka, op.cit., p.20. 
37.Janusz D'lbrowski, 'State-Owned Enterprises Under Pressure' in George Blazyca and Janusz 
Dctbrowski, Monitoring Economic Transition (Aldershot. Avebury, 1995). p.60. 
38.Janusz Lewandowski, The Political Struggle over Mass Privatisation in Poland Economic 
Transformation Papers 46 (Gdansk, GdaIisk Institute for Market Economics. 1994). p.7. 
39.Dctbrowski et ai, op.cit., p.410. 
40.lbid., p.4ll. 
41.Sachs and Lipton, 'Privatisation . .', op.cit., p.312. 
42.Andrew Berg, 'The Logistics of Privatisation in Poland' in O. J. Blanchard et al. The 
Transition in Eastern Europe Volume 2 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994), p.175. 
43.Blaszczyk and D'lbrowski, op.cit., p.61. 
44.Janusz Dctbrowski et ai, Stabilisation and Enterprise Adjustment: The Political Economy of 
State Firms after Five Months of Fiscal Discipline, Poland 1990 Programme on Central and 
Eastern Europe Working Paper 6 (Cambridge, Centre for European Studies, Harvard University. 
1991), p.64. 
45.0st, op.cit., p.14. 
46.lbid., p.32. 
47.Martin Myant, Transforming Socialist Economies: The Case of Poland and C~eclwsIO\'akia 
(Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1993), p.130. 
48.Poland 1990-1994 (Warsaw, Central Planning Office, May 1995). p.25. 
49.Stanislaw Gomulka and Piotr JasiIiski, Privatisation in Poland, 19X9-1993 Policies. Methods 
and Results (Warsaw, Institute of Economics. 1994), p.40. 
50.Anthony Levitas, 'Rethinking Reform: Lessons from Polish Privatisation', World Policy 
Journal, 9, 4, 1992, p.793. 
51.Lewandowski, op.cit., p.15. 
52.George Blazyca, 'Monitoring Economic Transformation', in Blazyca and Janusz D(Jbrowski. 
Monitoring Economic Transition (Aldershot. Avebury. 1995). p.13. 
53.Janusz Dctbrowski et aI, Privatisation Process in the Polish EconOl")' in 1991 Economic 
Transformation Paper 23 (GdaIisk, Gdansk Institute for Market Economics, 1992). pp.:!:!. )9-42. 
54.Peter Gowan. 'Neo-Liberal Theory and Practice for Eastern Europe'. New up Re\'iew, 213. 
1995. p.29. 
250 
55.Jerzy Hasuner and Stanislaw Owsiak, Financial Crisis of a State in Transformation: The 
Polish Case Economic and Social Policy Series 26 (Warsaw, Friedrich Ebert Foundation. 1992). 
p.50. 
56.Kowalik, 'From Self-. .', op.cit., p.95. 
57.Jacek KurOli, 'Musimy PaktowaC', Gazeta Wyborcza. 12 August 1992. 
58.Jerzy Hausner, Populist Threat in Transfonnation of Post-Socialist Socien' Economic and 
Social Policy 29 (Warsaw, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1992). p.71. . 
59.Economic Scenarios .. , op.cit., p.5. 
60.Marek Belka et aI, 'Transforming State Enterprises in Poland: Evidence on Adjustment hy 
Manufacturing Firms', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1, 1993. p.255. 
61.Alice Amsden, The Market Meets its Match (Cambridge. Harvard University Press. 1994). 
pp.l-16. 
62.Blazyca, op.cit., p.31. 
63.Jan Szomburg, 'The Political Constraints on Polish Privatisation' in Blazyca and D'lbrowski. 
op.cit., p.81-82. 
64.Jerzy Hausner and Jacek Kuron, Strategia Negocjacyjna w Procesie Transfomw(ji 
Gospodarki (Warsaw, Stefan Batory Foundation, 1994). 
65.Hausner, op.cit., p.78. 
66.Hausner and Kuron, op.cit., p.30. 
67.Kolodko and Nuti, op.cit., p.3. 
68.Conference on Transforming Post-Socialist Societies: Theoretical Perspecti\'es and Future 
Prospectsfor Economic and Political Change ill Europe, Krakow, 21-23 October 1993. 
69.Kolodko and Nuti, op.cit. 
70.lbid., p.15. 
7 I. Interview with Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Prime Minister 1991, London, 2 August 1996. 
72.Portes, op.cit. 
73.Peter MurrelL 'The Transition According to Cambridge, Mass'. Journal of Economic 
Literature. 33, 1, 1995. p.175. 
74.Stanley Fischer and Alan Gelb, 'The Process of Socialist Transformation'. JOllnrai of 
Economic Perspecti\'es. 5.4. 1991. p.IOl. 
251 
75.Martin Schrenk, 'Laszlo Csaba: Capitalist Revolution in Eastern Europe'. Transition. 6.5-6. 
1995, pp.16-17. 
76.Uszlo Csaba, The Capitalist Revolution in Eastern Europe (Aldershot. Edward Elgar. 1995). 
pp.99, 122. 
77.Blanchard et aI, The Transition.. Volumes I & 2, op.cit. 
78.Slay, op.cit., p.187. 
79.Frances Millard, The Anatomy of the New Poland (Aldershot. Edward Elgar. (994). 
80.RFEIRL Newsline Part 2, Prague, 3 February 1998. 
81.Janusz Lewandowski, Conference on Ownership Transfonllation and Restrllclllring Processes 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Warsaw, 11-12 April 1996. 
82.Janos Komai, 'Paying the Bill for Goulash Communism: Hungarian Development and Macro-
Stabilisation in a Political Economy Perspective'. Social Research, 63. 4. 1996. p.960. 
83.Jeffrey Sachs, 'What is to be Done?'. The Economist, 13 January 1990. 
84.Michael Bruno, 'Stabilisation and Refonn in Eastern Europe: A Preliminary Evaluation' .IMF 
Staff Papers, 39,4, 1992. 
85.Gomulka, op.cit., p.17. 
86.1nterview with Bielecki, London, 31 January 1997. 
87.Blaszczyk and D(}browski, op.cit., pp.18-20 .. 
88.D(}browski et aI, 'Polish State .. ', op.cit. p.405 . 
82.Stark, op.cit., pp.37 -41. 
90.D(}browski et aI, Stabilisation .. , op.cit., p.9 
91.Leszek BaIcerowicz, Commoll F a/lacies in the Debate 011 the Economic Trallsition in .C entral 




94.Levitas, op.cit., p.790. 
95.Roman Frydman et aI. Capitalism with a Comrade's Face (Budapest. Central European 
University, 1998), pp.24-25. 
252 
96.Murrell, op.cit. 
97.Blaszczyk and D'lbrowski, op.cit.. p.l O. 
98.Barbara Blaszczyk 'Privatisation in Poland: Accomplishments. Delay" ~lI1d Thin~" to Do' in 
Economic Scenarios .. , op.cit., p.47. 
99.Jeffrey Sachs, Understanding 'Shock Therapy' (London. Social \1arkct Foundation. 1994), 
p.2S. 
lOO.Csaba, op.cit., p.161. 
Appendix 
1 Phasing of Reform 
2 Selected Indicators January 1989-March 1990 
3 The Mazowiecki Cabinet 
4 Stabilisation in Poland 
5 Confidence in Institutions 
6 Survey on Government Policy 
7 Evaluation of the Balcerowicz Plan 
8 The Bielecki Cabinet 
9 Membership of Parliamentary Clubs 
10 State budget of Poland 1990-91 
11 The Privatisation process of State enterprises 
12 Survey on Privatisation 
13 Preferred form of ownership 
14 Country Survey I (Market Economy) 
15 Country Survey II (Country Direction) 
16 Country Survey III (Satifactlon with Democracy) 




Social safety net 
Institutional reforms 
Price and market reform 
Small scale 
privatisation and private 











small scale lending 
1 2 
Source Wortd Ban 
3 4 
Phasing of Reform 
5 6 7 8 9 10 
2 
Poland: Selected Indicators, January 1989-March1990 
Monthly Official 
change Monthly exchange 
Month in real rate of rate 
and wage inflation (Zlotys per 
year (percent) (percent) US Dollar) 
1989 
January -40.1 11 506 
February 18.2 7.9 526 
March 24.0 8.1 566 
April -12.0 9.8 631 
May -10.9 7.2 746 
N June 8.1 6.1 849 
V'I 
0' July -4.1 9.5 836 
August 45.2 39.5 988 
September -24.5 34.4 1340 
October -18.2 54.8 1970 
November 1.9 22.4 3077 
December 25.6 17.7 5235 
1990 
January -43.2 78.6 9500 
February -14.9 23.9 9500 
March 4.3 4.7 9500 





The Mazowiecki Cabinet 
(12 Sept. 1989-14 Dec.1 990) 
Incumbent 
Chairman of the Council Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
I 
of Ministers 
Deputy Chairman and Leszek Balcerowicz 
Minister of Finance 
roeputy Chairman and Czeslaw Janicki 
! Minister of Agriculture 
. Deputy Chairman and Jan Janowski 
Party Affiliation 
Independent. Solidarity 
I ndependent, Solidarity 
ZSL 
SO 
Deputy Chairman and Czeslaw Kiszczak* I PZPR 
Minister of Science ~ 
Minister of Interior + 
I Minister of Defence Florian Siwicki** -- - PZPR 
I 
Minister of Labour 
Minister of Industry 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 





- - + 
Independent, Solidarity 
Tadeusz Syryjczyk Independent. Solidarity 
Krysztof Skubiszewski Independent 
Jerzy Osiatynski Independent, Solidarity 
. Waldemar Kuczynski Tndependent. Sol ida rity 
(effective Sept. 1 990) I 
i Plenipotentiary for Ministry of Ownership Transformation: Krzysztof Lis 
*Replaced by K. Kozlowski 




Stabilisation in Poland:Planned Targets vs. Actual Results 
~-----------------------------------------,-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~--------














-11.6 +3.5 -7.6 
249.3 36 60.4 
6.1 11.8 
1123 2155 
l~~':::~:.,.;~~,. '~l!':~j~~;,\~,; ! 
-24.2 +5.0 -11.9 
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Source:Economic Transformation in Central Europe, Edition : R.Portes 
















































































































































Net confidence is the difference between those who think that the actMty 
of a particular institution serves the society well and is consistent with its Interests 
and those who think it does not and is not. 
Economic Reforms in N_ Democracies,Edition: L.ar- Pereit8lJ M MliraVIIllIA PrzeworsIo 
Cambridge University Press, 1993 
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6 
Re~ponses to the Question "Do You Think Government 
PolIcy Creates the Possibility of Exiting from the Economic Crisis?" 
Poland, 1990-91 . 
(Percent) 
Difficult Net 
Month and year Yes No to say approval* 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 
February 64 17 19 47 
May 58 21 21 37 
June 58 24 17 34 
July 51 30 19 21 
September 56 29 15 27 
October 48 31 21 17 
November 43 38 19 5 
1991 
January 43 11 45 32 
February 45 23 32 22 
March 48 27 25 21 
April 67 26 8 41 
May 47 39 14 8 
June 41 50 9 -9 
July 38 57 5 -19 
August 47 50 3 -3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 because people who did not answer were not 
included. The survey was conducted in March. April. August and December 1990 
* Calculated as the percentage answering yes minus the percentage answenng no 
Source. Voting for Reform, Edition: S Haggard/S Webb: The World Bank Washington D C 1994 
I 
~ -
7 Evaluation of the Balcerowicz Plan (1989-91) 
How do you define your sttItude .Responses _according to survey d~t~sLfT!,?ntfJ§lJ~~ 
V.90 VI.90 VI/.90 IX.90 X.90 XI.90 /.91 11.91 111.91 IV.91 V.91 VI.91: VI/.91 ; 
* *' 
towards the Salcerowlcz plan 1.90 111.90 IX. 89 
I am In favour of It 37.5 I 44.2: 35.7 32.7 37.1 26.1 34.8 
I 
I am not In favour of It 3.9! I 4.0: 11.2 23.9 22.5 24.3 20.9 
40.1 7.3 i 43.2 29.4 29.6 35.1 32.8 
i 
I know little about It 
13.5 10.7 14.4 11.4 Difficult to say 18.5 39.4: 9.1 , 
Net approval 34.4 40.2 24.5 8.8 146 1.8 13.9 
Note.' Poll results In months marked • have been rounded to nearest whole number 
Sourc.:CBOS, July 19f1O,Jun ... Augu.t 1991 
34.8 30.9 30.2 19.6 
19.2 23.6 28.9 32.0 
32.3 31.5 25.8 34.2 
13.3: 13.3 14.9 14.2 
15.6 7.3 1.3 -12 
31.1' 37.1 21.31 24.0 22.0 I 
26.9 25.3 38.2; 42.0 50.0 




I 1.51 8.1 3.0 . 1.0 
I 
! 
4.2 11.8 ;-17.0 :-18.0 1-28.0 I 
8 The Bielecki Cabinet 
(12 Jan. 1991-5 Dec.1991) 
,Ministry Incumbent· Party Affiliation 
,Chairman of the Council Jan Krzysztof Bielecki + KlD 
: of Ministers ~_~ 
i Deputy Chairman and Leszek Balcerowicz Independent 
I Minister of Finance 
Minister of Agriculture Adam Tanski Independent 
i -
,Minister of Ownership Janusz Lewandowski 
iTransformation -+ 
! Minister of Interior Henryk Majewski 
I Minister of Defence -t-piotr Kolodziejczyk 
I 
I 
,Minister of Labour Michal Boni 
:and Social Policy 








,Minister of Foreign ~ Krzysztof Skubiszewski 'Independent 
: Affairs ---+ 
Minister of Central Jerzy Eysymontt 
; 
i - -t-- ~ 
! PC 
I Planning +- .. 




Membership of Deputies in Parliamentary Clubs in Poland's Sejm, 1991 
December 31, 1990 February 15, 1991 ~~ _AJ,&u.st _ 1Jt91 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Club of Members of Total of Members of Total of Members* of total 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Christian Democrats 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.4 
Christian Social Union 8 1.7 8 1.7 8 1.7 
Citizens' Par1iamentary Club 155 33.7 111 24.2 106 23.0 
Club of Independent Deputies 10 2.2 9 2.0 9 2.0 
Club of Military Deputies 7 1.5 7 1.5 7 1.5 
Democratic Party 22 4.8 22 4.8 21 4.6 
Democratic Union 0 0.0 46 10.0 46 10.0 
Ecology Club 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 1.1 
Par1iamentary Club of Democratic Left 104 22.6 104 22.7 104 22.6 
N Par1iamentary Club of the Polish Soc. Dem.Union 41 8.9 40 8.7 0 0.0 
e; Par1iamentary Club of Workers 0 0.0 0 0.0 41 8.9 
Polish Peasant Party (led by Jan Zych) 73 15.9 73 15.9 72 15.7 
Polish Peasant Party (led by T adeusz KaszubskJ) 4 0.9 4 0.9 4 0.9 
Polish Sodal Catholic Union 4 0.9 4 0.9 5 1,1 
Solidarity of Wol1ters 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 1.3 
Union PAX 10 2.2 10 2.2 10 2.2 
Others not registered 21 4.6 21 4.6 20 4.3 
Total numbers of club members 395 100.0 459 100.0 466 100.0 
Total number of seats 460 100.0 459 100.0 460 100.0 
--------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------




State Budget of Po/and, 1990-91 
(Trillions of Zlotys, rounded to one decimal place) 
Income 
Period 1990 1991 
January 11.9 13.2 
January-February 24.7 30.6 
January-March 37.7 47.7 
January-April 55.1 64.3 
January-May 71.8 81.7 
January-June 87.3 95.6 
January-July 102.6 114.2 
January-August 117.2 130.2 
January-September 133.1 146.3 
January-October 151.9 166.6 
January-November 170.7 184.6 
January-December 196.2 210.6 
Source: Voting for Reform, Ed.: S.HaggardiS. Webb 






























The course of the privatisation process of state enterprises from 
1 August 1990 to 31 December 1991 
1- Grand 1990 1991 1991 Total (8-12) (1-6) (7-12) 
--+--
State enterprises qualified 
for privatisation 1258 130 375 753 
'of which 
capital privatisation 308 58 104 146 
including: 
for individual privatisation 244 58 104 82 
,of which: 
, 
i number of transformations 
completed 30 6 7 17 
I 
lifor mass privatisation 64 0 0 64 
. by liquidation 950 72 271 607 
I 
!including: 
! liquidated* 198 0 100 98 
'of which: 
ion basis of (art.19) law on 534 28 145 361 
: state enterprises 
including: 
i liquidated* 44 0 21 
23 
:on basis of (art.37)law on 
, 
privatisation of state 246 
enterprises 416 44 
126 
I 
including: 79 75 
liquidated* 154 0 
• -deleted from the register of state enterprises 
SOURCE: 
The Privatisation Process in Poland 1989-1992.8 Blaszczyk / M DabrowskI 




Evaluation of the importance of privatisation for the economy, (1990-92) 
Responses on survey dates (%) 
For the Polish economy 
privatisation will be 
advantageous 
September January TAPril August October May September ·_-t 1990 t 1991 1991 1991 1991 + 1992 1992 
. 44 47 42 26 32! 18 T 24 
just as advantageous 
as disadvantageous 
disadvantageous 
hard to say 
Source: 





30 26 27 34 28 
9 27 30 30 26 








Preferred form of ownership of the enterprise in which respondents presently work (%) 
Do you think the enterprise you presently work 1991 1992 1993 1994 1994-1991 
for should be : 
1. A state enterprise --+---27 51 59 I 50 .... -.·_1 
2. The property of Polish or foreign private capital 23 14 10 11 -I:: 
3. The property of all employees, with each of them 23 25 21 25 +2 
owning an identical number of shares 
,4. The property of those employees 7 5 8 10 +3 
. who buy it's stock 
. 5. Something else X 1 2 
.6. Hard to say 20 1 4 2 -18 
Source: J. Gardawskr 'Poland's Industnal Workers on the Return to Democracy and the Market Economy' 
Warsaw, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1996 
Preferred form of ownership of possible new place of work(%) 
Please imagine you are free to choose a place of 1991 1992 1993 1994 1994-1991 
work: Would you choose 
I 
I 
1. Staying with the present enterprise 51 61 t- 60 56 +4 
2. Working for another state-owned enterprise 4 6 5 6 +2 
3.Working for a privately owned firm 25 9 6 7 -18 
4. Working in an enterprise owned by it's x 4 3 4 
employees 
5. Working for myself 17 19 25 26 +9 
I 
6. Hard to say 1 3 1 -2 
Source J. Gardawski 'Poland's Industrial Workers on the Return to Democracy and the Market Economy 
Warsaw, Friedrich Ebert Foundation. 1996 
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Poland - Economic Statistics 1992-94 
Years 1992 1993 
1994 
% % % 
GOP @ constant prices 2.6 
3.8 5.0 
Industrial Production 3.9 
5.6 13.0 
Consumer Prices (end-yr) 44.4 
37 .6 29 .5 
% of GOP % of GOP % of GOP 
I-.J 
....... ...... 
State budget balance -6 9 
-3 .4 -3.0 
% % % 
Unemployment (% of labour force)" 13.6 
157 16 0 
Private Sector share of GOP 48.2 
535 560 
End -year 
Transition report 1995; ERBD 
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